`
`No.
`
`\
`
`-'•'M aJ V
`
`Supreme Court, U.S.
`FILED
`APR 0 7 2020
`OFFICE OF THE CLERK
`
`*
`
`.ci
`
`r{
`
`IN THE
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`JOSE YEYILLE —PETITIONER
`
`vs.
`CECILIA ALTONAGA, WALTER HARVEY, AND ALBERTO
`CARVALHO—RESPONDENTS
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
`UNITED STATES ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
`PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`Jose Yeyille
`
`5505 SW 135th Court
`
`Miami, Florida 33175
`
`786-201-6142
`
`RECEIVED
`APR 14 2020
`OFFICE OF THE CLERK
`SUPREME COURT I lT
`
`
`
`. -J
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`
`1. Whether the district court appropriately resolved genuine issues of disputed
`facts; correctly applied legal conclusions; and provided any statement explaining
`its dismissal of the Complaint that would facilitate any remotely ““intelligent
`appellate review”””. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992).
`
`2. Whether the summary disposition by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal
`of Petitioner’s Permission to Appeal In Forma Pauperis and Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)
`(5) is justified under Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), Cruz v.
`Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971), and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
`
`3. Whether district court judge Beth Bloom violated Petitioner’s Equal
`Protection rights protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
`United States.
`
`4. Whether district court judge Beth Bloom violated Petitioner’s right to a
`Jury Trial protected by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
`States.
`
`
`
`• u
`
`LIST OF PARTIES
`
`[X] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
`
`RELATED CASES
`
`Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia M. Altonaga, Walter Harvey, Alberto Carvalho,
`19-14835 (2020) (Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal
`in Forma Pauperis DENIED without opinion)
`
`Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia Altonaga, Walter Harvey, and Alberto Carvalho
`19-cv-24869[Document 10](2019)
`(Order Denying Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal)
`
`Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia Altonaga, Walter Harvey, and Alberto Carvalho
`19-cv-24869[Document 7](2019)
`Order on Motion Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.(60)(b)(6)
`
`Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia Altonaga, Walter Harvey, and Alberto Carvalho
`19-cv-24869 [Document 4] (2019)
`Order Dismissing Case and Denying as moot his Motion for Leave to Proceed
`In Forma Pauperis.
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`
`JURISDICTION
`
`1
`
`1
`
`CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED......... 2
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`REASONS FOR GRANTING BRIEF
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`,2
`
`11
`
`24
`
`INDEX TO APPENDICES
`
`APPENDIX A (Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia M. Altonaga, Walter Harvey, Alberto
`Carvalho, 19-14835 [February 26th, 2020](2020))
`
`APPENDIX B (Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia Altonaga, Walter Harvey, and Alberto
`Carvalho, 19-cv-24869[Document 10](2019))(December 5, 2019)(ORJDER
`DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL)
`
`APPENDIX C (Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia Altonaga, Walter Harvey, and Alberto
`Carvalho, 19-cv-24869[Document 7](November 26, 2019))(ORDER
`ON MOTION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P 60(b)(6))
`
`APPENDIX D (Jose Yeyille v. Cecilia Altonaga, Walter Harvey, and Alberto
`Carvalho, 19-cv-24869[Document 4](November 26, 2019))(ORDER
`DISMISSING CASE AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
`PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS)
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
`
`CASES
`
`PAGE NUMBER
`
`19,21
`8,17
`18
`2,16,20
`18
`
`Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).............................
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).........................................
`Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)..
`Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
`Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)............................................
`City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., et al.,
`526 U.S. 687 (1999)...........................................
`20
`....10,11,22,24
`Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962)
`11,15,18,22,24
`Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971)....................
`Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 (1974).............
`20
`Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)..........
`....... 12,23
`Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)................
`...15,16,17
`7,11,12,15
`Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992).........
`Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).............
`21
`F. Hofpmann-La Roche, Ltd. V. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)...,. 12,23
`Firestone Financial Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2015)..
`14
`Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2011)...............................
`7,14,21
`Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561 (11th Cir. 1996)................
`18
`Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949).............................
`19,21
`Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 US 847 (1988)
`19,22
`Louie M. Schexnayder, Jr. v. Darrel Vannoy Warden,
`589 U.S.
`(2019),No.18-8341 [Dec. 9, 2019]
`(The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied).......
