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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`US ENDODONTICS, LLC,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`GOLD STANDARD INSTRUMENTS, LLC
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case PGR2015-00019
`Patent 8,876,991 B2
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`PETITIONER’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
`TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(C)
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PAGE
`1
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`I.
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`EXHIBIT 2034 ................................................................................................ 1
`EXHIBIT 2034 .............................................................................................. ..1
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`II.
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`EXHIBIT 2035 ................................................................................................ 3
`EXHIBIT 2035 .............................................................................................. ..3
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`III. EXHIBIT 2036 ................................................................................................ 4
`III.
`EXHIBIT 2036 .............................................................................................. ..4
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`IV. EXHIBIT 2038 ................................................................................................ 4
`IV.
`EXHIBIT 2038 .............................................................................................. ..4
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`V.
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`EXHIBIT 2047 ................................................................................................ 5
`EXHIBIT 2047 .............................................................................................. ..5
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`
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`i
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`I.
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`EXHIBIT 2034
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`A.
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`Patent Owner’s Untimely Citation of Alleged Relevant Evidence
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`In its response to this motion, Patent Owner cites pages 372-405 of Exhibit
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`2034 for the first time in this proceeding. The Board should disregard such
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`untimely identified “evidence.”
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`B.
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`Lack of Authentication
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`To the extent Patent Owner argues that 37 C.F.R. § 42.61(b) obviates the
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`need for its evidence to comply with FRE 902, it is incorrect. Since Patent Owner
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`seeks to rely on a declaration from Luebke and accompanying report from KMT
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`included in Exhibit 2034 for the truth of the matters asserted therein, it should have
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`submitted declarations from Luebke, BodyCote, and KMT. See Gnosis S.p.A. v. S.
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`Ala. Med. Sci. Found., IPR2013-00118, Paper 64, at *21, n.12 (P.T.A.B. June 20,
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`2014) (“The patent [cited by Dr. Gregory] is admissible, however, only as evidence
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`of what it describes. 37 C.F.R. § 42.61(c). To the extent the ’381 patent includes
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`data upon which SAMSF relies to prove the truth of the data, Dr. Gregory’s
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`declaration is insufficient to authenticate the data. . . .”).The fact that such hearsay-
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`containing documents were submitted during the prosecution of a later-filed
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`application does not transform them into admissible evidence.
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`Patent Owner did not submit a declaration from BodyCote regarding: (1) the
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`identity of the samples, i.e., brand and model, it allegedly obtained and heated; (2)
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`1
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`whether such samples were in sealed, packaged containers, indicating that they had
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`not been previously handled; (3) whether it heated the samples at 300°C for 24
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`hours; and (4) to whom it sent the samples after heating.
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`Patent Owner also did not submit a declaration from KMT regarding: (1)
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`whether the report contained in Exhibit A to Luebke’s declaration is a true and
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`correct copy of a declaration allegedly prepared by it; (2) the identity of the
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`samples, i.e., brand and model, it allegedly obtained and bend-tested; (3) whether it
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`received the samples directly from BodyCote; and (4) whether the samples it
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`allegedly bend-tested were ones that BodyCote heated at 300°C for 24 hours.
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`Patent Owner argues that Exhibit A is self-authenticating under FRE 902(7),
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`but cites two cases that are inapposite. In Alexander, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
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`district court’s refusal to consider unauthenticated documents submitted by
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`appellant Alexander, except for one document on appellee CareSource’s letterhead,
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`which was found to be self-authenticating. Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551,
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`561 (6th Cir. 2009). In other words, where one party submitted a document
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`generated on the letterhead of the opposing party, the court found it to be self-
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`authenticating. Similarly, in Reitz v. Mt. Juliet, the court declined to consider
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`unauthenticated documents, but made an exception with respect to documents
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`attached by plaintiff Reitz that were on the letterhead of defendant City of Mt.
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`Juliet. Reitz v. Mt. Juliet, No. 3:08-cv-0728, 2009 WL 5170200, at *5 n.7 (M.D.
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`2
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`Tenn. Dec. 18, 2009). In such cases, there is less of a concern of forgery or
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`falsification. In contrast, the KMT document on which Patent Owner seeks to rely
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`neither was produced by Petitioner nor is on Petitioner’s letterhead.
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`C.
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`Inadmissible Hearsay
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`Patent Owner appears to concede that the objected-to portions of Exhibit
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`2034 contain hearsay. Patent Owner is incorrect that “there are circumstantial
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`guarantees of trustworthiness associated with submitting a declaration with the
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`PTO.” Luebke has a substantial financial stake in this outcome of these
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`proceedings. See Paper 31, p. 8. His potential to “receive millions of dollars more”
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`in royalties calls into question his self-serving statements. Id. at 9. Patent Owner’s
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`argument that Exhibit 2034 is more probative “than any other evidence” is belied
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`by the fact that it makes no representation of having made “reasonable efforts”—as
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`required by FRE 807—to submit declarations from Luebke, BodyCote, or KMT.
