Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 1 of 17 PageID 679
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`AMAZON DIGITAL SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
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`
`No.: 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp
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`JURY DEMAND
`
`MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT AMAZON DIGITAL SERVICES, INC.
`IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`Glen G. Reid, Jr. (#8184)
`greid@wyattfirm.com
`Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr. (#06389)
`mvorder-bruegge@wyattfirm.com
`WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
`The Renaissance Center
`1715 Aaron Brenner Dr., Suite 800
`Memphis, TN 38120-4367
`(901) 537-1000
`
`Counsel for Defendant
`AMAZON DIGITAL SERVICES, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`J. David Hadden
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`Darren F. Donnelly
`ddonnelly@fenwick.com
`Saina S. Shamilov
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`Ryan J. Marton
`rmarton@fenwick.com
`Clifford Webb
`cwebb@fenwick.com
`Justin Hulse
`jhulse@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`(650) 988-8500
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 2 of 17 PageID 680
`Case 2:12—cv—O2767—JPM—tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 2 of 17 Page|D 680
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
`INTRODUCTION ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— ——1
`
`ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
`ARGUMENT ————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————1
`
`I. 
`I.
`
`II. 
`II.
`
`III. 
`III.
`
`IV. 
`IV.
`
`THE PATENT LAWS PROHIBT
`THE PATENT LAWS PROHIBT
`PURELY FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING ------------------------------------------------ 1 
`PURELY FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING ------------------------------------------------1
`
`THE PURELY FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF THE
`THE PURELY FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF THE
`ASSERTED CLAIMS RENDER THEM INDEFINITE ---------------------------- 4 
`ASSERTED CLAIMS RENDER THEM INDEFINITE -------------------------- --4
`
`THE ASSERTED PATENTS DISCLOSE NO STRUCTURE
`THE ASSERTED PATENTS DISCLOSE NO STRUCTURE
`TO PERFORM THE CLAIMED FUNCTIONS -------------------------------------- 7 
`TO PERFORM THE CLAIMED FUNCTIONS ------------------------------------ --7
`
`THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`VIOLATE THE POSSESSION RULE ------------------------------------------------ 9 
`VIOLATE THE POSSESSION RULE ------------------------------------------------9
`
`CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
`CONCLUSION ————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— -- 10
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 3 of 17 PageID 681
`
`Cases:
`
`Page(s):
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc.,
`132 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2001) --------------------------------------------------------- 6
`
`Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`570 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ---------------------------------------------------------- 6
`
`Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`318 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.
`877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
`rev’d on other grounds 695 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) -------------------------------------- 7
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ----------------------------------------------------------- passim
`
`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8
`
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
`
`Fuller v. Yentzer,
`94 U.S. 288 (1876) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
`
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,
`91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
`
`Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,
`67 S. Ct. 6 (1946) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
`
`HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG,
`667 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5
`
`Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.
`802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied 480 U.S. 947 (1987) -------------------------- 8
`
`Juxtacomm-Texas Software, LLC v. Axway, Inc.,
`No. 6:10-cv-11, 2011 WL 6102057 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2011) ------------------------------- 6
`
`Kozam v. Phase Forward, Inc.,
`No. 04-1787, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46850 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2005) --------------------- 5–6
`
`LG Elecs., Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.,
`No. 07-cv-361, 2008 WL 4613054 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 4, 2008) ------------------------------- 3
`
`- ii -
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 4 of 17 PageID 682
`
`
`Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 10
`
`Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc.
