Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 1 of 38
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`
`C.A. No.: 2:22-cv-1776-WSH
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`AMERANTH, INC.,
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`
`v.
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`DOORDASH, INC.,
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`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
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`
`
`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`FOR IMPROPER VENUE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO TRANSFER,
`AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 2 of 38
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii 
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
`
`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 2 
`
`III. 
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 3 
`
`A. 
`B. 
`
`Improper Venue ...................................................................................................... 3 
`Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted ................................ 4 
`
`IV. 
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 5 
`
`A. 
`
`Venue is Improper for DoorDash in the Western District of
`Pennsylvania ........................................................................................................... 5 
`
`1. 
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`DoorDash Does Not “Reside” in Pennsylvania .......................................... 6 
`DoorDash Does Not Have a “Regular and Established
`Place of Business” in the Western District of Pennsylvania ....................... 6 
`If This Court Exercises Its Discretion Not To Dismiss
`Despite Ameranth’s Forum Shopping, This Case Should Be
`Transferred to the District of Delaware ...................................................... 9 
`
`B. 
`
`Ameranth’s Claims Must Be Dismissed Because The Asserted
`Patent Is Invalid .................................................................................................... 11 
`
`1. 
`
`Background Of The ‘130 Patent And Related Invalidated
`Patents ....................................................................................................... 12 
`
`a. 
`
`b. 
`
`c. 
`
`d. 
`
`Apple: The ‘850, ‘325, and ‘733 Patents At The
`Patent Office And Subsequent Appeal ......................................... 13 
`Domino’s: The ‘077 Patent In The Southern District
`Of California And Subsequent Appeal. ........................................ 14 
`Olo: The ‘651 Patent In The District Of Delaware
`And Subsequent Appeal. ............................................................... 15 
`The ‘130 Patent Asserted In This Case Is
`Substantially Similar To The Related Patents
`Already Found To Be Invalid. ...................................................... 17 
`
`2. 
`
`The Court Should Dismiss The Complaint Because The
`Asserted Patent Claims Patent Ineligible Subject Matter ......................... 21 
`
`
`
`i
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 3 of 38
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`
`
`a. 
`
`b. 
`
`The Asserted Patent’s Invalidity Is Confirmed By
`Two Prior District Court Determinations And Three
`Federal Circuit Affirmances ......................................................... 21 
`The Asserted Patent Fails The Alice Framework .......................... 23 
`
`i. 
`
`ii. 
`
`Alice Step One: The ‘130 Patent Is Directed
`To An Abstract Idea .......................................................... 23 
`Alice Step Two: The ‘130 Patent Does Not
`Recite Any Inventive Concepts ........................................ 24 
`
`C. 
`
`Ameranth’s Willfulness Claim Must be Dismissed Because
`DoorDash Did Not Have Pre-Suit Knowledge of the Patent or
`Alleged Infringement ............................................................................................ 27 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`Courts are Split on Whether Pre-Suit Knowledge is
`Necessary to Plead Willful Infringement .................................................. 27 
`The Better Approach is to Find that Pre-Suit Knowledge of
`a Patent and Alleged Infringement is a Prerequisite to a
`Claim of Willful Infringement .................................................................. 28 
`Ameranth Fails to Plead Pre-Suit Knowledge of the ‘130
`Patent......................................................................................................... 29 
`
`V. 
