Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 1 of 25 PageID 477
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp
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`)))))))))))
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`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
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`MATCH.COM L.L.C.,
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`Defendant.
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`Plaintiff,
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` v.
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`DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
`AND MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 2 of 25 PageID 478
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND. ......................................................................................... 1
`
`B.E.’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Match’s Counterclaims Satisfy The Notice Pleading Requirements Of Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 8....................................................................................................................2
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`Match’s Counterclaims Are Adequately Pled Under The Federal Rules Of Civil
`Procedure .................................................................................................................5
`
`III.
`
`B.E.’S MOTION TO STRIKE SHOULD BE DENIED .................................................... 6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Motions To Strike Are Disfavored ..........................................................................6
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`B.E.’s Claim That The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Applies To Affirmative Defenses
`Should Be Rejected ..................................................................................................7
`
`C.
`
`Each of Match’s Affirmative Defenses Has Been Adequately Pled ......................10
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`8.
`
`9.
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`Non-Infringement ..................................................................................... 10
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`Invalidity ................................................................................................... 11
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`Prosecution History Estoppel .................................................................... 12
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`No Injunctive Relief .................................................................................. 13
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`Patent Misuse ............................................................................................ 14
`
`Failure To State A Claim .......................................................................... 14
`
`Estoppel, Waiver, Implied License, Express License, Laches ................. 15
`
`Good Faith, Limitation on Patent Damages, Patent Marking,
`Invalid Claim ............................................................................................ 16
`
`Unclean Hands, Estoppel, Acquiescence, and/or Other Equitable
`Defenses .................................................................................................... 17
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17
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`i
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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 3 of 25 PageID 479
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................................... passim
`Avocent Redmond Corp. v. U.S.,
`No. 08-69C, 2009 WL 367499 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Feb. 5, 2009) ...................................................... 10
`Barry Fiala, Inc. v. Arthur Blank & Co., Inc.,
`No. 2:02-cv-2282, 2003 WL 22309442 (W.D. Tenn., Feb. 19, 2003) ....................................... 6
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,
`No. 10-1045 RMB-JS, 2011 WL 6934557 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) .......................................... 9
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................................................... passim
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States,
`201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.1953) ................................................................................................... 6, 7
`Conley v. Gibson,
`355 U.S. 41 (1957) ...................................................................................................................... 2
`Damron v. ATM Central LLC,
`No. 1:10-cv-01210-JDB-egb, 2010 WL 6512345 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) ..................... 6, 9
`Duramed Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc.,
`No. 308-CV-00116-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 5232908 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2008) .................. 12, 17
`eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
`547 U.S. 388 (2006) .................................................................................................................. 13
`Elan Pharma Intern. Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd.,
`No. 09-1008 (JAG), 2010 WL 1372316 (D.N.J. March 31, 2010) ................................... 2, 4, 11
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 12
`First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs.,
`No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) ................................................... 8
`Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton Dickinson and Co.,
`No. 09-cv-2319-BEN, 2010 WL 4442731 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) ....................................... 14
`Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co.,
`No. 1:10-cv-3008, 2011 WL 5829674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) .............................................. 12
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 132 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................... 5
`Keene Corp. v. United States,
`508 U.S. 200 (1993) .................................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`
`Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
`No. 2:11-cv-02601-JTF, 2012 WL 4062663 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) ....................... passim
`K-Tech Telecomm, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
`714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................. 5
`Mark IV Industries Corp. v. Transcore, L.P.,
` No. 09-418, 2009 WL 4828661 (D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) .......................................................... 15
`McLemore v. Regions Bank,
`Nos. 3:08–cv–0021 & 3:08–cv–1003, 2010 WL 1010092 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) ........... 8
`McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 5
`Microsoft Corp. v. Phoenix Sol’ns, Inc.,
`741 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ...................................................................................... 4
`Montgomery v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................ 8, 10
`MTA Metro-North R.R. v. Buchanan Marine, L.P.,
`No. 05 Civ. 881, 2006 WL 3655244, (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2006) ................................................ 15
`Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational, Inc.,
`No. 5:11-cv-00135-R, 2011 WL 5525938 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) ..................................... 12
`Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Norma Espinosa 2007-1 Ins. Trust,
`No. 09–300–LPS, 2011 WL 710970 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2011) .................................................... 9
`Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,
`726 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2010) .................................................................................... 4, 12
`Rosada v. John Wieland Homes & Neighborhoods, Inc.,
`No. 3:09–cv–653–J–20MCR, 2010 WL 1249841 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010) ......................... 15
`Schinzing v. Mid-States Stainless, Inc.,
`415 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................................... 2
`Senju Pharms. v. Apotex, Inc.,
`Civ. No. 12-159-SLR, 2013 WL 444928 (D. Del. Feb. 6, 2013) ............................................... 8
`Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc.,
`630 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Del. 2009) .......................................................................................... 16
`Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.,
`609 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. Del. 2009) ...................................................................................... 3, 16
`Teirstein v. AGA Medical Corp.,
`No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) .............................................. 12, 13
