Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 1054
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
` Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`
` JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Defendants.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED
`COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 1055
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Allegations in the Amended Complaint .................................................................. 3
`
`Previous Allegations in AGIS I ............................................................................... 4
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Motion to Dismiss ................................................................................................... 4
`
`Section 1498(a) ....................................................................................................... 5
`
`Claim Splitting ........................................................................................................ 6
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`AGIS’s Allegations Against TAK Should Be Dismissed ....................................... 8
`
`AGIS’s Allegations of Infringement of the ’829 and ’123 Patents Should Be
`Barred for Claim Splitting .................................................................................... 11
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 1056
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Abbey v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
`138 F. App’x 304 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..........................................................................................13
`
`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`525 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................7, 11, 14, 15
`
`Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Res. Bank,
`583 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................11
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Astornet Techs. Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc.,
`802 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................6
`
`Bank of New York Mellon v. Riley,
`Case No. 21-40383, 2022 WL 1773364 (5th Cir. June 1, 2022) .........................................6, 11
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`ChriMar Sys., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent, Inc.,
`Case No. 6:15-CV-163-JRG-JDL, 2015 WL 12941897 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2015) .......5, 6, 13
`
`D-Beam v. Roller Derby Skate Corp.,
`316 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..........................................................................................13
`
`Decca Ltd. v. United States,
`640 F.2d 1156 (Ct. Cl. 1980) .....................................................................................................5
`
`F.D.I.C. v. Nelson,
`19 F.3d 15, 1994 WL 93409 (5th Cir. 1994) .........................................................................6, 7
`
`FastShip, LLC v. United States,
`131 Fed. Cl. 592, 607 (2017), 892 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................................5
`
`Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co.,
`947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991)....................................................................................................7
`
`Garteiser Honea, P.C. v. Moskowitz,
`Case No. 2:18-CV-00372-JRG, 2018 WL 6617780 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2018) .................5, 10
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: 1057
`
`Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp.,
`296 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................6
`
`In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC,
`961 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................2, 7, 11, 12, 13
`
`IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp.,
`769 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................6
`
`JTH Tax, LLC v. Butschek,
`Case No. 6:20-CV-26, 2020 WL 5083523 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) .......................................2
`
`Katz v. Gerardi,
`655 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2011) ...............................................................................................11
`
`Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao
`418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................................9
`
`Madey v. Duke Univ.,
`307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................6
`
`Mars Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki-Kaisha,
`58 F.3d 616 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................13
`
`Motorola, Inc. v. U.S.,
`729 F.2d 765 (Fed. Cir. 1984)..................................................................................................11
`
`Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc.,
`580 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................12
`
`Orion IP, LLC v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,
`Case No. 2:05-cv-00306-LED, 2005 WL 8161153 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2005) ..........................2
`
`Oxbow Energy, Inc. v. Koch Indus., Inc.,
`686 F. Supp. 278 (D. Kan. 1988) ...............................................................................................6
`
`Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States,
`275 U.S. 331 (1928) .................................................................................................................11
`
`Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp.,
`273 Fed. Appx. 256 (4th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................7, 13
`
`Super Van Inc. v. City of San Antonio,
`92 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................................2, 7
`
`Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp.,
`805 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................5, 9
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 5 of 22 PageID #: 1058
`
`Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
`551 U.S. 308 (2007) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson,
`862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1988) .....................................................................................................6
`
`ViaTech Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`Case No. 17-570-RGA, 2018 WL 4126522 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2018) .....................................13
`
`Zoltek Corp. v. United States,
`672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................5
`
`STATUTES
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) ...................................................................................................................5, 11
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`18 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406 (Supp. 2008) ..................13
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) ....................................................................................................................5
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 6 of 22 PageID #: 1059
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC (“AGIS”) first sued Defendants Samsung
`
`Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (collectively, “Samsung”) in 2019
`
`(“AGIS I”), alleging infringement of two AGIS patents by Samsung’s “manufacture, use, [sale],
`
`offer for sale, and/or import[ation] into the United [of] electronic devices, such as Android-based
`
`smartphones, tablets, and smart watches”—essentially Samsung’s Galaxy devices. See Exhibit A,
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00362, ECF1 (the “AGIS I Complaint”), ¶ 15. Not achieving the results it
`
`wanted from the AGIS I lawsuit (which is still pending in the Northern District of California as
`
`Case No. 5-22-cv-04825), AGIS now tries for a second bite at the apple with this lawsuit (“AGIS
`
`II”) alleging infringement of four AGIS patents (the same two patents asserted in AGIS I plus two
`
`more from the same patent family) against the same Defendants (Samsung) accusing the same
`
`products (Samsung’s Galaxy devices).
