throbber
Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-11 Filed 06/16/23 Page 1 of 58 PageID #:
`2847
`
`EXHIBIT D7
`
`

`

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`
`2848
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`

































`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
`LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
`LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`WAZE MOBILE LIMITED,
`Defendant.
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
`LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. LTD.
`and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00361-JRG
`(LEAD CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00359-JRG
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00362-JRG
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 The Court granted in part Defendants’ unopposed motion for leave for increased page limits for
`Markman briefing and permitted up to 50 pages for Defendants’ brief. Dkt. 113.
`
`

`

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`
`2849
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8,213,970 ( “’970 PATENT”) ........................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`“selected response” (Claim 10) .............................................................................. 2
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`A “selected response” Is A “response message” ....................................... 2
`
`A “selected response” Is Selected By The “recipient” .............................. 5
`
`“the response list” (Claim 1) .................................................................................. 6
`
`“a response list” (Claim 2) ..................................................................................... 8
`
`“recipient PDA / cell phone” (Claims 1, 2, 10) and “sender PDA / cell
`phone” (Claims 1, 2, 10, 13) ................................................................................ 10
`
`Claim 10 preamble (“A method of receiving, acknowledging and
`responding to a forced message alert from a sender PDA/cell phone to a
`recipient PDA/cell phone, wherein the receipt, acknowledgment, and
`response to said forced message alert is forced by a forced message alert
`software application program, said method comprising the steps of:”)............... 14
`
`“a data transmission means that facilitates the transmission of electronic
`files between said PDA/cell phones in different locations” (Claim 1) ................ 16
`
`“means for attaching a forced message alert software packet to a voice or
`text message creating a forced message alert that is transmitted by said
`sender PDA/cell phone to the recipient PDA/cell phone, said forced
`message alert software packet containing a list of possible required
`responses and requiring the forced message alert software on said recipient
`PDA/cell phone to transmit an automatic acknowledgment to the sender
`PDA/cell phone as soon as said forced message alert is received by the
`recipient PDA/cell phone” (Claim 1) ................................................................... 18
`
`“means for requiring a required manual response from the response list by
`the recipient in order to clear recipient's response list from recipient’s cell
`phone display” (Claim 1) ..................................................................................... 22
`
`“means for receiving and displaying a listing of which recipient PDA/cell
`phones have automatically acknowledged the forced message alert and
`which recipient PDA/cell phones have not automatically acknowledged
`the forced message alert” and “means for receiving and displaying a
`listing of which recipient PDA/cell phones have transmitted a manual
`response to said forced message alert and details the response from each
`recipient PDA/cell phone that responded” (Claim 1) .......................................... 24
`
`J.
`
`“means for periodically resending said forced message alert to said
`recipient PDA/cell phones that have not automatically acknowledged the
`forced message alert” (Claim 1) .......................................................................... 27
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`

`

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`
`2850
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`
`
`K.
`
`Claim 2 Means-Plus-Function Terms .................................................................. 29
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Forced Message Alert Software On The Recipient PDA/Cell
`Phone Performs Each Limitation’s Function ........................................... 32
`
`Google’s Constructions Identify the Correct Algorithms, While
`AGIS’s Algorithms Are Imprecise and Over-Inclusive ........................... 35
`
`III.
`
`U.S. PATENT NOS. 9,408,055 (“’055 PATENT”), 9,445,251 (“’251 PATENT”),
`9,467,838 (“’838 PATENT”), 9,749,829 (“’829 PATENT”), AND 9,820,123
`(“’123 PATENT”) ............................................................................................................ 38
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`“spatial coordinates” (Claims 1, 14, 19, and 24 of the ’251 Patent; Claims
`1, 22, 23, and 54 of the ’838 Patent; Claims 1, 34, and 35 of the ’829
`Patent; Claims 1, 14, 18, 23, 36, 41, and 48 of the ’123 Patent) ......................... 38
`
`“Short Message Service (SMS) messages” (Claims 1, 28, 31, 41 of ’055
`Patent) .................................................................................................................. 41
`
`“facilitating initiation of Internet Protocol (IP) based communication
`between the first device and the respective second devices” (Claims 1, 28,
`41 of the ’055 Patent) ........................................................................................... 44
`
`“receiving a message from a second device” (Claims 1 and 24 of the ’251
`Patent) .................................................................................................................. 47
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 49
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`