`107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 10
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) --------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
`
`Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software,
`462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
`
`Noah Sys. v. Intuit, Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) --------------------------------------------------------------- 8–9
`
`O’Reilly v. Morse,
`56 U.S. 62 (1853) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 9
`
`Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 9
`
`Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Const.,
`172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
`
`Soque Holdings (Berm.) Ltd. v. Keyscan, Inc.,
`No. C 09-2651, 2010 WL 2292316 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) -------------------------------- 3
`
`Stanacard, LLC v. Rebtel Networks, AB,
`680 F. Supp. 2d 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ----------------------------------------------------------- 6
`
`Transperfect Global, Inc. v. MotionPoint Corp.,
`2013 WL 2299621 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2013)-------------------------------------------------- 3
`
`United Carbon v. Binney & Smith Co.,
`317 U.S. 228 (1942) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
`
`Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc.,
`983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
`
`Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc.,
`No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 WL 3734106 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2009) ----------------------------- 3
`
`Statutes and Rules:
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- passim
`
`
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`- iii -
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`
`Miscellaneous:
`
`Ex Parte Emigh,
`No. 2012-005145, 2013 WL 1450915 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 12, 2013) ---------------------------- 7
`
`Ex Parte Erol,
`No. 2011-001143, 2013 WL 1341107 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 11, 2013) ---------------------------- 7
`
`Ex Parte Rodriguez,
`No. 2010-003169 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 1, 2009) ------------------------------------------------------- 5
`
`Ex Parte Roussi,
`No. 2008-000693 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 7, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------ 5
`
`Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining
`Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 and for Treatment of
`Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162 (Feb. 9, 2011) ------------- 6, 10
`
`
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`- iv -
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`INTRODUCTION
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`B.E. Technology, LLC (“B.E.”) contends that it can own all ways for achieving a result,
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`without disclosing a single solution, as long as it avoids the “magic words” “means for.” Not
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`only is that not the law, it turns a hundred years of Supreme Court precedent on its head. A
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`patent that claims an invention only by its function, and thus seeks to appropriate from the public
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`any future improvements and innovations that achieve the same result, was invalid before
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`Congress enacted Section 112 paragraph 6 and remains so after. A patentee may claim only his
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`invention—his particular solution to achieve the desired result. Section 112 paragraph 6 merely
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`allows a patentee to specify that solution in the specification rather than in the claim itself.
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`Amazon’s Motion to Dismiss challenged B.E. to tell the Court where it could find the required
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`solution—an algorithm that implements the functions and achieves the results B.E. claims. B.E.
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`failed to identify any such solution either in its claims or specification. B.E.’s patents are invalid
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`on their face. No amount of delay, skill in the art, or opinions of paid experts can salvage them.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`THE PATENT LAWS PROHIBT PURELY FUNCTIONAL
`CLAIMING.
`For well over a century, it has been the law that a patent “will not be sustained if the
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`claim is for a result.” Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U.S. 288, 288 (1876). A claim to a result is
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`impermissible because it would grant to the patentee “the exclusive right to every improvement
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`. . . [mattering] not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.” O’Reilly v. Morse,
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`56 U.S. 62, 112–113 (1853). A valid claim must describe the patentee’s particular solution: “the
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`means or apparatus by which the result is obtained.” Fuller, 94 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
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`In doing so, the claim must “clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art
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`and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.” United Carbon v. Binney &
`
`Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
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`
`
`

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`Congress’ passing of Section 112 paragraph 6 did not change the rule that prohibits
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`claiming an invention by its function or result.1 Nor did it establish “means for” as “magic
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`words” that invoke a higher standard of disclosure as B.E. suggests. Prior to the passage of
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`Section 112 paragraph 6, a claim that recited only results with no structure or acts for achieving
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`those results was invalid. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 67 S. Ct. 6, 10 (1946).
`
`Section 112 paragraph 6, consistent with the rule prohibiting functional claiming, “limited the
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`breadth of such claim language by restricting its scope to the structure disclosed in the
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`specification and equivalents thereof.” Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580,
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`1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The rule—that to be valid a claim must be to a particular structure,
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`algorithm, or apparatus for achieving a result or performing a function, and not to the result or
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`function itself—remained unchanged. Section 112 paragraph 6 merely provides the claim drafter
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`the option of disclosing that specific limiting structure, algorithm, or apparatus in the patent
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`specification rather than the claim itself. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d
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`1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993). At the end of the day, the result is the same. A patentee cannot
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`own all ways for achieving a result or performing a function, but only the inventor’s particular
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`solution. That solution must be recited in the claim language itself or in the specification.