`
`AGIS’s second suit is improper for two reasons. First, AGIS’s Amended Complaint sets
`
`forth allegations of infringement by a collection of apps known as the Team Awareness Kit, or
`
`“TAK,” suite of apps, the Android version of which is ATAK. See ECF 29, ¶ 16. As made clear
`
`from the Amended Complaint, TAK was developed and is maintained by the United States
`
`Government, not Samsung. Id. at ¶ 17, p. 12. Thus, AGIS’s Amended Complaint fails to set forth
`
`a plausible claim of infringement against Samsung with respect to the TAK apps because, pursuant
`
`to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), AGIS’s exclusive remedy for the purported acts of infringement is an
`
`action against the U.S. Government in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
`
`Second, in a tacit acknowledgement of the impropriety of its TAK allegations,1 AGIS’s
`
`1 AGIS’s original Complaint accused only the TAK apps. ECF 1. Samsung filed a motion to
`dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), ECF 22, and in response AGIS filed its Amended
`Complaint with additional allegations.
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 7 of 22 PageID #: 1060
`
`Amended Complaint adds allegations that Samsung Knox on Samsung’s Galaxy devices infringes
`
`the same patents previously asserted against Samsung in AGIS I—the ’829 and ’123 patents.
`
`However, these allegations are barred by settled law of claim splitting. Claim splitting prevents
`
`the relitigating of a claim and prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal. See Super
`
`Van Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 92 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 1996); JTH Tax, LLC v. Butschek, Case No.
`
`6:20-CV-26, 2020 WL 5083523, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020). AGIS’s attempt to inject another
`
`feature of Samsung’s phones into its infringement claims here has created the very harassment that
`
`the claim splitting doctrine is supposed to prevent. Super Van Inc., 92 F.3d at 371 (“A main
`
`purpose behind the rule ... is to protect the defendant from being harassed by repetitive actions
`
`based on the same claim.”). Regardless of the specific infringement theories or differences in the
`
`specific accused features, AGIS is required to “raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds of recovery
`
`arising from a particular transaction.” In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2020). In an infringement case, the relevant transactions are “the manufacture, use, sale,
`
`importation, and/or offer for sale of the [accused] product.” Id. at 1376.
`
`“When a plaintiff serves its [infringement contentions], a defendant must have some
`
`assurance that, absent new information gleaned . . . these are the contentions that defendant must
`
`defend against as to the asserted patents.” Orion IP, LLC v. Home Depot USA, Inc., Case No.
`
`2:05-cv-00306-LED, 2005 WL 8161153 at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2005). Allowing AGIS to accuse
`
`Samsung of infringing the same patents based on the same products a second time “would undercut
`
`the purpose of the patent rules and would prejudice” Samsung. Id. (granting defendants motion to
`
`dismiss because plaintiff’s second patent lawsuit on the same patents was barred by the doctrine
`
`of claim splitting). This bedrock of basic judicial fairness precludes harassment, do-overs, and
`
`second bites at the apple—exactly what AGIS attempts here.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 8 of 22 PageID #: 1061
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`Samsung therefore requests that the Court (1) dismiss AGIS’s claims against TAK in their
`
`entirety because they are improper allegations against the U.S. Government, and (2) dismiss
`
`AGIS’s claims for infringement of the same patents that were asserted against Samsung in AGIS
`
`I—the ’829 and ’123 Patents asserted here in Counts III and IV—against the same products.2
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`A.