`Trading Tech. Int'l., Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc.,
`No. 10-cv-715, 2011 WL 3946581 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011) .................................................... 11
`Under Sea Indust., Inc. v. Dacor Corp.,
`833 F.2d 1551 (Fed.Cir.1987) .................................................................................................... 2
`
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`iii
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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 5 of 25 PageID 481
`
`
`Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
`395 U.S. 100 (1969) .................................................................................................................. 14
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 105 ............................................................................................................................. 12
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 285 ............................................................................................................................. 16
`35 U.S.C. § 286 ............................................................................................................................. 16
`35 U.S.C. § 287 ............................................................................................................................. 16
`35 U.S.C. § 288 ............................................................................................................................. 16
`
`FEDERAL RULES
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ........................................................................................................................ 2, 11
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ............................................................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 7
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 2
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) ................................................................................................................... 7, 15
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)................................................................................................................... 11
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(a) ................................................................................................................ 7
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ....................................................................................................... 7, 14, 15, 16
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ............................................................................................................................ 3
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .......................................................................................................................... 12
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................... 1
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ................................................................................................................ 1, 6, 7
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 ............................................................................................................................ 5
`Fed. R. Civ. P., Form 18 ............................................................................................................. 1, 5
`Fed. R. Civ. P., Form 30 ....................................................................................................... 1, 5, 15
`
`STATE RULES
`Local Patent Rule 3.1 ...................................................................................................................... 1
`Local Patent Rule 3.3 ...................................................................................................................... 4
`Local Patent Rule 3.5 ...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`
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`iv
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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 6 of 25 PageID 482
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`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
`Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (2d ed.1990) .............................................................. 6, 7
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`v
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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 7 of 25 PageID 483
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`
`I.
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`RELEVANT BACKGROUND.
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`B.E. Technology, L.L.C. (“B.E.”) accuses Match.Com L.L.C. (“Match”) of infringing
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 (“the ‘314 Patent”) by allegedly “providing demographically targeted
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`advertising.” See Compl. ¶ 11, D.E. 1. B.E.’s Complaint fails to provide any details as to why
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`or how Match’s products infringe the ‘314 Patent. Match filed its Answer, asserting multiple
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`affirmative defenses, and a Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment on December 31, 2012. See
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`Answer, D.E. 19. On January 25, 2013, B.E. filed a Motion to Dismiss Under to Federal Rule of
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`Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Motion to Strike Under to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
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`and a supporting memorandum. See D.E. 30 (Motion); D.E. 30-1 (Memorandum). On January
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`7, 2013, B.E. served its Initial Infringement Contentions pursuant to Local Patent Rule 3.1.
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`Match served its Initial Non-infringement Contentions on February 7, 2013.
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`II.
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`B.E.’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED.
`
`Match’s counterclaims satisfy and are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure, Forms 18 and 30, and precedent. Indeed, Match’s counterclaims contain the same, if
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`not more, detail than B.E.’s allegations of infringement in its Complaint. Neither the Federal
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`Rules, nor the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
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`(2007) or Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) support B.E.’s suggestion of a heightened
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`pleading standard.1
`
`
`1 The infringement allegations in B.E.’s Complaint are no more specific than the non-
`infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability Counts of Match’s Counterclaims. B.E. alleges
`in conclusory fashion that “Match has infringed the ‘314 patent by using a method of
`providing demographically targeted advertising that directly infringes at least Claim 11 of the
`‘314 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” D.E. 1 at Compl. ¶ 11.
`Nowhere does B.E. specify the specific product or why Match’s product actually infringes
`Claim 11.
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`
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`

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`A. Match’s Counterclaims Satisfy The Notice Pleading Requirements Of Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 8
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`Pleadings comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim
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`showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), such that the defendant is
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`given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550
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`U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Determining compliance with
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`this standard is not “a ‘fact-based’ question of law,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674, and “does not require
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`‘detailed factual allegations,’” but a claim for relief must be “plausible on its face.” Id. at 678
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`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
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`for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
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`judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Match’s counterclaims plainly adhere to
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`that standard.
