No. 18-587
`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
`SECURITY, ET AL.,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioners,
`
`REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`
`
`BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF IMMIGRATION
`LAW REFORM INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF
`PETITIONERS
`
`CHRISTOPHER J. HAJEC
`IMMIGRATION REFORM
`LAW INSTITUTE
`25 Massachusetts Av NW
`Suite 335
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 232-5590
`chajec@irli.org
`
`
`
`
`
`LAWRENCE J. JOSEPH
` Counsel of Record
`1250 Connecticut Av NW
`Suite 700-1A
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 202-355-9452
`lj@larryjoseph.com
`
`
`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
`SECURITY, ET AL.,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioners,
`
`REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`
`
`BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF IMMIGRATION
`LAW REFORM INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF
`PETITIONERS
`
`CHRISTOPHER J. HAJEC
`IMMIGRATION REFORM
`LAW INSTITUTE
`25 Massachusetts Av NW
`Suite 335
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 232-5590
`chajec@irli.org
`
`
`
`
`
`LAWRENCE J. JOSEPH
` Counsel of Record
`1250 Connecticut Av NW
`Suite 700-1A
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 202-355-9452
`lj@larryjoseph.com
`
`
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`
`This dispute concerns the policy of immigration
`enforcement discretion known as Deferred Action for
`Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). In 2016, this Court
`affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a decision of the
`U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding
`that two related Department of Homeland Security
`(DHS) discretionary enforcement policies, including
`an expansion of the DACA policy, were likely unlawful
`and should be enjoined. See United States v. Texas,
`136 S.Ct. 2271 (per curiam). In September 2017, DHS
`determined that the original DACA policy was
`unlawful and would likely be struck down by the
`courts on the same grounds as the related policies.
`DHS thus instituted an orderly wind-down of the
`DACA policy. The questions presented are as follows:
`1. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the
`DACA policy is judicially reviewable.
`2. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the
`DACA policy is lawful.
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Questions Presented ................................................... i
`Table of Contents ....................................................... ii
`Table of Authorities ................................................... iv
`Interest of Amicus Curiae .......................................... 1
`Statement of the Case ................................................ 2
`Summary of Argument ............................................... 2
`Argument .................................................................... 4
`I. This Court should vacate the injunction
`because plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable. ..... 4
`A. All plaintiffs lack standing because DACA
`could not and did not create any rights. ....... 5
`B. Rescission would not redress plaintiffs’
`injuries because DACA’s invalidity would
`require reinstating the pre-DACA status
`quo ante litem. ............................................... 8
`C. The amendment or rescission of mere
`enforcement policies — as distinct from
`rules or regulations — is unreviewable
`generally, and especially so in the
`immigration context at issue here. ............... 9
`II. Rescission was lawful because DACA was
`unlawful. ............................................................ 11
`A. As a legislative rule adopted without an
`APA rulemaking, DACA is void ab initio. .. 11
`B. If DACA did not bind agency discretion,
`rescission would be a lawful exercise of
`the same discretion used to issue DACA. ... 13
`C. Assuming arguendo that MVMA review
`is available, DACA’s rescission meets
`that narrow test. .......................................... 14
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`D. DACA violated the INA. .............................. 16
`III. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims should
`be dismissed. ...................................................... 23
`A. The “information-sharing” due-process
`claims fail to state a claim. ......................... 23
`B. The equal-protection claims fail to state
`a claim. ......................................................... 24
`Conclusion ................................................................ 25
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Alexander v. Sandoval,
`532 U.S. 275 (2001) ............................................... 6
`
`Am. Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health
`Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ............. 12
`
`Amrep Corp. v. FTC,
`768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985) ........................... 14
`
`Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,
`570 U.S. 1 (2013) ................................................. 22
`
`Arizona v. United States,
`567 U.S. 387 (2012) ............................................. 19
`
`Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh,
`715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) .......................... 12-13
`
`Bennett v. Spear,
`520 U.S. 154 (1997) ............................................. 11
`
`Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
`v. MCorp Financial, 502 U.S. 32 (1991) ............. 10
`
`Bolling v. Sharpe,
`347 U.S. 497 (1954) ............................................. 23
`
`Buckley v. Valeo,
`424 U.S. 1 (1976) ................................................. 23
`
`Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
`441 U.S. 281 (1979) ......................................... 6, 12
`
`City of Los Angeles v. Adams,
`556 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ............................... 17
`
`City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
`461 U.S. 95 (1983) ................................................. 4
`
`F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
`556 U.S. 502 (2009) ............................................. 15
`
`iv
`
`
`
`FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc.,
`466 U.S. 463 (1984) ............................................. 10
`
`Fed’l Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
`332 U.S. 380 (1947) ......................................... 7, 24
`
`Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
`Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)............. 7-8
`
`General Elec. Co. v. EPA,
`290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ............................. 12
`
`Guevara v. Holder,
`649 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................. 20
`
`Hollingsworth v. Perry,
`570 U.S. 693 (2013) ............................................... 8
`
`Hyder v. Keisler,
`506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007) ............................... 14
`
`In re GWI PCS 1, Inc.,
`230 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) ................................. 8
`
`Land v. Dollar,
`330 U.S. 731 (1947) ............................................... 5
`
`Leedom v. Kyne,
`358 U.S. 184 (1958) ............................................. 10
`
`Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,
`476 U.S. 355 (1986) ............................................... 6
`
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................... 5
`
`Lutwak v. United States,
`344 U.S. 604 (1953) ............................................. 18
`
`Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick,
`813 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................. 14
`
`Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner,
`297 U.S. 129 (1936) ............................................. 16
`
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`Massachusetts v. EPA,
`549 U.S 497 (2007) .............................................. 17
`
`McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas,
`838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ........................... 13
`
`Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
`Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) .............. 3, 14-15
`
`Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
`Agency, 725 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .............. 8-9
`
`North Am. Coal Corp. v. Director, Office of
`Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept.
`of Labor, 854 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1988) ............. 13
`
`Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond,
`496 U.S. 414 (1990) ......................................... 7, 24
`
`Organized Vill. of Kake v. United States Dep’t of
`Agric., 795 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015) ..................... 8
`
`Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. F.P.C.,
`506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) .......................... 13-14
`
`Paulsen v. Daniels,
`413 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................. 9
`
`Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
`135 S.Ct. 1199 (2015) .......................................... 15
`
`Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney,
`442 U.S. 256 (1979) ........................................ 24-25
`
`Plyler v. Doe,
`457 U.S. 202 (1982) ............................................. 25
`
`Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
`572 U.S. 291 (2014) ......................................... 5, 15
`
`Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R.,
`659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .......................... 9-10
`
`Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt,
`238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001) ............................... 12
`
`
`
`vi
`
`
`
`State of Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv. v. U.S.
`Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Health
`Care Financing Admin., 862 F.2d 1228 (6th
`Cir. 1988) ............................................................. 13
`
`Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
`523 U.S. 83 (1998) ................................................. 4
`
`Succar v. Ashcroft,
`394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005) ................................... 17
`
`Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,
`467 U.S. 883 (1984) ............................................. 21
`
`Texaco, Inc. v. F.P.C.,
`412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969) ................................ 14
`
`Texas Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Fed. Hous.
`Fin. Bd., 201 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2001) ............... 12
`
`Texas v. United States,
`86 F.Supp.3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015),
`aff’d 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.), aff’d by
`an equally divided Court, 136 S.Ct.
`2271 (2016) ...................................................... 2, 19
`
`Texas v. United States,
`809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by
`an equally divided Court, 136 S.Ct.
`2271 (2016) ............................................ 2, 9, 12, 20
`
`Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
`442 U.S. 560 (1979) ............................................ 5-6
`
`United States v. Mistretta,
`488 U.S. 361 (1989) ............................................. 21
`
`United States v. Picciotto,
`875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............................. 13
`
`Warth v. Seldin,
`422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............................................... 5
`
`
`
`vii
`
`
`
`Washington v. Glucksberg,
`521 U.S. 702 (1997) ............................................. 24
`
`Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
`531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................................. 21
`
`Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc.,
`555 U.S. 7 (2008) ................................................. 11
`
`Woodall v. Commissioner,
`964 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1992) ............................... 18
`
`Statutes
`
`U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 4 ......................................... 2
`
`U.S. CONST. art. III ................................................ 2, 5
`
`U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4................................. 23-24
`
`U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 4 ............................ 23
`
`Administrative Procedure Act,
`5 U.S.C. §§551-706 ................................ 2-4, 6, 9-15
`
`5 U.S.C. §551(5) ........................................................ 12
`
`5 U.S.C. §553(b) ........................................................ 12
`
`5 U.S.C. §553(b)(A) ................................................... 12
`
`5 U.S.C. §553(b)(B) ................................................... 12