`
`Allegations in the Amended Complaint
`
`In its Amended Complaint, AGIS alleges Samsung infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 8,213,970
`
`(“’970 Patent”); 9,467,838 (“’838 Patent”); 9,749,829 (“’829 Patent”); and 9,820,123 (“’123
`
`Patent”). Am. Compl., ¶¶ 21, 31, 46, 61. The four patents are all in the same family (stemming
`
`from the same parent application through a long line of continuations and continuations-in-part).
`
`Each of the four asserted patents is directed, generally, to coordinating or managing two or more
`
`people through the use of a communications network. See ’970 Patent, ECF 22-1, 1:15-23; ’838
`
`Patent, ECF 22-2, 1:30-43; ’829 Patent, ECF 22-3, 1:33-46; ’123 Patent, ECF 22-4, 1:33-46.
`
`AGIS’s infringement allegations are based on the alleged “manufacture, use, [sale], offer
`
`for sale, and/or import[ation] into the United States [of] the . . . [1] TAK, ATAK, and CivTAK,
`
`applications, products, and solutions, which also include related servers and services for supporting
`
`. . . TAK, ATAK and CivTAK and [2] Samsung Knox.” Am. Compl., ¶ 16.3 The infringement
`
`allegations include a long list of allegedly infringing Samsung Galaxy devices “all of which are
`
`2 Further, as explained in a motion to stay filed by Samsung concurrently with this motion, a stay
`of all non-dismissed allegations is warranted based on an ITC action filed by AGIS on November
`16, 2022 (in addition to AGIS I and II) and/or the significant overlap of issues among AGIS’s
`multiple suits.
`3 The Amended Complaint also includes allegations of infringement by a purported “Samsung
`Tactical” application and/or service. See, e.g., Am. Compl., ¶ 16. Samsung is unaware of any
`such application or service referred to as “Samsung Tactical,” and the Amended Complaint does
`not include any supporting factual allegations relating to infringement by the purported “Samsung
`Tactical” application and/or service.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 9 of 22 PageID #: 1062
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`[purportedly] configured and/or adapted with . . . [1] TAK, ATAK, and CivTAK and [2] Samsung
`
`Knox. . . .” Id. AGIS’s Amended Complaint relies extensively on cut-and-pasted pages from an
`
`ATAK manual, certain CivTAK websites describing ATAK capabilities, and a handful of Knox
`
`websites as purported support for the alleged infringement. See, e.g., id. at pp. 19-35, 43-57, 60-
`
`79, 83-87, 91-95, 104-118, 122-141, 145-149, 153-156, 165-179, 183-201, 205-209, 213-216.
`
`B.
`
`Previous Allegations in AGIS I
`
`AGIS’s allegations of infringement of the ’829 and ’123 Patents in AGIS II are not new;
`
`AGIS also asserted, and continues to assert, the same two patents in AGIS I against the very same
`
`devices alleged to infringe those patents here. On November 4, 2019, AGIS filed a lawsuit in this
`
`District against Samsung alleging infringement of the ’829 Patent and ’123 Patent, accusing
`
`Samsung of manufacturing, using, selling, offering for sale, and/or importing into the United States
`
`allegedly infringing electronic devices, such as Android-based smartphones, tablets, and smart
`
`watches, including a list of 269 specific Galaxy devices. See Exhibit A, AGIS I Complaint, ¶ 15.
`
`Here, AGIS alleges infringement of the same two patents by a substantively identical list of 264
`
`specific Galaxy devices. Am. Complaint, ¶ 15.
