`
`In The
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
`FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`SIMON SHIAO TAM,
`
`Respondent.
`
`On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
`Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`
`BRIEF OF AMICUSCURIAE PRO-FOOTBALL, INC.
`IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
`
`ROBERT L. RASKOPF
`TODD ANTEN
`JESSICA A. ROSE
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
`& Sullivan LLP
`51 Madison Ave.,
`22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`(212) 849-7000
`robertraskopf @
`quinnemanuel.com
`CounselforAmicusCuriaePro-Football,Inc.
`
`LISA S. BLATT
`CounselofRecord
`ROBERT A. GARRETT
`STEPHEN K. WIRTH
`Arnold & Porter LLP
`601 Massachusetts
`Ave., NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 942-5000
`lisa.blatt@aporter.com
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... iii
`INTEREST OF AMICUSCURIAE............................1
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
`ARGUMENT ...............................................................1
`ARGUMENT ...............................................................7
`SECTION 2(a) VIOLATES THE FIRST
`AMENDMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE
`CANCELLATION CONTEXT ....................................7
`A. Section 2(a) Triggers Strict Scrutiny...............7
`1. Trademarks Are Fully Protected
`Speech..........................................................7
`2. Section 2(a) Impermissibly Burdens
`Disfavored Speech .....................................11
`3. This Court’s Precedents Foreclose
`the Government’s “But You Can Still
`Speak” Argument ......................................13
`B. Section 2(a) Fails Even Intermediate
`Scrutiny...........................................................16
`1. Section 2(a) Cannot Be Justified As
`Protecting Underrepresented Groups ......16
`2. Section 2(a) Cannot Be Justified As
`Preventing Government Association........19
`3. PTO’s Arbitrary Application of § 2(a)
`Undercuts the Government’s
`Asserted Interests .....................................21
`C. Registration Is Neither Government
`Speech Nor a Subsidy.....................................24
`D. Section 2(a)’s Application in the
`Cancellation Context Is Independently
`Unconstitutional.............................................29
`
`
`
`ii
`TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued
`
`Page
`
`1. Cancellation Does Not Further the
`Government’s Asserted Interests .............29
`2. Cancellation Imposes Far Greater
`Burdens on Mark Owners.........................30
`CONCLUSION ..........................................................35
`APPENDIX
`
`
`
`iii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`AgencyforInt’lDev.v.AllianceforOpen
`Soc’yInt’l,Inc.,
`133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)..........................................26
`Ark.Writers’ProjectInc.v.Ragland,
`481 U.S. 221 (1987)..............................................14
`Autorv.Pritzker,
`740 F.3d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ..............................26
`B&BHardware,Inc.v.HargisIndus.,
`135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015)..................................4, 7, 11
`Bd.ofTrs.oftheStateUniv.ofN.Y.v.Fox,
`492 U.S. 469 (1989)................................................8
`Bolgerv.YoungsDrugProds.Corp.,
`463 U.S. 60 (1983)................................................16
`BullfrogFilms,Inc.v.Wick,
`847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988)................................26
`Cent.HudsonGas&Elec.Corp.v.Pub.
`Serv.Comm’nofN.Y.,
`447 U.S. 557 (1980)..............................................16
`CitizensUnitedv.Fed.ElectionComm’n,
`558 U.S. 310 (2010)..............................................12
`Clevelandv.UnitedStates,
`531 U.S. 12 (2000)..........................................11, 27
`Davenportv.Wash.Educ.Ass’n,
`551 U.S. 177 (2007)........................................26, 27
`
`
`
`iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`Page(s)
`
`Dep’tofTex.,VeteransofForeignWarsof
`theU.S.v.Tex.LotteryComm’n,
`760 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2014)................................26
`FCCv.LeagueofWomenVotersofCal.,
`468 U.S. 364 (1984)..............................................12
`GoodNewsClubv.MilfordCent.Sch.,
`533 U.S. 98 (2001)................................................30
`GreaterNewOrleansBroad.Ass’nv.
