Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 310
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
`COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
`OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS,
`LLC,
`
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`HUAWEI DEVICE CO., LTD.,
`HUAWEI DEVICE USA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`C.A. NO. 2:21-cv-00040-JRG
`
`LEAD CONSOLIDATED CASE
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
`AND SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
`INC.,
`
`C.A. NO. 2:21-cv-00041-JRG
`
`Defendants.
`
`RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 2 of 20 PageID #: 311
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 1
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`A. GTP Has Satisfied The Pleading Standard For Direct Infringement ....................... 4
`B. GTP’s Induced Infringement Claims Should Not Be Dismissed. ............................ 9
`C. GTP’s Willfulness Claim Should Not Be Dismissed. ............................................ 12
`D.
`If a More Definitive Statement Is Required, GTP Should Be Granted
`Leave to Amend. .................................................................................................... 13
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13
`
`IV.
`
`i
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`

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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Alacritech Inc. v. Centurylink, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00693,
`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155687 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2017) ................................................. 10, 11
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................... 2
`
`Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., 914 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .............................................................. 3
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) ................................................ 4
`
`Cellular Comms. Equip. LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 6:13-CV-507,
`2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179461 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2015) ........................................................ 9
`
`Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-00300-JRG,
`2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219072, (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2018) ................................................... 8, 9
`
`Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000) .......................................... 1
`
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) ...................................................... 3
`
`Computer Acceleration Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`503 F. Supp. 2d 819 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2007) ......................................................................... 7
`
`Dueling v. Devon Energy Corp., 623 Fed. Appx. 127 (5th Cir. 2015) ........................................... 2
`
`Estech Sys., Inc. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:20-cv-00128-JRG-RSP,
`Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 75 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020) .................................... 10
`
`Fuzzysharp Techs. Inc. v. Nvidia Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126989,
`2013 WL 4766877 (N.D. Ca. Dept. 4, 2013) ............................................................................ 12
`
`Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc.,
`655 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................. 13
`
`Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) ............................................... 3, 4
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ................................................... 3, 4
`
`Inmotion Imagery Techs. v. Brain Damage Films, No. 2:11-CV-414-JRG,
`2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112630 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012) ........................................................ 9
`
`Iron Oak Techs., Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., No. 6:17-cv-00143-RP-JCM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`221346 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017) ............................................................................................ 7
`
`ii
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`

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`
`Jones v. Robinson Prop Grp., L.P.,
`427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2005) ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards,
`677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
`714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................... 4
`
`Lochner Techs., LLC v. AT Labs Inc., No. 2:11-CV-242,
`2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92924 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 5, 2012) .............................................................. 9
`
`Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2004) .................................... 2
`
`MAZ Encryption Techs. LLC v. BlackBerry, Ltd., No. 6:15- cv-1167-RWS-JDL,
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191607 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 7, 2016) ....................................................... 6, 7
`
`McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................... 4
`
`Motiva Patents, LLC v. Sony Corp., 408 F. Supp. 3d 819 (E.D. Tex. 2019) ...................... 3, 11, 12
`
`Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014).................................. 3
`
`Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d 815 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (Davis, J.) .......................... 7
`
`Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., No. 6:19-cv-00207-ADA,
`2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144094 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) .................................................... 6, 9
`
`Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00423-JRG-RSP,
`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56729 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) ...................................................... 5, 7
`
`Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928 (E.D. Tex. 2016)................ 1, 2
`
`Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) ......................................................................................... 2
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Avaya Inc., No. 6:15-cv1168- JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. 181826 (E.D. Tex. May
`13, 2016) .............................................................................................................................. 4, 5, 8
`
