`APPENDIX
`
`
`
`i
`APPENDIX
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion
`for Leave
`to File a Second
`Amended and Supplemental
`Complaint in the United States
`Bankruptcy Court Southern
`District of New York
`(February 26, 2019). . . . . . . . . App. 1
`Order in the United States Court
`of Appeals for the Second Circuit
`(March 13, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . App. 16
`
`Appendix A
`
`Appendix B
`
`
`
`App. 1
`
`APPENDIX A
`
`UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`[Filed February 26, 2019]
`Chapter 11
`Case No. 11-15463 (SHL)
`(Jointly Administered)
`___________________________________
`In re:
`
`AMR CORPORATION, et al.,
`
`))
`
`))
`
`)
`Debtors.
`___________________________________ )
`Adv. Proc. No. 13-01392 (SHL)
`___________________________________
`CAROLYN FJORD, et al.,
`
`))
`
`))
`
`))
`
`))
`
`))
`
`)
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`Defendants,
`
`OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF
`
`AMR CORPORATION, AMERICAN )
`AIRLINES, US AIRWAYS GROUP,
`)
`INC. and US AIRWAYS, INC.,
`
`
`
`))
`
`App. 2
`UNSECURED CREDITORS,
`
`)
`As Intervenor.
`___________________________________ )
`ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
`LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED AND
`SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT
`Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
`File a Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint
`to Allege Injury and Damages Under Section 4 of the
`Clayton Act and Demand for Jury Trial (Fed. R. Civ. P.
`15 and Bankruptcy Rule 7015) (the “Motion”) [Adv.
`Proc. ECF No. 189] and Memorandum of Law in
`Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion (the “Memo of Law”) [Adv.
`Proc. ECF No. 190]. The Motion requests that the
`Court grant leave to file a second amended and
`supplemental complaint to add a claim for treble
`damages and a demand for a jury trial.
`BACKGROUND
`The history of the Debtors’ bankruptcy case and this
`five-year-old adversary proceeding has been previously
`set forth in prior decisions, familiarity with which is
`assumed. See, e.g., Fjord v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR
`Corp.), 506 B.R. 368, 373-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)
`(“Fjord I”); Fjord v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 527
`B.R. 874, 878-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Fjord II”).
`But to understand the Court’s decision today on the
`Motion, we must revisit some of that history, including
`previous iterations of the complaint.
`
`
`
`App. 3
`In August 2013, Plaintiffs filed this adversary
`proceeding against US Airways, AMR Corporation, and
`American Airlines, seeking to enjoin the entities’
`proposed merger that formed the basis of the Debtors’
`plan of reorganization. Plaintiffs claimed the proposed
`merger would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust
`Act. Subsequent to the filing of this case, the United
`States Department of Justice filed its own antitrust
`suit against the merger in August 2013—an action that
`was settled in November 2013. Plaintiffs’ request for a
`temporary restraining order to block the merger was
`subsequently denied, see Fjord v. AMR Corp. (In re
`AMR Corp.), 502 B.R. 23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), and
`the merger went forward at the end of 2013.
`In early 2014, Plaintiffs for the first time moved to
`amend their complaint by adding new factual
`allegations, a claim for damages, a demand for a jury
`trial, and modifications to the declaratory relief sought.
`See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File an Amended
`Complaint to Add Damages Claim (the “First Motion”)
`[Adv. Proc. ECF No. 91]. The Court granted Plaintiffs’
`requests to add new factual declarations and modify
`the request for declaratory relief but denied Plaintiffs’
`claim for damages and demand for a jury trial. See
`Fjord I, 506 B.R. 368. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an
`amended complaint consistent with the Court’s ruling
`(the “April 2014 Complaint”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 103].
`The April 2014 Complaint remains the operative
`complaint in this case.
