`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:22-cv-0185-JRG
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. and
`CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, d/b/a VERIZON
`WIRELESS,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 2 of 21 PageID #: 235
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`AGIS has filed fifteen lawsuits in this Court asserting the same set of
`patents. .................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Verizon’s Accused Products. .................................................................................. 2
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................2
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................5
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`AGIS fails to present plausible claims of direct infringement by Verizon
`or any other entity. .................................................................................................. 5
`
`In addition to the failure to address the requirements for direct
`infringement, AGIS fails to plead facts to plausibly support its
`infringement allegations. ......................................................................................... 8
`
`C.
`
`AGIS’s Indirect Infringement Claims for All Patents Fail. .................................. 11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`All allegations of pre-suit indirect infringement must be dismissed
`because AGIS did not allege the requisite notice of the patents. .............. 11
`
`Lacking Plausible Claims of Direct Infringement, the Complaint
`Cannot Allege Plausible Claims of Indirect Infringement. ....................... 11
`
`D.
`
`E.
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`AGIS’s Claims of Willful Infringement Should Be Dismissed. ........................... 12
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`AGIS fails to plead facts supporting entitlement to injunctive relief. .................. 13
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`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................15
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`
`
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`i
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 3 of 21 PageID #: 236
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`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 2013 WL 693955 (E.D. Tex.
`Jan. 10, 2013) ...........................................................................................................................12
`
`Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir.
`2015) ..........................................................................................................................................4
`
`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., 2014 WL 2892285, at *7
`(W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) .........................................................................................................4
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`(en banc) ....................................................................................................................................6
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .....................................14
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................2, 8
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ..........................................................................12
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323,
`1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................................4
`
`Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................3
`
`Centillion Data Sys. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F. 3d 1279 (Fed. Cir.
`2011) ...................................................................................................................................... 7-8
`
`Chapterhouse, LLC v. Spotify, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00300-JRG, 2018 WL 6981828
`(E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018) ................................................................................................ 3, 9-10
`
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632 (2015) ................................................. 3-4, 11
`
`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 2015 WL 12850550, at *5 (E.D.
`Tex. July 15, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 4910427
`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) .......................................................................................................12
`
`De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020) ............................9
`
`Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................10
`
`DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..............................................11
`
`eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).........................................................5, 13
`
`Fernandez-Montex v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) ........................................2
`
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`ii
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 4 of 21 PageID #: 237
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`Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) ................................................... 3-4
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93 (2016) ........................................................4, 12
`
`InMotion Imagery Tech. v. Brain Damage Films, 2012 WL 3283371 (E.D. Tex.
`Aug. 10, 2012) .........................................................................................................................12
`
`Int’l. Bus. Machines Corp. v. Bookings Holdings Inc., 775 F. App’x 674 (Fed. Cir.
`2019) ..........................................................................................................................................6
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) ................................................................................................................................ 7-8, 11
`
`Kirsch Research and Dev., LLC v. Atlas Roofing Corp., No. 5:20-cv-00055-RWS,
`2020 WL 8363154 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020) ..........................................................................3
`
`Lone Star Fund V. (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.
`2010) ..........................................................................................................................................3
`
`M&C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo Prods. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-2372, 2018 WL
`4620713 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2018) ..........................................................................................14
`
`N. Star Innovations, Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 2017 WL 5501489, at *2 (D. Del.
`Nov. 16, 2017), adopted by No. 1:17-cv-506, Dkt. #37, slip op. at 1 (D. Del.
`Jan. 3, 2018) ...............................................................................................................................9
`
`Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................13
`
`Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL
`3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) ..........................................................................................5
`
`Qwikcash, LLC v. Blackhawk Network Holdings, Inc., 2020 WL 6781566 (E.D.
`Tex. Nov. 17, 2020) ............................................................................................................. 9-11
`
`Ruby Sands LLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Tex., 2016 WL 3542430 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 28,
`2016) ..........................................................................................................................................8
`
`Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) ..........................................................................................3
`
`Software Development, LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00028 ......................................................1
`
`Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ..............................................................5, 13
`
`z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ...................................14
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271 ............................................................................................................................3, 7
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`iii
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 5 of 21 PageID #: 238
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`35 U.S.C. § 284 ..............................................................................................................................12
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`Other Authorities
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ......................................................................................................................2
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................1, 8
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`iv
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: 239
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants Verizon
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`Communications Inc.1 and Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless (collectively “Verizon”)
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`respectfully request the Court dismiss Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC’s (“AGIS”)
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`Complaint in toto including its claims of direct infringement, indirect infringement, and willful
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`infringement, and request for injunctive relief, as AGIS’s allegations are plainly deficient, even
`
`under the most basic pleading standards.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`A.
