No. 18-302
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
`INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
`PETITIONER
`
`v.
`
`ERIK BRUNETTI
`
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
`
`
`
` NOEL J. FRANCISCO
`Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`JOSEPH H. HUNT
`Assistant Attorney General
`MALCOLM L. STEWART
`Deputy Solicitor General
`FREDERICK LIU
`Assistant to the Solicitor
`General
`MARK R. FREEMAN
`DANIEL TENNY
`JOSHUA M. SALZMAN
`Attorneys
`Department of Justice
`Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
`SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
`(202) 514-2217
`
`SARAH HARRIS
`General Counsel
`THOMAS W. KRAUSE
`Solicitor
`CHRISTINA J. HIEBER
`THOMAS L. CASAGRANDE
`MARY BETH WALKER
`MOLLY R. SILFEN
`Associate Solicitors
`U.S. Patent and Trademark
` Office
`Alexandria, Va. 22314
`
`
`
`
`

`

`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a),
`provides in pertinent part that a trademark shall be
`refused registration if it “[c]onsists of or comprises
`immoral * * * or scandalous matter.” The question
`presented is as follows:
`Whether Section 1052(a)’s prohibition on the federal
`registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks is
`facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the
`First Amendment.
`
`
`
`(I)
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
`Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
`Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ...................... 2
`Statement ...................................................................................... 2
`Summary of argument ............................................................... 11
`Argument:
`The scandalous-marks provision in 15 U.S.C. 1052(a)
`is facially constitutional under the First Amendment...... 14
`A. This Court’s decision in Tam is limited to
`trademark-registration criteria that
`discriminate based on viewpoint ............................ 15
`B. Because the scandalous-marks provision is a
`viewpoint-neutral condition on a government
`benefit whose availability necessarily turns on
`the content of an applicant’s speech, the court
`of appeals erred in subjecting that provision to
`strict scrutiny .......................................................... 19
`1. The scandalous-marks provision does not
`restrict speech, but simply imposes a
`condition on the availability of a
`government benefit .......................................... 20
`2. Administration of the federal trademark-
`registration program inherently and
`necessarily requires the government to
`draw distinctions based on the content of
`applicants’ marks .............................................. 25
`3. The scandalous-marks provision is
`viewpoint-neutral .............................................. 26
`C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably
`related to legitimate government interests and
`does not reach outside the federal trademark-
`registration program .............................................. 31
`
`
`
`(III)
`
`