`UnitedStates,
`527 U.S. 173 (1999)..............................................23
`Harper&Row,Publishers,Inc.v.Nation
`Enters.,
`471 U.S. 539 (1985)..............................................10
`Harrisv.McCrae,
`448 U.S. 297 (1980)..............................................26
`HustlerMagazine,Inc.v.Falwell,
`485 U.S. 46 (1988)................................................17
`LegalServs.Corp.v.Velazquez,
`531 U.S. 533 (2001)..................................25, 26, 28
`L.A.PoliceDep’tv.UnitedReportingPubl’g
`Corp.,
`528 U.S. 32 (1999)................................................15
`Illinoisexrel.Madiganv.Telemarketing
`Assocs.,Inc.,
`538 U.S. 600 (2003)..............................................10
`
`
`
`v
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`Page(s)
`
`MinneapolisStar&TribuneCo.v.Minn.
`Comm’rofRevenue,
`460 U.S. 575 (1983)..............................................15
`MishawakaRubber&WoolenMfg.Co.v.
`S.S.KresgeCo.,
`316 U.S. 203 (1942)................................................7
`N.Y.TimesCo.v.Sullivan,
`376 U.S. 254 (1964)................................................8
`NEAv.Finley,
`524 U.S. 569 (1998)..............................................28
`Nike,Inc.v.Kasky,
`539 U.S. 654 (2003)................................................9
`PittNewsv.Pappert,
`379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) ...................................14
`Pro-Football,Inc.v.Blackhorse,
`112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015) .....................1
`QualitexCo.v.JacobsonProds.Co.,
`514 U.S. 159 (1995)................................................8
`Reedv.TownofGilbert,
`135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)..........................................12
`Reganv.TaxationWithRepresentationof
`Wash.,
`461 U.S. 540 (1983)........................................26, 28
`Renov.ACLU,
`521 U.S. 844 (1997)..............................................30
`
`
`
`vi
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`Page(s)
`
`Rosenbergerv.Rector&Visitorsofthe
`Univ.ofVa.,
`515 U.S. 819 (1995)........................................14, 28
`Rustv.Sullivan,
`500 U.S. 173 (1991)..............................................25
`Simon&Schuster,Inc.v.Membersofthe
`N.Y.StateCrimeVictimsBd.,
`502 U.S. 105 (1991)..............................................14
`Snyderv.Phelps,
`131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)..........................................17
`Sorrellv.IMSHealthInc.,
`564 U.S. 552 (2011)............................10, 14, 15, 16
`UnitedStatesv.Stevens,
`559 U.S. 460 (2010)................................................9
`Walkerv.Tex.Div.,SonsofConfederate
`Veterans,Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015)....................................24, 25
`WaltDisneyCo.v.Powell,
`698 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1988) .............................10
`Ysursav.PocatelloEduc.Ass’n,
`555 U.S. 353 (2009)..............................................27
`Zacchiniv.Scripps-HowardBroad.Co.,
`433 U.S. 562 (1977)..............................................10
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Decisions
`ApplicationofHeleneCurtisIndus.,Inc.,
`305 F.2d 492 (C.C.P.A. 1962)...............................20
`
`
`
`vii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`Page(s)
`
`ApplicationofNat’lDistillers&Chem.
`Corp.,
`297 F.2d 941 (C.C.P.A 1962)................................20
`Blackhorsev.Pro-Football,Inc.,
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014)..................29
`Harjov.Pro-Football,Inc.,
`50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999)....................21
`InreHeebMediaLLC,
`89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008)....................22
`InreInOverOurHeads,
`16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990)....................21
`
`Constitutional Provisions
`U.S. Const. amend. I .........................................passim
`
`Statutes
`15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(C) ............................................8
`15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)............................................passim
`15 U.S.C. § 1063 ........................................................27
`15 U.S.C. § 1064 ............................................23, 29, 31
`15 U.S.C. § 1067 ..................................................23, 29
`15 U.S.C. § 1070 ........................................................27
`15 U.S.C. § 1071 ..................................................27, 29
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)....................................................16
`18 U.S.C. § 48 ..............................................................9
`
`
`
`viii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`Page(s)
`
`35 U.S.C. § 153 ..........................................................20
`
`Other Authorities
`A. Taube & K. Richards, 15RacistBrand
`MascotsandLogosthatMakethe
`RedskinsLookProgressive, Business
`Insider (June 19, 2014) ........................................34
`Brief of the United States, Pro-Football,Inc.