`
`AGIS has filed fifteen lawsuits in this Court asserting the same set of patents.
`
`Starting in June 2017 and through the filing of this motion, AGIS has filed fifteen lawsuits
`
`in this Court. The first thirteen were against Huawei, HTC, LG, Apple, ZTE, Waze, Google,
`
`Samsung, AT&T, Lyft, Uber, Whatsapp, and T-Mobile.2 Ten of the thirteen suits were settled and
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`dismissed and the other three were ordered by the Federal Circuit to be transferred to the Northern
`
`District of California. Immediately after the Federal Circuit’s order issued on May 24, 2022
`
`transferring the cases against Google, Samsung, and Waze, AGIS started filing more lawsuits in
`
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`1 Verizon Communications Inc. specifically denies that personal jurisdiction exists over it for this
`matter.
`
`2 AGIS Software Development, LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00513, AGIS
`Software Development, LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00514, AGIS Software Development, LLC
`v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00515, AGIS Software Development, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:17-
`cv-00516, AGIS Software Development, LLC v. ZTE Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00517, AGIS Software
`Development, LLC v. Waze Mobile Ltd., No. 2:19-cv-00359, AGIS Software Development, LLC v.
`Google LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00361, AGIS Software Development, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`No. 2:19-cv-00362, AGIS Software Development, LLC v. Lyft, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00024, AGIS
`Software Development, LLC v. Uber Techs. Inc., d/b/a Uber, No. 2:21-cv-00026, AGIS Software
`Development, LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00028, AGIS Software Development, LLC v.
`WhatsApp, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00029, and AGIS Software Development, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-00072.
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`1
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`
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 7 of 21 PageID #: 240
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`this Court. On May 27, 2022, AGIS brought the instant action accusing Verizon of infringing U.S.
`
`Patent Nos. 9,467,838 (“the ’838 patent”), 9,749,829 (“the ’829 patent”), 8,213,970 (“the ’970
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`patent”), and 9,820,123 (“the ’123 patent”) (hereinafter “the Patents-in-Suit” of “Asserted
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`Patents”). A few weeks later AGIS sued Samsung3 again. Each of the patents-in-suit has been
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`asserted in some combination in each of the other fourteen cases.
`
`B.
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`Verizon’s Accused Products.
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`In the Complaint, AGIS accused three Verizon products: (1) Verizon Smart Family and
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`Companion applications and related services and/or servers (collectively, “Verizon Smart
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`Family”), (2) Verizon Frontline and Real Time Response System solutions, devices, applications,
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`and related services and/or servers, and (3) Verizon Connect, Connect Reveal, and Spotlight
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`(mobile app) solutions, devices, applications and related services and/or servers. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 16. On
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`July 13, 2022, AGIS dismissed with prejudice its claims against Verizon Smart Family. Dkt. 17.
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`The two remaining Accused Products generally relate to Verizon’s public safety solutions for first
`
`responders on the front line and services providing the ability to track fleets of vehicles.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that if accepted as true, states “a claim
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`to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
`
`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to meet this factual
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`plausibility standard, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the
`
`reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” based on “more than
`
`a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare
`
`recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
`
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`3 AGIS Software Development, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 2:22-cv-00263.
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`2
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 8 of 21 PageID #: 241
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`suffice.” Id. Or said another way, “conclusory allegations, or legal conclusions masquerading as
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`factual conclusions, will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Fernandez-Montex v. Allied
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`Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
`
`In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the question presented is “not
`
`whether [the plaintiff] will ultimately prevail, . . . but whether his complaint was sufficient to cross
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`the federal court’s threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011). Indeed, the “court’s
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`task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not
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`to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.” Lone Star Fund V. (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank
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`PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
`
`To allege direct infringement, the “plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to create a plausible
`
`inference that each element of the claim is infringed by the accused products.” Kirsch Research
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`and Dev., LLC v. Atlas Roofing Corp., No. 5:20-cv-00055-RWS, 2020 WL 8363154, at *2 (E.D.
