`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
`
`Case No. 5:16-cv-00179-RWS
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`§§§§§§§§§§§
`
`MAXELL LTD.,
`
`ZTE (USA) INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFF MAXELL, LTD.’S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND
`RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 2 of 59 PageID #: 16719
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW............................ 1
`A.
`Legal Standards...................................................................................................... 1
`B.
`Background............................................................................................................ 2
`1.
`The law of patent eligibility ....................................................................... 2
`2.
`Procedural History .................................................................................... 3
`The Court Should Enter Judgment As A Matter Of Law Against ZTE On
`Counterclaim IV (eligibility of the ’317 patent).................................................... 4
`1.
`The claims of the ’317 patent are not directed to an abstract idea. .......... 4
`2.
`ZTE has failed to prove that the claims recite no inventive concept. ........ 7
`The Court Should Enter Judgment As A Matter Of Law Against ZTE On
`Counterclaim XII (eligibility of the ’794 patent)................................................... 9
`1.
`The Claims Are Not Directed To An Abstract Idea. .................................. 9
`2.
`ZTE has not proven that the claims recite no inventive concept. ............ 10
`REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.................................................................... 12
`REQUEST FOR ENHANCED DAMAGES................................................................... 12
`A.
`Legal Standards.................................................................................................... 13
`B.
`Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury’s Verdict Of Willful
`Infringement......................................................................................................... 15
`Enhanced Damages Are Appropriate Based On The Read Factors..................... 21
`Factor 1: Whether ZTE copied the ideas of another. .......................................... 21
`Factor 2: ZTE’s good faith investigation of the merits of the case. .................... 21
`Factor 3: ZTE’s litigation behavior..................................................................... 23
`Factor 4: ZTE’s size and financial condition. ..................................................... 27
`Factor 5: The closeness of the case. .................................................................... 28
`Factor 6: The duration of ZTE’s misconduct. ..................................................... 30
`Factor 7: ZTE’s lack of remedial action.............................................................. 31
`Factor 8: ZTE’s motivation for harm. ................................................................. 32
`Factor 9: ZTE’s attempts to conceal its conduct................................................. 33
`Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 35
`REQUEST FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES .................................................... 36
`A.
`Legal Standard ..................................................................................................... 36
`
`C.
`
`i
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 3 of 59 PageID #: 16720
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
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`Page
`
`ZTE’s Litigation Misconduct Warrants Attorney’s Fees..................................... 38
`B.
`ZTE’s Weak Litigating Position Also Warrants Fees.......................................... 48
`C.
`MOTION FOR PRE- AND POST- JUDGMENT INTEREST AND COSTS................ 48
`A.
`Pre-Judgment Interest .......................................................................................... 48
`B.
`Post-Judgment Interest......................................................................................... 49
`C.
`Costs..................................................................................................................... 49
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 49
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`ii
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`
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 4 of 59 PageID #: 16721
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp.,
`671 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1987)......................................................................................18, 19
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)...................................................................................................2, 3, 5, 6
`
`Am. Patriot Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Mut. Risk Mgmt., Ltd.,
`364 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................44
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc.,
`876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................36
`
`Avia Grp. Intern., Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,
`853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988)................................................................................................27
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................................................................................2, 3, 8, 11
`
`Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1274, 2016 WL 4778699 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016)..........................................18
`
`Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`No. SACV 05-467-JVS, 2007 WL 2326838 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2007),
`vacated on other grounds, 2007 WL 8030058 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007)..............................30
`
`CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty,
`717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) ..................................................3
`
`Creative Internet Advert. Corp. v. Yahoo Inc.,
`689 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Tex. 2010)...............................................................................28, 35
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.,
`No. 6:11-cv-00201, 2018 WL 1156284 (E.D. Tex., Mar. 5, 2018)...................................23, 35
`
`Elbit Sys. Land and C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys. LLC,
`No. 2:15-cv-37, Dkt. 550 (E.D. Tex., Apr. 23, 2018)............................................37, 39, 43, 48
`
`iii
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 5 of 59 PageID #: 16722
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................5, 6, 10
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.,
`2016 WL 3880774 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016), aff’d in part rev’d in part on
`separate grounds, 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................14
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................9
`
`General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.,
`461 U.S. 648 (1983).................................................................................................................48
`
`Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P.,
`867 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..........................................................................................14, 35
`
`Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland LP,
`Cause No. 6:13-cv-366, 2016 WL 3346084 (E.D. Tex. June 16, 2016)
`(Schroeder, J.) ....................................................................................................................14, 35
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).................................................................................................13, 15, 16
`
`Hoffman v. Blaski,
`363 U.S. 335 (1960).................................................................................................................44
`
`Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`203 F.Supp.3d 755 (E.D. Tex. 2016)...........................................................................23, 30, 35
`
`Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc.,
`667 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................13
`
`Integra LifeSciences Corp. v. HyperBranch Med. Tech., Inc.,
`Civ. Action No. 15-819-LPS-CJB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124152 (D. Del.