`Plaintiffs subsequently sought to further amend the
`April 2014 Complaint. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave
`to File a Second Amended Complaint (the “Second
`
`
`
`App. 4
`Motion”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 105]. The Court denied
`the motion without prejudice, criticizing it as mere
`“boilerplate without any analysis.” See May 16, 2014
`Hr’g Tr. at 15:13 [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 107]. This
`prompted Plaintiffs to file a revised motion (the
`“Amended Second Motion”) that proposed an amended
`complaint with 160 new allegations, a claim for treble
`damages, and a jury demand (the “June 2014
`Complaint”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 106-1, Ex. A]. The
`Court ultimately denied the Amended Second Motion
`in its entirety, concluding that the June 2014
`Complaint “[did] not plausibly define a relevant market
`for the alleged antitrust violation and personal harm to
`the majority of the Plaintiffs” and that “Plaintiffs lack
`antitrust standing to the extent they seek damages as
`travel agents—rather than consumers—because they
`are not efficient enforcers for the alleged antitrust
`violations.” Fjord II, 527 B.R. at 883.
`In August 2015, Plaintiffs again moved to amend
`their complaint. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File
`Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint to Add
`Damages Claim and for Jury Trial (the “Fourth
`Motion”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 118].1 This iteration of
`the complaint sought to add claims under Sections 1
`and 3 of the Sherman Act (the “August 2015
`Complaint”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 118-1, Ex. A]. At
`Plaintiffs’ request, the Court withheld a decision on the
`
`1 For the avoidance of doubt, Plaintiffs made four motions to
`amend before the current Motion: the First Motion, the Second
`Motion, the Amended Second Motion, and the Fourth Motion. As
`explained above, the Court only ruled on the first three of these
`motions.
`
`
`
`App. 5
`Fourth Motion, as Plaintiffs sought to have this case
`transferred to the Multidistrict Litigation Panel
`overseeing dozens of other lawsuits filed around the
`country regarding collusion and price fixing by airlines,
`including American. See Memorandum Endorsed Order
`dated Oct. 27, 2015 [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 123]; see also
`Sept. 9, 2015 Hr’g Tr. at 5:14-6:3 [Adv. Proc. ECF No.
`121]. However, Plaintiffs’ motion to transfer the action
`was ultimately denied by the MDL Panel in February
`2016. See In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig.,
`MDL No. 2656, ECF No. 304 (Order Denying Transfer).
`While the Court requested that the parties establish a
`briefing schedule on the Fourth Motion, see Apr. 4,
`2016 Hr’g Tr. at 13:6-10 [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 126],
`Plaintiffs ultimately chose “not [to] proceed with the
`pending motion to amend their complaint” and instead
`decided to “proceed on the basis of [the April 2014
`Complaint].” Decl. of Robin L. Kuntz, Ex. A (Sept. 7,
`2016 Joint Ltr. to Court) at 1 [Adv. Proc. ECF No.
`202-1]; see also Dec. 18, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at 11:2-3 (Court
`stating that it “remember[ed] there was another
`[motion for leave to amend the complaint] teed up, and
`then that was taken off the table, saying [that the
`Court did not] have to address it”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No.
`200].
`In February 2017, the parties notified the Court of
`their proposed schedule for completion of pretrial
`matters and a trial date. See Memorandum Endorsed
`Order dated Feb. 1, 2017 [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 127].
`Mindful of the four prior motions to amend, the Court
`at a hearing that month repeatedly stressed the need
`for clarity as to where trial would eventually take place
`and whether it would include a jury. See Feb. 8, 2017
`
`
`
`App. 6
`Hr’g Tr. at 15:11-12 (“Is this jury, non-jury, what is
`contemplated here?”), 15: 18-22 (“But what’s pretty
`clear from the jurisprudence is that if everyone is
`saying well we want to have it here because you all
`consent to having here in the bankruptcy court it’s
`pretty clear that that consent should be very clear on
`the record.”), 16:1-2 (“I want to make sure any such
`consent here is reflected in a very clear, unambiguous,
`and written way.”), 18:11-14 (“[A]t the risk of beating
`a dead horse I think it’s appropriate to have something
`filed in the court that’s written that reflects that so
`that that issue is forever put to bed.”) [Adv. Proc. ECF
`No. 130]. In response to the Court’s concerns, the
`parties appeared to agree that the case would proceed
`before this Court without a jury. See id at 16:18-22
`(“We did go through this process several times in this
`case, and I believe the record is very clear in written
`submissions and the hearing, that the parties have
`agreed to proceed before Your Honor for this trial and
`that it would be a non-jury bench trial . . . ”), 17:2-5
`(“On the issue of trying it before Your Honor that did
`come up previously and it is on the record that we’re
`prepared to do that and I think [Defendants are] quite
`right about that.”), 18:16-17 (counsel for both Plaintiffs
`and Defendants agreeing to submit a written consent
`to trial before the bankruptcy court).