`

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`
`2851
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`Cases
`
`3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,
`350 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A,
`657 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................ 13
`
`Arterbury v. Odessa Separator, Inc.,
`No. 5:16-CV-00183-RWS-RSP, 2018 WL 4027026 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2018) .............. 21, 26
`
`Asyst Techs, Inc. v. Empak, Inc.,
`268 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .............................................................................. 20, 23, 29, 34
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 15
`
`Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering–Plough Corp.,
`320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 43
`
`Burns, Morris & Stewart Ltd. P’ship v. Masonite Int’l Corp.,
`401 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ...................................................................................... 42
`
`C.W. Zumbiel Co. v. Kappos,
`702 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 15
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................ 14, 15
`
`Chief Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-1112-JRG, 2015 WL 8073722 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015) ................................... 17
`
`E2E Processing v. Cabela's,
`No. 2:14-cv-36, 2015 WL 4051423 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2015) ............................................. 42, 43
`
`Halliburton Energy Serv., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Image Processing Technologies, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
`No. 2:16-cv-505, 2017 WL 2672616 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2017) ............................................... 7
`
`In re Fought,
`941 F.3d 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................ 15
`
`
`
`
`
`-iii-
`
`
`
`

`

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`2852
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`
`Innovative Display Techs. LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co.,
`No. 2:14-CV-201-JRG, 2015 WL 2090651 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2015) ............................. 8, 9, 10
`
`Konami Corp. v. Roxor Games, Inc.,
`445 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ...................................................................................... 16
`
`Maurice Mitchell Innovations, LP v. Intel Corp.,
`No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 21, 2006) .............................................. 1
`
`North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.,
`415 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................ 49
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 23, 40, 41, 43
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 8
`
`TPQ Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc.,
`No. 2:12-cv-180, 2014 WL 2810016 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) ......................................... 2, 42
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................. 41
`
`Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Acer, Inc.,
`712 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Tex. 2010) ...................................................................................... 21
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-iv-
`
`
`
`

`

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`2853
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS AND ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`Abbreviation
`FWD
`
`’970 FH, Sept. 9,
`2011 Amendment
`’970 FH, Dec. 17,
`2010 Amendment
`Inst.
`
`Merriam-Webster
`
`Collins
`
`Document Description
`Excerpts of the Final Written Decision in Google LLC v. AGIS
`Software Development, LLC, IPR2018-01079
`Excerpts of the ’970 Patent’s File History, Applicant’s
`Response and Amendment (Sep. 9, 2011)
`Excerpts of the ’970 Patent’s File History, Applicant’s
`Response and Amendment (Dec. 17, 2010)
`Excerpts of the Institution Decision in Google LLC v. AGIS
`Software Development, LLC, IPR2018-01079
`Merriam-Webster, Collegiate Dictionary 275, 1196 (11th ed.
`2005)
`HarperCollins Publishers, Collins English Dictionary 371, 1546
`(7th ed. 2005)
`Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, The American Heritage Desk
`Dictionary and Thesaurus 168, 698 (2005)
`Frank Hargrave, Hargrave’s Communications Dictionary 467
`(2001)
`Brad Hansen, The Dictionary of Multimedia 380 (4th ed. 2005) Hansen
`Excerpts of 3G TS 23.040 Technical Specification, Technical
`SMS Tech. Spec.
`Realization of the Short Message Service (SMS) (1999)
`Email from Counsel for AGIS Agreeing Not to Brief “receiving
`a message . . .” (July 31, 2020)
`Excerpts of the ’251 Patent’s File History, Examiner’s
`Rejection (Aug. 13, 2015)
`U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2004/0148090 (“Melen”)
`Excerpts of the ’251 Patent’s File History, Applicant’s
`Response and Amendment (Nov. 13, 2015)
`Excerpts of the ’251 Patent’s File History, Final Rejection
`(Dec. 10, 2015)
`
`American Heritage
`
`Hargrave
`
`AGIS Agreement
`
`’251 FH, Aug. 13,
`2015 Rejection
`Melen
`’251 FH, Nov. 13,
`2015 Amendment
`’251 FH, Dec. 10,
`2015 Rejection
`
`
`
`Ex
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`14
`
`15
`
`
`
`-v-
`
`