`Aug. 12, 2016) ...................................................................................................................19, 20
`
`Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
`790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................2
`
`Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Silergy Corp.,
`127 F.Supp.3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .....................................................................................17
`
`Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).......................................................................................................36, 37
`
`iv
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`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 6 of 59 PageID #: 16723
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc.,
`782 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)....................................................................................37, 42, 47
`
`Polara Eng’g Inc v. Campbell Co.,
`894 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................14, 15
`
`Read Corp. v. Portec Inc.,
`970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).......................................................................................... passim
`
`S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
`781 F.2d 198 (Fed. Cir. 1986)............................................................................................37, 39
`
`Shum v. Intel Corp.,
`629 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................49
`
`SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. CIV. 10-389-LPS, 2012 WL 3061027 (D. Del. July 26, 2012)........................................19
`
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc.,
`127 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..........................................................................................15, 28
`
`State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc.,
`948 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................14
`
`Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.,
`716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983)................................................................................................16
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:10-cv-417, 2017 WL 9565675 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (Schroeder,
`J.)...................................................................................................................................... passim
`
`WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
`829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................15
`
`WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
`837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) overruled on other grounds by 138 S. Ct. 2129
`(2018).......................................................................................................................................13
`
`ZitoVault, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`No. 3:16-CV-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971131 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018)...................................17
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1920............................................................................................................................49
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`v
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 7 of 59 PageID #: 16724
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page(s)
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`28 U.S.C. § 1923............................................................................................................................49
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`28 U.S.C. § 1961......................................................................................................................12, 49
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`35 U.S.C. § 101........................................................................................................................1, 3, 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284............................................................................................................12, 13, 48, 49
`
`35 U.S.C. § 285..............................................................................................................................36
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`Other Authorities
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)..................................................................................................................10
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) ........................................................................................................................1
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) ....................................................................................................................1, 4
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) note (1991).....................................................................................................1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) ......................................................................................................................49
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 408 ...........................................................................................................................25
`
`Local Rule CV-54(b) .....................................................................................................................49
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`vi
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 8 of 59 PageID #: 16725
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`Pursuant to the Post-Trial Briefing Schedule (Dkt. No. 283), Plaintiff Maxell, Ltd.,
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`(“Maxell”) respectfully moves the Court for judgment as a matter of law, entry of judgment, and
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`for enhanced damages, attorneys’ fees, pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs.
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`Maxell’s requests for post-judgment interest and costs are unopposed.
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`I. RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
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`Pursuant to Rule 50(b), Maxell respectfully renews its motion for a Judgment as a Matter
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`of Law on Defendants’ Counterclaims IV and XII, wherein ZTE alleges that the ’317 and ’794
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`patents respectively are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Maxell is entitled to judgment of no
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`invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for both patents because (1) both are directed to patent eligible
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`subject matter, and (2) ZTE has failed to prove that any of the claims recite no inventive concept.
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`A.
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`Legal Standards
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides that “[i]f a party has been fully heard on
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`an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally
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`sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue
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`against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a
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`claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a
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`favorable finding on that issue.” Rule 50(b) provides that “[i]f the court does not grant a motion
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`for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a) … the movant may file a renewed motion
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`for judgment as a matter of law” after the jury returns its verdict. In ruling on the 50(b) motion,
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`“the court should disregard any jury determination for which there is no legally sufficient
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`evidentiary basis enabling a reasonable jury to make it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) note (1991).
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`1
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 9 of 59 PageID #: 16726
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`B.
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`Background
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`1.
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`The law of patent eligibility
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`The Supreme Court has prescribed a two-step framework for determining whether a
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`claim is invalid for claiming an abstract idea. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct.
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`2347, 2355 (2014). The first step requires considering the claim “in [its] entirety to ascertain
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`whether [its] character as a whole is directed to” an abstract idea. Internet Patents Corp. v. Active
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`Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At the second step of the inquiry, a claim
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`“directed to” an abstract idea may nevertheless be eligible if it recites an “inventive concept.”
