Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 1 of 20
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
`COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
`OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION
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`HAPTIC, INC.,
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`v.
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`APPLE, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 1-23-cv-01351
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`JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
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`PLAINTIFF HAPTIC INC.’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO APPLE’S RULE
`12(b)(6) MOTION
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`APPLE 1104
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`1
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 2 of 20
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`I. 
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`II. 
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 
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`Legal Standard .....................................................................................................................3 
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`III. 
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`Argument .............................................................................................................................3 
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`A. 
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`Haptic’s Complaint States a Claim for Direct Infringement. ..................................3 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`3. 
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`4. 
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`Apple’s Claim Construction Arguments Are Premature and
`Should Be Rejected. .....................................................................................4 
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`Even if the Court Addressed Claim Construction Issues, Apple’s
`Construction Improperly Inserts the Word “Directly” into the
`Claim Language. ..........................................................................................5 
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`Haptic Did Not Disavow the Claim Scope During Prosecution. .................8 
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`Apple’s Back Tap Feature Infringes the ’738 Patent, Even Under
`Apple’s Strained Claim Construction. .......................................................10 
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`B. 
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`Haptic Has Sufficiently Pleaded Contributory Infringement Based on
`Apple’s Sales and Monetization of HomeKit and HomeKit Certified
`Devices. ..................................................................................................................12 
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`IV. 
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`Conclusion .........................................................................................................................14 
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 3 of 20
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`
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`Cases
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`3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................................................8
`
`Apple Inc. v. AliveCor, Inc.,
`2023 WL 4091287 (N.D. Cal. 2023) .......................................................................................14
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................3
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`Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`915 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................8
`
`Crane Co. v. Sandenvendo Am., Inc.,
`2009 WL 1586704, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 5, 2009) .................................................................7
`
`Glaston Corp. v. Salem Fabrication Techs. Grp.,
`2022 WL 16901987 (M.D.N.C. 2022) .....................................................................................14
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`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
`
`In re Varma,
`816 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................10
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`Liqui-Box Corp. v. Scholle IPN Corp.,
`449 F. Supp. 3d 790 (N.D. Ill. 2020) .........................................................................................8
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`Mel NavIP LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:22-CV-00152-JRG, 2023 WL 1766266 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2023) ..................................4
`
`Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC,
`883 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................3, 4, 5
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`SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Comm’s AB,
`820 F.3d 419 (Fed. Cir. 2016)....................................................................................................8
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................10
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 271(c) .........................................................................................................................12
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 4 of 20
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`Rules
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) .............................................................................. passim
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`Other Authorities
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`Apple, Use Back Tap on your iPhone, https://support.apple.com/en-us/111772 ..........................12
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`Macworld, ‘Back Tap’ Feature in iOS 14 Turns Rear of iPhone into a Button
`(Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.macworld.com/article/675545/back-tap-feature-
`in-ios-14-turns-rear-of-iphone-into-a-button.html ...................................................................12
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`McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms ...........................................................7
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 5 of 20
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`Plaintiff Haptic, Inc. (“Haptic”) submits this Response in Opposition to Defendant Apple,
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`Inc.’s (“Apple”) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, (ECF No. 13).
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`Apple improperly asks the Court to resolve claim construction disputes at the motion-to-
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`dismiss stage, inserts the word “directly” into the claim language, and attempts to import
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`limitations based on prosecution statements that do not “clearly and unmistakably” disavow the
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`claims’ scope. In short, Apple attempts to rewrite the patent in suit. Even under Apple’s strained
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`claim construction assumptions, Haptic’s complaint adequately alleges infringement against
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`Apple’s Back Tap feature.
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`The Court should deny Apple’s Motion.
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`This case involves Apple’s infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,996,738 (’738 Patent) titled
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`“System and Method for Controlling a Terminal Device.” The ʼ738 Patent generally covers a tap-
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`based control system that converts a surface into a controller for a terminal device. The control
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`system includes a housing, a sensor, a mounting surface, a sensor, and a terminal device. The
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`functionality disclosed in the ’738 Patent allows users to control devices through tap gestures on
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`an ordinary surface. Claim 1 of the ’738 Patent reads:
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`A control system comprising:
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`a housing having an engagement means for a mounting surface;
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` a
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` sensor contained within said housing, said sensor forming an interactive
`zone defined by a range of said sensor, said sensor being comprised of an
`accelerometer, said interactive zone being aligned with said mounting
`surface and overlaying said mounting surface outside a perimeter of said
`housing, said sensor being in a fixed position relative to said engagement
`means, wherein a contact interaction associated with said mounting surface
`within said interactive zone is detected by said sensor as data signals, said
`contact interaction being comprised of an impact on said mounting surface,
`said data signals being comprised of vibration data of said contact
`interaction;
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`a server in communication with said sensor, said server being comprised of
`a routing module, a processing module being connected to said routing
`module, and an output module connected to said processing module, said
`routing module receiving said data signals from said sensor, said processing
`module determining a data pattern corresponding to said data signals of said
`contact interaction and matching said data pattern with a gesture profile,
`said gesture profile being associated with a command; and
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` a
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` terminal device being comprised of a receiving module and means for
`initiating activity of said terminal device corresponding to said command,
`said terminal device being in communication with said server, said output
`module transmitting said command to said receiving module,
`wherein said engagement means of said housing comprises:
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`an attachment means between said housing to said mounting
`surface; and
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` a
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` transmission portion connecting said sensor to said attachment
`means of said housing and being comprised of a material with
`flexibility different than said mounting surface so as to set a rigid
`position of said sensor relative to said mounting surface, said contact
`interaction generating said data signals of said sensor through said
`transmission portion.