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 30 
`
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`ii
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 4 of 38
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc.,
`No. 3:16-CV-1400-SI, 2017 WL 2543811 (D. Or. June 12, 2017) .........................................29
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`In re Ameranth Cases,
`No. 11cv1810 DMS (WVG), 2018 WL 11433300 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018),
`aff’d, 792 F. App’x 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .............................................................................2, 14
`
`Ameranth Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp.,
`Case No. 2:07-cv-271-CE, Dkt. No. 265 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2010) ......................................13
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,
`792 F. App’x 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................................................................................. passim
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc.,
`No. 2021-1211, 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021)........................................... passim
`
`Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C.,
`6 F.4th 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................7
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`989 F.3d 964 (Fed. Cir. 2021)....................................................................................................5
`
`Beteiro, LLC v. BetMGM, LLC,
`626 F. Supp. 3d 789 (D.N.J. 2022) ..........................................................................................27
`
`In re Bilski,
`545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
`(2010) .........................................................................................................................................4
`
`BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................24
`
`Cooper Lighting, LLC v. Cordelia Lighting, Inc.,
`No. 1:16-CV-2669-MHC, 2017 WL 3469535 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2017) .................................29
`
`In re Cordis Corp.,
`769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985)....................................................................................................3
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 5 of 38
`
`
`
`In re Cray Inc.,
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Dietz v. Bouldin,
`136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) .......................................................................................................10, 11
`
`Eko Brands LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters.,
`946 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................5
`
`Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................23
`
`Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp.,
`587 F. Supp. 3d 115 (D. Del. 2022) .........................................................................................25
`
`Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
`578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).......................................................................................................4
`
`Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`290 F. Supp. 3d 599 (N.D. Tex. 2017) ......................................................................................9
`
`In re Google LLC,
`949 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`GreatGigz Sols., LLC v. Maplebear Inc.,
`No. W-20-CV-00737-ADA, 2021 WL 4691145 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) ..............................9
`
`Helios Streaming, LLC v. Vudu, Inc.,
`2020 WL 3167641 (D. Del. June 15, 2020) .............................................................................28
`
`iFIT Inc. v. Peloton Interactive, Inc.,
`No. CV 21-507, 2022 WL 609605 (D. Del. Jan. 28, 2022) .....................................................29
`
`Infinity Comput. Prod., Inc. v. OKI Data Americas, Inc.,
`No. CV 12-6797, 2018 WL 1035793 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018).................................................8
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co.,
`200 F. Supp. 3d 565 (W.D. Pa. 2016) ..................................................................................4, 23
`
`Lafferty v. St. Riel,
`495 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 2007).........................................................................................................9
`
`M&C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo Prods. Corp.,
`2018 WL 4620713 (S. D. Tex. July 31, 2018) .........................................................................28
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................22
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 6 of 38
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`
`
`MG Freesites Ltd. v. ScorpCast LLC,
`No. 20-1012-MFK, 2023 WL 346301 (D. Del. Jan. 20, 2023) ...............................................27
`
`In re Micron Tech.,
`875 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................10
`
`Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc.,
`No. 20-125-LPS, 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020) ......................................... passim
`
`Ravgen, Inc. v. Quest Diagnostics Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-09011-RGK-GJS, 2022 WL 2047613 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022) ........................28
`
`Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prod.
`983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................27
`
`Sonos, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`591 F. Supp. 3d 638 (N.D. Cal. 2022), leave to appeal denied, No. 2022-134,
`2022 WL 1486359 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2022) ....................................................................28, 29
`
`Talsk Rsch. Inc. v. Evernote Corp.,
`No. 16-cv-2167, 2017 WL 4269004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) .................................................9
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
`137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) .......................................................................................................1, 3, 6
`
`In re TLI Comms. LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................24
`
`VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`CV No. 18-966-CFC, 2019 WL 1349468 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2019) .........................................27
`
`WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
`829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................30
`
`Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co.,
`927 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................3
`
`Wrinkl, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,
`No. 20-cv-1345-RGA, 2021 WL 4477022 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2021) .................................28, 29
`
`Xodus Med., Inc. v. Allen Med. Sys., Inc.,
`No. 2:17-CV-00581, 2018 WL 2338763 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018) .........................................8
`
`ZapFraud, Inc. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc.,
`528 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D. Del. 2021) ...............................................................................5, 27, 28
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 7 of 38
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`
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`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) .........................................................................................................................8
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) ............................................................................................................... passim
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ...................................................................................................................9, 10
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ..............................................................................................................................12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 120 ..............................................................................................................................12
`
`
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`vi
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 8 of 38
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`Defendant DoorDash, Inc., (“DoorDash”) respectfully moves this Court for an Order
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`dismissing this case for improper venue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), or alternatively, to
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`transfer the case to the District of Delaware where venue is proper, and for failure to state a claim
`
`under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`First, this Court should dismiss this case because venue is improper against DoorDash
`
`under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)—the exclusive venue statute for patent infringement cases. See TC
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`Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017). Section 1400(b)
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`provides that a patent infringement case may be brought in the judicial district where (1) “the
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`defendant resides,” or (2) “has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
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`place of business.” (emphasis added). Here, DoorDash does not “reside” in, nor does it maintain a
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`“regular and established place of business,” in this District.1 While Plaintiff Ameranth, Inc.
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`(“Ameranth”) seeks to circumvent an appropriate forum for this dispute, no doubt because of its
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`track record of unsuccessful litigation outside this District, it has not and cannot make a showing
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`to establish venue in this District. In the alternative to dismissal, this Court should transfer the case
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`to the District of Delaware, a judicial district where venue is proper.
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`Second, even if the Court decides venue is proper in this case, the Court should dismiss
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`this case because Ameranth fails to plead a claim upon which relief can be granted, as the asserted
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`patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Like five other related patents that have already been
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`invalidated under Section 101, the asserted patent in this case claims an abstract idea that lacks
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`any inventive concept sufficient to render the patent claims eligible for patenting.