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`Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
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`One way in which “[t]he second step of the Alice test is satisfied [is] when the claim
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`limitations involve more than performance of well-understood, routine, and conventional
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`activities previously known to the industry.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018) (internal punctuation omitted). “The question of whether a claim element or
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`combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the
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`relevant field is a question of fact.” Id. at 1369. Two aspects of this inquiry are particularly
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`notable. First, the question trains on “[w]hether something is well-understood, routine, and
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`conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, there must
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`be evidence not just from a skilled artisan, but one who can testify about what was “well-
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`understood, routine, and conventional” at the historical time of the patent. Id. Second, “[w]hether
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`a particular technology is well-understood, routine, and conventional goes beyond what was
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`simply known in the prior art.” Id. For this reason, evidence that some element “is disclosed in a
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`piece of prior art … does not mean it was well-understood, routine, and conventional.” Id.
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`2
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 10 of 59 PageID #: 16727
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`Because a patent is presumed valid, “[a]ny fact, such as this one, that is pertinent to the
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`invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.; see also CLS Bank
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`Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (plurality opinion)), aff’d 134 S.
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`Ct. 2347 (2014) (“that presumption [of validity] applies when § 101 is raised as a basis for
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`invalidity in district court proceedings”). Accordingly, ZTE carries the burden of proving that the
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`claimed elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional at the time of invention.
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`2.
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`Procedural History
`
`In Counterclaims IV and XII, ZTE alleges that the ’317 and ’794 patents respectively are
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`invalid for, among other reasons, claiming ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dkt.
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`12 (ZTE Ans.) at 17, 22.
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`Before trial, ZTE moved for summary judgment on those counterclaims, on the basis of
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`ineligible subject matter. Dkt. 196. The Court denied ZTE’s motion because, “[e]ven accepting
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`ZTE’s suggestion that the patents are both directed to abstract ideas and accepting ZTE’s
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`formulation of the abstract ideas for either patent as correct, there is a genuine dispute of material
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`fact as to whether either patent contains an inventive concept,” including whether “the specific
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`combination of limitations do not perform only routine or well understood activities.” Dkt. 181 at
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`9-10. Indeed, the Court observed that both parties’ experts had actually opined that certain
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`claimed elements were not routine and conventional. Id. at 10.
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`After ZTE had been fully heard at trial, Maxell moved under Rule 50(a) for judgment as
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`a matter of law on Counterclaims IV and XII. Dkt 247, Trial Tr., June 29, 2018, Morning
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`Session at 6:15-8:5. Maxell argued that ZTE had failed to produce any evidence (let alone clear
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`and convincing evidence) from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the asserted claims
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`recite only elements that were routine and conventional at the time of the patents. Id. And
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`3
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 11 of 59 PageID #: 16728
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`because ZTE could not prevail at step two of the controlling legal framework without a favorable
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`finding on that issue, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate under Rule 50(a).
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`The Court denied Maxell’s 50(a) motion and submitted the factual issue of
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`conventionality to the jury. Dkt. 247, Trial Tr., June 29, 2018, Morning Session at 23:20-24:1.
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`The jury found that ZTE had produced clear and convincing evidence showing that their
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`elements were routine and conventional at the time of invention. Dkt. 228 at 7-8.
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`Under Rule 50(b), Maxell now renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law on
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`Counterclaims IV and XII. Because the jury has returned a verdict of no invalidity for the claims
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`of the ’317 Patent, and the claims of the ’794 Patent were not challenged by ZTE on any other
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`ground, the motion is directed to the remaining issue of patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. §
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`101.
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`C.
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`The Court Should Enter Judgment As A Matter Of Law Against ZTE On
`Counterclaim IV (eligibility of the ’317 patent).
`
`The Court should enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of Maxell on ZTE’s
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`counterclaim IV for two independent reasons: (1) under step one of the Alice inquiry, the claims
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`are not directed to an abstract idea, and (2) under step two of the Alice inquiry, no reasonable
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`jury could have found clear and convincing evidence in the trial record that the claimed
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`combination of components was routine and conventional at the time of invention, and ZTE
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`cannot prevail at step two of the controlling legal framework without that finding.
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`1.
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`The claims of the ’317 patent are not directed to an abstract idea.