`v.Blackhorse, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Feb.
`4, 2016) .................................................................34
`Brief of the United States, Nike,Inc.v.
`Kasky,
`539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).........................31
`HearingsonH.R.4744Beforethe
`Subcomm.onTrademarksoftheH.
`Comm.onPatents, 76th Cong. (1939)...........17, 21
`J.W. Cox et al., NewPollFinds9in10
`NativeAmericansAren’tOffendedby
`RedskinsName, Wash. Post, May 19,
`2016 ......................................................................30
`L. Munoz, WearingPrideonSleeve, L.A.
`Times, Jan. 17, 2008 ............................................22
`M. Kern-Foxworth, AuntJemima,Uncle
`Ben,andRastus:BlacksinAdvertising,
`Yesterday,Today,andTomorrow(1994) ............34
`M.M. Manring, SlaveinaBox:TheStrange
`CareerofAuntJemima(1998) ............................34
`
`
`
`ix
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`Page(s)
`
`Opening Brief of Appellant, Pro-Football,
`Inc.v.Blackhorse,
`No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2015)....................17
`PTO, BasicFactsAboutTrademarks......................11
`PTO, DoINeedaTrademarkAttorney?.................11
`PTO, TrademarkBasics............................................11
`PTO, Trademark Electronic Search System ..............3
`TheRacialSlurDatabase.........................................22
`TheRaciallyChargedMeaningBehindthe
`WordThug, National Public Radio (Apr.
`30, 2015) ...............................................................24
`Reply Brief of Appellant, Pro-Football,Inc.
`v.Blackhorse,
`No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2016) ..................17
`ThereAreFarMorePeopleNamedHitler
`thanYou’dThink, Vice.com (Sept. 22,
`2014) .....................................................................16
`TTAB Manual of Practice § 303.03 (June
`2016) .....................................................................31
`U.S. Copyright Office, CopyrightBasics..................15
`U.S. Copyright Office, Sample Certification
`of Registration......................................................20
`
`
`
`INTEREST OF AMICUSCURIAE1
`Amicus Pro-Football, Inc. (the “Team” or “Red-
`skins”) owns and operates the National Football
`League’s Washington Redskins. The Team has a
`substantial interest in whether the disparagement
`clause in § 2(a) of
`the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
`§ 1052(a), violates the First Amendment.
`In 2014,
`the PTO invoked § 2(a) to schedule the cancellation
`of six of the Team’s Redskins trademark registra-
`tions on the theory that the trademarks disparaged
`Native Americans when the PTO registered the first
`mark in 1967. The U.S. District Court for the East-
`ern District of Virginia affirmed the cancella-
`tions. Pro-Football,Inc.v.Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp.
`3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015). The Team appealed; the case
`is fully briefed; and the Fourth Circuit has placed the
`appeal
`in abeyance pending this Court’s decision
`here. Pro-Football,Inc.v.Blackhorse, No. 15-1874.
`INTRODUCTION AND
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`Section 2(a)’s ban on the registration of disparag-
`ing trademarks is facially unconstitutional. At min-
`imum, the ban is unconstitutional as applied to the
`cancellation of existing registrations.
`A. The disparagement clause triggers strict
`scrutiny. Trademarks are names, symbols, and logos
`that communicate powerful messages: they allow au-
`diences to connect trademark owners with their
`
`1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part.
`No one other than amicuscuriae, its members, its member as-
`sociation, or amicus’s counsel made a monetary contribution in-
`tended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. The
`parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and copies of
`the letters of consent are on file with the Clerk’s Office.