`

`IV
`
`Table of Contents—Continued:    Page
`
`1. A ban on registration of scandalous marks
`is a longstanding and reasonable means of
`vindicating legitimate government
`interests ............................................................. 32
`2. The scandalous-marks provision does not
`subject respondent or similarly situated
`persons to any adverse legal consequences
`outside the trademark-registration
`program ............................................................. 38
`D. The court of appeals’ contrary reasoning is
`erroneous .............................................................. 40
`1. The court of appeals erred in treating the
`scandalous-marks provision as a restriction
`on speech ........................................................... 40
`2. The court of appeals erred in treating as
`irrelevant this Court’s decisions involving
`government-established subsidies and
`forums ................................................................ 41
`3. A decision sustaining the scandalous-marks
`provision against respondent’s First
`Amendment challenge would have no
`necessary implications for the
`constitutionality of analogous limits
`on copyright registration ................................. 43
`4. The court of appeals’ concern that the
`scandalous-marks provision has been
`applied inconsistently provides no basis
`for invalidating that provision ......................... 45
`Conclusion ................................................................................... 48
`Appendix — Statutory provisions ........................................... 1a
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`V
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Page
`Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) ............ 42
`Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l,
`Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) ........................ 12, 23, 31, 32, 38, 40
`American Freedom Def. Initiative v. Washington
`Metro. Area Transit Auth., 901 F.3d 356
`(D.C. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. pending,
`No. 18-1000 (filed Jan. 28, 2019) ........................................ 30
`B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) ............................................. 2, 3, 4, 20
`Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
`(1986) .................................................................................... 29
`Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., In re, 334 F.3d 1336
`(Fed. Cir. 2003) ....................................................... 23, 27, 46
`Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ...................... 47
`Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
`Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) ....................................... 10, 37
`Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,
`Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,
`561 U.S. 661 (2010)........................................................ 22, 24
`Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) .............................. 29
`Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
`473 U.S. 788 (1985)........................................................ 23, 35
`Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
`539 U.S. 23 (2003) ............................................................... 44
`Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177
`(2007) ............................................................. 19, 22, 23, 41, 42
`De Walt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp.,
`289 F.2d 656 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ............................................. 46
`Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ............................... 44
`FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) ............... 28, 33
`
`
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`VI
`
`Fox, In re, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...................... 26, 27
`Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) ............................... 36
`General Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen,
`131 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
`524 U.S. 951 (1998).............................................................. 30
`Griffin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
`274 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
`537 U.S. 947 (2002).............................................................. 30
`Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) ......................... 42
`Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) ....................................... 22
`Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).......................... passim
`McGinley, In re, 660 F.2d 481
`(C.C.P.A. 1981) ........................................................... passim
`Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ........................ 28, 45
`Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S.
`Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942) ..................................... 3, 36
`Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater,
`604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
`445 U.S. 917 (1980).............................................................. 45
`National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
`524 U.S. 569 (1998).............................................................. 18
`PMG Int’l Div., L.L.C. v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163
`(9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................... 30
`Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
`469 U.S. 189 (1985).................................................... 5, 20, 22
`Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001) ................ 29
`Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
`460 U.S. 37 (1983) ......................................................... 12, 25
`Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924) ............... 3, 37
`Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159
`(1995) ................................................................................ 3, 34
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`VII
`
`R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
`(1992) .................................................................. 12, 20, 27, 28
`Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) .................. 19
`Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
`461 U.S. 540 (1983).............................................. 9, 23, 31, 43
`Riverbank Canning Co., In re, 95 F.2d 327
`(C.C.P.A. 1938) .................................................................... 27
`Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
`515 U.S. 819 (1995)............................................ 17, 18, 30, 31
`Runsdorf, In re, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) ............ 27
`Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) ................ 23, 25, 32, 45
`San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
`States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) ................... 36
`Shinnecock Smoke Shop, In re, 571 F.3d 1171
`(Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1149 (2010) ........ 46
`St. Helena Hosp., In re, 774 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..... 46
`Trade-Mark Cases, In re, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) ................. 3, 21
`Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
`Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) ............................................ 31
`Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763
`(1992) .................................................................................... 39
`United States v. American Library Ass’n,
`539 U.S. 194 (2003).............................................................. 33
`United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
`529 U.S. 803 (2000)........................................................ 40, 41
`United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) .................... 47
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
`529 U.S. 205 (2000).............................................. 2, 34, 36, 44
`Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353
`(2009) ........................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`VIII
`
`Constitution, treaties, and statutes:
`
`Page
`
`U.S. Const.:
`Art. I, § 8 (Spending Clause) ...................................... 9, 43
`Amend. I .................................................................. passim
`Free Speech Clause ................................... 2, 11, 16, 31
`General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark
`and Commercial Protection, Feb. 20, 1929,
`Art. 3(3), 46 Stat. 2914, T.S. No. 833 ................................. 32
`Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
`Property, Mar. 20, 1883, Art. 6, 25 Stat. 1376
`(U.S. accession effective May 30, 1887) ............................ 32
`Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
`Property, July 14, 1967, Art. 6quinquies,
`21 U.S.T. 1643, 828 U.N.T.S. 331 ...................................... 35
`Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-212 ......... 4
`Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 ............................. 4
`§ 5, 33 Stat. 725 ...................................................... 6, 25, 32
`Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (15 U.S.C. 1051
`et seq.)..................................................................................... 4
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1) ......................................... 5, 24, 35, 1a
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(2) ..................................................... 5, 1a
`15 U.S.C. 1052 ............................................................ 25, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(a) ............................................... passim, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(b) ................................................... 5, 25, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(c) ................................................... 5, 25, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(d) ................................................... 5, 25, 8a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1) ............................................... 5, 25, 9a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(5) ............................................... 5, 25, 9a
`15 U.S.C. 1057(a) ................................................. 5, 35, 10a
`15 U.S.C. 1057(b) ................................................. 4, 21, 11a
`15 U.S.C. 1062 .......................................................... 35, 14a
`15 U.S.C. 1063 .................................................................. 46
`
`
`
`