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`II. EXHIBIT 2035
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`As set forth above, the Alexander and Reitz cases upon which Patent Owner
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`relies do not support its argument regarding self-authentication. Patent Owner also
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`appears to concede that Exhibit 2035 contains hearsay. Patent Owner’s argument
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`that Exhibit 2035 is more probative “than any other evidence” is belied by the fact
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`that it makes no representation of having made “reasonable efforts”—as required
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`by FRE 807—to submit declarations from Kowalski or Jason Nolan. Further,
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`3
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`nothing in Exhibit 2035 indicates any relation between the samples allegedly
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`heated by Kowalski and the files tested by Kuhn.
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`III. EXHIBIT 2036
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`Again, the Alexander and Reitz cases upon which Patent Owner relies do not
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`support its argument regarding self-authentication. Patent Owner also appears to
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`concede that Exhibit 2036 contains hearsay. Patent Owner’s argument that Exhibit
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`2036 is more probative “than any other evidence” is belied by the fact that it makes
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`no representation of having made “reasonable efforts”—as required by FRE 807—
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`to submit a declaration from KMT. Further, nothing in Exhibit 2036 indicates that
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`the files allegedly tested by KMT were the same files as the ones alleged heated by
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`Kowalski at 400°C in a salt bath for 10 minutes.
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`IV. EXHIBIT 2038
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`Patent Owner is incorrect that “Mr. Bennett’s statements in the email are not
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`hearsay under FRE 801(d)(2).” Mr. Bennett’s statements were not made in his
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`individual capacity or as a representative of Petitioner, but as a representative of
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`non-party D&S Dental. Indeed, the e-mail is dated prior to the formation of
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`Petitioner. Patent Owner also appears to concede that the statements are hearsay. It
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`argues that “Petitioner had an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Luebke on his
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`statements in Ex. 2038, but declined to do so.” Patent Owner has it backwards.
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`Patent Owner, which is owned by Luebke, could have submitted a declaration from
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`4
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`Luebke in this proceeding, but chose not to. Thus, Petitioner could not cross-
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`examine him without satisfying the relatively high hurdle of showing that such
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`discovery was “necessary in the interest of justice.” 35 U.S.C. ¶ 316(a)(5)(B).
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`V. EXHIBIT 2047
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`Patent Owner does not, and cannot, argue that the objected-to portions of Dr.
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`Goldberg’s cross-examination testimony is within the scope of his direct testimony
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`in his supplemental declaration, Exhibit 1041, which consists of merely ten
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`paragraphs discussing the supplemental bend-testing commissioned by Petitioner
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`and conducted by Innovative Test Solutions (“ITS”). In the objected-to portions,
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`Patent Owner did not question Dr. Goldberg about such testing. Patent Owner also
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`misleadingly and incorrectly states that Petitioner “concedes that the testimony in
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`these portions of the transcript is relevant to the issues of this trial.” First, 37 C.F.R
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`§ 42.53(d)(5)(ii) provides ample basis to exclude such portions of the transcript.
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`Second, Petitioner specifically argued the irrelevance of the portions of Exhibit
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`2047 upon which Patent Owner submitted Observations on Cross-Examination.
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`See Paper 45.
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`Dated: October 7, 2016
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Jeffrey S. Ginsberg/
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`
`
`Jeffrey S. Ginsberg (Reg. No. 36,148)
`Abhishek Bapna (Reg. No. 64,049)
`Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
`1133 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036-6710
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`5
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies that on October 7,
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`2016, the foregoing PETITIONER’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
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`TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(C) was served via
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`electronic mail on the following counsel of record for the Patent Owner:
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`Joseph A. Hynds
`(jhynds@rothwellfigg.com)
`R. Elizabeth Brenner-Leifer
`(ebrenner@rothwellfigg.com)
`Steven Lieberman
`(slieberman@rothwellfigg.com)
`Jason M. Nolan
`(jnolan@rothwellfigg.com)
`Derek F. Dahlgren
`(ddahlgren@rothwellfigg.com)
`C. Nichole Gifford
`(ngifford@rothwellfigg.com)
`ROTHWELL, FIGG, ERNST & MANBECK, P.C.
`607 14th Street, N.W., Ste. 800
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`
`
`/Abhishek Bapna/
`
`
`Abhishek Bapna (Reg. No. 64,049)