`
`
`
`2
`
`goods or services. When the PTO registers a trade-
`mark, the PTO confers on the mark special legal sta-
`tus and legal protections from interference by third
`parties. The PTO acts as regulator in registering
`trademarks, just like the government acts as regula-
`tor when it issues patents or registers copyrights.
`Denying legal protection to disfavored speech
`blatantly violates the First Amendment. The dis-
`paragement clause impermissibly discriminates on
`the basis of both disfavored content and viewpoint.
`The government expressly concedes that the clause
`is content-based. Br. 11, 36. The government also
`implicitly concedes that it is viewpoint-based. The
`government acknowledges that the clause targets on-
`ly racial slurs, crudereferences to women’s anatomy,
`and demeaning depictions of religious figures, while
`leaving unburdened speech that expresses a positive
`or neutral viewpoint on those same subjects. Br. 10,
`28.
`
`B. Section 2(a) fails even intermediate scrutiny.
`Congress did not pass the Lanham Act as civil rights
`legislation. The Act does not directly further the
`government’s interest in protecting underrepresent-
`ed groups from racial slurs, misogyny, or demeaning
`religious messages.
`If social justice were the goal,
`the disparagement clause overshoots it by a mile.
`The clause applies to all persons, institutions, and
`beliefs. The statute therefore equally protects rac-
`ists, misogynists, and blasphemers from disparage-
`ment. The same is true for racist, misogynist, and
`blasphemous institutions and beliefs.
`The PTO does not rigorously enforce the statute.
`And when it does, the PTO’s actions are arbitrary
`and wildly inconsistent. Amicus regrets that it is
`necessary to use offensive language in a brief to this
`
`
`
`3
`
`Court. But reference to the range and pervasiveness
`of the PTO’s startling registrations disproves that
`§ 2(a) furthers significant government interests, that
`these registrations reflect merely occasional errors,
`and that the PTO applies the statute rationally and
`evenhandedly. The PTO has registered marks such
`as YARDAPES landscaping services; AFRO-SAXONS and
`DAGO SWAGG clothing; BAKED BY A NEGRO baked
`goods; CRIPPLED OLD BIKER BASTARDS clothing; YID
`DISH online dating newsletter; CRACKA AZZ SKATE-
`BOARDS skateboards and apparel; RETARDIPEDIA en-
`tertainment services, and many more similar marks.
`The PTO has registered BOOBS AS BEER HOLDERS
`adult-themed videos and photos; VAJAYJAY HAT party
`hats; and MATCH-A-SNATCH playing cards. The Ap-
`pendix contains additional examples, and is by no
`means exhaustive.2
`These registrations similarly defeat the govern-
`ment’s assertion that § 2(a) “avoid[s] the incorpora-
`tion of objectionable marks into official government
`communications, and the consequent association of
`the marks with the government itself.” Br. 11, 28.
`Over two million registered marks for countless
`goods and services render the Principal Register in-
`capable of communicating any government message.
`C. The government argues that although no
`“discrete analytic”
`category supports upholding
`§ 2(a), this Court should combine government speech
`and subsidy principles to hold that trademark regis-
`
`2 The PTO has registered all marks appearing in this brief in
`small-cap font. The registrations in the Appendix appear in al-
`phabetical order. These and other registrations are available
`by searching the PTO’s database. See PTO, Trademark Elec-
`tronic Search System, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov.
`
`
`
`4
`
`tration permits rank discrimination against disfa-
`vored speech. Br. 43. The government’s brief refers
`to trademark registration 89 times as a government
`program, 26 times as government assistance, and 25
`times as a government subsidy. But to our know-
`ledge, in the 70 years since the passage of the Lan-
`ham Act, the PTO has never described trademark
`registration in any of these terms, or treated regis-
`trations as government speech.