`

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`2854
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`AGIS’s proposals and opening brief arguments dodge the parties’ core disputes and the
`
`intrinsic record. For nearly every limitation that is not a means-plus-function limitation governed
`
`by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, AGIS proposes plain and ordinary meaning. But AGIS’s ordinary
`
`meaning proposals either do nothing to resolve significant between the parties or the ambiguities
`
`in the claim language, such as no antecedent basis, or ignore that many of the terms are coined by
`
`the Asserted Patents and have no ordinary meaning. For means-plus-function limitations, AGIS
`
`asserts that its proposals are “consistent” with those adopted by the PTAB in IPR proceedings.
`
`AGIS’s assertion, however, is belied by the fact that the PTAB rejected the very proposals AGIS
`
`now advances. AGIS’s desire to be “consistent” with the PTAB also raises the question of why
`
`the PTAB’s constructions should not simply be adopted wholesale―as Defendants propose.
`
`AGIS also repeatedly defends its proposals as following constructions issued by Judge
`
`Gilstrap in AGIS Software Dev., LLC v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-513-JRG (E.D.
`
`Tex.) (“Huawei”), and AGIS cites two cases to contend that this Court should simply defer to those
`
`prior constructions. Dkt. 116 (“AGIS Br.”) at 2; Dkt. 116-9 (Markman Order in Huawei). But in
`
`the first case, Maurice Mitchell Innovations, LP v. Intel Corp., the court emphasized that it must
`
`“render its own independent claim construction,” and it ultimately chose to “depart somewhat from
`
`[the prior] construction.” No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779, at *4, 7 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 21, 2006).
`
`In the second case, TPQ Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc., the court went further, finding that no
`
`deference was entitled to a prior construction because: (1) “defendants . . . requested a claim
`
`construction different from any that has been adopted by a court in any of the previous cases”; (2)
`
`“the construction given to the claim language in question has varied in . . . other cases”; and (3)
`
`“Federal Circuit has made clear that a district court may adopt an ‘evolving’ or ‘rolling’ claim
`
`construction, in which the court’s construction of claims evolves as the court better understands
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

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`2855
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`
`
`the technology and the patents at issue.” No. 2:12-cv-180, 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
`
`June 20, 2014). TPQ applies here. The Defendants here were not parties to Huawei and are
`
`proposing different constructions from the defendants in that case. And the PTAB issued its
`
`constructions after carefully considering several of Judge Gilstrap’s constructions and explaining
`
`in detail why it was declining to follow them. See Ex. 1 at 12-29. Accordingly, the Court should
`
`not blindly defer to Huawei constructions as AGIS proposes, and instead should conduct an
`
`independent analysis in light of Defendants’ new proposals and the PTAB’s additional analysis.
`
`II.
`
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8,213,970 ( “’970 PATENT”)
`
`A.
`
`“selected response” (Claim 10)
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`There are two disputed issues regarding the construction of “selected response”: (1)
`
`Google’s Proposal
`“recipient selected response message”
`
`whether the response is a “message,” and (2) whether the response is selected by a recipient.
`
`Both issues have already been argued and decided in favor of Google’s construction. In Huawei,
`
`Judge Gilstrap construed the closely related term “manual response” in Claim 1 as a “recipient
`
`selectable response message.” Dkt. 116-9 at 39-42. The term “selected response” should be
`
`construed in the same vein.
`
`1.
`
`A “selected response” Is A “response message”
`
`The claimed “selected response” is a response message, not a mere indicator of whether a
`
`response message exists or was sent as AGIS argues. As Judge Gilstrap found in Huawei, when
`
`a response is selected, “the content of the response must be sent, not merely an indication of
`
`whether or not a response has been selected.” Dkt. 116-9 at 41 (emphasis in original). “To
`
`whatever extent Plaintiff is interpreting the disputed term otherwise, the Court hereby expressly
`
`rejects Plaintiff’s interpretation.” Id. As detailed below, the intrinsic record demonstrates that
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