`Consistent with the Court’s instructions at that
`hearing, the parties subsequently filed a written notice
`of consent to have a bench trial before this Court,
`which explicitly stipulated that “a United States
`Bankruptcy Judge [would] conduct all proceedings in
`this case including trial, the entry of final judgment,
`and all post-trial proceedings.” Notice, Consent, and
`
`
`
`App. 7
`Reference of a Civil Action to the Bankruptcy Court
`[Adv. Proc. ECF No. 129]. On the same day, the Court
`approved the parties’ proposed scheduling order that
`provided for the close of fact discovery on March 15,
`2017, deadlines for expert discovery, and deadlines for
`summary judgment briefing. See Interim Scheduling
`Order dated Feb. 22, 2017 [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 128].
`Shortly thereafter, the Court approved a revised
`schedule
`for summary
`judgment briefing. See
`Memorandum Endorsed Order dated May 1, 2017 [Adv.
`Proc. ECF No. 134].
`The Court ultimately ruled on the parties’
`cross-motions for summary judgment in a bench ruling
`delivered in August 2018 (the “Summary Judgment
`Decision”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 177]. At the conclusion
`of the bench ruling, the Court stated that it anticipated
`trial would be scheduled sometime in the fall of 2018
`and requested proposed dates from the parties. See id
`at 84:4-5. The Court did not hear from the parties until
`they sent a letter in November (the “Letter”) [Adv.
`Proc. ECF No. 178]. The Letter set forth a proposed
`pretrial schedule, but it also requested the Court’s
`guidance on the admissibility of a supplemental expert
`report. See id. at 1. After denying Plaintiffs’ request to
`admit such report, the Court entered an order on
`January 9, 2019 scheduling a weeklong trial to begin
`on March 11, 2019 (the “Trial Date Order”) [Adv. Proc.
`ECF No. 188]. Four days later, Plaintiffs filed the
`Motion seeking to amend their complaint once again
`(the “January 2019 Complaint”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No.
`191-1]. The Court heard argument on the Motion on
`February 20, 2019.
`
`
`
`App. 8
`DISCUSSION
`A party may amend its pleading as a matter of
`course within the time limits imposed by Rule 15(a)(1)
`of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a party
`seeks to amend its pleadings outside of the prescribed
`time frames, the opposing party must consent or the
`moving party must obtain leave of the court. See Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (incorporated in these proceedings by
`Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015). Rule 15(a)(2) provides that
`“[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend the
`complaint] when justice so requires.” Id.
`While “summary disposition of all litigation,
`especially antitrust cases, is not favored and . . .
`amendments should be freely and liberally granted to
`the end that all cases are decided on their merits,”
`Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson’s, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 788
`(10th Cir. 1967), the decision to grant or deny a motion
`to amend nevertheless rests within the “sound judicial
`discretion of the trial court.” Adelphia Recovery Trust
`v. FPL Grp., Inc. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 452
`B.R. 484, 489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). More specifically,
`a court may exercise its discretion to deny leave to
`amend a pleading where: (i) the movant has acted with
`undue delay, bad faith, or a dilatory motive; (ii) the
`movant has repeatedly failed to cure a deficient
`pleading; (iii) the amendment would unduly prejudice
`the opposing party; or (iv) the amendment would be
`futile. See, e.g., Tronox Inc. v. Kerr McGee Corp. (In re
`Tronox Inc.), 503 B.R. 239,340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)
`(citing Farnan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
`Applying these standards here, the Court denies the
`Motion for four reasons.