`Wapp Tech Ltd. P’ship v. Micro Focus Int’l, PLC,
`406 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .................................................................................. 2, 13
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 5 of 20 PageID #: 314
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271(b) .......................................................................................................................... 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284 ............................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Fed. R Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ...................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) ....................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P.15(a)(2) .................................................................................................................... 2
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 6 of 20 PageID #: 315
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`Plaintiff Gesture Technology Partners, LLC (“GTP”) files this Response to Defendants
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.’s (“Defendants”) Motion
`
`to Dismiss GTP’s Complaint (the “Motion” or “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 23. For the following reasons,
`
`the Motion should be denied in its entirety.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Motion fails for two primary reasons. First, Defendants inappropriately seek a level
`
`of detail about the Accused Products that exceeds the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
`
`Procedure. Defendants do not attempt to explain, let alone articulate, what additional information
`
`they think they need; instead, they summarily conclude that the Complaint is deficient because
`
`they want more information at the pleading stage. Second, Defendants inappropriately seek to
`
`parse GTP’s induced infringement claims by improperly dividing the case into pre- and post-filing
`
`segments, but pre- and post-suit knowledge of the patents are not evaluated separately at the
`
`pleading stage. Defendants have inadequate legal support for such a proposed division at the
`
`pleadings stage and arrive at their position only by ignoring the law of this Court and the entirety
`
`of the Complaint’s allegations. The Motion should therefore be denied.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) – Motions to Dismiss. In the Fifth Circuit, a “motion to dismiss under rule
`
`12(b)(6) ‘is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.’” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
`
`224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale
`
`Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`
`12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint ‘fail[s] to state a claim upon
`
`which relief can be granted.’” Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928,
`
`935 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (Bryson, J.) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). “The question resolved on a
`
`1
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 7 of 20 PageID #: 316
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`motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail,
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`‘but whether
`
`[the]
`
`complaint was
`
`sufficient
`
`to
`
`cross
`
`the
`
`federal
`
`court's
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`threshold.’” Id. (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011)). The “plaintiff is generally
`
`required to provide ‘only a plausible “short and plain” statement of the plaintiff's claim . . .’” Id. at
`
`936 (quoting Skinner, 562 U.S. at 530; Fed. R Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).
`
`The plausibility standard is satisfied when the complaint pleads “enough facts to raise a
`
`reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” in support of the alleged claims. Id.
`
`Thus, particularly when the relevant information is beyond the plaintiff’s access, the courts should
`
`generally permit discovery to proceed unless the complaint recites no more than sheer speculation
`
`about
`
`the plaintiff’s entitlement
`
`to
`
`relief.
`
` See Ashcroft v.
`
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
`
`(2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-
`
`specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
`
`sense.”).
`
`Rule 15(a) – Leave to Amend. When deciding motions to dismiss, Federal Rule 15(a)
`
`instructs the courts to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” within the discretion
`
`of the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Wapp Tech Ltd. P’ship v. Micro Focus Int’l, PLC, 406 F.
`
`Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (Mazzant, J.). This Court has interpreted Federal Rule 15(a)
`
`to “evince[] a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Wapp Tech Ltd. P’ship, 406 F. Supp. 3d
`
`at 593 (quoting Jones v. Robinson Prop Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). Indeed,
`
`“district courts must entertain a presumption in favor of granting parties leave to amend.” Dueling
`
`v. Devon Energy Corp., 623 Fed. Appx. 127, 129 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mayeaux v. La. Health
`
`Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal citation omitted) (holding the
`
`district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend).
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 8 of 20 PageID #: 317
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`Induced Infringement. “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable
`
`as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). “[I]nducement can be found where there is [e]vidence of
`
`active steps taken to encourage direct infringement.” Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., 914 F.3d 1310,
`
`1334 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Inducement also has a knowledge requirement—
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`“liability for inducing infringement attaches only if the defendant knew of the patent and that ‘the
`
`induced acts constitute patent infringement.’” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
`
`1920, 1926 (2015) (quoting Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011)).
`
`Knowledge of the patent can be shown directly or through evidence of willful blindness on the
`
`part of the alleged infringer. See Motiva Patents, LLC v. Sony Corp., 408 F. Supp. 3d 819, 828
`
`(E.D. Tex. 2019) (Gilstrap, C.J.) (collecting relevant Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases).
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`In order to prove knowledge by evidence of willful blindness, the patentee must show that (1) the
`
`defendant “subjectively believes that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
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`defendant must have taken deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Global–Tech. at 769
`
`(citations omitted).