`
`5 U.S.C. §701(a)(1) ................................................... 10
`
`5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2) ................................................... 10
`
`5 U.S.C. §702 .............................................................. 9
`
`5 U.S.C. §703 ............................................................ 10
`
`5 U.S.C. §704 ............................................................ 11
`
`5 U.S.C. §706(2)(B) ................................................... 16
`
`5 U.S.C. §706(2)(C) .................................................... `6
`
`6 U.S.C. §202(5) ........................................................ 22
`
`Immigration and Naturalization Act,
`8 U.S.C. §§1101-1537 ....... 3-4, 10, 16, 18-20, 22-23
`
`
`
`viii
`
`
`
`8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(3) ................................................. 22
`
`8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1) ................................................. 16
`
`8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(3) ................................................. 16
`
`8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)(A) ....................................... 16-17
`
`8 U.S.C. §1229a ................................................... 16-17
`
`8 U.S.C. §1252(g) ............................................... 2-3, 10
`
`8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(3) .......................................... 20-21
`
`8 U.S.C. §1182(n) ...................................................... 21
`
`8 U.S.C. §1184(g) ...................................................... 21
`
`8 U.S.C. §1188 .......................................................... 21
`
`Rules, Regulations and Orders
`
`S.Ct. Rule 37.6 ............................................................ 1
`
`8 C.F.R. §274a.12(a)(1)-(16) ..................................... 13
`
`8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(14) ........................................... 13
`
`Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Exercising
`Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
`Individuals Who Came to the United States as
`Children (June 15, 2012) .............................. 18, 19
`
`Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson,
`Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
`Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
`United States as Children and with Respect to
`Certain Individuals Who are Parents of U.S.
`Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20,
`2014) ............................................................... 17-18
`
`Legislative History
`
`H.R. REP. NO. 104-725 (1996) .................................. 18
`
`
`
`ix
`
`
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Michael X. Marinelli, INS Enforcement of the
`Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986:
`Employer Sanctions During the Citation
`Period, 37 CATH. U. L.R. 829 (1988) ................... 19
`
`
`
`x
`
`
`
`No. 18-587
`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
`SECURITY, ET AL.,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioners,
`
`REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`
`
`
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
`
`The Immigration Reform Law Institute1 (“IRLI”)
`is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) public interest law firm
`dedicated both to litigating immigration-related cases
`in the interests of United States citizens and to
`assisting courts in understanding federal immigration
`law. IRLI has litigated or filed amicus curiae briefs in
`a wide variety of immigration-related cases. For more
`than twenty years the Board of Immigration Appeals
`has solicited supplementary briefing, drafted by IRLI
`
`
`1 Amicus files this brief with all parties’ written consent, with
`more than 10 days’ written notice. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel
`for amicus authored this brief in whole, no party’s counsel
`authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity —
`other than amicus and its counsel — contributed monetarily to
`preparing or submitting the brief.
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`staff, from the Federation for American Immigration
`Reform, of which IRLI is a supporting organization.
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`Several states, state universities, and individuals
`sued federal immigration officials to challenge the
`rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood
`Arrivals (“DACA”) policy implemented by the prior
`administration, after that administration proved
`unable to convince Congress to enact legislation to
`address illegal aliens who arrived here as minors. In
`addition to providing deferred-action status with
`respect to deportation, the DACA program also
`provided work authorization.
`After a review, the new administration rescinded
`DACA, with a
`future effective date to allow
`Congress — which has plenary power to regulate
`immigration, U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 4 — six months
`to act. A major part of the rationale was that the
`successful state plaintiffs in Texas v. United States, 86
`F.Supp.3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d 809 F.3d 134
`(5th Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S.Ct.
`2271 (2016) (“Texas”), announced plans to challenge
`DACA on the same grounds on that they used to
`invalidate the expanded DACA and Deferred Action
`for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”) programs in
`Texas.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`The district lacked jurisdiction for a preliminary
`injunction not only under Article III but also under
`the waiver
`of
`sovereign
`immunity
`in
`the
`Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-706
`(“APA”), and the preclusion-of-review provision, 8
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`U.S.C. §1252(g), in the Immigration and Natural-
`ization Act, 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1537 (“INA”). As for
`standing, DACA cannot serve as the basis for a
`judicially cognizable right because mere agency action
`cannot create a federal right, and the fact that the
`prior administration misled beneficiaries
`into
`applying for DACA does not support estoppel against
`the government (Section I.A). In addition, because
`plaintiffs cannot prevail against DACA’s rescission
`without simultaneously showing that DACA was void
`ab initio when promulgated, plaintiffs’ reward for
`invalidating rescission would be to invalidate DACA,
`which would not redress anything (Section I.B).