`
`Tex. Sept. 29, 2020) (citing Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Under any
`
`standard, the complaint must support its entitlement to relief with factual content, not just
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`conclusory statements that merely track the claim language that the accused products meet every
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`claim limitation. Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “If
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`it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an insurmountable bar to relief exists, and the
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`plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the claim.” Chapterhouse, LLC v. Spotify,
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`Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00300-JRG, 2018 WL 6981828, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018) (citing Jones v.
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`Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
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`To allege indirect infringement, the plaintiff must plead specific facts sufficient to show
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`the accused infringer had actual knowledge of the patent-in-suit or was willfully blind to the
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`existence of the patent-in-suit. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766, 769
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`3
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: 242
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`(2011) (“[I]nduced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts
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`constitute patent infringement” or at least “willful blindness” to the likelihood of infringement.);
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`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 639 (2015) (“Like induced infringement,
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`contributory infringement requires knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent
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`infringement.”). Willful blindness requires a showing that “(1) the defendant must subjectively
`
`believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate
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`actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 769.
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`To allege induced infringement, the plaintiff must plead specific facts sufficient to show
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`that the defendant “specifically intended their customers to infringe the [asserted] patent and knew
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`that the customer’s acts constituted infringement.” Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys.
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`Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). This “demanding specific intent requirement
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`for a finding of induced infringement” requires more than “unsubstantiated assertions.” Affinity
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`Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7. An inducement claim cannot “simply recite[] the legal conclusion
`
`that Defendants acted with specific intent.” Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter,
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`620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`To allege contributory infringement, the plaintiff must establish “(1) that there is direct
`
`infringement, (2) that the accused infringer had knowledge of the patent, (3) that the component
`
`has no substantial noninfringing uses, and (4) that the component is a material part of the
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`invention.” Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285 at *8. “Like induced infringement, contributory
`
`infringement requires knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.”
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`Commil, 575 U.S. at 639.
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`Similarly, to allege willful infringement, the plaintiff must plausibly establish the
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`“subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing.” Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`4
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 10 of 21 PageID #: 243
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`Pulse Electronics, Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 105 (2016). In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts
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`plausibly showing that the defendant: “(1) knew of the patent-in-suit; (2) after acquiring that
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`knowledge, it infringed the patent; and (3) in doing so, it knew, or should have known, that its
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`conduct amounted to infringement of the patent.” Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No.
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`6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) (quoting Valinge
`
`Innovation AB v. Halstead New England Corp., No. 16-1082-LPS-CJB, 2018 WL 2411218, at *13
`
`(D. Del. May 29, 2018)).
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`To allege a claim for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish a facially valid basis for
`
`the Court to infer irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Weinberger v. Romero-
`
`Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (emphasis added). Well-established principles of equity require
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`a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction to satisfy a four-factor test: “(1) that it has suffered an
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`irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
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`compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
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`defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
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`by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`AGIS fails to present plausible claims of direct infringement by Verizon or
`any other entity.
`
`AGIS broadly defines the “Accused Products” as “the Verizon public safety and first
`
`responder solutions, such as the Verizon Frontline and Real Time Response System solutions,
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`devices, applications and related services and/or servers, the Verizon fleet tracking, field service
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`management, and assert tracking solutions, such as Verizon Connect, Connect Reveal, and
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`Spotlight solutions, devices, applications and related services and/or servers (collectively, ‘the
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`Accused Products’).” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 16. This broad definition includes actions controlled by drivers
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`5
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: 244
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`(e.g., the Spotlight App.), dispatchers (e.g., the Spotlight App. and web-based system), managers
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`(e.g., web-based interfaces into the accused products), public safety first responders, and Verizon
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`itself (e.g., “servers for the applications”). Given the involvement of so many parties, AGIS’s
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`direct infringement allegations, where present, rely on the combined conduct of a mix of
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`independent entities, including customers’ manager, driver, and first responders, but the Complaint
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`contains no allegations of joint infringement, i.e., “direction and control” or “joint enterprise” for
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`these varied entities. Instead of specificity here, AGIS largely cuts and pastes conclusory
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`allegations (from previous complaints) with little regard to the patent asserted or the requirements
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`of the asserted claims and with only conclusions explanations of how Verizon – or any entity for
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`that matter – allegedly performs each step of the asserted method claims, whether alone or as a
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`collective entity. Compare Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 28-33, 42-48 with AGIS v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 2:21-
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`cv-00072, Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 65-70, 94-97, 99-101 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2021); compare Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 18-
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`22 with AGIS v. Uber Techs. Inc., d/b/a Uber, No. 2:21-cv-00026, Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 28-32 (E.D. Tex.
