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THIS OPINION IS NOT A
`PRECEDENT OF
`
`THE T.T.A.B.
`
`Mailed: September 21, 2007
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`________
`
`In re Nexense, Ltd.
`________
`
`Serial No. 78465875
`_______
`
`Kenneth W. Farak of Renner, Otto, Boisselle & Sklar for
`Nexense, Ltd.
`
`Daniel Capshaw, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
`110 (Chris A. F. Pedersen, Managing Attorney)
`_______
`
`Before Drost, Cataldo and Bergsman,
`Administrative Trademark Judges.
`
`Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge:
`
`
`An application was filed by Nexense, Ltd. to register
`
`on the Principal Register the mark NEXAVER in standard
`
`character form for the following goods, as amended:
`
`“Medical devices, namely respiration sensors, pulse
`
`sensors, blood pressure sensors” in International Class 10.1
`
`
`1 Application Serial No. 78465875 was filed on August 11, 2004,
`based on applicant’s assertion of its bona fide intent to use the
`mark in commerce in connection with the goods, and claiming
`priority under Section 44(d) of the Trademark Act. Applicant
`subsequently perfected a Section 44(e) basis for application by
`submitting a copy of its foreign registration.
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`The trademark examining attorney refused registration
`
`under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act on the ground that
`
`applicant’s mark, as used in connection with its goods, so
`
`resembles the mark NEXAVAR, previously registered on the
`
`Principal Register in typed or standard character form for
`
`“pharmaceutical preparations for the treatment of
`
`cardiovascular diseases, central nervous system diseases,
`
`cancer, respiratory and infectious diseases, diagnostic
`
`reagents adapted for medical use” in International Class 5,2
`
`as to be likely to cause confusion.
`
`When the refusal was made final, applicant appealed.
`
`Applicant and the examining attorney filed briefs on the
`
`issue under appeal. In addition, applicant filed a reply
`
`brief.
`
`Likelihood of Confusion
`
`Our determination of the issue of likelihood of
`
`confusion is based on an analysis of all of the probative
`
`facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
`
`forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
`
`1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). See also In re
`
`Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d
`
`1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of
`
`
`2 Registration No. 2745627 issued on August 5, 2003.
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`confusion analysis, however, two key considerations are the
`
`similarities between the marks and the similarities between
`
`the goods and/or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v.
`
`Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 27 (CCPA
`
`1976). See also In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d
`
`1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`The Marks
`
`We first consider whether applicant’s mark and
`
`registrant’s mark are similar or dissimilar when viewed in
`
`their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation
`
`and overall commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imports,
`
`Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396
`
`F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In this case,
`
`applicant’s mark, NEXAVER, is nearly identical in
`
`appearance and sound to the registered mark NEXAVAR. The
`
`marks differ by a single vowel that forms the penultimate
`
`letter of each mark. Such difference does little to
`
`diminish the otherwise identical appearance of the marks.
`
`As to sound, the substitution of the letter “e” in
`
`applicant’s mark for the letter “a” in that of registrant
`
`does not necessarily mean that the marks will be pronounced
`
`differently. It is well settled that there is no correct
`
`pronunciation of a trademark. See In re Belgrade Shoe, 411
`
`F.2d 1352, 162 USPQ 227 (CCPA 1969) and Interlego AG v.
`
`3
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`Abrams/Gentile Entertainment Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1862 (TTAB
`
`2002). See also In re Microsoft Corp., 68 USPQ2d 1195
`
`(TTAB 2003) (it is not possible to control how consumers
`
`will vocalize marks). Particularly in cases such as this
`
`in which neither mark is a recognized term having an
`
`accepted pronunciation, it is possible that consumers will
`
`pronounce applicant’s mark in an identical manner to that
`
`of registrant’s mark. In view of the nearly identical
`
`nature of NEXAVER and NEXAVAR in terms of appearance and
`
`sound, the marks convey highly similar commercial
`
`impressions.
`
`We are not persuaded by applicant’s argument that
`
`because its NEXAVER mark “is the combination of Applicant’s
`
`name and the word ‘saver’ as in life saver” (brief, p. 7)
`
`the mark when viewed in relation to its goods “creates the
`
`connotation that Applicant’s sensors save lives” (Id).