`

`Statutes—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`IX
`
`15 U.S.C. 1064 .................................................................. 46
`15 U.S.C. 1065 ...................................................... 5, 21, 16a
`15 U.S.C. 1067 .................................................................. 46
`15 U.S.C. 1070 .................................................................. 46
`15 U.S.C. 1071 .................................................................. 46
`15 U.S.C. 1072 .............................................................. 4, 21
`15 U.S.C. 1091 .................................................................. 35
`15 U.S.C. 1111 ...................................................... 5, 35, 17a
`15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a) ................................................... 4, 18a
`15 U.S.C. 1115(a) ................................................. 4, 21, 19a
`15 U.S.C. 1115(b) ................................................. 5, 21, 20a
`15 U.S.C. 1116-1118 ......................................................... 21
`15 U.S.C. 1117(a) ............................................... 24, 39, 22a
`15 U.S.C. 1124 .................................................................. 21
`15 U.S.C. 1125(a) ................................................. 4, 39, 25a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(a)-(d) ....................................................... 21
`15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) ........................................... 24, 39, 25a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(b) ........................................... 4, 24, 39, 26a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(c) ................................................. 4, 24, 27a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(c)-(d) ....................................................... 39
`15 U.S.C. 1125(d) ................................................. 4, 24, 31a
`15 U.S.C. 1141b ................................................................ 35
`17 U.S.C. 102(a) ..................................................................... 44
`35 U.S.C. 2(a)(1) ....................................................................... 5
`
`Miscellaneous:
`
`1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks
`(2014) .................................................................................. 3, 4
`Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks
`Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous Or
`Immoral, 101 Trademark Rep. 1476 (2011) ..................... 32
`
`
`
`

`

`X
`
`Miscellaneous—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`3 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair
`Competition (5th ed. 2018) .................................................. 4
`Teresa Scassa, Antisocial Trademarks,
`103 Trademark Rep. 1172 (2013) ...................................... 32
`Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous
`Speech, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2331 (2018) ....................... 33
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark
`Official Gazette, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-
`and-resources/official-gazette/trademark-official-
`gazette-tmog (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) .......................... 35
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No. 18-302
`
`ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
`INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
`PETITIONER
`
`v.
`ERIK BRUNETTI
`
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
`
`
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-54a)
`is reported at 877 F.3d 1330. The opinion of the Trade-
`mark Trial and Appeal Board (Pet. App. 55a-67a) is
`available at 2014 WL 3976439.
`
`JURISDICTION
`The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
`December 15, 2017. A petition for rehearing was denied
`on April 12, 2018 (Pet. App. 68a-69a). On July 5, 2018,
`the Chief Justice extended the time within which to file
`a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including August
`10, 2018. On July 31, 2018, the Chief Justice further ex-
`tended the time to and including September 7, 2018, and
`the petition was filed on that date. The petition for a
`
`(1)
`
`