`
`
`
`App. 9
`First, the Motion is untimely, Case law in this
`Circuit is clear that motion for leave to amend
`complaints are untimely when such motions are not
`made until after the close of discovery, especially if
`made after summary judgment or on the eve of trial.
`See, e.g., Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 143 F.3d
`71, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of motion to
`amend that was filed after the close of discovery and
`the filing of a motion for summary judgment as
`untimely and prejudicial), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1041
`(1998); Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 686 (2d
`Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of leave to amend sought
`two-and-a-half years after the filing of an action and
`three months before trial).
`Moreover, the history of this case confirms undue
`delay by Plaintiffs. Long before the Court was faced
`with this Motion, the Court commented on the slow
`pace of this case, in part caused by Plaintiffs’ numerous
`motions to amend their complaint. See Apr. 4, 2016
`Hr’g Tr. at 10:17-21 (“I too grow weary of this case
`sitting here with not a whole lot happening . . . . [T]he
`judges and courts in the federal system are—pretty
`uniformly like to move things with appropriate speed,
`and this case is lagging behind.”). Nearly three years
`have passed since the Court made that statement. This
`case has continued to trudge along over the past
`several years, and discovery has been closed for almost
`two years. But there is finally an end in sight, as
`summary judgment has been decided and trial is
`scheduled to begin in less than a month. The
`procedural posture of this case weighs heavily against
`granting the Motion.
`
`
`
`App. 10
`Plaintiffs attempt to undermine this timing problem
`by arguing that there is no undue delay because the
`January 2019 Complaint would have been futile if it
`were filed at any point before the Summary Judgment
`Decision. See Reply Memorandum in Support of
`Plaintiffs’ Motion at 4 (the “Reply”) [Adv. Proc. ECF
`No. 204]. Plaintiffs’ position also does not hold water
`given the timeline of events. The Summary Judgment
`Decision was issued in August 2018. Plaintiffs did not
`even hint that they were considering moving to amend
`the complaint until a conference on December 18, 2018
`and ultimately did not file the Motion until nearly a
`month
`later—five months after the Summary
`Judgment Decision had been issued. Plaintiffs offer no
`explanation for this delay. But the Summary Judgment
`Decision did not
`somehow—directly or
`indirectly—grant Plaintiffs the right or basis to add a
`damages claim. Plaintiffs specifically rely on the
`discussion in the Summary Judgment Decision of the
`alleged harm to Plaintiffs and the antitrust market. See
`Memo of Law at 3, 8; Reply at 3. But that discussion
`was in the context of antitrust standing, not a damages
`claim. That is significant because, for standing
`purposes, injunctive relief only requires an allegation
`that one plaintiff suffered antitrust injury. See
`Summary Judgment Decision at 39:9-10, 39:19
`(concluding that “standing is not necessary for all
`plaintiffs in injunctive cases” and that it was enough
`for “one plaintiff [to have] standing”). The Summary
`Judgment Decision then concluded that at least some
`of the Plaintiffs had established themselves as regular
`customers of domestic air travel. See id at 44:18-21.
`Just as the Summary Judgment Decision did not open
`the door to new discovery, see Order on Plaintiffs’
`
`
`
`App. 11
`Motion for Reconsideration at 7 (the “Reconsideration
`Order”) [Adv. Proc. ECF No. 199], the Court’s ruling on
`antitrust standing likewise does not permit Plaintiffs
`to amend the April 2014 Complaint on the eve of trial
`without satisfying the applicable legal requirements.
`Notably, Plaintiffs cite no authority for their theory
`that the Summary Judgment Decision somehow allows
`them yet another bite at this apple.