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`B.E. relies heavily on the rebuttable presumption that the use the words “means for” in a
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`claim shows that the patentee intended to avail himself of the option provided by Section 112
`
`paragraph 6 of reciting the required structure in the specification rather than the claim itself. See
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`Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But that reli-
`
`ance makes no sense in this case. This is not a case where a claim recites its own structure such
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`that it should not be limited to the structures disclosed in the specification. Here, the claims are
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`undeniably and completely structure-less. Under these circumstances, it is irrelevant whether the
`
`
`1 In the 2011 amendments to the Patent Act, Congress relabeled Section 112 paragraph 6 as
`112(f). For sake of continuity with the case law, Section 112 paragraph 6 is used throughout.
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`applicant intended to invoke Section 112 paragraph 6 because the sole source of structure must
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`come, if from anywhere, from the specification. And yet here, the specification, too, is undenia-
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`bly and completely structure-less. Under these circumstances, the claims simply violate the
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`basic prohibition against purely functional claims that the Supreme Court established over a
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`hundred years ago and the Federal Circuit has repeatedly enforced. Whether or not a claim uses
`
`the words “means for,” if it recites no structure for performing the claimed function, Section 112
`
`paragraph 6 applies and the claim is limited to the corresponding structure disclosed in the
`
`specification and equivalents. See Transperfect Global, Inc. v. MotionPoint Corp., 2013 WL
`
`2299621, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2013) (presumption against Section 112 paragraph 6
`
`treatment rebutted with respect to the term “module for”); Soque Holdings (Berm.) Ltd. v.
`
`Keyscan, Inc., No. C 09-2651, 2010 WL 2292316, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) (“[I]f [the
`
`term] ‘computer’ is insufficient structure for a ‘means’ limitation, the naked term ‘computer’
`
`cannot describe sufficient structure when recited directly in the claim limitation”(internal cita-
`
`tions omitted)); Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 WL 3734106,
`
`at *14 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2009) (finding “device” to be a means-plus-function limitation and
`
`concluding that because there was no algorithm for running the device the claim was indefinite);
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`LG Elecs., Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 07-cv-361, 2008 WL 4613054, at *2 (W.D. Wis.
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`Mar. 4, 2008) (finding that “input unit receiving”, “recording unit”, and “reproducing unit” were
`
`means-plus-function claims and stating that “[i]f a patentee can avoid the limitations of § 112, ¶
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`6, simply by taking the function and turning it into a noun, it is difficult to understand what
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`purpose the section serves”). “The point of the requirement that the patentee disclose particular
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`structure in the specification and that the scope of the patent claims be limited to that structure is
`
`to avoid pure functional claiming.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521
`
`F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). If no such structure is disclosed, the patent is invalid.
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`
`II.
`
`THE PURELY FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF THE ASSERTED
`CLAIMS RENDER THEM INDEFINITE.
`The asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,771,290 (the “’290 patent”) and U.S. Patent
`
`No. 6,141,010 (the “’010 patent”) claim a computer program solely by the functions it performs.
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`(See Motion at 9–17.) For the ’290 patent, these include: “display a graphical user interface
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`comprising an application window having a number of user-selectable items,” and “in response
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`to selection by a user of one of said items [] access the associated information resource over the
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`network.” (’290 patent, claim 2, col. 39, l. 1–col. 40, l. 11.) For the ’010 patent, the claimed
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`functions include: “display a graphical user interface” and “select the information data to be
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`displayed from among a larger amount of [] informational data.” (’010 patent, col. 21, l. 32–
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`col. 22, l. 4.) The claims do not define how any of this is done, namely what the invention is.
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`They are therefore subject to Section 112 paragraph 6.
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`As Judge Rader explained in his concurrence in Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and
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`Court Const., 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999), if a “claim element recites only an underlying
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`function without acts for performing it, then § 112, ¶ 6 applies even without express step-plus-
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`function language.” Id. at 850. “[T]he ‘underlying function’ of a claim element corresponds to
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`what that element ultimately accomplishes in relationship to what the other elements of the claim
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`and the claim as a whole accomplish. ‘Acts’ on the other hand, correspond to how the function is
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`accomplished.” Id. Judge Rader gave an example of such a purely functional element from the
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`case at hand: “[I]f this claim limitation had specified only the underlying function, namely
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`‘adhering the mat to the foundation’ without recital of specific acts for ‘adhering,’ 112, ¶ 6
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`would have governed, despite the lack of ‘step for’ language.” Id. at 851. The same analysis
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`applies here. Each claim element describes only a result, e.g., “display a graphical user
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`interface” and “select information data to be displayed,” without reciting any specific acts for
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`achieving those results.