`

`2
`
`writ of certiorari was granted on January 4, 2019. The
`jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
`
`CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
`PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`The First Amendment provides in pertinent part
`that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the
`freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. Relevant
`statutory provisions are reprinted in an appendix to this
`brief. App., infra, 1a-38a.
`
`STATEMENT
`This case involves a facial First Amendment chal-
`lenge to a century-old provision of federal trademark
`law that directs the United States Patent and Trade-
`mark Office (USPTO) to refuse registration of trade-
`marks containing “scandalous” or “immoral” matter.
`15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Respondent sought federal registra-
`tion for the mark “FUCT” in connection with a clothing
`line including children’s and infants’ apparel. The
`USPTO refused registration under Section 1052(a)
`based on evidence that the mark would be perceived as
`equivalent to the vulgar word for which it is a homonym.
`Pet. App. 55a-67a. The court of appeals agreed that the
`mark is “scandalous” within the meaning of Section
`1052(a), but the court struck down the provision deny-
`ing federal registration of scandalous or immoral marks
`as facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the
`First Amendment. Id. at 1a-54a.
`1. “The principle underlying trademark protection
`is that distinctive marks—words, names, symbols, and
`the like—can help distinguish a particular artisan’s
`goods from those of others.” B & B Hardware, Inc. v.
`Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015); see
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205,
`212 (2000) (explaining that the “predominant function”
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`of a trademark is “source identification”). By prevent-
`ing others from copying such marks, trademark law
`“helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
`competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
`rewards associated with a desirable product.” Qualitex
`Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
`Trademark law likewise “ ‘reduces the customer’s costs
`of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ ” by “as-
`sur[ing] a potential customer that this item—the item
`with this mark—is made by the same producer as other
`similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked)
`in the past.” Id. at 163-164 (brackets and citation omit-
`ted); see Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S.
`Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (describing a trade-
`mark as a “merchandising short-cut”).
`“Trademarks and their precursors have ancient ori-
`gins, and trademarks were protected at common law
`and in equity at the time of the founding of our country.”
`Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017); see In re
`Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). At common
`law, “[o]ne who first uses a distinct mark in commerce
`* * * acquires rights to that mark.” B & B Hardware,
`135 S. Ct. at 1299; see 1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson
`on Trademarks § 3.02[2][a] (2014) (Gilson). Those rights
`allow the owner of the mark “to prohibit the use of it so
`far as to protect the owner’s good will against the sale
`of another’s product as his.” Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,
`264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (Holmes, J.). The owner can
`enforce those rights “under state common law, or if [the
`mark] has been registered in a State, under that State’s
`registration system.” Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753.
`“Though federal law does not create trademarks,
`Congress has long played a role in protecting them.”
`B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1299 (citation omitted);
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`see, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1905 (1905 Act), ch. 592, 33 Stat.
`724; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-
`212. In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act, ch. 540,
`60 Stat. 427 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.), “the current federal
`trademark scheme,” B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at
`1299. Under the Lanham Act, the owner of a mark used
`in interstate or foreign commerce, whether registered
`or not, may sue for trademark infringement “in federal
`court if another is using a mark that too closely resem-
`bles the plaintiff ’s.” Id. at 1301; see 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a)
`(federally registered marks); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (feder-
`ally unregistered marks); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at
`1752 (explaining that, “even if a trademark is not feder-
`ally registered, it may still be enforceable under [Sec-
`tion 1125(a)]”). Certain federal remedies for dilution
`and unfair competition are likewise available to owners
`of marks used in commerce, regardless of whether the
`mark is registered. See 15 U.S.C. 1125(b) (importation
`ban); 15 U.S.C. 1125(c) (remedy for dilution of famous
`marks); 15 U.S.C. 1125(d) (remedy for cybersquatting).
`The Lanham Act confers additional benefits on
`owners who federally register their marks. See Tam,
`137 S. Ct. at 1753; 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks
`and Unfair Competition § 19:9 (5th ed. 2018). For ex-
`ample, registration serves as nationwide “constructive
`notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership” of the
`mark, 15 U.S.C. 1072, which forecloses certain defenses
`in infringement actions, see 1 Gilson § 4.02. It also is
`“prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
`mark * * * and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use
`the registered mark in commerce on or in connection
`with the goods or services specified in the registration.”
`15 U.S.C. 1115(a); see 15 U.S.C. 1057(b). In addition,
`after five years of registration, the owner’s right to use
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`a trademark can become “incontestable,” so that it may
`be challenged only on limited grounds. 15 U.S.C. 1065,
`1115(b); see, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park &
`Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985) (holding that, after
`the owner’s right to use the mark becomes incontesta-
`ble, the mark cannot be challenged on the ground that
`it is “merely descriptive”).
`To obtain the benefits of registration, an “owner of a
`trademark used in commerce” applies to the USPTO to
`record the mark on the agency’s “principal register.”
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1); see 35 U.S.C. 2(a)(1). The applica-
`tion must include a description of “the goods in connec-
`tion with which the mark is used.” 15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(2).
`If the USPTO grants the application, it issues the owner
`of the trademark a certificate of registration “in the
`name of the United States of America,” 15 U.S.C.
`1057(a), and the owner “may give notice that his mark
`is registered by displaying with the mark the words
`‘Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’ or
`‘Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off.’ or the letter R enclosed
`within a circle, thus ®,” 15 U.S.C. 1111.
`Only marks that satisfy the statutory criteria can be
`registered. Congress has directed the USPTO to “re-
`fuse[] registration” of, among others, marks that are de-
`ceptive, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a); marks containing a flag, coat
`of arms, or insignia of the United States, a State, or a
`foreign nation, 15 U.S.C. 1052(b); marks that include a
`name, portrait, or signature of a living person without
`his or her consent, 15 U.S.C. 1052(c); marks that so re-
`semble other marks that they are likely to cause confu-
`sion, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d); marks that are merely descrip-
`tive, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1); and marks that are functional,
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(5).
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`This case concerns a Lanham Act provision that di-
`rects the USPTO to refuse registration of marks con-
`sisting of or comprising “immoral” or “scandalous” mat-
`ter. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Such a provision has been a fea-
`ture of federal trademark-registration programs since
`1905. See 1905 Act § 5, 33 Stat. 725. Although the
`Lanham Act precludes registration of “scandalous” and
`“immoral” marks, the USPTO has long treated the two
`terms as composing a single category, and we accordingly
`refer to the prohibitions collectively as the “scandalous-
`marks” provision. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481,
`484 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“not[ing] the dearth of reported
`trademark decisions in which the term ‘immoral’ has
`been directly applied”).
`To determine whether the scandalous-marks provi-
`sion applies to a particular mark, the USPTO asks
`whether a “ ‘substantial composite of the general public’
`would find the mark scandalous.” Pet. App. 3a (citation
`omitted). The agency generally defines “scandalous” as
`“ ‘shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety;
`disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense
`to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . or calling out
`for condemnation.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted). The agency
`understands, and the Federal Circuit has held, that the
`term includes “[v]ulgar” marks, i.e., those “ ‘lacking in
`taste, indelicate, [and] morally crude.’ ” Ibid. (citation
`omitted; second set of brackets in original). Over the
`years, the USPTO has invoked this provision as a basis
`for refusing to register a variety of vulgar and lewd
`marks. See Gov’t C.A. Supp. Letter Br. Add. 1 (July 20,
`2017) (providing a sample of particularly vulgar marks,
`including depictions of individuals engaged in sexual ac-
`tivity, for which the USPTO has refused registration).
`
`
`
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`