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Motion to Dismiss
`
`To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, which if accepted
`
`as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
`
`(2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
`
`court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
`
`(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Conclusory allegations or a
`
`“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 10 of 22 PageID #: 1063
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`A court “must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts
`
`ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents
`
`incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
`
`notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A court may take
`
`judicial notice of facts that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
`
`cannot reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), including prior court proceedings,
`
`ChriMar Systems, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent, Inc., Case No. 6:15-CV-163-JRG-JDL, 2015 WL
`
`12941897, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2015), and government websites. Swindol v. Aurora Flight
`
`Scis. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Garteiser Honea, P.C. v. Moskowitz, Case
`
`No. 2:18-CV-00372-JRG, 2018 WL 6617780, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2018) (explaining that
`
`“[i]nformation obtained from online sources is becoming a frequently used basis for judicial
`
`notice” and that “government and corporate websites . . . are among the most commonly relied
`
`upon sources”).
`
`B.
`
`Section 1498(a)
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) provides, in relevant part:
`
`Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States
`is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner
`thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall
`be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims
`for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
`manufacture.
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Accordingly, Section 1498(a) waives the U.S. Government’s immunity when
`
`there is an allegation of unauthorized use of a patented invention by or for the United States. See
`
`Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012); FastShip, LLC v. United
`
`States, 131 Fed. Cl. 592, 607 (2017), aff'd as modified, 892 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing
`
`Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 n.15 (Ct. Cl. 1980)) (“The government directly
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 11 of 22 PageID #: 1064
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`infringes a patent when it uses or manufactures the patented invention without a license.”).
`
`Application of Section 1498(a) is an affirmative defense. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d
`
`1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, courts may grant Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
`
`claims under § 1498(a) in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp.,
`
`769 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s decision to grant the
`
`defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under § 1498(a)); Astornet Techs. Inc. v. BAE Sys.,
`
`Inc., 802 F.3d 1271, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`C.
`
`Claim Splitting
`
`“In dealing with simultaneous actions on related theories, courts at times express principles
`
`of ‘claim splitting’ that are similar to claim preclusion, but that do not require a prior judgment.”
`
`ChriMar Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 12941897, at *3 (quoting18 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
`
`Practice and Procedure § 4406, at 30 (Supp. 2008)); see also, e.g., Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v.
`
`Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 273 Fed. Appx. 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal based on
`
`claim-splitting even where there was no final judgment in earlier action); Oxbow Energy, Inc. v.
`
`Koch Indus., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 278, 282 (D. Kan. 1988) (holding that even absent a final judgment,
`
`a party cannot split claims); Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 296 F.3d
`
`982, 987 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that motion to dismiss based on claim-splitting often cannot
`
`wait until final judgment in first-filed action, and, therefore, appropriate inquiry in claim-splitting
`
`context is whether, assuming first-filed suit were already final, second suit could be precluded
`
`pursuant to claim preclusion).
`
`A “single cause of action or claim cannot be ‘split’ by advancing one part in an initial suit
`
`and attempting to reserve another part for a later suit.” Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson,
`
`862 F.2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1988); see also F.D.I.C. v. Nelson, 19 F.3d 15, 1994 WL 93409, at *2
`
`n.5 (5th Cir. 1994); Bank of New York Mellon, 2022 WL 1773364, at *3. The rule against claim
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 12 of 22 PageID #: 1065
`
`splitting prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal and requires that all claims arising
`
`out of a single wrong be presented in one action. In a claim-splitting case, the second suit will be
`
`barred if the claim involves the same parties and arises out of the same transaction or series of
`
`transactions as the first claim. Sensormatic, 273 Fed. Appx. at 265 (citations and internal
`
`quotations omitted); Nelson, 1994 WL 93409, at *2 n.5 (holding that Fifth Circuit applies the
`
`“same transaction” test to determine whether a single claim has been split). “A main purpose
`
`behind the rule ... is to protect the defendant from being harassed by repetitive actions based on
`
`the same claim.” Super Van Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 92 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 1996).