`Instead, the PTO aptly describes the registration
`process as a legal proceeding, and this Court has ex-
`plained that registration confers legal status, protec-
`tion, and rights. B&BHardware,Inc.v.HargisIn-
`dus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299–1301 (2015). Legal pro-
`ceedings and advantages are not government subsi-
`dies, much less platforms for government speech.
`The government’s theory would open the floodgates
`to discrimination based on disfavored content, view-
`point, and speakers in other government-regulatory
`schemes, including copyright registration.
`But the consequences would be staggering even
`were this Court to adopt a for-this-case-only theory
`of the First Amendment. Two million registered
`trademarks would overnight become government-
`subsidized names and government speech. Marks
`like those set forth in the Appendix, including YO’
`ASS FACE; I WORK HARD BITCH; TRANNY SURPRISE;
`SMACK MY ASS & CALL ME SALLY; RELIGION KILLS;
`SEX SENT ME TO THE SLAMMER; LAUGHING MY VAGINA
`OFF; ANAL FANTASY COLLECTION; BUSH PANTY;
`BLACKGIRLSDOPORN.COM; and TEENSDOPORN.COM,
`would have the full backing of, and bear the official
`seal of approval from, Uncle Sam. What’s more, Un-
`cle Sam would be the one speaking. The same would
`be true for all registered logos, such as numerous
`
`
`
`5
`
`confederate flags and lewd depictions of women’s
`anatomy, including those on the registered marks
`SPANK ME CARDS.COM, RIDE DOGGIE STYLE, and
`EWHIP.COM. The PTO cannot, on its own initiative,
`rid the registry of these or similar registrations.
`Registration is thus not analogous to government
`speech. Either the PTO has unfettered control over
`the government’s message, or registration does not
`reflect the government’s message.
`D. However the Court rules with respect to the
`PTO’s initial refusal to register marks, § 2(a) cannot
`be constitutionally applied to cancel existing regis-
`trations.
`If the government cancels a registration
`because it historically may have disparaged a group,
`the government’s purported interests in protecting
`the affected group or disassociating itself from disfa-
`vored speech are incoherent. Those interests relate
`to the impact that the mark has on the group today,
`not its historical impact. The chilling of speech and
`the upending of reliance interests are magnified ex-
`ponentially when the mark owner has relied on the
`protections of registration in investing in its brand.
`And cancellation forces mark owners to defend
`against claims of historical offense when relevant
`witnesses may no longer be alive and key documents
`may no longer exist.
`The Redskins’ case illustrates the fundamental
`constitutional principles at stake. The Redskins are
`one of the most storied franchises in sports. The
`Team adopted the Redskins name in 1933, and the
`PTO registered six Redskins marks on six separate
`occasions from 1967 to 1990, without objection from
`anyone. Yet in 2014, the PTO granted a petition
`brought by five Native Americans to cancel the
`Team’s registrations because the Redskins’ name
`
`
`
`6
`
`may have disparaged an unspecified percentage of
`Native Americans starting in 1967. The PTO was
`indifferent to whether Native Americans today over-
`whelmingly do not find the name disparaging. Like-
`wise, the PTO expressed no concerns with transmit-
`ting the Team’s name abroad for half of a century.
`Upholding the statute in the cancellation context
`would permit extraordinary abuses of government
`power. Anyone offended by a registered mark can
`seek cancellation, no matter the registration’s age,
`no matter the number of times that the PTO previ-
`ously registered the mark, and no matter the conse-
`quences to the owner’s brand or consumers. Any
`person belonging to the referenced group can seek
`cancellation based on the mark’s allegedly disparag-
`ing meaning in the past, whether or not the person
`was alive at the time of registration, whether or not
`any member of the group objected at the time of reg-
`istration, whether or not anyone besides the person
`seeking cancellation currently finds the mark dis-
`paraging, whether or not the person ever purchased
`the mark’s good or service, whether or not a foreign
`country ever
`complained about
`the mark, and
`whether or not relevant witnesses or pertinent rec-
`ords still exist. And the PTO will cancel the registra-
`tion so long as the person shows that some unspeci-
`fied percentage of the referenced group may have
`perceived, to some unspecified non-trivial degree,
`that the mark was unflattering to the group (or for
`that matter, to any institution or belief) when the
`mark was registered.