`7
`
`2. This case arises from the USPTO’s refusal of re-
`spondent Erik Brunetti’s application to register the
`mark “FUCT” for a clothing line that includes chil-
`dren’s and infants’ apparel. Pet. App. 55a. Respondent
`has used the mark in connection with his clothing line
`since 1991. C.A. App. A52. In 2011, the USPTO re-
`ceived an application for federal registration of the
`mark. Pet. App. 4a. A USPTO examining attorney re-
`fused registration under Section 1052(a) based on evi-
`dence that the mark consisted of “scandalous” matter.
`See J.A. 19, 26.
`The USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`(Board) affirmed. Pet. App. 55a-67a. The Board ob-
`served that “the term ‘fuct’ is recognized as a slang and
`literal equivalent” of the word for which it is a homo-
`nym, id. at 61a, and that respondent used the mark in
`connection with apparel and promotional material dis-
`playing “strong, and often explicit, sexual imagery,” id.
`at 63a. Based on that evidence, the Board found that
`the mark as used by respondent would “be perceived by
`his targeted market segment” as the profane word for
`which it is a homonym. Id. at 64a. The Board concluded
`on that basis that the mark was vulgar and therefore
`unregistrable under 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Pet. App. 67a.
`Although respondent argued that the scandalous-marks
`provision violated the First Amendment, the Board
`found the resolution of that constitutional question to be
`beyond its statutory authority. Ibid.
`3. a. Respondent sought review of the Board’s deci-
`sion in the Federal Circuit. While the case was pending
`in the court of appeals, this Court issued its decision in
`Matal v. Tam, supra, concerning the constitutionality
`of Section 1052(a)’s separate ban on federal registration
`of “disparag[ing]” trademarks, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). All
`
`
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`