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`2856
`
`
`
`the “selected response” is an actual content-bearing message. Conversely, there is no support for
`
`AGIS’s position that a selected “response” is just any selected “option” on a device.
`
`The claim language itself describes the selected response as a message. First, the claimed
`
`“selected response” is a response to an initial, received message. Specifically, the forced
`
`message alert software application program shows or audibly plays a message. See ’970 at
`
`Claim 10. In other words, the initial message received has content. A “response” to such a voice
`
`or text message would be a message in return. Claim 10 is explicit about this, as the “selected
`
`required response” is one selected from a “message required response list”:
`
`transmitting a selected required response from the response list in order to allow
`the message required response list to be cleared from the recipient's cell phone
`display . . .. ’970 at Claim 10.
`
`
`
`That selected response message is then actually displayed to the sender, which only makes
`
`sense if the response has content:
`
`displaying the response received from the PDA cell phone that transmitted the
`response on the sender of the forced alert PDA/cell phone (Id.)
`
`
`
`The specification likewise describes the selected response messages as bearing content
`
`like “will comply”: “A military default response list would typically consist of choices such as,
`
`‘will comply,’ ‘will not comply,’ and ‘have complied.’” Id. at 7:27-29. Responses consist of
`
`either text or voice—both media that relay content. Id. at 2:28-31 (“manually selecting and
`
`transmitting a response from the list or recording and transmitting a voice response”), 8:52-53
`
`(“Once a response is selected or recorded or transmitted to the sender PC or PDA/cell phone”).
`
`The sender then receives “the content of the manual response from each recipient PCs and
`
`PDA/cell phones.” Id. at 2:34-35; see also id. at Abstract (“provide an indication on the sender
`
`PDA/cell phone of the status and content [of] the manual responses”).
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

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`2857
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`
`
`
`
`In addition, during prosecution, the applicant twice emphasized that a response is a
`
`message with content. In an office action response, the applicant underscored that the “the
`
`recipient must respond with a particular answer selected.” Ex. 2 (’970 FH, Sept. 9, 2011
`
`Amendment) at 8. In another response, the applicant argued that the claims require a “response
`
`from the individual” that includes text content such as “‘Yes Sir’ or ‘No Sir.’” Ex. 3 (’970 FH,
`
`Dec. 17, 2010 Amendment) at 8.
`
`Under the guise of “plain meaning,” AGIS attempts to rewrite the claims to recite a
`
`selected “option” rather than a “response.” AGIS Br. at 7. Under AGIS’s interpretation, a
`
`“selected response” can come from a menu of options that are not responses at all, but rather a
`
`list of actions that can be performed entirely on the recipient’s device, without sending anything
`
`back to the sender. Id. Nothing in the ’970 Patent supports such a broad construction. Indeed,
`
`all of AGIS’s cited evidence merely confirms that an actual content-bearing message must be
`
`sent back. For instance, AGIS cites to evidence that the forced message alert software on the
`
`recipient’s device relinquishes control “[o]nce a response is selected or recorded and transmitted
`
`to the sender PC or PDA/cell phone.” AGIS Br. at 7 (quoting ’970 at 8:52-57). The fact that a
`
`response must either be selected or recorded (as a voice message) confirms that it is a message
`
`with text or audio content. AGIS also selectively quotes the specification statement that “the
`
`user operator is required to select a reply from this list.” Id. at 6 (quoting ’970 at 7:20-24). But
`
`the surrounding specification text, which AGIS omits, explains that the “reply” is selected from
`
`the “required response list,” which lists text or voice responses as discussed above. ’970 at 7:17-
`
`24 (“A required response list which will be either preinstalled in the phone application software
`
`or sent with the forced message alert . . . the user operator is presented with the required
`
`response list . . . the user operator is required to select a reply from this list”).
`
`
`
`4
`
`