`Second, the Motion is prejudicial to Defendants in
`light of its timing. “One of the most important
`considerations in determining whether amendment
`would be prejudicial is the degree to which it would
`delay the final disposition of the action.” H.L. Hayden
`Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 417, 419
`(S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also State Farm Ins. Cos. V
`Kop-Coat, Inc., 183 F. App’x 36, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2006)
`(affirming denial of motion for leave to amend where it
`was “submitted four years after commencement of this
`action, almost one year after the close of discovery, and
`five months after the district court’s summary
`judgment ruling”). The proposed amendment would
`clearly delay the final disposition here. Trial is
`scheduled for next month, and a new damages claim
`would require a reopening of discovery on the new
`claim and likely the need for additional expert
`discovery. See Defendant American Airlines Group
`Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion at 8 (“A trial on
`a damages claim would necessarily involve extensive
`factual and expert discovery from both parties
`(including from each of the 40 named plaintiffs in this
`case, whereas there were depositions allowed of only 6
`such plaintiffs)[.]”) (the “Opposition”) [Adv Proc. ECF
`No. 201].
`
`
`
`App. 12
`Since the Summary Judgment Decision, it has been
`clear that the next step for this case is trial. Indeed, the
`Court anticipated that trial would take place in early
`Fall 2018, but parties did not contact the Court with a
`proposed schedule until they sent the Letter in
`November. In early January—after ruling on a
`separate but similar attempt by Plaintiffs to add new
`expert evidence, see Order on Plaintiffs’ Request to
`Supplement Dr. Lundgren’s Expert Report [Adv. Proc.
`ECF No. 179]; Reconsideration Order—the Court
`ordered that trial will commence on March 11, 2019.
`The Court
`likewise entered the Agreed Upon
`Scheduling Order of Pretrial Deadlines in late January
`[Adv. Proc. ECF No. 196]. The law is clear that
`allowing an amendment at this juncture in the case
`would be prejudicial to Defendants and would upend
`the process—a process designed to bring this case to a
`final disposition.
`Third, Plaintiffs’ Motion is undermined by the fact
`that they largely requested this exact same relief
`earlier in the case and it was denied. Plaintiffs’
`Amended Second Motion sought to add more than 160
`allegations to the April 2014 Complaint, a request that
`the Court denied. See generally Fjord II, 527 B.R. 874;
`see also Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Amended Second
`Motion. Plaintiffs now seek to add more than 160 new
`paragraphs, with all but three of these paragraphs
`being exact duplicates of allegations that Plaintiffs
`sought to add as part of the Amended Second Motion.
`Compare January 2019 Compl. with June 2014 Compl;
`see also Opposition at 18 (discussing redline of
`proposed new complaint with proposed new complaint
`
`
`
`App. 13
`of Amended Second Motion).2 But nothing in the
`Summary Judgment Decision somehow overturned the
`Court’s prior decision denying the Amended Second
`Motion and its rejection of the 160 allegations proposed
`in the June 2014 Complaint.3 Moreover, the three new
`proposed paragraphs do little to help Plaintiffs. They
`rely solely on data that Plaintiffs have had at their
`disposal since 2017, which again underscores the fact
`that Plaintiffs acted with undue delay.
`Fourth and finally, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully seek to
`characterize the current dispute as an attempt to take
`away their Seventh Amendment right to a jury.
`Plaintiffs’ argument that they did not waive their right
`to a jury trial presupposes a fact not in evidence: that
`they have a right to a jury trial on the operative
`complaint, i.e. the April 2014 Complaint. As this Court
`already explained in ruling on Plaintiffs’ First Motion
`back in March 2014, “actions for injunctive relief under
`Section 16 of the Clayton Act are equitable in nature
`and create no right to a trial by jury.” Fjord I, 506 B.R.
`at 376. The April 2014 Complaint was brought “under
`Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act . . . for
`divestiture and an injunction prohibiting further
`violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act . . . arising
`from and out of the anticompetitive combination of the
`defendants, and to prevent a threatened violation of
`Section 2(c) of the Clayton Antitrust Act[.]” April 2014
`
`2 This fact was confirmed at the hearing on this Motion but no
`transcript of that hearing is available.