`The constitutional guarantees of free speech and
`fundamental fairness prevent this kind of madness.
`
`
`
`7
`
`ARGUMENT
`SECTION 2(a) VIOLATES THE FIRST AMEND-
`MENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE CANCELLATION
`CONTEXT
`Section 2(a) bars registration of trademarks that
`“may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institu-
`tions, [or] beliefs . . . or bring them into contempt, or
`disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). That language fa-
`cially discriminates against protected speech based
`on disfavored content and viewpoint and is thus un-
`constitutional. At a minimum, the clause cannot be
`constitutionally applied to cancel existing registra-
`tions.
`A. Section 2(a) Triggers Strict Scrutiny
`Registration of trademarks, like any registration
`scheme, is purely regulatory. As such, Congress can-
`not condition the “procedural and substantive legal
`advantages” guaranteed by the Lanham Act, B&B
`Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300, on a requirement that
`the mark owner change its name. Such burdens
`trigger strict scrutiny, and the government has never
`argued that the statute survives this exacting stand-
`ard.
`
`1. TrademarksAreFullyProtectedSpeech
`Trademarks are names that are expressive in
`their own right, and they enable mark owners to as-
`sociate all of their other speech—commercial or oth-
`erwise—with their brands.
`Just as an individual
`needs a name to function at home, work, and in soci-
`ety,
`individuals and organizations rely on trade-
`marks to communicate to the public when providing
`a good or service. Their very “function” is “psycho-
`logical,” Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v.
`
`
`
`8
`
`S.S.KresgeCo., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)—to “carry[]
`meaning,” Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
`U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
`Countless marks speak for themselves: AMBU-
`LANCE CHASERS SUCK; I HATE MY TEENAGE DAUGH-
`TER; and STOP COMPLAINING ABOUT YOUR BABY DAD-
`DY, YOU PICKED HIM! But all marks are inherently
`expressive, whether or not the speaker is motivated
`by profit. HERSHEY’S and MERCEDES-BENZ signal a
`certain quality of chocolate or automobile. THE NEW
`YORK TIMES and FOX NEWS CHANNEL signal certain
`types of news. THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
`LATTER-DAY SAINTS, MARCH OF DIMES, NATIONAL RI-
`FLE ASSOCIATION, and REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COM-
`MITTEE communicate certain religious, charitable, or
`political missions. HARVARD UNIVERSITY signals the
`source and quality of educational services.
`The expressive value of marks is readily appar-
`ent for respondent’s and the Team’s marks for enter-
`tainment services. Entertainment is inherently ex-
`pressive, and entertainers’ names are inextricably
`intertwined with the entertainment services they
`provide. Names are powerful. The marks THE 2
`LIVE CREW and NEW YORK PHILHARMONIC conjure up
`very different emotions and associations with music.
`The same is true for the names of sport teams, bal-
`lets, musicals, or improvisational comedies.
`That mark owners act for a profit is of no mo-
`ment.
`“Some of our most valued forms of fully pro-
`tected speech are uttered for a profit.” Bd.ofTrs.of
`the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482
`(1989); see,e.g., N.Y.TimesCo.v.Sullivan, 376 U.S.
`254 (1964). It is thus irrelevant that registration re-
`quires that trademarks be “in use in commerce.” 15
`U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(C). Neither Congress’s exercise
`
`
`
`9
`
`of Commerce Clause power nor an owner’s profit mo-
`tive insulates government burdens on speech from
`strict scrutiny. For instance, United States v. Ste-
`vensapplied strict scrutiny to a statute criminalizing
`depictions of animal cruelty “done for ‘commercial
`gain’ in interstate or foreign commerce.” 559 U.S.
`460, 464–65 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48). For-
`profit companies also use their registered names to
`engage in non-commercial speech. Nike, Inc. v.
`Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003) (Stevens, J., concur-
`ring in dismissal of the writ).
`In any event, countless non-profit organizations
`use registered trademarks to engage in purely politi-
`cal, religious, or similar speech not for profit. EVAN-
`GELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, SOUTHERN
`POVERTY LAW CENTER, MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL
`DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, and UNITED
`STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM are but a
`few. Although these non-profits must use their
`marks in commerce to obtain registration, they do
`not communicate with a commercial purpose or in a
`commercial capacity. Religious, charitable, political,
`and other non-profit speakers receive the federal pro-
`tections that come from registration because these
`speakers use their marks across state lines. And be-
`cause this case involves a facial challenge, the gov-
`ernment must show that regulatory burdens on these
`marks would not trigger strict scrutiny. Stevens,
`559 U.S. at 472–73.
`Regardless of the type of mark at issue, § 2(a) “is
`squarely based on the expressive aspect of the
`speech, not its commercial-speech aspects.”
`Pet.
`App. 61a–62a. The PTO looks to whether a mark
`disparages a referenced group, over and above the
`mark’s source-identification function.
`And even
`
`
`
`10
`
`when marks operate purely in the commercial arena,
`because § 2(a) discriminates against viewpoint, see
`infra pp. 12–13, the disparagement clause is subject
`to at least “heightened scrutiny.” Sorrell v. IMS
`HealthInc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).
`Several amici argue that trademarks deserve
`less protection because trademarks prevent third
`parties from speaking freely. See,e.g., Brief for Ami-
`ci Blackhorse et al. 9–12; cf. Gov’t Br. 40. But
`trademark law prevents speech that causes consum-
`er confusion or constitutes theft of intellectual prop-
`erty. The First Amendment does not protect speech
`that misleads consumers. Illinoisexrel.Madiganv.
`Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612
`(2003). It similarly “gives no right to steal another’s
`statutorily protected intellectual property.” Walt
`DisneyCo.v.Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 n.2 (D.D.C.
`1988); seeHarper&Row,Publishers,Inc.v.Nation
`Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Zacchini v. Scripps-
`HowardBroad.Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
`Judge Dyk opined below that trademarks involve
`only commercial speech unless the mark communi-
`cates “core political expression” such as respondent’s
`mark. Pet. App. 103a (Dyk, J., concurring in part
`and dissenting in part). The decision below ex-
`plained that respondent seeks, through the name of
`his all Asian-American band, to reclaim a slur as a
`source of pride. Id. at 10a. The government rightly
`disavows Judge Dyk’s approach as impermissibly
`viewpoint-based. Br. 46–47 n.12.
`Such a distinction is also unconstitutionally
`speaker-based. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 580. The PTO
`cannot treat two speakers differently depending on
`the speaker’s motivation for choosing the name. Se-
`rious equal-protection concerns likewise would be
`
`
`
`11
`
`triggered if the government provided legal protection
`to disparaging names only when the mark owner be-
`longs to the referenced group. The distinction also
`would be impossible to administer. What if one non-
`Asian-American joined The Slants. Two? And would
`the government be required to accept the mark own-
`er’s representation as to motive for choosing the
`name?
`
`2. Section2(a) ImpermissiblyBurdens Dis-
`favoredSpeech
`like registering
`Registering trademarks—just
`copyrights or issuing patents or video-poker licens-
`es—is regulatory in nature and does not give rise to
`any proprietary government interest. Cleveland v.
`United States, 531 U.S. 12, 23–24 (2000).
`In ex-
`change for meeting statutory criteria, the govern-
`ment confers on registered marks “legal rights” and
`“legal advantages” to “protect” those marks against
`interference from third parties. B&BHardware, 135
`S. Ct. at 1299–1301 (quotation marks omitted). The
`PTO similarly advises the public that registration is
`a “legal proceeding.”3
`Because registration is regulatory, this case is
`straightforward.