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`B.E. contends that because the claims recite generic computer hardware and
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`programming,2 they are tethered to a specific solution and not subject to Section 112 paragraph
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`6. Not so. The patents claim computer-implemented inventions. Of course, the claimed
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`computer-implemented functions are performed using computer hardware and programming. To
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`be valid, the B.E. patents must describe the specific programming, i.e., the algorithm that the
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`computer implements to perform the claimed functions. See Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1334–35.
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`The Federal Circuit, district courts, the Board of Patent Appeals, and the United States
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`Patent and Trademark Office have repeatedly held that recitations like those in B.E.’s patents,
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`that do no more than express that a function is to be performed on standard computer hardware
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`components or by “software,” do not provide sufficient limiting structure to avoid Section 112
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`paragraph 6. See HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG, 667 F.3d 1270, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
`
`(an algorithm, not hardware is the required structure); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d
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`1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“‘commands’ (i.e., software) is so broad as to give little indication
`
`of the particular structure used here and is described only functionally, one must still look to the
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`specification for an adequate understanding of the structure of that software”); Ex Parte Roussi,
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`No. 2010-003169 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 7, 2011) (Exh. B to Amazon’s Motion) at 5 (“software” in a
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`claim denotes no particular structure and is simply a substitute for the word “means” in Section
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`112 paragraph 6); Ex Parte Rodriguez, No. 2008-000693 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 1, 2009) (Exh. C to
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`Amazon’s Motion) at 22 (“system builder” and similar software components do not denote
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`structure and are subject to Section 112 paragraph 6); Kozam v. Phase Forward, Inc., No. 04-
`
`2 On the ’290 patent, B.E. notes that Claim 2 recites a “computer readable memory
`comprising: a non-volatile data storage device” and “a program stored on said non-volatile
`memory device.” (Opp. at 10, citing ’290 patent, col. 39:7–11.) B.E. explains that the
`specification defines “program” as “[o]ne or more program modules,” which is in turn defined as
`“[a] set of instructions stored in a file in computer-readable format, whether as object code or
`source code, and whether written in a complied language, in byte code (such as JavaTM), or in a
`scripting or other interpreted language.” (Id. at 11, citing ’290 patent, col. 4:55–59.) On the
`’010 patent, B.E. points to the recitation of “program modules” which is similarly defined as
`“computer readable code.” (Id. at 11.) None of these sections describe the required algorithm.
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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 11 of 17 PageID 689
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`1787, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46850, at *18 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2005) (“module” is a software
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`component that denotes no structure required to avoid Section 112 paragraph 6); Supplementary
`
`Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of
`
`Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7171 (Feb. 9, 2011) (Exh. E to
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`Amazon’s Motion) (“module for” does not connote a structure).
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`The district court cases that B.E. cites are either distinguishable or misconstrue
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`“structure” in a way that is inconsistent with the requirements of both the Federal Circuit and
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`Board of Patent Appeals. In Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1231 (N.D.
`
`Cal. 2001), the claims defined specific operations performed on data obtained from physical
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`nucleic acids. Id. Even then, relying on the pre-Aristocrat precedent, the court considered the
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`application of Section 112 paragraph 6 a “close question.” Id. at 1131–32. Stanacard, LLC v.
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`Rebtel Networks, AB, 680 F. Supp. 2d 483, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), relies on the fact that in
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`contrast to the use of module as a generic reference to software where it does not connote the
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`required structure, “in the telecommunications context, there exists a well-understood structure
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`associated with the term ‘module.’” Id. at 500.