`23
`Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528 (11th Cir. 2002).
`.............11,12
`Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)...............
`8,10,11,12,17
`Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, et al. v. Larry W. Jander, et al.,
`589 U.S.
`(2019), No.18-1165 [January 14, 2020]...................
`Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).............................................
`Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)........................................
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).....................
`United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 102 S. Ct. 1373(1982)
`
`12,23
`18
`8,16
`8
`18
`
`
`
`• e
`
`. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
`
`United States Constitution, Amendment V
`
`United States Constitution, Amendment VII
`
`STATUTES AND RULES
`
`28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3)
`
`
`
`28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),(ii),(iii)
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6)
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(1)
`
`FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)
`
`RULE 10(C) OF THE SUPREME COURT
`OF THE UNITED STATES (2019).............
`
`OTHER
`
`Posner: Most judges regard pro se litigants as ‘kind of trash
`not worth the time. ’ ABA Journal, by Debra Cassens Weiss.
`September 11, 2017, 11:57 AM..............................................
`
`Sir William Blackstone. Commentaries on the Laws of England
`(1765-1769), Book 3, CHAPTER XXI. Of Issue and Demurrer.
`
`William Shakespeare. Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 2
`
`3,9,17,19
`
`3,9,14,19,22
`
`12
`
`7,8,12,13,15
`
`10
`
`8,14,17,21
`
`9,10,12,17,19,21,23
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`,23
`
`20
`
`16
`
`
`
`IN THE
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment
`below.
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`
`[X] For cases from federal courts:
`
`The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to
`the petition and is [X] unpublished. [This Case, February 7, 2020]
`
`The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix D to
`the petition and is reported at 654 Appx. 394 (11th Cir. 2016) [First Appeal]
`
`The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to
`the petition and is [X] unpublished. [December 16, 2019]
`
`The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix C to
`the petition and is [X] unpublished. [December 2, 2019]
`
`JURISDICTION
`
`[X] For cases from federal courts:
`
`The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was
`February 26th, 2020.
`
`[X] No petition for rehearing was timely filed.
`
`The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
`
`1
`
`
`
`CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`
`United States Constitution, Amendment V.
`
`United States Constitution, Amendment VII.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`In November 25th, 2019 Petitioner brought a lawsuit in the United States District
`
`Court, Southern District of Florida, seeking compensatory damages, treble civil
`
`damages, restitution, equitable remedies, and court costs against Cecilia Altonaga,
`
`Walter Harvey, and Alberto Carvalho, in their individual capacities under 18
`
`U.S.C § 1964(c) for violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c)1 and 18 U.S.C §1964(c) for
`
`violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)2; and Bivens* claims against United States
`
`District Court judge Cecilia Altonaga in her individual capacity, and in her official
`
`i First Claim: Cecilia Altonaga (Counts 1-33). Walter Harvey (Counts 34-66).
`Alberto Carvalho (Counts 67-99). (Bribery) 18 U.S.C. §201 etseq. (Obstruction of
`Justice) 18 U.S.C. §1503 (Money Laundering) 18 U.S.C. §1956 et seq. (Engaging
`in Monetary Transactions derived from Bribery, Obstruction of Justice, Money
`Laundering, and Conspiracy to Commit svpra.) 18 U.S.C. §1957 etseq.
`(Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, Obstruction of Justice, Money Laundering, and
`Engage in Monetary Transactions Derived from svpra.) 18 U.S.C. §1956(h).
`
`2 Second Claim
`
`3 Third Claim: Cecilia Altonaga (Counts 100-102).
`Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
`
`2
`
`
`
`capacity for violating Plaintiffs civil rights of Due Process and Equal Protection
`
`protected by the Fifth Amendment, and his right to jury trial protected by the
`
`Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Jury Trial was duly
`
`demanded.
`
`In December 8, 20144, Plaintiff brought a lawsuit to recover $46.431 of federal
`
`funds in unpaid salary, and for compensatory and treble damages against The
`
`School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, ALBERTO CARVALHO, Lisa
`
`Robertson, Armandina Acosta-Leon, Asuncion-Valdes, and Egna Rivas in their
`
`individual and official capacities for their violation of Plaintiff s civil rights—
`
`discrimination, retaliation, and harassment—and extortion, forced labor, and
`
`human trafficking. Defendants were represented by The School Board of Miami-
`
`Dade County, Florida’s attorney, WALTER HARVEY. (COMPLAINT. Facts.