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`Enhanced Damages. “In a case of infringement, courts ‘may increase the damages up to
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`three times the amount found or assessed.’” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923,
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`1928 (2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284). “[A] case presenting ‘subjective bad faith’ alone could
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`‘sufficiently . . . warrant [an enhanced] fee award,’” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (quoting Octane
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`Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 (2014)), as long as the patent
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`infringer’s conduct was “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful,
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`flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. This Court has found
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`that “a well-pled claim for willful blindness is sufficient to state a claim for willful infringement.”
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`See Motiva Patents, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 836–38 (explaining that this determination is “squarely
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`3
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`

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`consistent” with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Global-Tech and Halo and to hold otherwise
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`would present a “legal quagmire”).
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`III.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
`
`GTP Has Satisfied The Pleading Standard For Direct Infringement
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`GTP has sufficiently identified the accused products in the Complaint and has met the
`
`plausibility standard by pleading “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
`
`will reveal evidence” in support of its alleged claims. See Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C., 170 F. Supp. 3d
`
`928, 935 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)).
`
`Defendants’ Motion expressly demands, at the pleading stage, the level of specificity that may not
`
`be required even in infringement contentions, e.g., allegations “how . . . screenshots meet the
`
`language of the exemplary claims.” Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 5. Defendants’ demand is entirely
`
`contrary to controlling law. See K-Tech Telecomms. Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d
`
`1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“It logically follows that a patentee need only plead facts sufficient
`
`to place the alleged infringer on notice as to what he must defend . . . Thus, a plaintiff in a patent
`
`infringement suit is not required to specifically include each element of the claims of the asserted
`
`patent”) (quoting McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). )
`
`(emphasis added)); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Avaya Inc., No. 6:15-cv1168- JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist.
`
`181826, at *14-17 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2016) (Gilstrap, J.) (holding that the plausibility
`
`requirement of Rule 8 “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply
`
`calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ that the
`
`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 556. )).
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`Defendants are, in effect, asking the Court to require that detailed infringement contentions
`
`be included in the Complaint:
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`4
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 10 of 20 PageID #: 319
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`
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`
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`“The only factual evidence GTP submits is four screenshots from Samsung’s
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`website.” Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 5
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`“GTP does not allege how these screenshots meet the language of the exemplary
`
`claims, which claim elements the screenshots purportedly satisfy, or which
`
`features allegedly infringe which claims.” Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 5.
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`
`
`“[T]he Complaint does not tie these control functions to the Accused Features.”
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`Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 6.
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`
`
`“the Complaint only vaguely references the claim limitations without identifying
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`which of the 25 Accused Features supposedly perform each claim limitation.”
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`Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 6.
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`
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`“[T]he Complaint fails to tie the 25 Accused Features to the ‘functions’
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`supposedly infringing the claim.” Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 6.
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`The pleading requirement that Defendants seek to impose would render infringement
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`contentions superfluous and is contrary to well-established precedent. See Uniloc USA, Inc., 2016
`
`U.S. Dist. 181826, at *14-17 (recognizing the need for infringement contentions at an early stage
`
`in the litigation, and “declin[ing] to infuse [Federal Rule] 8(a)’s well-established pleading standard
`
`with such a heightened burden [of including infringement contentions withs the original
`
`complaint] at the initial pleading stage.”).
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`Defendants do not deny that the Complaint identifies the specific patents, specific
`
`exemplary claims, and the Accused Products, including their features and capabilities. And the
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`Complaint identifies those items with more than sufficient detail to state a plausible claim for
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`relief. See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00423-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`56729 at *10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (Payne, J.) (denying a motion to dismiss when plaintiff
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`5
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 11 of 20 PageID #: 320
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`alleged infringement by a “specific supercomputer,” and concluding that “factual assertions about
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`what specific components, features, or capabilities the accused products have, let alone how they
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`allegedly infringe [are] not required at the pleading [stage]”); MAZ Encryption Techs. LLC v.
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`BlackBerry, Ltd., No. 6:15- cv-1167-RWS-JDL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191607, at *9 (E.D. Tex.