`
`In Juxtacomm-Texas Software, LLC v. Axway, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-11, 2011 WL 6102057,
`
`at *11–*12 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2011), the court cited its decision in Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe
`
`Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 887, 897–98 (E.D. Tex. 2008), and held that “executable code” was
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`structure because it “exists as a physical structure that is embodied on a physical medium such as
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`a memory storage device.” But as the Federal Circuit explained in Aristocrat and its progeny,
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`the test for “structure” is not whether it can be physically embodied, but whether it specifies a
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`means or apparatus for performing the claimed function. For a computer-implemented function,
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`that requires an algorithm, not a bare reference to computer code, instructions or programming.
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`Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1334 (“appropriate programming” does not denote required structure).3
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`3 Apple similarly provides only superficial analysis in denying a motion for a preliminary
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`Today, applying the current Federal Circuit law, the Patent Office would find that the
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`claims in the B.E. patents (and the claims at issue in the district court cases B.E. relies on) are
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`purely functional and subject to section 112 paragraph 6. The Patent Office guidelines for patent
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`examiners and the decisions of its appellate judges hold that claims to software, modules, or a
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`computer programmed to perform a claimed function, i.e., claims to what a program can do, ra-
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`ther than how it does is, do not specify structure. Such claims are subject to Section 112 para-
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`graph 6 and invalid if the specification does not disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
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`function. Ex Parte Eroll, No. 2011-001143, 2013 WL 1341107 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 11, 2013); Ex
`
`Parte Emigh, No. 2012-005145, 2013 WL 1450915 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 12, 2013); Supp. Exam.
`
`Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7171.
`
`III. THE ASSERTED PATENTS DISCLOSE NO STRUCTURE TO
`PERFORM THE CLAIMED FUNCTIONS.
`Under Section 112 paragraph 6, the specifications of the asserted patents must disclose an
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`algorithm for performing each of the claimed functions. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333. They do
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`not.
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`As detailed in Amazon’s Motion, and above, the asserted claims list several different
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`functions and results but neither they, nor the specifications, disclose any algorithms that one
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`could program a computer to perform to achieve those functions and results. (Motion at 11–17.)
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`B.E.’s Opposition identifies no algorithms for performing any of the claimed functions. Indeed,
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`B.E. wholly ignores Amazon’s arguments concerning the ’010 patent and does not even attempt
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`to identify a single algorithm for performing even one of the claimed functions. (Opp. at 14–16.)
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`For the ’290 patent, B.E. does not address the specific functions required by the claim
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`and does not attempt to identify specific algorithms for performing any of the claimed functions.
`
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`injunction and fails to address the post Aristocrat case law, instead relying on outdated district
`court opinions. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. 877 F. Supp. 2d 838, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
`rev’d on other grounds 695 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`Instead B.E. addresses only the claim as a whole, asserting that “[c]laim 2 of the ’290 patent and
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`specification include the very steps that the software follows to perform the claimed functions.”
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`(Opp. at 14.) B.E. then quotes the claim and a section of the specification that describes the
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`results of the claimed software in the same functional language as the claim, e.g., “ . . . when the
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`user runs the first program module, it identifies the user and connects to the server to access the
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`user’s profile and library . . . .” Id. Like the claim, this “describes an outcome, not a means for
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`achieving that outcome”. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1334.
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`For other claimed functions including “display[ing] a graphical user interface,” B.E.
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`asserts that it is “not the invention” and no algorithm need be disclosed because ways to perform
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`the function were known in the art, citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 802
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`F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied 480 U.S. 947 (1987). First, the claims define the
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`invention. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995). B.E.
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`cannot “redefine” its invention after the fact for purposes of its Opposition. Second, the
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`quotation from Hybritech regards the enablement requirement. It is true that to meet the
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`enablement requirement “a patent need not teach, and preferably omits what is well known in the
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`art.” That is not the law where a patentee claims an invention by its result, as B.E. did here. To
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`the contrary, “[a] patentee cannot avoid providing specificity as to structure simply because
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`someone of ordinary skill in the art would be able to devise a means to perform the claimed
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`function. To allow that form of claiming under section 112, paragraph 6, would allow the
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`patentee to claim all possible means of achieving a function.” Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn,
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`Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Noah Sys. v. Intuit, Inc., 675 F.3d 1302,
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`1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“That various methods might exist to perform a function is ‘precisely
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`why’ the disclosure of specific programming is required”) (citation omitted).