`8
`
`eight Justices who participated in Tam agreed that the
`disparagement provision discriminated based on the
`speaker’s viewpoint, and that the provision was facially
`invalid under the First Amendment. See 137 S. Ct. at
`1763, 1765 (Alito, J.); id. at 1766-1769 (Kennedy, J.).
`b. After supplemental briefing and reargument in
`light of Tam, the court of appeals reversed the Board’s
`decision in this case. Pet. App. 1a-46a. The court first
`upheld the Board’s determination that respondent’s
`mark is “scandalous” under Section 1052(a). Id. at 6a-
`10a. The court held that substantial evidence supported
`the Board’s findings that respondent’s mark is a “  ‘pho-
`netic twin’ ” of a vulgar term, and that a “ ‘substantial
`composite’ of the American public would find the mark
`vulgar.” Id. at 6a-7a, 9a (citation omitted). The court fur-
`ther held that, given those findings, federal registration
`of the mark was barred by Section 1052(a)’s scandalous-
`marks provision. Id. at 9a-10a.
`The court of appeals concluded, however, that Section
`1052(a)’s scandalous-marks provision is facially invalid
`under the First Amendment. Pet. App. 11a-46a. While
`assuming arguendo that the provision is viewpoint-
`neutral, the court held that “the provision impermissi-
`bly discriminates based on content in violation of the
`First Amendment.” Id. at 14a. In reaching that conclu-
`sion, the court began from the premise that content dis-
`crimination of any kind is subject to strict scrutiny un-
`less some alternative First Amendment framework ap-
`plies. Id. at 15a. The court then rejected each of the
`government’s arguments that the statutory criteria for
`obtaining the benefits of federal trademark registration
`should not receive the same First Amendment scrutiny
`that applies to a content-based restriction on speech.
`
`
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`

`9
`
`The court of appeals rejected the government’s ar-
`gument that the trademark-registration program
`should be analyzed as a government subsidy for marks
`that the government wishes to promote, rather than as
`a restriction on speech. Pet. App. 16a-22a. The court
`distinguished prior decisions recognizing Congress’s
`broad authority to define the scope of government pro-
`grams, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
`Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983), on the ground that “[t]rade-
`mark registration does not implicate Congress’ power
`to spend funds.” Pet. App. 19a. The court concluded
`that the constitutional principles applicable to govern-
`ment subsidies apply only to Spending Clause legisla-
`tion, and that the trademark-registration program is
`not a Spending Clause program. Id. at 21a-22a. The
`court also distinguished precedents related to limited
`public (or nonpublic) forums, id. at 22a-28a, concluding
`that limited-public-forum principles apply only when
`the government excludes speech from its own property,
`id. at 25a.
`Having rejected the subsidy and limited-public-
`forum frameworks, the court of appeals analyzed the
`scandalous-marks provision as a direct restriction on
`speech. The court concluded that the ban on registering
`scandalous marks regulates speech based on its expres-
`sive (and not just commercial) content; that it is not re-
`lated to the trademark-registration program’s commer-
`cial purpose of facilitating source identification; and
`that it is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Pet. App.
`29a-31a. Noting that the government had not suggested
`that the provision could survive strict scrutiny, the
`court concluded that the scandalous-marks provision is
`facially invalid. Id. at 31a.
`
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`

`10
`
`In the alternative, the court of appeals held that the
`scandalous-marks provision could not survive scrutiny
`under the First Amendment standards that apply to
`regulation of commercial speech. Pet. App. 31a-42a; see
`Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
`Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (explaining that First
`Amendment analysis of restrictions on commercial
`speech turns on whether (1) the speech being regulated
`concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the
`asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the reg-
`ulation directly advances that government interest; and
`(4) the regulation is “more extensive than is necessary
`to serve that interest”). The court concluded that the
`government has no legitimate substantial interest in de-
`clining to encourage graphic sexual images as source
`identifiers in commerce, bec