`
`Applicant simply provides no evidence that consumers
`
`encountering its mark on its identified goods would derive
`
`either that or any other connotation therefor. Neither
`
`does applicant provide any evidence to support its
`
`suggestion that “NEX” in registrant’s NEXAVAR mark suggests
`
`the word “next” or that registrant’s goods connote “a ‘next
`
`4
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`generation’ drug for treating diseases” (brief, p. 8).3 In
`
`short, applicant’s assertions regarding the connotations of
`
`its mark and that of registrant are speculative and
`
`unsupported by the record in this case. Due to the nearly
`
`identical nature of the NEXAVER and NEXAVAR marks, we find
`
`that to the extent the marks convey a particular
`
`connotation, those connotations are likely to be highly
`
`similar.
`
`Finally, there is no evidence of record that NEXAVAR
`
`is anything but a strong, distinctive mark that is entitled
`
`to a broad scope of protection.
`
`Thus, despite the minor difference in spelling, the
`
`marks NEXAVER and NEXAVAR are nearly identical in
`
`appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
`
`Accordingly, this du Pont factor favors a finding of
`
`likelihood of confusion.
`
`The Goods
`
`Turning now to our consideration of the recited goods,
`
`we must determine whether consumers are likely to
`
`mistakenly believe that they emanate from a common source.
`
`It is not necessary that the goods at issue be similar or
`
`competitive, or even that they move in the same channels of
`
`
`3 We note, for instance, that neither mark appears to have an
`accepted definition or meaning.
`
`5
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`trade, to support a holding of likelihood of confusion. It
`
`is sufficient instead that the respective goods are related
`
`in some manner, and/or that the conditions and activities
`
`surrounding the marketing of the goods are such that they
`
`would or could be encountered by the same persons under
`
`circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the
`
`marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate
`
`from the same producer. See In re International Telephone
`
`& Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910, 911 (TTAB 1978).
`
`In this case, applicant’s goods include sensors used
`
`to measure respiration, pulse and blood pressure.
`
`Registrant’s goods include pharmaceutical preparations
`
`used, inter alia, to treat cardiovascular disease and
`
`respiratory disease. “Cardiovascular” is defined as “of,
`
`pertaining to, or affecting the heart and blood vessels.”4
`
`“Respiratory” is defined as “pertaining to or serving for
`
`respiration.”5 We hereby take judicial notice of these
`
`definitions. See University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C.
`
`Gourmet Food Imports Co., 213 USPQ 594, 596 (TTAB 1982);
`
`aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Pulse
`
`and blood pressure are, of course, cardiovascular
`
`functions. Thus, as identified both applicant’s and
`
`
`4 Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2006.
`5 Id.
`
`6
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`registrant’s goods are used in the fields of cardiovascular
`
`and respiratory care. Specifically, applicant’s sensors
`
`may be used to measure the same respiratory, pulse and
`
`blood pressure values that are affected by registrant’s
`
`cardiovascular and respiratory medicines. As such,
`
`applicant’s goods as identified are related to those of
`
`registrant.
`
`In addition, the examining attorney has made of record
`
`a number of use-based third-party registrations which show
`
`that various entities have adopted a single mark for both
`
`pharmaceutical preparations used to treat various
`
`conditions as well as medical devices used to address the
`
`same conditions. See, for example:
`
`Registration No. 2639224 for, inter alia,
`pharmaceutical preparations and formulations for
`the treatment of respiratory disorders and
`medical apparatus and devices, namely, finger
`control adapter for medical nebulizers, nebulizer
`sets comprised of a nebulizer, a tee, a
`mouthpiece, a flexible tube, and a two-meter
`connection tube sold as a unit for medical use;
`
`Registration No. 1902350 for, pharmaceutical
`preparations, namely, inhalant decongestants and
`electric vaporizers for the inhalation of
`medicaments, and electyrically [sic] activated
`heating pads for medical purposes;
`
`Registration No. 2505787 for, pharmaceutical
`preparations, namely, respiratory medications and
`insulin and medical and healthcare supplies,
`namely, respiratory medication delivery devices,
`glucometers, lancets, blood hemoglobin testing
`
`7
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`supplied, namely blood hemoglobin testing kits;
`and
`
`Registration No. 2843548 for, pharmaceutical
`preparations, namely, analgesics, hormones,
`psychotropics, anti-infectives, anti-
`inflammatory, and anti-cancer agents for use in
`the treatment of disease via application to the
`lungs and medical apparatus, namely,
`electronically-based devices used to deliver
`drugs and biologics to the lungs.