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`Third, the Court should dismiss Ameranth’s willful infringement claim, as it relies solely
`
`
`1To be clear, DoorDash denies committing any acts of infringement in this District or elsewhere.
`1
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 9 of 38
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`on DoorDash’s knowledge of the asserted patent and alleged infringement from Ameranth’s
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`complaint. Such knowledge should not be sufficient to impute willful infringement upon
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`DoorDash.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff Ameranth, a Delaware corporation having a principal place of business in San
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`Diego, California, filed its Complaint on December 9, 2022. (Dkt. 1.) At issue is a single patent,
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`U.S. Patent No. 11,276,130 (the “’130 patent”). The ’130 patent, however, is part of a larger family
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`of related patents and applications. (Dkt. 1-1 at 2.) Notably, districts courts for the Southern
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`District of California and the District of Delaware have already determined that other members of
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`this patent family are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming patent ineligible subject matter—
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`decisions which were appealed by Ameranth and subsequently affirmed by the Federal Circuit
`
`Court of Appeals. See In re Ameranth Cases, No. 11cv1810 DMS (WVG), 2018 WL 11433300
`
`(S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018), aff’d, 792 F. App’x 780, 787 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX,
`
`Inc., No. 20-125-LPS, 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020), aff’d without opinion, No. 2021-
`
`1211, 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo,
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`Inc., 213 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 142 S. Ct. 2814 (2022).
`
`Defendant DoorDash is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in San Francisco,
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`California. DoorDash has no offices in this District and does not own or lease any property in this
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`District. Ameranth tellingly did not file this matter in Delaware, or in the Southern District of
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`California, where it has received unfavorable decisions in related lawsuits, but instead brings this
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`matter here. On March 24, 2023, the parties met and conferred regarding DoorDash’s motions
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`pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). (Dkt. 12 and 13.) In light of arguments that
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`DoorDash raised, Ameranth subsequently sought and was granted leave to amend its Complaint.
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`Ameranth filed a First Amended Complaint on May 5, 2023. (Dkt. 14 (“FAC”).)
`2
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 10 of 38
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`A. Improper Venue
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`Venue in patent infringement actions is governed exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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`TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1519–21. “Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in
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`the judicial district where [1] the defendant resides, or [2] where the defendant has committed acts
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`of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). It is
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`well established that “[t]he requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of
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`those vague principles which, in the interests of some overriding policy, is to be given a liberal
`
`construction.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Schnell v. Peter
`
`Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 264 (1961)); see also In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1346
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned against a broad reading of the venue
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`statute.”). In patent cases, “the plaintiff has the burden of establishing proper venue under 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1400(b).” Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., 927 F.3d 1378, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`Regarding the first prong of the venue test, “for purposes of § 1400(b), a domestic
`
`corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation.” TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517, 1520–
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`21. Personal jurisdiction alone cannot establish residence for purposes of §1400(b). See id.
`
`Regarding the second prong of the venue test, “a corporate defendant has a regular and
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`established place of business in a district … [if] the corporate defendant does its business in that
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`district through a permanent and continuous presence [in that district].” In re Cordis Corp., 769
`
`F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985). “[T]he regular and established place of business standard requires
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`more than the minimum contacts necessary for establishing personal jurisdiction or for satisfying
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`the doing business standard of the general venue provision.” In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361. Rather,
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`this standard has three requirements: “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must
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`be a regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.” Id.
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`3
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 11 of 38
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`at 1360. “If any statutory requirement is not satisfied, venue is improper under § 1400(b).” Id.
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`With respect to the first requirement under Cray, “[w]hile the ‘place’ need not be a ‘fixed
`
`physical presence in the sense of a formal office or store,’ there must still be a physical,
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`geographical location in the district from which the business of the defendant is carried out.” Id.
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`at 1362. (citation omitted). With respect to the second Cray requirement, “[a] business may be
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`‘regular,’ for example, if it operates in a ‘steady[,] uniform[,] orderly [, and] methodical’ manner.”
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`Id. (citation omitted). This prong also requires the “regular, physical presence of an employee or
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`other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged ‘place of business.’
`
`In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Finally, Cray’s third requirement is that
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`the place of business must be “the place of the defendant,” and not merely “a place of the
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`defendant’s employee” or a place of an independent contractor. In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
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`“Relevant considerations include,” among other things, “whether the defendant owns or leases the
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`place, or exercises other attributes of possession or control over the place.” Id.
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`B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted
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`A complaint must allege facts “sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim
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`for relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v.