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`Judgment that the claims of the ’317 patent are not ineligible is appropriate because,
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`under step one of Alice, the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. Rather they are directed to
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`a mobile device, comprising a particular combination of components, that together constitute a
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`“concrete improvements in the recited … technology,” such as “a specific improvement to the
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`4
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 12 of 59 PageID #: 16729
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`way [mobile devices] operate.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334, 1336
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355-60; DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
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`773 F.3d 1245, 1257-59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`The inventors of the ’317 Patent set out “to provide a portable terminal with the function
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`of walking navigation, which can supply location information easier for the user to understand
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`during walking with use of a narrow screen of a portable telephone.” ’317 Patent at 2:47-52.
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`At the time, existing mapping applications had many shortcomings that made them
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`suboptimal for use on a mobile device. For example, such applications were frequently
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`“optimized on the assumption that the maps can be displayed at a resolution … of personal
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`computers” rather than on the small screens of the day’s mobile devices. Id. at 1:44-50; see also
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`id. at 1:17-22. Thus, the mapping applications were “not always easy for walkers to understand”
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`on small screens. Id. at 2:2-13. For instance, some provided directions in a format that was “too
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`wide to obtain detailed information” on small screens or that required scrolling through and
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`reloading a “plurality of pages.” Id.
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`The limited hardware of the day’s mobile devices also presented hurdles. For example,
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`the inventors noted that “character information is often supplied as contents” on these smaller
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`screens, but “when the user wants to know such a spatial position as a place and a route,” text-
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`based displays would not work well. Id. at 2:22-28. Moreover, there was an input problem: the
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`portable devices were “just provided with some button keys including dialing buttons used as
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`input devices, so they will not able to cope with inputs of complicated retrieving conditions”
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`associated with mapping applications. Id. at 2:28-32.
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`The inventors’ idea was to enable new kinds of user interfaces by equipping a mobile
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`device with a device for getting its location as well as its orientation. Id. at 2:58-67. This new
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`5
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 13 of 59 PageID #: 16730
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`combination of hardware “ma[de] it possible to match a direction in an actual space with the
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`displayed direction on the screen,” and thus enabled new kinds of user interactions that were
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`more usable on small devices. Id. at 3:14-22.
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`The newly enabled user interfaces alleviated both the display-related and input-related
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`difficulties. “For example,” with the new hardware combination “it is possible to compress
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`information so as to display a direction of movement from the present place simply with an
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`arrow,” and “[c]onsequently, location information can be displayed on a small-size display
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`screen of a portable telephone … so that the user can understand the displayed information easily
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`while the information is compressed.” Id. The newly enabled interfaces could also alleviate the
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`input-related difficulties. For example, “the user can save labor to enter retrieving conditions,”
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`by “specify[ing] a desired direction … [by] turning the tip of the portable terminal directly in the
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`direction instead of entering such direction information.” Id. 3:4-11
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`Thus, the claimed invention provides specific improvements over existing technology by
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`making it “possible to realize a user-friendly interface that enables the user to understand
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`displayed items intuitively.” Id. at 3:12-14. Such an invention is patent eligible under step one of
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`Alice. It is not directed to an abstract idea, but rather “concrete improvements in the recited …
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`technology,” and provides “a specific improvement to the way [mobile devices] operate.”
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`Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334, 1336; see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355-60; DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257-59.
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`The claims are therefore eligible under step one.
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`That conclusion alone compels entry of judgment in favor of Maxell on ZTE’s claim
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`relating to Section 101. Because ZTE’s claim fails as a matter of law, no finding of fact is
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`relevant to the determination of whether the ’317 Patent claims eligible subject matter.
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`6
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 287 Filed 08/07/18 Page 14 of 59 PageID #: 16731
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`2.
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`ZTE has failed to prove that the claims recite no inventive concept.
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`Even if the Court were to find that the claims of the ’317 Patent are directed to abstract
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`ideas, it should still enter judgment for Maxell under step two because ZTE failed to provide any
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`evidence to support its claims, much less a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which a
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`reasonable jury could have concluded that the claims recite only routine and conventional
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`elements. Because that factual finding is necessary to maintain ZTE’s counterclaim of
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`ineligibility, judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is additionally appropriate on this
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`independent ground.