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`Jun. 7, 2016) (Love, J.) (denying a motion to dismiss when plaintiff alleged infringement of
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`systems “such as the Blackberry Enterprise Solution,” holding that “[a]llegations to the level of
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`detail contained in infringement contentions are not required at the pleading stage.”). Nothing
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`more is required at the pleading stage. See id.; see also Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., No.
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`6:19-cv-00207-ADA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144094, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) (Albright,
`
`J.) (“Plaintiff’s pleadings are sufficient and . . . any deficiencies will necessarily be addressed when
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`Plaintiff serves its infringement contentions as is required.”).
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`The Complaint’s allegations are thorough and detailed. Paragraph 21 of the Complaint
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`provides an overview of the Asserted Patents. Paragraphs 23-24 put Defendants on notice of the
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`Accused Products. Factual allegations of Defendants’ infringement of each Asserted Patent are
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`described in detail in Paragraphs 31-91, including an identification of a specific claim of each
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`patent that is allegedly infringed by the accused products and features. The Complaint identifies
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`and describes the specific accused products with screen shots, narrative explanations, and
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`hyperlinks to additional supporting information (see, e.g., Paragraphs 25-30). The Complaint also
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`details how the accused products and features infringe each exemplary asserted claim and pleads
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`factual information that more than sufficient to raise a plausible inference that all elements of the
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`asserted claims are infringed. Nothing more is required.
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`Short of full-blown, element-by-element claim charting, which is undeniably not required
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`at the pleading stage, it is difficult to see how a complaint could describe Defendants’ alleged
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`6
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 12 of 20 PageID #: 321
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`infringement in greater detail. The Complaint’s allegations are specific as to the features of the
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`specific Accused Products and are alleged in greater specificity than those in many other patent
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`infringement complaints that have been found to provide sufficient detail when challenged on a
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`motion to dismiss. See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00423-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 56729 at *10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (Payne, J.) (denying a motion to dismiss when
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`plaintiff alleged infringement of a “specific supercomputer,”); MAZ Encryption Techs. LLC, No.
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`6:15- cv-1167-RWS-JDL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191607, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 7, 2016) (Love,
`
`J.) (“[a]llegations to the level of detail contained in infringement contentions are not required at
`
`the pleading stage.”).
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`Defendants’ demands for an “explanation linking the screenshot(s) to the claim element(s)”
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`and more supporting “factual evidence” are mere attempts to impose a pleading standard beyond
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`what the law requires--and, indeed, beyond what is required even of infringement contentions. See
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`Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 4-5; see, also e.g., Iron Oak Techs., Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., No. 6:17-cv-
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`00143-RP-JCM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221346, at *7-8 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017 , at *7-10
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`(denying motion to dismiss direct infringement claim when the defendant was on notice that “any
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`non-Android Acer product utilizing the ‘system and method for remote patching of operating code
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`located in a mobile unit’ would be directly infringing upon [the plaintiff’s] patent.”) (internal
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`quotation marks and citation omitted). The courts allow a patent plaintiff to forgo describing how
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`software infringes in initial infringement contentions and only require a detailed allegation after
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`source code is produced by the defendant. See, e.g., Computer Acceleration Corp. v. Microsoft
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`Corp., 503 F. Supp. 2d 819 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2007) (Clark, J.) (“In software cases, the Court
`
`has recognized the pragmatic limitation on detailed [infringement contentions] when plaintiffs do
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`not have the necessary access to non-public software, which is needed to make detailed
`
`7
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 13 of 20 PageID #: 322
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`infringement contentions.”) (quoting Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d 815, 817 (E.D.
`
`Tex. 2006) (Davis, J.). The allegations of GTP’s Complaint far exceed that standard.