`m-
`At all relevant times George Mencio Jr. was CECILIA ALTONAGA’s husband.
`
`At all relevant times George Mencio Jr. was employed by the law firm of Holland
`
`& Knight, LLP. (COMPLAINT. Facts. IT91.
`
`CECILIA ALTONAGA offered to WALTER HARVEY and ALBERTO
`
`4 The Complaint erroneously states the date as December 4, 2014.
`
`3
`
`
`
`CARVALHO to dismiss Plaintiffs lawsuit with prejudice in exchange for their
`
`promise to hire, and to give Plaintiffs money to, the law firm of Holland &
`
`Knight, LLP to represent The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida.
`
`Aware that CECILIA ALTONAGA’s husband is employed by the law firm of
`
`Holland & Knight, LLP, WALTER HARVEY and ALBERTO CARVALHO
`
`accepted her offer and promised her to hire the law firm of Holland & Knight,
`
`LLP immediately; but CECILIA ALTONAGA advised them that as a precaution,
`
`and for the sake of appearances, that they should wait until after she dismissed
`
`Plaintiffs lawsuit with prejudice. WALTER HARVEY and ALBERTO
`
`CARVALHO agreed with CECILIA ALTONAGA’s concerns and promised her
`
`to hire, and to give Plaintiffs money to, the law firm of Holland & Knight, LLP
`
`as soon as possible after she dismissed Plaintiffs lawsuit with prejudice.
`
`(COMPLAINT. Facts. 1P10).
`
`In June 15th, 2015s, judge CECILIA ALTONAGA dismissed Plaintiffs
`
`lawsuit with prejudice. (Yeyille v. Miami-Dade County Public Schools, et al.,
`
`U.S. District Court Case No. 14-24624-CIV ALTONAGA/O’Sullivan (S.D.
`
`Fla. 2015). (COMPLAINT. Facts, fll).
`
`5 The Complaint erroneously states the date as May 15, 2014.
`
`4
`
`
`
`In July, 2015, WALTER HARVEY, the School Board Attorney, “requested
`
`proposals from qualified law firms to provide.. .legal services” for The School
`
`Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida. (G-5: Authorization for the School
`
`Board Attorney to Retain Public Private Partnership Legal Counsel)
`
`(“Emphasis”). (COMPLAINT. Facts. If 12).
`
`WALTER HARVEY and Superintendent ALBERTO CARVALHO “agreed
`
`that the most qualified law firms were Greenberg Traurig, PA, and Holland &
`
`Knight, LLP.” (Ibid) (Emphasis). (COMPLAINT. Facts. FI 3).
`
`In November 6th, 2015 HARVEY and CARVALHO made a request to The
`
`School Board “to retain Greenberg Traurig and Holland & Knight to provide legal
`
`assistance and to represent the School Board in developing public private
`
`partnerships and to be compensated at a blended rate of $425 per hour to partners
`
`and associates.” (Ibid). (COMPLAINT. Facts. Ifl4).
`
`In November 16th, 2015 CARVALHO informed the Honorable Chair and
`
`Members of The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida that: “At the
`
`request of Mr. Walter J. Harvey, School Board Attorney, the attached Agenda
`
`Item G-5 is being withdrawn from the November 18, 2015 Agenda for further
`
`consideration.” (WITHDRAWN—11-16-15 G-5). (COMPLAINT. Facts. If 15).
`
`In November 20th, 2015 HARVEY and CARVALHO “recommended the
`
`5
`
`
`
`selection of the law firm Holland & Knight, LL.P. The proposed compensation
`
`is a blended rate of $394 per hour for both partners and associates. Another very
`
`qualified firm, Greenberg Traurig, already has an existing agreement with the
`
`Board at the same rates. Authorization is therefore requested to retain Holland
`
`& Knight, LL.P.” (G-2 Revised: Authorization for the School Board Attorney
`
`to Retain Public Private Partnership Legal Counsel) (Emphasis).
`
`(COMPLAINT. Facts. FI 6).