`
`Third-party registrations which individually cover a number
`
`of different items and which are based on use in commerce
`
`serve to suggest that the listed goods and/or services are
`
`of a type which may emanate from a single source. See In
`
`re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1786 (TTAB
`
`1993). In this case, the evidence of record supports a
`
`finding that the same marks are used to identify both
`
`pharmaceutical preparations and medical devices in numerous
`
`fields.
`
`The identification of applicant’s goods as well as
`
`those of registrant and the above evidence demonstrate the
`
`related nature of the goods at issue, and this du Pont
`
`factor also favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
`
`
`
`
`
`Channels of Trade
`
`Furthermore, it is settled that in making our
`
`determination regarding the relatedness of the parties’
`
`goods, we must look to the goods as identified in the
`
`involved application and cited registration. See Octocom
`
`8
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`Systems, Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d
`
`937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority
`
`is legion that the question of registrability of an
`
`applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the
`
`identification of goods set forth in the application
`
`regardless of what the record may reveal as to the
`
`particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular
`
`channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the
`
`sales of goods are directed.”) See also Paula Payne
`
`Products v. Johnson Publishing Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ
`
`76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“Trademark cases involving the issue of
`
`likelihood of confusion must be decided on the basis of the
`
`respective descriptions of goods.”) In this case, there
`
`are no restrictions in either applicant’s or registrant’s
`
`identification of goods as to the channels of trade in
`
`which the goods may be encountered, or type or class of
`
`customer to which the services are marketed. Accordingly,
`
`both applicant’s and registrant’s goods are presumed to
`
`move in all normal channels of trade and be available to
`
`all classes of potential consumers, including consumers of
`
`each others’ goods. See In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640
`
`(TTAB 1981). In addition, the examining attorney has
`
`introduced evidence in the form of “screen shots” from
`
`Internet web sites suggesting that both pharmaceutical
`
`9
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`preparations and medical devices move in the same channels
`
`of trade and are available from the same retail outlets.
`
`Conditions of Sale
`
`Another du Pont factor discussed by applicant and the
`
`examining attorney is that of the conditions of sale.
`
`Applicant asserts that both its goods and those of
`
`registrant “are administered under highly controlled
`
`conditions” (brief, p. 10) by physicians and pharmacists,
`
`who are careful and sophisticated professionals. However,
`
`the marks NEXAVER and NEXAVAR are so similar that even
`
`careful purchasers are likely to assume that the marks
`
`identify goods emanating from a single source. Even
`
`sophisticated purchasers are not necessarily knowledgeable
`
`in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.
`
`See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812, 1814-1815 (TTAB 1988).
`
`Finally, applicant argues that the failure of the
`
`owner of the cited registration, a European company, to
`
`oppose registration of applicant’s foreign registration,
`
`“is a strong indicator that confusion is not likely”
`
`(brief, p. 11). However, applicant cites to no authority,
`
`nor are we aware of any, to support its contention that the
`
`actions of the owner of a registration cited as a bar to
`
`registration under Section 2(d) with regard to an
`
`applicant’s foreign registration has any bearing on our
`
`10
`
`

`
`Ser No. 78465875
`
`determination of likelihood of confusion in an ex parte
`
`appeal.
`
`In light of the foregoing, and resolving any doubt as
`
`we must in favor of the prior registrant, we find that a
`
`likelihood of confusion exists between the applied-for
`
`NEXAVER mark and the NEXAVAR mark in the cited
`
`registration. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press
`
`Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); and
`
`In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d
`
`1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`
`Decision: The refusal of registration is affirmed.
`
`
`
`11

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