`“Content-based laws—those that
`
`3 See, e.g., PTO, Trademark Basics, https://www.uspto.gov/
`trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics (“The trademark
`registration process is a legal proceeding[.]”); PTO, BasicFacts
`AboutTrademarks, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
`trademarks/basics/printable_transcript_Trademark_Basics_
`presentation.doc (“[T]he trademark registration process is pret-
`ty complex. It is, technically, a legal proceeding[.]”); PTO, Do
`I Need a Trademark Attorney?, https://www.uspto.gov/
`trademarks-getting-started/using-legal-services/do-i-need-
`trademark-attorney (“The filing of a trademark application be-
`gins a legal proceeding[.]”).
`
`
`
`12
`
`target speech based on its communicative content—
`are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justi-
`fied only if the government proves that they are nar-
`rowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”
`Reedv.TownofGilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
`“Government discrimination among viewpoints . . . is
`a more blatant and egregious form of content dis-
`crimination.” Id.at 2230 (quotation marks omitted).
`The First Amendment “stands against attempts to
`disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.” Citizens
`United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340
`(2010). And because the government has never ar-
`gued that § 2(a) satisfies strict scrutiny, the statute
`is facially unconstitutional if it is either content- or
`viewpoint-based.
`Section 2(a)’s bar on registering disparaging
`marks is content-based because it is a “speech regu-
`lation targeted at specific subject matter.” Reed, 135
`S. Ct. at 2230. Section 2(a) is viewpoint-based be-
`cause it facially regulates speech based on a “particu-
`lar point of view,” FCCv.LeagueofWomenVotersof
`Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383–84 (1984), i.e., the statute
`“discriminate[s] among viewpoints within [a] subject
`matter.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230; seePet. App. 21a–
`24a.
`The government’s brief concedes the former (at
`11, 36) and inadvertently demonstrates the latter.
`The brief explains that § 2(a) bars registration of
`“marks containing crude references to women based
`on parts of their anatomy; the most repellent racial
`slursand white-supremacist slogans; and demeaning
`illustrations of the prophet Mohammed and other re-
`ligious figures.” Br. 10, 28 (emphases added). Exact-
`ly. The words “crude,” “slurs,” and “demeaning” are
`unabashedly and paradigmatically viewpoint-based.
`
`
`
`13
`
`Section 2(a) does not target allreferences to women,
`allreferences to women’s body parts, allcommentary
`on race, or alldepictions of religious figures. Rather,
`§ 2(a) burdens speech only if and when it conveys a
`negative viewpoint towards the subject matter at is-
`sue. The statute targets viewpoint in its most injuri-
`ous form: it bars registration of marks that express a
`critical opinion or perspective. Id. Accordingly, § 2
`“driv[es] ideas from the market place.” Gov’t Br. 48.
`The government argues that § 2(a) is viewpoint-
`neutral because it operates without regard to “the
`ideology, opinion, or perspective of the trademark
`owner.” Br. 46 (quotation marks omitted). But that
`is non-responsive. The statute still discriminates on
`the basis of viewpoint. Section 2(a) bars registration
`based on the “ideology, opinion, or perspective” that
`the mark purportedly expresses to the referenced
`group. “It is thus the viewpoint of the message con-
`veyed which causes the government to burden the
`speech.” Pet. App. 23a.
`3. This Court’s Precedents Foreclose the
`Government’s“ButYouCanStillSpeak”
`Argument
`Citing the text of the First Amendment, the gov-
`ernment argues that § 2(a) “does not abridge re-
`spondent’s freedom of speech” because “it does not
`restrict [his] ability to use [his] mark or to engage in
`any other speech.” Br. 25–26. As such, the govern-
`ment argues that § 2(a) “is reviewed for a rational
`basis.” Br. 48. But speech is restricted whenever the
`government denies protection to disfavored speech.
`Section 2(a)
`forces mark owners to change their
`names and brand identities to obtain the legal pro-
`tections of registration. This is precisely what the
`First Amendment is designed to prevent. The gov-
`
`
`
`14
`
`this Court’s Firs