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`2858
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`
`
`At bottom, the entire purpose of the patent is to enable communication between
`
`individuals. See e.g., id. at Title (“Method of utilizing forced alerts for interactive remote
`
`communications”), 1:15-18 (“1. Field of the Invention. A communications system and method
`
`that uses a plurality of PCs and PDA/cell phones for the coordination of two or more people
`
`through the use of a communications network.”). AGIS’s treatment of a “response” as a non-
`
`message menu “option” on a screen is inconsistent with this purpose and finds no place in the
`
`intrinsic record. As Judge Gilstrap has already done, this Court should reject AGIS’s proposal.
`
`2.
`
`A “selected response” Is Selected By The “recipient”
`
`In Huawei, Judge Gilstrap found a related term “‘manual response’ must be selectable by
`
`the recipient.” Dkt. 116-9 at 40. Judge Gilstrap explained how the claims and specification led
`
`to this conclusion (id. at 40-42), and his reasoning applies to “selected response.”
`
`First, the claims recite a “message required response list” on “the recipient’s cell phone
`
`display,” from which the “selected response” is chosen. Second, the specification confirms the
`
`same. The flowchart of Figure 4 is explicit: “The recipient selects a response from the response
`
`list.” ’970 at Fig. 4. The specification explains, “[i]n order to clear the forced text message alert
`
`from the user operator’s PC or PDA/cell phone display, the user operator is required to select a
`
`reply from this list.” Id. at 7:22-24. “If the alert is a voice message, the message keeps repeating
`
`at a defined rate until the user operator selects from the required response list.” Id. at 7:24-27.
`
`AGIS’s argument that the “user operator” is not the recipient (AGIS Br. at 6) fails because the
`
`very sentence AGIS cites confirms that the user operator is a recipient using its PDA/cell phone
`
`to select a reply to the sender. Id. at 7:22-24.
`
`Third, the prosecution history erases any doubts that AGIS raises. The applicant twice
`
`emphasized that a response comes from the recipient of a message. In one office action
`
`response, the applicant argued that “the claims “require a manual response from the individual to
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 120 Filed 09/04/20 Page 12 of 57 PageID #: 3447Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-11 Filed 06/16/23 Page 13 of 58 PageID #:
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`2859
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`
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`whom the command was issued, in much the same manner that when a U.S. Marine issues a
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`command and he demands a ‘Yes Sir’ or ‘No Sir’ response.” Ex. 3 at 8 (underline emphasis in
`
`original). In another response, the applicant argued that “the recipient must respond with a
`
`particular answer selected from previously provided list of potential answers.” Ex. 2 at 8.
`
`By opposing that the “selected response” is selected by a “recipient,” AGIS is implying
`
`that the “selected response” could be selected by somebody else or automatically. But AGIS
`
`cites no evidence to support those alternatives. Indeed, in pointing out that “the user operator”
`
`selects a response (AGIS Br. at 6), AGIS concedes that such a selected response cannot be an
`
`automatic response, and the “user operator” is the “recipient” as discussed above. Moreover,
`
`Claim 10 distinguishes between the “automatic acknowledgement” sent by the recipient versus
`
`the separate “selected response” that the recipient also sends, reciting: “transmitting an
`
`automatic acknowledgment of receipt to the sender PDA/cell phone,” and separately
`
`“transmitting a selected required response . . . whether [sic] said selected response is a chosen
`
`option from the response.” Finally, the claimed invention involves forcing either the display of a
`
`message required response list or the repeated playback of an audible message on the recipient’s
`
`device, ’970 at 8:37-51, both of which compel a response by the recipient. Such a forced display
`
`and audio message makes no sense if the device itself can automatically provide a response
`
`without user selection. Thus, a “selected response” must be a response selected by the recipient.
`
`B.
`
`“the response list” (Claim 1)
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Google’s Proposal
`
`Indefinite
`
`*Google initially proposed that the antecedent
`basis is “a list of possible required responses,”
`but now asserts the limitation is indefinite in
`view of AGIS’s arguments.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 120 Filed 09/04/20 Page 13 of 57 PageID #: 3448Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-11 Filed 06/16/23 Page 14 of 58 PageID #:
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`AGIS’s inability to identify any antecedent basis for “the response list” in Claim 1 shows
`
`that the claim is indefinite. The fact that “the response list” could refer to many possible recited
`
`features Claim 1, as AGIS argues (AGIS Br. at 7-8), only reinforces the term’s indefiniteness.
`
`A claim is indefinite if it recites a “term [that] does not have proper antecedent basis
`
`where such basis is not otherwise present by implication or the meaning is not reasonably
`