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`The rest of what B.E. points to as purported structure for performing the claimed
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`functions was addressed in detail in Amazon’s Motion and is insufficient as a matter of law.
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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 14 of 17 PageID 692
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`(Motion at 11–12.) Specifically, B.E. points to language describing figure 5, and explaining that
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`the interface can be programmed using a “suitable programming language.” (Opp. at 15–16.)
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`But as Amazon already explained, figure 5 (and the language discussing it) discloses nothing but
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`a functional black box with no explanation of how the interface is actually created and displayed.
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`ePlus,Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 518–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Likewise, that the
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`interface could be programmed using “ActiveXTM, JavaTM, or any other suitable programming
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`language” just foists the burden of invention off on another of ordinary skill in the art. That too
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`does not suffice. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1334 (“appropriate programming” not sufficient).
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`As B.E. has failed to identify any algorithm that performs the functions recited in the
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`claims of the ’290 patent—and has failed to even address the ’010 patent—the claims are
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`indefinite and invalid. Making these determinations does not require expert testimony as B.E.
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`suggests. (Opp. at 14.) Where a patent on its face fails to disclose any algorithm to perform the
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`claimed function, it is invalid as a matter of law, and no expert can salvage it. See, e.g., Noah
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`Sys., 675 F.3d at 1312 (“[w]hile it is undisputed that the question of whether a claim is indefinite
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`is based on how the claim limitation would be understood by one of skill in the art, ‘the
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`testimony of one of ordinary skill in the art cannot supplant the total absence of structure from
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`the specification’”) (citation omitted); Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337 (“[i]t is certainly true that the
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`sufficiency of the disclosure of algorithmic structure must be judged in light of what one of
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`ordinary skill in the art would understand the disclosure to impart . . . That principal, however,
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`has no application here because . . . there was no algorithm at all disclosed in the specification”).
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`IV.
`THE ASSERTED PATENTS VIOLATE THE POSSESSION RULE.
`A patentee can claim only what he invents and possesses and “if he claims more his pa-
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`tent is void.” O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 121. This is because “[t]he description requirement of the pa-
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`tent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might
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`achieve if one made that invention.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d
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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 15 of 17 PageID 693
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`1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
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`For computer-implemented inventions, like those claimed here, the possession rule re-
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`quires “disclosure of the computer algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordi-
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`nary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention including how to program the dis-
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`closed computer to perform the claimed function.” Supp. Exam. Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. at
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`7171. As explained above, B.E. fails to identify any algorithms for achieving the results
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`claimed, let alone all possible algorithms. As the Federal Circuit held in Lizardtech, if a patent
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`claims all solutions, disclosure of only a single algorithm would not be enough. Lizardtech,
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`Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005). B.E. has not even man-
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`aged that here.
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`Instead, B.E. repeatedly relies on its assertion that one skilled in the art would be able to
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`create a computer program to perform the claimed function. As the matter of law, the patentee
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`cannot rely on skill in the art to show possession of the claimed invention. Lockwood v. Am. Air-
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`lines, Inc. 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lizardtech, 424 F.3d at 1345–46. The inven-
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`tion that must be disclosed is the inventor’s own solution—here, it must be the inventor’s specif-
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`ic algorithms for performing the claimed functions. The written description requirement is “not
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`a question of whether one skilled in the art might be able to construct patentee’s device from the
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`teachings of the disclosure . . . Rather, it is a question of whether the application necessarily dis-
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`closes that particular device.” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572 (citation omitted). There is no ques-
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`tion that the asserted patents do not. As such, they are invalid for failing to show possession of
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`the claimed invention.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Amazon respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion
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`to Dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice.
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`Case 2:12-cv-02767-JPM-tmp Document 64 Filed 08/09/13 Page 16 of 17 PageID 694
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
`
`s/ Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr.
`Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr. (#0