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`Match’s First Counterclaim for a Declaratory Judgment of Non-Infringement alleges that
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`its products do not infringe any valid and/or enforceable claim of the ‘314 Patent. B.E. claims
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`that this counterclaim “falls well short of the requirements articulated in Twombly and Iqbal.”
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`D.E. 30-1 at 13. However, B.E. brought the instant action for infringement against Match and
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`B.E. has the burden of proof as to infringement of the ‘314 Patent. See Schinzing v. Mid-States
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`Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 814 (8th Cir. 2005) (where defendant counterclaimed for a
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`declaratory judgment of non-infringement, patent holder “was obligated to counterclaim for
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`infringement and had the burden to show infringement”); Under Sea Indust., Inc. v. Dacor Corp.,
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`833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The burden is always on the patentee to show
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`infringement”). Therefore, B.E. is on notice as to Match’s non-infringement counterclaims. See
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`Elan Pharma Intern. Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., No. 09-1008 (JAG), 2010 WL 1372316, at *4 (D.N.J.
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`March 31, 2010) (concluding that non-infringement counterclaims merely averring that the
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`2
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`defendant’s product did not infringe the listed patents satisfied Rule 8(a) and put the plaintiff on
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`full notice of the defendant’s claims of non-infringement). Moreover, it would be nonsensical to
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`suggest that Plaintiff’s Complaint, which contains fewer factual allegations than Defendant’s
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`non-infringement counterclaim, is somehow satisfactory while a mirror allegation of non-
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`infringement is not. Such a result is plainly not supported by Iqbal or Twombly.
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`Match’s Second Counterclaim for a Declaratory Judgment of Invalidity alleges that the
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`‘314 Patent is invalid. B.E. contends that Match’s second counterclaim simply reads “[t]he
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`claims of the ‘314 Patent are invalid for failing to satisfy one or more of the conditions for
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`patentability set forth in Title 35, United States Code, including §§ 101, 102, 103 and/or 112, and
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`the rules, regulations, and laws pertaining thereto.” D.E. at 30-1 at 10. However, B.E. fails to
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`note that Match’s counterclaim includes the specific allegations that “[t]he ‘392 Patent (in view
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`of the ‘061 Patent) renders obvious at least claim 11 of the ‘314 Patent” (D.E. 19 at
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`Counterclaim ¶ 19) and that “[t]he ‘418 Patent anticipates and/or renders obvious at least claim
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`11 of the ‘314 Patent” (D.E. 19 at Counterclaim ¶ 20). In other words, the counterclaim points to
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`specific prior art as a basis for invalidity. These allegations are sufficient to put B.E. on notice of
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`Match’s claim and the grounds upon which this claim rests.
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`Similarly, Match’s Third Counterclaim alleges that the ‘314 Patent is unenforceable due
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`to laches. As noted above, B.E. brought the instant action for infringement against Match’s
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`products and services, which have been on the market for many years. B.E. had an obligation
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`under Rule 11 to verify its infringement claims and it can be reasonably inferred that B.E. knew
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`of its rights against Match and intended to relinquish those rights, by failing to assert its patent
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`for nearly a decade, thereby facially demonstrating laches. See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
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`Aruba Networks, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 353, 357 (D. Del. 2009) (“[g]iven that equitable estoppel
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`3
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`‘is not limited to a particular factual situation not subject to resolution by simple or hard and fast
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`rules,’ and that the factual record before the Court is sparse,” equitable estoppel defense not
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`deemed insufficient).
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`Moreover, dismissal of Match’s counterclaims would undermine the Local Patent Rules,
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`which require more detailed disclosures at a later stage. Pursuant to the Local Patent Rules, both
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`parties are required to disclose certain information regarding their theories of the case. Indeed,
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`Local Patent Rule 3.3 required Match to serve its Initial Non-Infringement Contentions on
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`February 7, 2013, which it did, after B.E. served its Initial Infringement Contentions. Similarly,
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`Local Patent Rule 3.5 requires Match to serve its Invalidity and Unenforceability Contentions.
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`Under the Local Patent Rules these filings will contain any additional basis for Match’s
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`counterclaims.
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`Multiple district courts have concluded that local patent rules requiring similar
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`disclosures advise against dismissal of counterclaims for alleged noncompliance with Rule 8(a).