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`ZTE presented no evidence to support its contention that the ’317 Patent “fail[s] to claim
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`patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Dkt. 209 (Pre-Trial Order) at 10. During
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`trial, ZTE offered no opinions regarding any conventional nature of the claim elements, and did
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`not dispute the contrary opinion of Dr. Braasch that the ’317 Patent “specifically distinguish[ed]
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`itself from existing or underdeveloped car navigation systems.” Dkt. 246, Trial Tr., June 28,
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`2018, Afternoon Session at 49:13-15. Moreover, Dr. Braasch testified that at least the orientation
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`device that forms a claim element of the ’317 Patent is “a very different thing” from prior
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`orientation devices. Id. at 44:9-45:2; see also Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1360 (courts should weigh
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`motions for judgment as a matter of law in view of “any rebuttal evidence presented by the
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`patentee”).
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`ZTE’s technical expert for the ’317 Patent, Mr. Scott Andrews, presented no opinions on
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 at trial, let alone opinions that the claim elements were well-understood, routine,
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`and conventional. Moreover, Mr. Andrews’s expert report similarly omitted any such opinions.
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`The only exhibits Mr. Andrews presented to the jury related either to the accused ZMax 2 phone
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`and its testing, the Alumbaugh reference, or negotiation documents between the parties.
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`Tellingly, the terms “well-understood,” “routine,” and “conventional” were not used at any point
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`during the questioning of Dr. Andrews—not by him or by the attorneys who questioned him.
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`Dkt. 242, Trial Tr., June 26, 2018, Afternoon Session at 21:13 through Dkt. 261, Trial Tr., June
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`27, 2018, Sealed Portion 23 at 46:24.
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`The deficiency of this evidence is twofold. First, the evidence provides no insight into
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`what a skilled artisan would have recognized as “well-understood, routine, and conventional,” as
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`opposed to “simply known in the prior art.” See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. “Whether a
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`particular technology is well-understood, routine, and conventional goes beyond what was
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`simply known in the prior art.” Id. Second, the evidence fails to show that the skilled artisan
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`would have known this at the time of invention. Id.
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`Failure on either point is fatal to ZTE’s claim; here, ZTE failed on both. There was thus
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`an insufficient factual record—indeed, there was no factual record—on which a jury could base a
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`conclusion that, by clear and convincing evidence, ZTE had proven that an ordinary artisan
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`would have considered the claim elements to have been well-understood, routine, and
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`conventional at the time of invention.
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`Because ZTE failed to introduce any evidence on this issue, Maxell objected to
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`submitting the factual question of conventionality to the jury and to instructing the jury on
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`ineligibility. See Dkt. 246, Trial Tr., June 28, 2018, Afternoon Session at 100:6-13; see also Ex.
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`1 (proposed jury instructions, submitted June 29, 2018).
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`For this reason, the Court should alternatively grant Maxell judgment as a matter of law
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`regarding ZTE’s Counterclaim IV for invalidity of the ’317 Patent on the basis of the second step
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`of Alice.
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`D.
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`The Court Should Enter Judgment As A Matter Of Law Against ZTE On
`Counterclaim XII (eligibility of the ’794 patent).
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`The Court should also enter judgment as a matter of law for Maxell as to ZTE’s
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`Counterclaim XII for two, independent reasons. First, under step one of the Alice inquiry, the
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`claims of the ’794 Patent are not directed to an abstract idea. Second, under step two of the Alice
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`inquiry, no reasonable jury could have found clear and convincing evidence in the trial record
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`that the claimed combination of components was routine and conventional at the time of
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`invention, and ZTE cannot prevail at step two of the controlling legal framework without that
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`finding.
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`1.
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`The Claims Are Not Directed To An Abstract Idea.
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`The ’794 Patent satisfies the requirements for Alice at step one because it provides an
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`improvement to a computer system allowing it to “do things it could not do before.” Finjan, Inc.
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`v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Specifically, the ’794 Patent
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`provides an invention that allows a device to “stop[] unimportant features in an information
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`processing device like a smartphone based on battery level.” Dkt. 239, Trial Tr., June 25, 2018,
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`Morning Session at 46:3-5. The ’794 Patent teaches and claims assigning at least two priority
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`rankings to those function devices, correlating each priority ranking to a threshold remaining
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`battery level, and sending power consumption reduction instructions to all function devices
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`based on a priority rank when the battery level decreases below the correlated threshold. Id. at
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`47:16-19; see also ’794 Patent at cl. 1. Because digital components “don’t like to have the cord
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`yanked and just be powered down in an unceremonious way,” the ’794 Patent teaches that its
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`power saving objectives can be achieved through the use of “instructions” to the components.
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`Dkt. 239, Trial Tr., June 25, 2018, Morning Session at 49:7-19. This is an invention that allows a
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`device to operate in a more effici