`
`In December 2nd, 2015 the School Board authorized HARVEY “to retain
`
`Holland & Knight LL.P to provide legal assistance and to represent the School
`
`Board in developing public private partnerships and to be compensated at a
`
`blended rate of $394 per hour for partners and associates.” (Excerpts from
`
`Unofficial Minutes of December 2,2015 School Board Meeting).
`
`(COMPLAINT. Facts. If 17).
`
`WALTER HARVEY retained Holland & Knight LL.P to provide legal
`
`assistance and to represent the School Board in developing public private
`
`partnerships and to be compensated at a blended rate of $394 per hour for
`
`partners and associates. Since then HARVEY and CARVALHO have
`
`continuously compensated Holland & Knight LLP in an amount higher
`
`than $10.000 and threaten to continue to do so. (COMPLAINT. Facts. FI8).
`
`6
`
`
`
`In November 26, 2019, the district court dismissed Petitioner’s Complaint and
`
`denied as moot his Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [APPENDIX
`
`D] “for all three reasons enumerated under section [28 U.S.C.] 1915(e)(2)(B).”
`
`(Order, page 3).
`
`1. According to the court, the Complaint is factually frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
`
`§1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because
`
`Plaintiff... alleges that Judge Altonaga offered to dismiss Plaintiffs
`previous lawsuit with prejudice in exchange for their promise to hire,
`and to give his money to, Holland & Knight to represent the Miami-
`Dade County School Board because her husband is an attorney at
`Holland & Knight. Id. at 6 f 10.” In essence, Plaintiff takes issue
`with Judge Altonaga’s ultimate conclusion that his previous claims be
`dismissed. Nevertheless, Plaintiff appealed Judge Altonaga’s dismissal
`of his previous case to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the
`dismissal with prejudice.” (Order, page 4).
`
`“In addition,” the court considered these facts in the Complaint (Complaint,
`
`Facts, If 10) ““fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal judges
`
`are all too familiar”” citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,32 (1992), and
`
`compared these facts with the “factually frivolous where Plaintiff alleged that
`
`senior government officials caused the September 11, 2001 attacks” wielding
`
`Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2011) (Order, pages 4-5).
`
`2. According to the court, the Complaint is legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
`
`§1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because
`
`7
`
`
`
`In addition, the Complaints legal theories, as presented here, are
`indisputably meritless, as Plaintiffs claims amount to nothing more
`than dissatisfaction with the outcome of his previous case.............
`Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989)(a complaint is legally
`frivolous when it contains “claims of infringement of a legal
`interest which clearly does not exist.” (Order, page 4){emphasis).
`
`3. According to the court, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
`
`may be granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
`
`because its facts are “frivolous” (Order, pages 4-5)(svpra.), and does not meet
`
`the requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) regarding Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 8(a)(2) that “a complaint must contain sufficient matter, accepted as true,
`
`to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atlantic
`
`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570)(2007){Ibid.).
`
`4. According to the court, the Complaint is legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
`
`§1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
`
`immune from such relief. “Judge Altonaga is immune from civil liability for
`
`damages taken in her judicial capacity....” and ““A judge will not be deprived of
`
`immunity because the action[s]he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was
`
`in excess of [her] authority.
`
`9995
`
`Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357
`
`(1978).”” (Order, page 4).
`
`In November 29, 2019 Petitioner moved the district court to vacate its
`
`judgment in Yeyille v. Altonaga, et al., Case No.l9-ev-24869-BLOOM/Louis,
`
`8
`
`
`
`Document 4, FLSD Docket 11/26/2019 pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P (60)(b)(6)
`
`dismissing his Complaint [ECF No. [1], and denying Plaintiffs Motion to
`
`Proceed in»forma»pavperis [ECF No. [3] on the grounds that it violated
`
`Petitioner’s Equal Protection rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, and his
`
`right to a Jury Trial protected by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of
`
`the United States. In addition, Petitioner petitioned the court, and the United
`
`States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to exercise their supervisory power over
`
`its judgment to allow Petitioner to entertain an independent action to relieve
`
`Petitioner from this Court’s onerous and arbitrary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. (60)(d)(l). (Hereinafter, Motion/Petition).
`
`In December 2, 2019 the district court—without addressing either Petitioner’s
`
`constitutional challenges or grounds for an independent action—denied
`
`Petioner’s Motion/Petition because “the Motion fails to demonstrate extraordinary
`
`circumstances necessary to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), or entitlement to
`
`relief under Rule (60(d)(l).”(Order, 12/02/2019)[APPENDIX C].