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`See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Phoenix Sol’ns, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
`
`(“[B]ecause the Court requires that invalidity contentions be served promptly after a
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`counterclaim of invalidity is advanced, invalidity claims are not subject to the heightened
`
`pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal.”); Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938
`
`(N.D. Ill. 2010) (“In analogous cases, other district courts have concluded that local patent rules
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`requiring similar disclosures militate against dismissal of counterclaims for failure to meet the
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`pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).”). The same consideration applies to Match’s affirmative
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`defenses. See, e.g., Elan Pharma, 2010 WL 1372316, at *5 (“This motion suggests a factual
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`disclosure that the Federal Circuit does not require, and a disclosure that, if required here, would
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`4
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`make [the Local Patent Rules] superfluous. This Court cannot rule in a manner that undermines
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`logic, the Federal Rules, and the District of New Jersey Local Patent Rules.”).
`
`B. Match’s Counterclaims Are Adequately Pled Under The Federal Rules Of
`Civil Procedure
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`Match’s counterclaims for declaratory judgment are consistent with Forms 18 and 30 of
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`the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 states that the forms in
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`the appendix to the Federal Rules “suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and
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`brevity that these rules contemplate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 84. Form 30 provides that counterclaims
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`should be “[s]et forth . . . in the same way a claim is pleaded in a complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`app. Form 30. Form 18 states that a complaint for patent infringement should include:
`
`(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
`owns the patent; (3) a statement that the defendant has been
`infringing the patent “by making, selling, and using [the device]
`embodying the patent”; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given
`the defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for
`injunction and damages.
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012) (quoting McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007));
`
`see also K-Tech Telecomm, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`Match’s First Counterclaim provides an allegation of jurisdiction, (D.E. 19 at
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`Counterclaim ¶¶ 3-5); (b) a statement that an actual controversy exists as to whether the patents
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`are infringed, (D.E. 19 at Counterclaim ¶¶ 6-8); (c) an allegation that Match has not and does not
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`infringe the patent-in-suit literally or under the doctrine of equivalents (D.E. 19 at Counterclaim
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`¶ 13); and (d) a demand for relief in the form of a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
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`(D.E. 19 at Counterclaim ¶¶ 14-15). Match’s Second (invalidity) and Third (laches)
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`
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`5
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`

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`Counterclaims contain similar allegations. See D.E. 19 at Counterclaim at ¶¶ 16-22 (Second
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`Counterclaim); D.E. 19 at Counterclaim at ¶¶ 23- 26 (Third Counterclaim).2
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`III. B.E.’S MOTION TO STRIKE SHOULD BE DENIED
`
`A. Motions To Strike Are Disfavored
`
`The purpose of a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is to
`
`eliminate “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter in any pleading, and [it] is
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`the primary procedure for objecting to an insufficient defense.” Barry Fiala, Inc. v. Arthur
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`Blank & Co., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-2282, 2003 WL 22309442 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2003) (citing 5A
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`Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (2d ed. 1990)).
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`A motion to strike must be denied unless B.E. has “shown that the allegations being challenged
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`are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that
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`their pleading throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party.” Wright &
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`Miller, § 1380, at 650; see also Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A., No. 2:11-cv-02601-JTF,
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`2012 WL 4062663, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) (“It is ‘well established that the action of
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`striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts.’”) (citing Brown & Williamson
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`Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)) (internal citations omitted).
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`Additionally, this Court has specifically admonished plaintiffs for moving to strike affirmative
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`defenses before any discovery has occurred. See Damron v. ATM Central LLC, No. 1:10-cv-
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`01210-JDB-egb, 2010 WL 6512345, *2-3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) (denying motion to strike
`
`
`2 Even after Twombly, the Forms continue to be the standard to which direct infringement is
`measured. See In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (“[T]o the extent that the parties argue
`that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the Forms and create differing pleading
`requirements, the Forms control.”) (citing McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1360); see also Twombly, 550
`U.S. at 569 n. 14 (acknowledging that altering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be
`accomplished by judicial interpretation).
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`6
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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 13 of 25 PageID 489
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`and noting it is “particularly inappropriate at this early stage, before any discovery has
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`occurred”).
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`Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit expressly discourages motions to strike, characterizing
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`them as “a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.”
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`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 201 F.2d at 822 (citations omitted); see also Wright &
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`Miller, § 1380, at 647-49 (“motions under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are
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`infrequently granted”); id., § 1381, at 672 (“even when technically appropriate and well-founded,
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`they often are not granted in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the moving party.”).