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`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). A “‘plausible claim for relief’ in a patent infringement case
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`necessarily requires a valid patent; otherwise there can be no infringement.” Intellectual Ventures
`
`I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 565, 569 (W.D. Pa. 2016). “[T]he 12(b)(6) stage is a
`
`proper one at which to examine patent eligibility under § 101.” Id.
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`Patent Ineligibility
`
`“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 is an issue of law.”
`
`In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
`
`(2010). The Supreme Court in Alice provided a two-step framework to analyze whether a patent
`4
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 12 of 38
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`
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`claim captures patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank
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`Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (“Alice”). At Alice Step One, the court must “determine whether the
`
`claims at issue are directed to … patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. at 217. If this standard is met,
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`then the court proceeds to Step Two, wherein the court must ask “[w]hat else is there in the claims.”
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`Id. This inquiry requires consideration of “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an
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`ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the
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`claim’ into a patent eligible application.’” Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
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`Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2012)). In the second step of the analysis, the court must “search
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`for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure
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`that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
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`itself.’” Id. at 217-18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
`
`Willful Infringement
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`To establish willful patent infringement, the patent owner must prove knowledge of the
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`patent and knowledge of infringement. “To establish willfulness, the patentee must show the
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`accused infringer had a specific intent to infringe at the time of the challenged conduct.” Bayer
`
`Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Eko Brands LLC
`
`v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., 946 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“deliberate or intentional
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`infringement”). Courts are divided over whether a defendant must have pre-suit knowledge to
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`sustain a claim of willful infringement. See ZapFraud, Inc. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc., 528 F.
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`Supp. 3d 247, 249–50 n.1 (D. Del. 2021) (collecting cases).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A. Venue is Improper for DoorDash in the Western District of Pennsylvania
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`This Court should dismiss this case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) because Ameranth
`
`cannot satisfy either prong of § 1400(b) for DoorDash. In the alternative, this Court should transfer
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`
`
`5
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`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 13 of 38
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`
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`the case to the District of Delaware, where venue is proper.
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`1. DoorDash Does Not “Reside” in Pennsylvania
`
`There is no dispute that DoorDash is a publicly traded corporation organized and existing
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`under the laws of the State of Delaware. (FAC at ¶ 2; Ex. 1, Declaration of Kelsey Merrigan
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`(“Merrigan Dec.”), ¶ 3.) Accordingly, pursuant to TC Heartland, DoorDash does not “reside” in
`
`Pennsylvania for purposes of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at
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`1517. Venue in this District therefore is improper based on the first prong of 28 U.S.C. §1400(b).
`
`2. DoorDash Does Not Have a “Regular and Established Place of Business” in
`the Western District of Pennsylvania
`
`Venue also fails in this District under the second prong of 28 U.S.C. §1400(b) because
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`DoorDash does not have any “regular and established place of business” in this District that meets
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`each Cray requirement.
`
`For starters, DoorDash does not have any “physical place” of business in this District, much
`
`less one that is “regular and established.” See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. Indeed, DoorDash does
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`not own or lease any real property in this District. (Merrigan Dec., ¶ 5.) DoorDash does not
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`maintain any offices, research, development or manufacturing facilities in this District. (Id. ¶ 6.)
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`DoorDash does not operate any distribution centers or maintain any inventory in this District. Id.
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`Thus, venue is not proper in this District against DoorDash. See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362
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`(“[T]there must still be a physical, geographical location in the district from which the business of
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`the defendant is carried out.”).
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`In its First Amended Complaint, Ameranth pleads the existence of a DashMart convenience
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`store located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (FAC ¶ 2.) This DashMart store, however, is not a place
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`“of the defendant [DoorDash].” See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363 (“‘[T]he regular and established
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`place of business’ must be ‘the place of the defendant.’”). DashMart store locations
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`6
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 14 of 38
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`a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of DoorDash, DoorDash Essentials LLC
`”
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`— eS°} vy°°= 5o rno> a,<@4 JQoSs vyOoQO = ‘© © °|
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`ar o°° oO 2 ~”ao ty n n @=e 2 —n
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`control any of the DashMart stores. Jn re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
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`P| Simply put, DoorDash doesnot
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`|| As noted above, DoorDash Essentials is wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of DoorDash that
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`is formed in the State of Delaware. (/d. at § 9.)
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`Essentials in this District cannot be imputed to its parent DoorDashsince they maintain formal
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`corporate separateness. See Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C., 6 F.4" 1283, 1289
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`As a result, any presence of DoorDash
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`Ameranth points to one suchinstance in its First Amended Complaint in connection
`with a purported job posting by DoorDash for a Site Manager for the DashMart facility
`in
`Pittsburgh, PA.