`
`3 Nor have Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the Court’s prior
`ruling on the Amended Second Motion.
`
`
`
`App. 14
`Compl. at 1. While it is true that “a claim for treble
`damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act falls within
`the ambit of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury
`trial,” Fjord I, 506 B.R. at 377, the Court has denied
`Plaintiffs’ motions to amend the complaint to add such
`a claim. See id. at 384-86; Fjord II, 527 B.R. at 890
`(“Despite these repeated admonitions, the Plaintiffs
`here again level allegations of general harm without
`connecting such harms to any named plaintiff.”).
`Though they make yet another attempt to add such a
`claim through the current Motion and the January
`2019 Complaint, this attempt fails for the reasons set
`forth above. As such, their demand for a jury trial must
`also necessarily fail.4
`While the Court, does not rely on waiver in reaching
`its conclusion on the Motion, a good argument can be
`made that Plaintiffs here did waive their right to a
`jury. Back in 2017, the Court explicitly asked parties
`about the nature of this matter—including whether
`
`4 At the hearing on the Motion, Plaintiffs posited that the April
`2014 Complaint nevertheless entitled them to a jury trial because
`of the language included in their prayer for relief. Specifically, the
`April 2014 Complaint notes that “[i]f and when one or more of the
`plaintiffs experiences damages by reasoning of the lessening of
`competition, plaintiffs will move to amend or supplement this
`complaint to request treble damages and a trial by jury.” April
`2014 Compl. at 38. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument to the
`extent they are arguing that they automatically have a right to a
`jury trial (and a claim for treble damages) simply because they
`provided for such possibilities in a reservation of rights. Critically,
`Plaintiffs must still satisfy the underlying legal standards for a
`treble damages claim and a jury trial right as well as the legal
`standard for a motion to amend in order to obtain such relief. They
`have done none of these things.
`
`
`
`App. 15
`they contemplated it as a “jury [or] non-jury” case. Feb.
`8, 2017 Hr’g Tr. at 15:11-12. They agreed that the case
`would proceed before this Court, and
`it was
`represented to the Court that it would be a non-jury
`bench trial. See id. at 16:18-22 (“We did go through this
`process several times in this case, and I believe the
`record is very clear in written submissions and the
`hearing, that the parties have agreed to proceed before
`Your Honor for this trial and that it would be a
`non-jury bench trial . . . .”). While the Court expressed
`the need to “forever put [this issue] to bed,” id at 18:14,
`even though it was “at the risk of beating a dead
`horse,” id at 18:9, Plaintiffs now claim that they only
`waived their right to have the case tried by an Article
`III Judge—not their right to a jury trial. But as
`Plaintiffs are well aware, cases before a Bankruptcy
`Court are tried before the Judge, not a Jury.
`For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the Court
`denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for leave to file January 2019
`Complaint.
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`Dated: New York, New York
`February 26, 2019
`
`/s/Sean H. Lane
`UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
`
`
`
`App. 16
`
`APPENDIX B
`
`Bankr. S.D.N.Y.-N.Y.C.
`13-1392
`Lane, B.J.
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE
`SECOND CIRCUIT
`19-513
`[Filed March 13, 2019]
`__________________________
`In re Fjord, et al.,
`
`))
`
`)
`Petitioners.
`__________________________ )
`At a stated term of the United States Court of
`Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood
`Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
`in the City of New York, on the 13th day of March, two
`thousand nineteen.
`Present:
`
`Richard C. Wesley,
`Denny Chin,
`Richard J. Sullivan,
`Circuit Judges.
`Petitioners, through counsel, have filed a petition for a
`writ of mandamus. Upon due consideration, it is hereby
`ORDERED that the mandamus petition is DENIED
`
`
`
`App. 17
`because Petitioners have not demonstrated that they
`lack an adequate, alternative means of obtaining relief,
`that their right to the writ is clear and indisputable, or
`that granting the writ is appropriate under the
`circumstances. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
`542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004).
`FOR THE COURT:
`Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
`/s/Catherine O’Hagan
`[SEAL]
`
`