`Furthermore, neither APA review nor its waiver of
`sovereign immunity is available under three distinct
`barriers to APA review: DHS’s actions are committed
`to agency discretion, fall under the INA’s special
`statutory review, and are non-final (Section I.C).
`On the merits, the 2012 DACA policy is void ab
`initio because it was issued in violation of APA notice-
`and-comment requirements by virtue of its creating
`rights and cabining discretion in a sufficiently binding
`manner to exceed its mere enforcement-discretion
`justification (Section II.A). Alternatively, if viewed as
`a mere statement of policy, DACA did not create any
`rights or even constitute final agency action because
`such policies are not final, but become final only on a
`case-by-case basis when applied (Section II.B). In any
`event, DACA’s unlawfulness under Texas and a pause
`to allow congressional action provided ample
`justification under Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
`Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
`(“MVMA”), for rescission (Section II.C). Finally,
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`inconsistent with INA
`is substantively
`DACA
`requirements to commence removal proceedings for
`illegal aliens (Section II.D).
`The lower courts also erred in denying dismissal
`two Fifth Amendment claims. First,
`the
`of
`“information-sharing” claims under substantive due
`process fail to meet the test for establishing a
`substantive due-process right, and any reliance on the
`informal DACA policies was unreasonable (Section
`III.A). Second, the equal-protection claims based on
`race or ethnicity are impermissible disparate-impact
`claims because the issue here is illegal aliens’
`immigration status, not race or ethnicity (Section
`III.B).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE THE
`INJUNCTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS’
`CLAIMS ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE.
`
`A federal court must have jurisdiction to issue a
`preliminary injunction, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
`461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983), and this Court has the duty
`to examine jurisdiction, even if the parties concede the
`issue. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
`523 U.S. 83, 105 (1998). If jurisdiction is lacking, this
`Court should remand with an order to dismiss.
`Either DACA created no rights or — if it did —
`DACA required an upfront APA rulemaking and is
`thus void ab initio for lacking that rulemaking. Even
`in the latter case, plaintiffs lack a judicially cognizable
`right to enforce
`in this
`litigation, since the
`unlawfulness of DACA on the merits deprives them of
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`standing. 2 The preliminary injunction violates both
`the separation of powers and principles of democratic
`self-government, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
`Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 311-12 (2014), and
`must be vacated.
`All plaintiffs lack standing because
`A.
`DACA could not and did not create
`any rights.
`
`Article III poses a tripartite test for standing:
`judicially cognizable injury to the plaintiff, causation
`by the challenged conduct, and redressable by a court.
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62
`(1992). For several reasons, plaintiffs here lack a bare
`threshold injury that is judicially cognizable. But even
`if they had cognizable rights under DACA, the cost to
`redeem those rights would be DACA’s invalidation
`because the process of challenging DACA’s rescission
`calls into question DACA’s promulgation. Since DACA
`was procedurally and substantively unlawful when
`adopted, a reviewing court’s injunction must reinstate
`the pre-DACA status quo ante litem, leaving plaintiffs
`in the same place as rescission.
`Agency officers like petitioners — as well as their
`predecessors from the prior Administration — cannot
`create rights. Of course, “Congress may create a
`statutory right … the alleged deprivation of which can
`confer standing,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514
`(1975), but mere agencies cannot create rights.
`Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577
`
`
`2 When standing and the merits “intertwine,” federal courts
`must resolve the jurisdictional and merits issues together. Land
`v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 (1947).
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`n.18 (1979). As Justice Scalia colorfully explained,
`“Agencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not
`the sorcerer himself.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
`275, 291 (2001). If the prior administration had
`wanted to create rights, it needed either to work with
`Congress to enact new legislation or, at least, to act
`using the APA rulemaking authority that Congress
`has delegated for agencies to create regulatory rights
`in furtherance of rights that Congress already created
`by statute. Since neither of these two acceptable
`routes was taken in DACA, it did not create any rights
`that plaintiffs can enforce in court.3
`Relatedly, to the extent that plaintiffs and the
`lower courts complain about unfairness, they are
`complaining to the wrong branch of government:
`SIPC and the Trustee contend that the
`result we reach sanctions injustice. But
`even if that were the case, the argument is
`made in the wrong forum, for we are not at
`liberty to legislate.
`Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 579. Neither this Court nor
`the district court has the power to alter plaintiffs’
`immigration status by enjoining Executive Branch
`officers. Instead, as the prior administration and
`
`
`3 Failure to follow APA requirements renders the resulting
`agency action both void ab initio and unconstitutional. Chrysler
`Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303 (1979); Louisiana Pub. Serv.
`Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“an agency literally
`has no power to act … unless and until Congress confers power
`upon it”); see Section II.A, infra. The missing procedure provides
`at least some of the unconstitutionality that puzzled the Ninth
`Circuit. See Suppl. Pet. App. 48a-49a.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`current administration both have recognized, the only
`lawful solution here is action by Congress.
`Even the district court admits that DACA
`represents an “expectation of (though not a right to)
`continued deferred action,” Pet. App. 29a, and that is
`not enough. Nor does the district court’s repeated
`invocation of five years of reliance by 689,800 DACA
`beneficiaries, see, e.g., id. 28a, affect the analysis.
`Most obviously, something that is “not a right” is also
`not a judicially cognizable right. Moreover, reliance is
`no basis to estop the federal government. Office of
`Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419-20
`(1990) (“equitable estoppel will not lie against the
`Government”). What plaintiffs call an “expectation”
`was simply misplaced reliance on the administration
`that issued DACA:
`Whatever the form in which the Govern-
`ment functions, anyone entering into an
`arrangement with the Government takes
`the risk of having accurately ascertained
`that he who purports to act for the
`Government stays within the bounds of his
`authority.
`Fed’l Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384
`(1947). Insofar as DACA beneficiaries were misled, it
`was the prior administration that misled them. But
`under Merrill and its progeny, having been misled
`does not provide any rights to redress.
`Finally, third parties such as the institutional and
`state plaintiffs “lack[] a judicially cognizable interest
`in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another,”
`which “applies no less to prosecution for civil [matters]
`… than to prosecution for criminal [matters].” Friends
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
`528 U.S. 167, 204 (2000) (emphasis added, internal
`quotations omitted). Similarly, it is a “fundamental
`restriction on [judicial] authority” that “a litigant
`must assert his or her own legal rights and interests,
`and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or
`interests of third parties,” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
`U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (interior quotation marks
`omitted). Thus, the third-party institutional and state
`plaintiffs lack standing.
`Rescission would not redress
`B.
`plaintiffs’ injuries because DACA’s
`invalidity would require
`reinstating the pre-DACA status
`quo ante litem.
`
`Plaintiffs also have a redressability problem: the
`very act of voiding DACA’s rescission would show that
`DACA was void ab initio the day it was promulgated.
`If DACA cannot be rescinded at will as discretionary,
`it could not have been adopted in the first place as an
`exercise of discretion, without a rulemaking.
`Procedurally, an action that succeeds in voiding a
`rescission or amendment reinstates the prior rule,
`Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
`725 F.2d 761, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“NRDC v. EPA”);
`Organized Vill. of Kake v. United States Dep’t of
`Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2015); cf. In re GWI
`PCS 1, Inc., 230 F.3d 788, 796 n.14 (5th Cir. 2000)
`(“[r]escission unwinds the transaction and restores
`the status quo ante”). But that does nothing to protect
`the underlying rule from procedural or substantive
`challenges. Indeed, judicially revoking an agency’s
`rescission sometimes “casts a cloud over the very
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`regulations it implicitly reinstates” because the
`rationale for vacating the agency’s revocation also
`affects the underlying rule, NRDC v. EPA, 725 F.2d at
`772; Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir.
`2005) (refusing to reinstate a previous rule under that
`standard because it was itself invalid).
`Such a cloud would be cast by any judgment that
`revokes the federal defendants’ rescission of DACA.
`Specifically, plaintiffs’ prevailing here and in similar
`cases would make clear that DACA was procedurally
`invalid on the day that the federal defendants’
`predecessors promulgated DACA. See Section II.A,
`infra. If DACA either created judicially cognizable
`rights that support a federal court’s enjoining DACA’s
`repeal or so bound the federal defendants that they
`could not repeal DACA at will, then DACA required
`notice-and-comment rulemaking. Texas, 809 F.3d at
`171. Because no rulemaking occurred, DACA would
`become procedurally invalid ab initio the instant a
`court held its rescission impermissible.
`The amendment or rescission of
`C.
`mere enforcement policies — as
`distinct from rules or regulations —
`is unreviewable generally, and
`especially so in the immigration
`context at issue here.
`
`In the 1976 APA amendments to 5 U.S.C. §702,
`Congress “eliminat[ed] the sovereign
`immunity
`defense in all equitable actions for specific relief
`against a Federal agency or officer acting in an official
`capacity.” Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659
`F.2d 243, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting S. Rep. No.