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`Finally, Defendants argue that the Complaint is insufficient because it does not explain
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`how the Accused Instrumentalities infringe the Asserted Patents. See Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 5 (“GTP
`
`does not allege how these screenshots meet the language of the exemplary claims.”) (emphasis in
`
`original). But then Defendants fail to identify any case law requiring that a complaint provide
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`such information. See id. That is because Defendants’ attempt to impose a heightened requirement
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`at the initial pleading stage in this case is unsupported by the law and far beyond the requirements
`
`of Rule 8. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Avaya Inc., No. 6:15-cv-1168-JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`181826, at *14-17 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2016) (Gilstrap, J.) (recognizing the need for infringement
`
`contentions at an early stage in the litigation, and “declin[ing] to infuse [Federal Rule] 8(a)’s well-
`
`established pleading standard with such a heightened burden [of including infringement
`
`contentions with the original complaint] at the initial pleading stage.”). To the extent Defendants
`
`are seeking to understand more particularly how they infringe the Asserted Patents, that additional
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`has already been provided in GTP’s infringement contentions, which were served on April 28,
`
`2021.
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`Defendants’ reliance on Chapterhouse is misplaced. See Dkt. 23, Mot. at 3-5 (citing
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`Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-00300-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219072,
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`(E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2018) (Gilstrap, C. J.)). In that case, the plaintiff sued Shopify for infringement
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`of four patents, including one system claim covering the generation of electronic receipts and
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`initiating transactions. See generally Chapterhouse, No. 2:18-CV-00300-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 219072. In its motion to dismiss, Shopify argued that the plaintiff’s infringement
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`allegations were based on the integration of a third-party application into the Shopify system. Id.
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`8
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 14 of 20 PageID #: 323
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`at *7-8. Shopify therefore successfully argued that its system did not provide one component of
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`the claimed system, and the Court agreed that the plaintiff had not stated a plausible claim for
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`direct infringement under a single entity theory. See Chapterhouse, No. 2:18-CV-00300-JRG,
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`2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219072 . at *7, 9. Defendants do not allege that any similar single entity
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`theory issues exist here, and for at least that reason Chapterhouse is easily distinguished from this
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`case. GTP has plainly satisfied the pleading standard by identifying the Accused Products, as
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`described supra, and creating a plausible inference based on factual allegations that the Asserted
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`Claims are infringed. See e.g., Parity Networks, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (denying a motion to
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`dismiss direct and indirect infringement claims when plaintiff accused numerous “[e]xemplary
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`infringing products”). The Motion should therefore be denied.
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`B.
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`GTP’s Induced Infringement Claims Should Not Be Dismissed.
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`Defendants argue that GTP’s indirect infringement claims should be dismissed because the
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`Complaint does not (1) sufficiently plead pre-suit knowledge of the Asserted Patents; and (2)
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`allege the requisite intent. Dkt. 23, Mot. at 9. Those arguments fail.
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`First, the argument that the Complaint fails to plead pre-suit knowledge sufficiently (see
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`Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 9-10) fails because the Court has repeatedly held that “pre-suit” and “post-
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`suit” indirect infringement claims should not be evaluated separately at the pleading stage. For
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`example, in Lochner Techs., LLC v. AT Labs Inc., No. 2:11-CV-242, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`92924, at *9-10 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 5, 2012) (Gilstrap, J.), the Court declined to dismiss plaintiff’s
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`indirect infringement claims, even though plaintiff did not allege pre-suit knowledge of the
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`asserted patents. The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that there was a “‘pleading
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`deficiency at least with respect to any allegedly infringing activities that pre-date the filing of the
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`Original Complaint’” and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on that basis. Id.; see also Cellular
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`Comms. Equip. LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 6:13-CV-507, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179461, at *26-27
`9
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 15 of 20 PageID #: 324
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`(E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2015) (Davis, J.) (denying motion to dismiss indirect infringement claims
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`based on failure to allege pre-suit knowledge); Inmotion Imagery Techs. v. Brain Damage Films,
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`No. 2:11-CV-414-JRG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112630, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012)
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`(Gilstrap, J.) (same). The Court’s subsequent jurisprudence confirms that there is no reason “to
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`depart from the reasoning of these cases.” Alacritech Inc. v. Centurylink, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-
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`00693-RWS-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155687, at *8-9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2017) (Payne, J.)