`
`In the context of patent infringement suits, the bar against claim splitting requires the
`
`accused products in the two suits to be “essentially the same.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525
`
`F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “Accused devices are ‘essentially the same’ where the
`
`differences between them are merely ‘colorable’ or ‘unrelated to the limitations in the claim of the
`
`patent.’” Id. at 1324 (quoting Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
`
`Further, in a patent infringement lawsuit, plaintiff alleges that it has been injured by acts of
`
`infringement consisting of the manufacture, use, sale, importation, and/or offer for sale of the
`
`accused product. In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d at 1375. Thus, when alleged acts of
`
`infringement in two suits are based on the manufacture, use, sale, importation, and/or offer for sale
`
`of the same or essentially the same accused products, the causes of action relate to the same set of
`
`transactions and the later suit is barred. Id. at 1376. Different accused features or different theories
`
`of infringement for the same products do not create multiple transactions or multiple claims. Id.
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`AGIS improperly accuses Samsung of (1) infringing its four patents based on the
`
`functionality of apps that were developed and are owned by the U.S. Government and (2)
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 13 of 22 PageID #: 1066
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`infringing the same two patents asserted against Samsung in AGIS I based on the same allegedly
`
`infringing transactions. Accordingly, all allegations against the TAK apps should be dismissed
`
`along with all remaining allegations of infringement of the ’829 and ’123 patents.
`
`A.
`
`AGIS’s Allegations Against TAK Should Be Dismissed
`
`The Court should dismiss AGIS’s allegations related to the U.S. Government’s TAK apps
`
`because AGIS fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim against Samsung. AGIS’s Amended
`
`Complaint alleges in Counts I–IV that Samsung infringes AGIS’s patents based on the operation
`
`of the U.S. Government’s TAK apps. E.g., Am. Compl., ¶¶ 23, 33, 48, 63. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1498(a), AGIS’s exclusive remedy for the purported acts of infringement based on the TAK apps
`
`is an action against the U.S. Government in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The
`
`accused apps are not Samsung-developed apps. Rather, as stated in AGIS’s Amended Complaint,
`
`TAK was developed and is maintained by the U.S. Government:
`
`Am. Compl., ¶ 17, p. 12 (citing https://www.civtak.org/atak-about/); see also id. at ¶ 24, p. 30
`
`(“There are numerous products in the TAK family, all developed at government expense.”).
`
`The Amended Complaint also demonstrates U.S. Government ownership and control of
`
`the TAK apps. For example, the Amended Complaint includes a screenshot of a graphic on the
`
`cited www.civtak.org webpage, shown below, that includes a standard U.S. military distribution
`
`statement: “Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.”
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 1067
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`Id. at ¶ 17, p. 11 (screenshot annotated and excerpted).
`
`As explained in a Department of Defense Instruction memorandum, this statement
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`indicates that U.S. Government approval was required and obtained to distribute the information
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`publicly: “If public release clearance is obtained, the controlling DoD office shall assign
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`Distribution Statement A, cancel any other distribution statement, and notify all known holders of
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`the change.” Exhibit B, DoD Instruction No. 5230.24 (August 23, 2012, incorporating Change 3,
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`October 15, 2018) at 12 (available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
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`issuances/dodi/523024p.pdf); see also id. at 15 (“This statement may be used only on unclassified
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`technical documents that have been cleared for public release by competent authority . . . .”).4
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`4 This Court can, and Samsung respectfully submits should, take judicial notice of the relevant
`information set forth in government websites and documents cited herein. For example, in Kitty
`Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, the Fifth Circuit took judicial notice of the National Mediation
`Board’s approval of a transfer of a certification where the approval was available on the agency’s
`government website. 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Swindol, 805 F.3d at 519.
`Moreover, this Court has previously taken judicial notice of information on websites in ruling on
`Rule 12 motions to dismiss. In Garteiser Honea, this Court took judicial notice of information on
`the defendant’s own website and on a third-party real estate website in determining the address
`footnote continued on next page
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`9
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 1068
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`The Amended Complaint also explains that ATAK is a “Government-off-the-Shelf
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`(GOTS) software application”:
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`Am. Compl., ¶ 24, p. 21. A “Government off the shelf (GOTS)” product is defined by the U.S.