`
`In December 5, 2019, Petitioner timely submitted a Notice of Appeal of the
`
`district court’s Orders [APPENDIX D and C].
`
`In December 5, 2019 the district court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to
`
`Proceed in Forma Pauperis on Appeal. [APPENDIX B]. “A claim is frivolous
`
`9
`
`
`
`((((
`
`where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”” Neitzke v. Williams,
`
`490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) ”6
`
`In December 6, 2019 Petitioner submitted a Fed. R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(5)
`
`Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis with Affidavit Accompanying Motion for
`
`Permission to Appeal in Forma Pauperis to the United States Eleventh Circuit
`
`Court of Appeals. In my issues on appeal. Petitioner repeated his contentions in
`
`his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) Motion of November 29, 2019 (svpra.)7, and argued
`
`that the district court’s certificate denying Plaintiffs leave to proceed in forma
`
`pauperis is arbitrary and abusive, and definitively not conclusive8 and—like the
`
`6 “As the Court’s order of dismissal makes clear, Plaintiffs complaint is
`frivolous, fails to state a claim, and the legal theories presented are meritless.
`See ECF No. [4]. Moreover, the Motion simply reasserts Plaintiffs previous
`meritless claims and simply disagrees with the Court’s Order of dismissal. As
`such, the Court certifies that this appeal is not taken in good faith, and the
`Motion ECF No.[9] is DENIED.” (Emphasis).
`
`Plaintiff’s appeal is pursued in good faith. There is nothing exotic or esoteric
`about the legal claims and statements of facts stated in his Complaint. Plaintiff’s
`appeal will succeed because his Complaint’s factual allegations have evidentiary
`support, and will have further evidentiary support during, and after, discovery;
`and its claims, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
`non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
`establishing new law. F. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
`
`8 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,446 (1962)
`
`10
`
`
`
`Orders dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and Fed.R.Civ.P. (60)(b)(6) Motion—
`
`carelessly written and poorly supported. Petitioner also requested to submit a brief.
`
`In February 26, 2020 judge Luck of the United States Eleventh Circuit Court
`
`of Appeals, citing Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528,531 (11th Cir. 2002), denied
`
`Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis “because
`
`the appeal is frivolous.” [APPENDIX A].
`
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
`
`The United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has decided an important
`
`federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
`
`Sup. Ct. Rule 10(c)(2019).
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AND THE CIRCUIT
`COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THIS COURT’S COMMANDS IN
`DENTON v. HERNANDEZ. 504 U.S. 25 (1992). NEITZKE v. WILLIAMS.
`490 U.S. 319 (1989). COPPEDGE v. UNITED STATES. 369 U.S. 438
`(1962). AND CRUZ v. HAUCK, 404 U.S. 59 (1971).
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`“[A] [28 U.S.C. §] 1915(d)9 dismissal is properly reviewed for an abuse of
`
`discretion.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)[emphasis].
`
`9 Petitioner notices that current 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) states
`
`“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform
`
`11
`
`
`
`STANDARD OF FRIVOLITY
`
`“[A] Complaint, containing as it does, both factual and legal allegations and
`
`legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
`
`fact.” Denton at 31. quoting from Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989).
`
`Napier10(svpra.) purports to obey this Court’s commands in Denton and Neitkze,
`
`but in its Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal In
`
`Forma Pauperis circuit court judge Robert Luck flouted them.
`
`Circuit court Judge Luck deliberately avoided elaborating about what
`
`factual, and legal allegations, in Petitioner’s Complaint and Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`60(b)(6) Motion, he deemed to be frivolous in denying Petitioner’s Motion for
`
`Leave to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis with the intention of evading
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`this Court’s review.11 This Court should not allow it.
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`all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the
`same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other
`cases.” [Source: Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, 2020].
`Currently, Denton and Neitzke appears to refer to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3)
`and 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), not 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
`
`10 Bilial v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346,1348-1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
`
`11 Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, et al. v. Larry W. Jander, et al.,
`589 U.S.
`(2019), No.18-1165 [January 14, 2020], page 3. F. Hofpmann-La
`Roche, Ltd. V. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155,175 (2004). Cutter v. Wilkinson,
`544 U.S. 709,718 n.7 (2005).