`996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1656,
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
`Admin. News 6121, 6129) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.). But that
`waiver has several restrictions that preclude review.
`First, as the Government explains, Pet. at 17-21,
`APA exempts actions committed to agency discretion
`from APA review. 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2). In addition to
`the arguments that the Government makes, amicus
`IRLI respectfully submits that this issue includes a
`“Catch-22” element. If DACA so cabined agency
`discretion as to lie beyond discretionary rescission,
`DACA required a rulemaking in the first place and
`thus is void ab initio. See Section II.A, infra.
`Second, APA excludes APA review for “statutes
`[that] preclude judicial review” and ones with “special
`statutory review.” 5 U.S.C. §§701(a)(1), 703. When a
`statute provides special statutory review, APA review
`is not available. FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc.,
`466 U.S. 463, 469 (1984). As the Government explains,
`8 U.S.C. §1252(g)’s focus on removal proceedings is
`not an invitation for aliens to file pre-enforcement
`APA
`actions
`preemptively,
`before
`removal
`proceedings commence. Pet. at 22. Only when
`preclusion-of-review statutes provide no opportunity
`whatsoever for review has the Court used equity to
`provide review. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-90
`(1958). But that extraordinary relief is not available
`where — as here — Congress precludes pre-
`enforcement review, but allows review in enforcement
`proceedings. Board of Governors of the Federal
`Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, 502 U.S. 32, 43-
`44 (1991). Amicus IRLI respectfully submits that INA
`review is exactly the type of statutory review that
`precludes APA review.
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`Third, and finally, APA review applies only to
`agency action made reviewable by statute and final
`agency action for which no adequate remedy is
`available. 5 U.S.C. §704. To the extent that an
`enforcement policy like DACA does not bind agency
`actors, the enforcement policy is not final agency
`action. See Section II.B, infra; Bennett v. Spear, 520
`U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). Instead, the final agency
`action lies in the agency action to apply the policy in a
`specific case. See Section II.B, infra. Thus, on the one
`hand, assuming arguendo that DACA’s issuance did
`not impermissibly bind agency discretion without
`APA rulemaking, neither DACA’s issuance nor its
`rescission is final agency action, id., and both are
`outside APA review. 5 U.S.C. §704. On the other hand,
`if DACA’s issuance did bind agency discretion so that
`its rescission now would qualify as final agency action,
`then DACA is void ab initio for failure to follow
`required APA rulemaking procedures in the first
`place. See Section II.A, infra.
`II. RESCISSION WAS LAWFUL BECAUSE
`DACA WAS UNLAWFUL.
`
`Plaintiffs must show a likelihood of prevailing on
`the merits to establish entitlement to a preliminary
`injunction. Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council,
`Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Because plaintiffs cannot
`make that showing for DACA’s rescission, this Court
`should grant review in this important case.
`As a legislative rule adopted
`A.
`without an APA rulemaking, DACA
`is void ab initio.
`
`As the Fifth Circuit held and an equally divided
`panel of this Court affirmed, a procedurally identical
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`form of DACA-like relief violated APA’s notice-and-
`comment rulemaking procedures. Texas, 809 F.3d at
`165-78, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S.Ct.
`2271 (2016). So too with DACA, which is void ab initio
`on the merits.
`Specifically, DACA’s issuance violated APA’s rule-
`making requirements as a legislative rule issued
`without complying with APA’s notice-and-comment
`requirements, 5 U.S.C. §553(b), without eligibility for
`any exceptions to the requirement. Id. §553(b)(A)-(B).
`The exemption for policy statements and interpretive
`rules:
`• Does not apply when agency action narrows the
`discretion otherwise available to agency staff,
`Texas Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Fed. Hous.
`Fin. Bd., 201 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2001);
`General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C.
`Cir. 2002);
`• Cannot be used to promulgate the regulatory
`basis on which to confer benefits, Avoyelles
`Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
`908 (5th Cir. 1983); Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302; and
`• Cannot be used to promulgate new rules that
`effectively amend existing rules. Am. Mining
`Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995
`F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 5 U.S.C. §551(5)
`(defining “rule making” as the “agency process for
`formulating, amending, or repealing a rule”)
`(emphasis added); Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt,
`238 F.3d 622, 629 (5th Cir. 2001).
`DACA cannot meet these tests.
`Under APA, DACA plainly required notice-and-
`comment rulemaking. For example, employment
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`authorization is a benef
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