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`Government as:
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`A software and/or hardware product that is developed by the technical staff of a
`Government organization for use by the U.S. Government. GOTS software and
`hardware may be developed by an external entity, with specification from the
`Government organization to meet a specific Government purpose, and can
`normally be shared among Federal agencies without additional cost. GOTS
`products and systems are not commercially available to the general public. Sales
`and distribution of GOTS products and systems are controlled by the
`Government.
`Source: NSA/CSS Policy 3-14
`
`Exhibit C, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary, CNSSI No. 4009 (March
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`2, 2022) at 96 (available at https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Ref/CNSSI_4009.pdf) (emphasis added).
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`The U.S. Government’s ownership and control of the TAK apps is also confirmed by the
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`Government’s TAK website, which states at the bottom of every page:
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`The TAK capability suite is a United States Government (USG) owned product.
`Use of these USG owned products outside of test and evaluation require the proper
`authority to operate (ATO) paperwork granted by your organization’s headquarters
`(HQ). Before installing and/or using any of the products, ensure you are within the
`guidelines of your organization.
`
`E.g., Exhibit D, TAK.gov, https://tak.gov/products (last accessed Nov. 18, 2022), p. 2 (emphasis
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`and property type of the defendant’s principal place of business. 2018 WL 6617780, at *1; see
`also id. at *1 n.1 (citing other examples of courts taking judicial notice of information on websites).
`Samsung submits that the government websites cited here are even more reliable than the private
`websites relied upon in Garteiser Honea.
`
`10
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 16 of 22 PageID #: 1069
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`added); see also id. (the “TAK capability suite” is maintained by the TAK Product Center, located
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`at Fort Belvoir, in Virginia).
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`The accused TAK apps are indisputably apps that are “used or manufactured by or for the
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`United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Therefore, the exclusive remedy for the alleged infringement
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`based on the TAK apps set forth in the Complaint is a suit against the United States in the Court
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`of Federal Claims, and the allegations against TAK should be dismissed.5 See Advanced Software
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`Design Corp. v. Fed. Res. Bank, 583 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Section 1498(a) “is more
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`than a waiver of immunity and effects an assumption of liability by the government.”) (quoting
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`Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 344 (1928)).
`
`B.
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`AGIS’s Allegations of Infringement of the ’829 and ’123 Patents Should Be
`Barred for Claim Splitting
`
`Claim splitting prevents defendants from “being harassed” by multiple claims based on a
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`single transaction. Bank of New York Mellon v. Riley, Case No. 21-40383, 2022 WL 1773364, at
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`*3 (5th Cir. June 1, 2022). Moreover, “[b]y spreading claims around in multiple lawsuits in other
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`courts or before other judges, parties waste scarce judicial resources and undermine the efficient
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`and comprehensive disposition of cases.” Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011)
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`(internal citations and quotes omitted). In the context of patent infringement suits, the bar against
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`claim splitting requires the accused products in the two suits to be “essentially the same.” Acumed
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`LLC, 525 F.3d at 1324. Under well-settled principles, “different arguments or assertions in support
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`of liability do not all constitute separate claims.” In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d at
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`1375. “Regardless of the number of substantive theories available to a party and regardless of the
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`5 If the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) applies, AGIS is required to file its patent infringement
`claim under two separate, mutually exclusive, statutory causes of action. Motorola, Inc. v. U.S.,
`729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)
`against the government are distinct and separate from 35 U.S.C. § 271 patent infringement claims
`against private parties).
`
`11
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 39 Filed 12/27/22 Page 17 of 22 PageID #: 1070
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`differences in the evidence needed to support each of those theories, a party may not split a single
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`claim into separate grounds of recovery and raise those separate grounds in successive lawsuits.”
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`Id.
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`AGIS asserts infringement of the ’829 and ’123 Patents by Samsung’s Galaxy Devices in
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`both AGIS I and AGIS II. Not only are these products “essentially the same,” they are exactly the
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`same products. Compare Exhibit A, AGIS I Compl., ¶ 15 with Am. Compl., ¶ 16. This is just the
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`type of duplicative litigation the doctrine of claim splitting is designed to prevent. Becau