`
`12
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`
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`In an abundance of caution, Petitioner will refer to those factual and legal
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`allegations, including his Motion/Petition, that the district court determined to be
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`frivolous.
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`THE ARGUMENT
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`1. Factual Alleeations are not frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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`Petitioner’s Complaint’s factual allegations (Complaint, flf8-18, Svpra.) have
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`evidentiary support, and will have further evidentiary support during, and after,
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`discovery; and its claims, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
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`law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
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`law or for establishing new law.
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`The district court decided that the factual allegations are frivolous because “in
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`essence, Plaintiff takes issue with Judge Altonaga’s ultimate conclusion that his
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`previous claims be dismissed”; that they are “fantastic and delusional.. .claims”
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`comparing them to those where a Plaintiff accused government officials of
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`causing the September 11th, 2011 events.(Order, pages 4-5)[APPENDIX D].
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`Petitioner is suing Defendant Altonaga, in her individual capacity for selling
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`his claims against The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, and five of
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`its officials sued in their individual capacities, including the superintendent
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`Defendant Alberto Carvalho, to Defendant Walter Harvey and Alberto Carvalho
`
`13
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`
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`in exchange for Harvey and Carvalho hiring the law firm of Defendant Altonaga’s
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`husband, Holland & Knight, LL.P.
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`The facts state why, how, when, and where they accomplished their criminal
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`acts. They are facts, not conjectures. By comparing Petitioner’s claims to those
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`in Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2011) the Court employed an
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`extravagant and mischievous label to discredit them; and attempt to portray
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`Petitioner as a crackpot. In other words, judge Bloom disbelieved the facts.
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`This, as this Court warned lower court judges in Neitzke , they must refrain from
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`doing. Otherwise, they would violate Plaintiffs’ right to a Jury Trial protected by
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`the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (See infra.).
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`The frivolity standard is elusive . If the district court judge found them
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`11
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`12 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989): “What Rule 12(b)(6)
`does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a
`complaint’s factual allegations. District court judges looking to dismiss
`claims on such grounds must look elsewhere for legal support.” (Emphasis).
`
`Firestone Financial Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822,827 (7th Cir. 2015). The
`Circuit Court found that the District Court’s determination that a litigant’s
`factual allegations were “implausible” constitutes an erroneous application of
`Twombly and Iqbal. The trial court had ““determined that it was “implausible to
`allege that somehow Firestone committed orally to provide a half million dollars
`unsecured to what was essentially a comparative startup business.
`(Emphasis).
`
`5555
`
`13
`
`“The elusive nature of the frivolity standard is partly demonstrated by the
`
`14
`
`
`
`improbable, she should have properly disposed of them on summary judgment14,
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`not svam«spontem dismissing the Complaint before Defendants could answer it.
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`If federal judges are all too familiar with “fantastic or delusional claims”, they
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`are also all too familiar with corrupt judges.
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`2. Legal Claims are not frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and
`§1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
`
`A. Petitioner seeks monetary relief against Defendant Altonaga who is
`not immune against Civil RICO claims for criminal acts performed
`in her individual capacity.
`
`Defendant Altonaga does not enjoy judicial immunity from damages liability
`
`for acts which are not performed in her judicial capacities (i.e. bribery,
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`obstruction of justice, money laundering, engaging in monetary transaction
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`derived from them, and conspiracy to commit all of the above).15 Bribery,
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`obstruction of justice, money laundering, and engaging in monetary transaction
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`derived from them are criminal acts, not judicial acts; and Defendants Harvey
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`and Carvalho dealt with Altonaga in her capacity as a common criminal to steal
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`number of times this Court has vacated findings of bad faith by the lower courts.”
`Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59,65 (1971).
`
`14 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,32 (1992).
`
`15 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,27 (1980) “[Judges] are subject to criminal
`prosecutions as are other citizens.” (Id. at 31) (emphasis).
`
`15
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s money16, not in her judicial capacity17.
`
`The relevant RICO statutes (18 U.S.C. §1961 etseq.) at issue in Petitioner’s
`
`Complaint neither expressly nor impliedly immunize a federal judge—sued
`
`in her individual capacity—from liability for crimes and civil RICO damages.