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`Jan. 29, 2021); compare Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 44-48 with AGIS v. WhatsApp, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00029, Dkt.
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`at ¶¶ 76-77, 79-81 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2021).
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`Direct infringement requires that all elements of the claim be performed by or attributable
`
`to a single actor. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015) (en banc). “Divided [or joint] infringement occurs when more than one actor is involved in
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`practicing the steps and the acts of one are attributable to the other such that a single entity is
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`responsible for the infringement.” Int’l. Bus. Machines Corp. v. Bookings Holdings Inc., 775 F.
`
`App’x 674, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Akamai, the en banc
`
`Federal Circuit held that one entity is responsible for the acts of others “(1) where that entity directs
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`6
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 12 of 21 PageID #: 245
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`or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.” Akamai, 797
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`F.3d at 1022.
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`AGIS’s direct infringement allegations against the Asserted Patents fail because AGIS
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`cannot identify a single actor that performs all of the method steps of the asserted claims of those
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`patents. Instead, the method steps are allegedly performed by some combination of Verizon,
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`drivers, dispatchers, managers, first responders, and/or other third parties, and AGIS does not (and
`
`cannot) make any allegations of joint enterprise between these separate entities.
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`’970 patent. Asserted claim 10 of the ’970 patent is a method claim. Thus, the only form
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`of direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is “use” but the Complaint does not allege any
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`such “use” by a single entity. AGIS’s only allegation of direct infringement against Verizon is that
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`“Defendants directly infringe and/or indirectly infringe by instructing their customers to infringe
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`by performing claim 10 of the ’970 Patent.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 24. “Instructing” other parties to perform
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`the method steps is not an act of direct infringement. See 35 U.S.C.§ 271(a) (defining acts of direct
`
`infringement). The Complaint does not ever allege in any cognizable fashion that Verizon
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`performs all of the recited method claim steps. Thus, the ’970 patent allegations of direct
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`infringement against Verizon must be dismissed.
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`Moreover, the Complaint does not recite an allegation that any entity performs all of the
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`method steps as is required for direct infringement by any entity. The Complaint conspicuously
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`does not identify a single entity purporting to be the direct infringer. See id. at ¶¶ 24-27.
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`’838 patent / ’829 patent / ’123 patent. For the ’838, ’829 and ’123 patents, AGIS asserts
`
`claim 54, claim 34, and claim 23, respectively. Each of these claims are “system” claims. A “direct
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`infringement by ‘use’ of a system claim requires a party . . . to use each and every . . . element of
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`a claimed system.” Centillion Data Sys. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F. 3d 1279, 1284 (Fed.
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`DM2\16110469.6
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`7
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`
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 13 of 21 PageID #: 246
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`Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). To “use” a system, “a party must put the invention into service,
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`i.e., control the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it.” Id. Use requires that an “infringer
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`obtain[] ‘benefit’ from each and every element….” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola
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`Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284).
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`AGIS’s only allegation of direct infringement against Verizon is the identical assertion for
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`each patent that “Defendants directly infringe and/or indirectly infringe by instructing their
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`customers to infringe by a system….” Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 34 (’838 patent), 49 (’829 patent), 64 (’123
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`patent). Again, “instructing” other parties to infringe is not an act of direct infringement.
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`For each of these patents, the Complaint does not ever allege in any cognizable fashion that
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`Verizon puts the invention into service, controls the system as a whole or obtains benefit from it.
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`Indeed, the Complaint merely includes screenshots purporting to show various aspects of the
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`operation of the accused products. See id. at ¶¶ 34-43 (’838 patent), ¶¶ 49-58 (’829 patent), ¶¶ 64-
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`73 (’123 patent). Such screenshots do not meet the Centillion / Intellectual Ventures test for
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`alleging direct infringement of a system claim. Indeed, the Complaint does not identify any single
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`entity that puts the invention into service and “obtains ‘benefit’ from each and every element.”
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`Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329. Thus, the allegations of direct infringement against
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`Verizon (and any other entity) must be dismissed for each of the ’838 patent, ’829 patent, and ’123
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`patent.
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`B.
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`In addition to the failure to address the requirements for direct infringement,
`AGIS fails to plead facts to plausibly support its infringement allegations.