`ascertainable.” Halliburton Energy Serv., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2008). Courts in this District have thus found a claim term with multiple potential antecedent
`
`bases to be indefinite. As one example, in Image Processing Technologies, LLC v. Samsung
`
`Electronics Co., “the boundary” was found indefinite where the claims either provided no
`
`antecedent basis at all or recited four types of “boundaries,” making it “unclear [as to] which of
`
`the referenced four boundaries of the target is referred to by the phrase ‘the boundary.’” No.
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`2:16-cv-505, 2017 WL 2672616, at *32 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2017).
`
`Here, “the response list” is indefinite for the same reasons. As excerpted below, Claim 1
`
`recites two distinct lists—“a list of required possible responses” that is preinstalled on the
`
`application program, and “a list of possible required responses” that is sent to the recipient
`
`PDA/cell phone―and it is not clear which one of those should correspond to “the response list”:
`
`a forced message alert software application program including a list of required
`possible responses to be selected by a participant recipient of a forced message
`response loaded on each participating PDA/cell phone;
`
`means for attaching a forced message alert software packet to a voice or text
`message creating a forced message alert that is transmitted by said sender PDA/cell
`phone to the recipient PDA/cell phone, said forced message alert software packet
`containing a list of possible required responses and requiring the forced message
`alert software on said recipient PDA/cell phone to transmit an automatic
`acknowledgment to the sender PDA/cell phone as soon as said forced message alert
`is received by the recipient PDA/cell phone;
`
`means for requiring a required manual response from the response list by the
`recipient in order to clear recipient's response list from recipient’s cell phone
`display;
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 120 Filed 09/04/20 Page 14 of 57 PageID #: 3449Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-11 Filed 06/16/23 Page 15 of 58 PageID #:
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`2861
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`
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`’970 at Claim 1. AGIS offers no proposal for resolving the ambiguity. To the contrary, AGIS
`
`merely confirms the ambiguity by arguing that either “list” in Claim 1 could be “the response
`
`list,” stating that “[a] required response list [] will be either preinstalled in the phone application
`
`software or sent with the forced message alert.” AGIS Br. at 8 (quoting ’970 at 7:17-20).
`
`
`
`AGIS’s apparent position that “the response list” could refer to either of two completely
`
`different lists confirms the claim’s indefiniteness. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
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`789 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding term “molecular weight” indefinite because it has
`
`three possible meanings); Innovative Display Techs. LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 2:14-CV-
`
`201-JRG, 2015 WL 2090651, at *23 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2015) (finding a term indefinite where
`
`“divergent interpretations are plausible”). Because “the response list” lacks antecedent basis and
`
`has at least two plausible meanings, it is indefinite.
`
`C.
`
`“a response list” (Claim 2)
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Google’s Proposal
`
`Indefinite
`
`*Google initially proposed that this term be
`construed the same as “the response list” in
`Claim 1, but now asserts the limitation is
`indefinite in view of AGIS’s arguments.
`
`
`The term “a response list” appears twice in Claim 2. Google initially proposed that each
`
`instance of “a response list” in Claim 2 have the same meaning as “the response list” in base
`
`Claim 1. AGIS, however, asserts that “a response list” is not limited to any of the response lists
`
`in Claim 2. AGIS Br. at 9. AGIS’s position leaves it wholly uncertain what “a response list” in
`
`Claim 2 is referencing, particularly given that Claim 1 already recites two separate response lists
`
`as discussed above for “the response list.” Claim 2 is therefore indefinite.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 120 Filed 09/04/20 Page 15 of 57 PageID #: 3450Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-11 Filed 06/16/23 Page 16 of 58 PageID #:
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`
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`Claim 2 twice recites “a response list,” while also reciting “said response list” or “the
`
`response list,” as excerpted below:
`
`means for controlling of the recipient PDA/cellphone upon transmitting said
`automatic acknowledgment and causing, in cases where the force message alert is
`a text message, the text message and a response list to be shown on the display of
`the recipient PDA/cellphone or causes, in cases where the forced message alert is a
`voice message, the voice message being periodically repeated by the speakers of
`the recipient PDA/cell phone while said response list is shown on the display;
`
`means for allowing a manual response to be manually selected from the response
`list or manually recorded and transmitting said manual response to the sender
`PDA/cellphone; a

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