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`(denying motion to dismiss pre-suit indirect infringement claims because plaintiff alleged
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`knowledge of the asserted patents as of service of the complaint); see also Estech Sys., Inc. v. Wells
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`Fargo & Co., No. 2:20-cv-00128-JRG-RSP, Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 75 at 6-7
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`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020) (Payne, J.) (denying motion to dismiss indirect infringement claim
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`where plaintiff alleged defendant’s knowledge of the asserted patents “at least as of the date when
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`it was notified of the filing of this action.”). As in those cases, the instant Complaint alleges for
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`each Asserted Patent that “Samsung had knowledge of [the Asserted Patent] at least as of the filing
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`of this Complaint. Compl. at ¶¶ 45, 60, 75, 89. This allegation is sufficient at the pleading stage
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`under the Court’s precedent.
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`Second, Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege any facts to show that
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`Defendants had the requisite intent to induce infringement. See Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 8. But GTP
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`has properly pled that
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`
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`“Samsung took active steps, directly or through contractual relationships with
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`others, with the specific intent to cause them to use the Accused Products in a
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`manner that infringes one or more claims” of each Asserted Patent;
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` Defendants took those active steps “with the knowledge of the ’431 patent and
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`with the knowledge that the induced acts constitute[d] infringement;” and
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`10
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 16 of 20 PageID #: 325
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` Defendants’ actions were “willful, intentional, deliberate, or in conscious disregard
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`of the Plaintiff’s rights” See Compl. ¶¶ 46, 61, 76, 91.
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`This Court has consistently found that such allegations satisfy the pleading requirements for intent
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`and willfulness at the pleading stage. See Estech Systems, Inc. v. Target Corporation et al., 2:20-
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`cv-00123-JRG-RSP, Dkt. 75 at 13-14 (“Wells Fargo argues that Estech's claims of indirect and
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`willful infringement fail because Estech does not allege that Wells Fargo had pre-suit knowledge
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`of the Asserted Patents through either actual knowledge or willful blindness. . . Wells Fargo is
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`prematurely trying to parse pre-filing scienter from post-filing scienter. . . Estech prevails here as
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`it pleads all the elements needed to allege claims for induced, contributory, and willful
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`infringement”); see also Alacritech, No. 2:16-CV-00693-RWS-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`155687, at *8-9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2017) (Payne, J.) (denying motion to dismiss pre-suit indirect
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`infringement claims because plaintiff alleged knowledge of the asserted patents as of service of
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`the complaint).
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`Defendants’ reliance on Motiva Patents is misplaced. As the Motion acknowledges, the
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`Court there denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s induced infringement allegations because
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`Motiva had properly pled that the defendant in that case was “willfully blind” to infringing
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`conduct. Dkt. No. 23, Mot. at 10-11 (citing Motiva Patents, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 833–34).
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`Defendants then argue that the Complaint does not allege “that Samsung ‘has been willfully blind’
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`to GTP’s patents.” Id. at p. 11. But the Complaint plainly alleges that Defendants’ actions were
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`“willful, intentional, deliberate, or in conscious disregard of the Plaintiff’s rights.” See Compl.
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`¶¶ 46, 61, 76, 91 (emphasis added). Defendants’ argument is pure semantic gymnastics. While
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`the Complaint does not use the exact phrase “has been willfully blind,” its allegation of “conscious
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`disregard of the Plaintiff’s rights” is directly analogous to the allegations in Motiva Patents that
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`11
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 33 Filed 05/11/21 Page 17 of 20 PageID #: 326
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`the Court found sufficient to support a pleading of induced infringement, and Defendants have not
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`cited any case law to the contrary. Indeed, elsewhere in the Motion, Defendants concede that the
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`relevant allegations in GTP’s Complaint are “nearly identical” to those in the Motiva Patents
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`complaint. Dkt. No. 23, p. 13.
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`Defendants’ request to dismiss GTP’s induced infringement claims should therefore be
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`denied.
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`C.
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`GTP’s Willfulness Claim Should Not Be Dismissed.
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`Defendants argue that GTP’s claims for willful infringement should be dismissed because
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`GTP failed to adeq