`
`A judge is just a citizen or person within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3)
`
`and 1962(c). “[T]he RICO statute provides that its terms are to be liberally
`
`construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S.
`
`938,944 (2009). For the same reasons a federal judge is not immune in her
`1 fi
`individual capacity from a Bivens cause of action.
`
`B. Even if Altonaea is immune under Stump v. Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349
`(1978). her immunity does not extend to Defendants Harvey and
`Carvalho under Dennis v. Sparks. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
`
`The district court’s Order and the court of appeal’s Order are silent regarding
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`the other two Defendants —Harvey and Carvalho.
`
`19,20
`
`Judge Altonaga is not
`
`16 “Thieves for their robbery have authority
`When judges steal themselves.”
`
`William Shakespeare. Measure for Measure, Act 211, Sc. 2.
`
`17 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
`
`18 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
`
`16
`
`
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`immune against RICO claims in her individual capacity, but even if she
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`were immune, her immunity does not extend to Harvey and Carvalho.
`
`19,20
`
`3.
`
`Petitioner’s Complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted.
`
`Petitioner’s Complaint is well-drafted, and more than sufficiently and
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`comfortably meets and surpasses the requirements of Iqbal’ s incantation.
`
`It perfectly states claims upon which relief may be granted .
`
`4. The district court’s Order violated Petitioner’s Equal Protection rights
`Protected bv the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S.,
`Petitioner’s Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) should have been
`granted and the district court’s Order should have been vacated.
`
`19,20 Each Defendant separately and independently faces 33 Counts in the
`Complaint: Harvey (Counts 34 through 66), Carvalho (Counts 67 through 99).
`Petitioner providently drafted his Complaint in this manner for this contingency.
`
`20 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,29 (1980). Judicial immunity does not
`insulate “from damages liability...private persons who corruptly conspire with
`the judge” in a § 1983 action.
`
`21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009).
`
`22
`
`Close questions of federal law.. .have on a number of occasions arisen on
`motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and have been substantial
`enough to warrant this Court's granting review, under its certiorari juris
`diction, to resolve them. Neitzke at 328.
`Indeed, we recently reviewed the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a
`complaint based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 and found by a 9-to-0 vote that it
`had, in fact, stated a cognizable claim—a powerful illustration that a
`finding of a failure to state a claim does not invariably mean that the
`claim is without arguable merit. Neitzke at 329.
`
`17
`
`
`
`The judiciary is one of the three branches of government. The Fifth
`
`/yj
`
`Amendment restrains “the power of the general government.”24 It forbids the
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`federal government from denying to U.S. citizens a “fair trial in a fair tribunal”25,
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`and the Equal Protection of the laws26 including access to the courts27,28.
`
`Had a paying—well-connected and represented by a similarly well-connected
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`lawfirm—Plaintiff, instead of an indigent pro*se Plaintiff like Petitioner, submitted
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`Petitioner’s Complaint to judge Bloom, she would not have svam*spontem
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`dismissed it on account of being frivolous.
`
`Congress enacted the in forma pauperis statute to assure “equality of
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`consideration for all litigants.” Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,329 (1989).
`
`The district court, by arbitrarily svam*spontem dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint,
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`23 Barron ex rel. Tieman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
`
`24
`“When performing federal judicial duties, a federal judge performs the
`functions of government itself’” Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561,
`tcu
`1572 (11th Cir. 1996), en banc, quoting from United States v. New Mexico, 455
`U.S. 720,735,102 S.Ct. 1373,1383 (1982). (Emphasis added).
`
`“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re
`Murchison etal., 349 U.S. 133,136 (1955).
`
`26 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
`
`27 Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 61-66 (1971).
`
`28 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
`
`18
`
`
`
`treated Petitioner differently from paying Plaintiffs, violated his fundamental
`
`right of access to the courts, and arbitrarily deprived him of “the considerable
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`benefits of the adversary proceedings contemplated by the Federal Rules [of Civil
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`Procedure].” Nietzke, at 330.
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) authorizes federal courts “to vacate
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`judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice” Klapprott
`
`v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,614-15 (1949), while also cautioning that it
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`should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ Ackerman v. United
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`States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,
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`486 US 847,864 (1988).
`
`Since the district court’s violation of a Plaintiffs Equal Protection rights
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`protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution qualifies
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`as an “extraordinary circumstance”, the dist