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`Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss a complaint that does not state a claim for
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`relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Such is the case here. Rather
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`than identify facts that enable the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Verizon allegedly
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`infringes each patent, AGIS cuts and pastes purported factual allegations across the patents. But
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 14 of 21 PageID #: 247
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`this Court has recognized that “cut-and-paste pleading practices” are among those “that Rule
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`12(b)(6) was meant to address.” Ruby Sands LLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Tex., 2016 WL 3542430 at
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`*5 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 28, 2016). As a result, AGIS ignores multiple claim limitations, provides
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`conclusory allegations that essentially parrot claim language, reuses screenshots with little or no
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`supporting explanation and, to the extent they can be called factual, present assertions that are
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`implausible on their face and thus require dismissal. Qwikcash, LLC v. Blackhawk Network
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`Holdings, Inc., 2020 WL 6781566, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2020); Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify,
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`Inc., 2018 WL 6981828, at *1, *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018). In sum, for each of the Asserted
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`Patents, AGIS’s complaint lacks “sufficient factual allegations which might permit the Court to
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`find that the Iqbal/Twombly standard is met.” Chapterhouse, 2018 WL 6981828, at *2.
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`The Complaint reuses the same screenshots across the many different limitations from
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`different patents, but provides little or no explanation as to how the screenshots meet the claim
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`requirements. See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at pp. 59-73. Indeed, the Complaint does not make any attempt to
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`match the screenshots with any specific claim elements. Rather, the Complaint merely recites the
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`claim elements (e.g., id. at ¶¶ 24 (’970 patent), 34 (’838 patent), 49 (’829 patent), 64 (’123 patent))
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`and then subsequently does a cut/paste purporting to show accused functionality without any effort
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`to link that accused functionality with any claim element.
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`This approach does not satisfy the pleading standard. See Chapterhouse LLC v. Shopify,
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`Inc., No. 2:18-cv-0300-JRG, 2018 WL 6981828, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018) (“While
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`screenshots may be useful in laying out a plausible allegation of patent infringement, Plaintiff must
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`further allege how the screenshots meet the claim in order to lay out sufficient factual allegations
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`which might permit the Court to find that the Iqbal/Twombly standard is met.”); De La Vega v.
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`Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 3528411, at *6-7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020) (dismissing with prejudice
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 15 of 21 PageID #: 248
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`direct infringement claims because complaint did not include any explanation as to how the
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`screenshots of evidence performed a claim limitation); see also N. Star Innovations, Inc. v. Micron
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`Tech., Inc., 2017 WL 5501489, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2017), adopted by No. 1:17-cv-506, Dkt.
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`#37, slip op. at 1 (D. Del. Jan. 3, 2018).
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`The failure (or inability) of AGIS to link any of the claim elements of each asserted claim
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`of every patent with specific accused functionality or components dooms AGIS’s Complaint.
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`Courts in this District, as well as courts in other districts,6 have held that“‘[f]air notice,’ in turn,
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`requires the plaintiff to plausibly allege that the accused products meet ‘each and every element of
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`at least one claim’ of the asserted patent.” Qwikcash, 2020 WL 6781566, at *3. And this Court
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`has held that “[t]he complaint must contain enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable
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`expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of plaintiffs’ claim.”
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`Chapterhouse, 2018 WL 6981828, at *1. Of course, in the context of a patent infringement suit,
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`“evidence of each element of plaintiff’s claim” requires evidence that each element of each
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`asserted patent claim is present in the accused device. While not every case requires a plaintiff to
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`track, verbatim, every element of a claim, allegations that involve “more claims and more
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`complicated patents” require more than “bare bones allegations.” Id. at *2 (distinguishing the
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`“simple technology,” few independent claims, and limited accused products at issue in Disc
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`Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Indeed, in Chapterhouse,
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`the plaintiff actually “br[oke] the exemplary claim into individual elements,” and the Court still
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`found the allegations insufficient. Id. at *2.
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`Here, AGIS does not even make that effort to link any claim element with any accused
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`functionality or component. Thus, AGIS’s allegations of infringement (both direct and indirect)
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`should be dismissed.
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`Case 2:22-cv-00185-JRG Document 19 Filed 08/09/22 Page 16 of 21 PageID #: 249
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`C.
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`AGIS’s Indirect Infringement Claims for All Patents Fail.
`1.
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`All allegations of pre-suit indirect infringement must be dismissed
`because AGIS did not allege the requisite notice of the patents.
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`Indirect infringement requires, at a minimum, knowledge of the asserted patents and the
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`alleged infringement. “Like induced infringement, contributory infringement requires knowledge
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`of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” Com