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`Therefore, even if a court grants a motion to strike, “the general practice is to grant the defendant
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`leave to amend.” Id.
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`B.
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`B.E.’s Claim That The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Applies To Affirmative
`Defenses Should Be Rejected
`
`Match’s Affirmative Defenses are adequately stated under Rules 8(b) and (c) and
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`governing precedent. B.E.’s claim that Match’s asserted affirmative defenses should be held to a
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`higher standard than B.E.’s infringement allegations has been rejected by this Court. Unlike a
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`claim, an affirmative defense does not entitle Match to any form of relief. This difference is
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`expressly reflected in the language of Rule 8. Specifically, while Rule 8(a) provides that “a
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`claim for relief” must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
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`is entitled to relief,” Rule 8(b), by contrast, requires only that a party “state in short and plain
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`terms its defenses.”3 Consequently, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have found the
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`3 B.E. claims that “[n]othing would be added if Rule 8(b)(1)(a) said that [a defendant] must
`‘state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it showing that the
`opposing party is not entitled to relief.’” D.E. 30-1 at 9. B.E. does not explain why the rule
`does not state that a defendant must “show in short and plain terms its defenses” or why this
`Court should ignore the canon of statutory interpretation that different phrasings within a
`statute should be given different meanings. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200,
`(continued…)
`
`
`
`7
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 14 of 25 PageID 490
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`Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards inapplicable to affirmative defenses.4 See, e.g., McLemore v.
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`Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08–cv–0021 & 3:08–cv–1003, 2010 WL 1010092, at *14 (M.D. Tenn.
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`Mar. 18, 2010) (“The Sixth Circuit has consistently used ‘fair notice’ as the standard for whether
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`a defendant has sufficiently pleaded an affirmative defense. Twombly and Iqbal did not change
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`this.”) (citations omitted); First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., No. 08-cv-12805, 2009
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`WL 22861, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) (“Twombly’s analysis of the ‘short and plain
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`statement’ requirement of Rule 8(a) is inapplicable to [a motion to strike affirmative
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`defenses].”); see also Senju Pharms. v. Apotex, Inc., Civ. No. 12-159-SLR, 2013 WL 444928, at
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`*4 (D. Del. Feb. 6, 2013) (same).
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`Moreover, courts have stated numerous of other reasons why the pleading standards for
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`affirmative defenses at issue in this case differ from the standards for pleading claims for relief:
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`(1) a diminished concern that plaintiffs receive notice in light of their
`ability to obtain more information during discovery;
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`(2) the absence of a concern that the defense is “unlocking the doors of
`discovery”;
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`(3) the limited discovery costs, in relation to the costs imposed on a
`defendant, since it is unlikely that either side will pursue discovery on
`frivolous defenses;
`
`
`(…continued)
`
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`208 (1993) (“W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
`omits it in another . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
`in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (internal quotation omitted).
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`4 The Sixth Circuit, post-Twombly/Iqbal, has stated that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil
`Procedure do not require a heightened pleading standard for a statute of repose defense.”
`Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009). This holding has been applied
`within the Sixth Circuit to affirmative defenses similar to those raised by Match. See
`Kilgore-Wilson, 2012 WL 4062663, at *3.
`
`
`
`8
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02834-JPM-tmp Document 47 Filed 07/29/13 Page 15 of 25 PageID 491
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`(4) the unfairness of holding the defendant to the same pleading standard
`as the plaintiff, when the defendant has only a limited time to respond
`after service of the complaint . . . ;
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`(5) the low likelihood that motions to strike . . . would expedite the
`litigation given that leave to amend is routinely granted;
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`(6) the risk that a defendant will waive a defense at trial by failing to plead
`it at the early stage of the litigation;
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`(7) the lack of detail in Form 30, which demonstrates the appropriate
`pleading of an affirmative defense; and
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`(8) the fact that a heightened pleading requirement would produce more
`motions to strike, which are disfavored.
`
`See Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045 RMB-JS, 2011 WL
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`6934557, at *1-2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (collecting cases). Therefore, motions to strike
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`affirmative defenses are appropriately viewed as “a drastic remedy.” Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
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`Norma Espinosa 2007-1 Ins. Trust, No. 09–300–LPS, 2011 WL 710970, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 22,
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`2011). Moreover, such motions should only be granted if “they [the affirmative defenses] are so
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`unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that
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`their presence in the pleading throughout the proceeding