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 15 of 38
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021) (“But where related companies have maintained corporate separateness, the place
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`of business of one corporation is not imputed to the other for [patent] venue purposes.”).
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`District courts have applied these principles consistently when refusing to impute a
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`subsidiary’s presence to its parent for patent venue purposes. See Xodus Med., Inc. v. Allen Med.
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`Sys., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00581, 2018 WL 2338763, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018) (“Plaintiff has
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`not demonstrated that the existing and formal corporate distinctions between the Defendant and its
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`parent should be disregarded here for compelling equitable reasons so as to permit the Hill-Rom
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`facility in Monroeville be treated as a ‘physical presence’ of its subsidiary, the Defendant.”); see
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`also Infinity Comput. Prod., Inc. v. OKI Data Americas, Inc., No. CV 12-6797, 2018 WL 1035793,
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`at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018) (“Though CSA is Defendant Canon’s subsidiary, CSA’s presence
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`within this district is not enough to render venue proper as to Defendant Canon.”). As a result,
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`Ameranth cannot meet its burden to show that DoorDash Inc. maintains “a regular and established
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`place of business” based on the presence of DashMart stores in this District.
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`Moreover, Ameranth’s allegations regarding purported acts of infringement in this District
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`fail to establish that DoorDash has a “regular and established place of business” here. See In re
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`Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360-61 (“[T]he regular and established place of business standard requires
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`more than the minimum contacts necessary for establishing personal jurisdiction or for satisfying
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`the doing business standard of the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).” (citation
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`omitted)). For example, Ameranth alleges that DoorDash employs a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-
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`based engineering team that supports and works on products and services accused of infringement,
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`including use of DoorDash’s mobile application in this District. (FAC ¶¶ 6 and 8-11.) DoorDash,
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`however, does not maintain an engineering office in Pittsburgh. (Merrigan Dec., ¶¶ 5-6.) Rather,
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`any DoorDash engineers located in the District work remotely from home. (Id. ¶ 7.) This is not
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`8
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 16 of 38
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`
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`sufficient to infer that DoorDash has a “regular and established place of business” in this District.
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`See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599, 610 (N.D. Tex.
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`2017) (“The third requirement—that “the regular and established place of business” must be “the
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`place of the defendant”—means that it cannot be solely a place of the defendant’s employee, such
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`as an employee’s home, if that employee works from home.”) (citing In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360);
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`see also GreatGigz Sols., LLC v. Maplebear Inc., No. W-20-CV-00737-ADA, 2021 WL 4691145,
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`at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) (dismissing for improper venue because defendant “does not
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`conduct business out of its employees’ homes, nor are the employee’s homes places of
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`Instacart.”)).
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`Similarly, Ameranth’s allegations that delivery “Dashers” operate and use the accused
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`products and services within this District cannot establish that DoorDash has a “regular and
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`established place of business” in the district. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 11.) Contrary to Ameranth’s assertions,
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`delivery “Dashers” are not employed by DoorDash. Rather, DoorDash onboards Dashers as
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`independent contractors for the provision of contracted services through the DoorDash online
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`delivery platform. (Merrigan Dec., ¶ 8.) See, e.g., Talsk Rsch. Inc. v. Evernote Corp., No. 16-cv-
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`2167, 2017 WL 4269004 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (finding no defendant presence through
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`non-employee independent contractors, and noting that “relying on customer use of Defendant’s
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`[product] within the district as a substitute for a fixed physical location would not be proper.”).
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`Thus, DoorDash has no regular and established place of business physically located in this
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`District for purposes of § 1400(b). Accordingly, patent venue in this District is also not proper
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`against DoorDash under the second prong of the patent venue statute.
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`3. If This Court Exercises Its Discretion Not To Dismiss Despite Ameranth’s
`Forum Shopping, This Case Should Be Transferred to the District of Delaware
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`Where a plaintiff files suit in an improper forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “district courts
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`9
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`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 22 Filed 06/29/23 Page 17 of 38
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`are required either to dismiss or transfer to a proper forum.” Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 77
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`(3d Cir. 2007) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1962)). In such a case,
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`transfer may be made to “any district or division in which [the case] could have been brought.” 28
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`U.S.C. § 1406(a). As noted above, venue in a patent infringement action is governed solely and
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`exclusively by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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`Here, DoorDash is organized and exists under the laws of the State of Delaware. (Merrigan
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`Dec., ¶ 3.). The District of Delaware is the sole judicial district in the State of Delaware.
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`Consequently, as DoorDash “resides” in Delawar