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`Dkt. No. 1-1 (“’738 Patent”).
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`As set out in Haptic’s Complaint, Haptic owns all rights, title, and interests to the ’738
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`Patent. Haptic is also an operating business that offers Knocki, a small wireless device that
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`activates surfaces into touch control interfaces for terminal devices. The specific mode of
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`interaction of Knocki are “tap gestures,” which are predefined tap patterns that can be applied to
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`an activated surface. Knocki can be configured to control a variety of devices and programs.
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`In 2016 and 2017, Haptic and Apple representatives met several times to discuss
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`partnership, collaboration, and opportunities to integrate Haptic’s patented technology into
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`Apple’s products. Haptic disclosed its technology and its patent application to Apple at these
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`meetings. Shortly after 2017, Apple ceased all contact with Haptic. In September 2020, Apple
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`launched its “Back Tap” feature on all iPhones. Back Tap utilizes the invention disclosed in the
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`’738 Patent by activating the back side of the iPhone as a remote control tap interface and allowing
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`users to double-tap or triple-tap that surface (or on an iPhone case) to trigger a wide variety of
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`functions on an iPhone and other external devices.
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`Haptic sued Apple in November 2023 asserting claims for direct, contributory, and willful
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`infringement.
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`II.
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`Legal Standard
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`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient
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`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
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`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts
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`accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor
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`of the plaintiff. Id.
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`The “purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide
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`the merits.” Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
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`A plaintiff need not “prove its case at the pleading stage.” Id. Instead, the complaint must place
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`the “potential infringer . . . on notice of what activity . . . is being accused of infringement.” Id.
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`(citation omitted).
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`III. Argument
`A.
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`Haptic’s Complaint States a Claim for Direct Infringement.
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`Haptic’s complaint states a claim for direct infringement of the ’738 Patent. Apple asks
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`this Court to prematurely engage in claim construction, asserts a construction that improperly
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`inserts the word “directly” into the claim language, and misreads statements made during
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`prosecution that do not clearly and unmistakably disavow the claim scope.
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`1.
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`Apple’s Claim Construction Arguments Are Premature and Should Be
`Rejected.
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`Apple seeks dismissal of Haptic’s claims by arguing that the Accused Products do not
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`involve “an impact on said mounting surface,” as required by the ’738 Patent. Apple’s argument
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`implicitly depends upon a claim construction that is favorable to Apple: that “an impact on said
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`mounting surface” means an impact directly on the mounting surface. Motion at 10-11 (“Haptic
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`points to a part inside the iPhone as the alleged ‘mounting surface,’ but a user does not tap or knock
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`that part of the iPhone.”); id. (“The claims require a user to directly ‘impact’ or tap ‘on’ the claimed
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`‘mounting surface.’”). Not only is Apple’s claim construction incorrect on the merits, such claim
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`construction is wholly improper at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
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`Courts routinely hold that “claim construction is inappropriate at the 12(b)(6) pleading
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`stage” because the parties “have neither completed claim construction discovery nor briefed claim
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`construction issues.” See Mel NavIP LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc., No. 2:22-CV-00152-JRG,
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`2023 WL 1766266, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2023) (collecting authority); Nalco Co., 883 F.3d at
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`1349 (holding that claim construction is “not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.”). To
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`the extent claim construction arguments are considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage at all, courts
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`give patent claims their “broadest possible construction.” In re Bill of Lading Transmission &
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`Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1343 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`In Nalco, the Federal Circuit considered a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of patent
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`infringement claims in which the parties asserted competing interpretations of the terms “flue gas”
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`and “injecting.” 883 F.3d at 1348–49. The Federal Circuit reversed that dismissal because it
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`required resolving claim construction issues:
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`These disputes between the parties hinge on where “flue gas” may be located within
`the power plant and what limitations are appropriate on where “injecting” may
`occur. It is not appropriate to resolve these disputes, or to determine whether the
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`method claimed in the ’692 patent should be confined to the preferred embodiment,
`on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, without the benefit of claim construction.
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`Id. at 1350 (collecting authority).
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`Here, as in Nalco, the parties dispute the interpretation and scope of the term “impact on a
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`mounting surface.” Apple’s primary argument is that this term requires an impact directly on a
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`mounting surface and not an impact on the mounting surface that originated elsewhere. As
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`discussed below, Haptic disputes Apple’s construction and addition of the word “directly” because
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`that word does not appear in the claim language and was not discussed during prosecution.1
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`Further, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand an impact on a surface to
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`include both impacts originating on the surface and impacts originating elsewhere that have an
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`impact on the surface. Because Apple’s motion implicates claim construction issues, the Court
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`should decline to resolve them at this early stage. See id. at 1349 (“Defendants’ arguments boil
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`down to objections to Nalco’s proposed claim construction for ‘flue gas,’ a dispute not suitable for
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`resolution on a motion to dismiss.”).
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`2.
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`Even if the Court Addressed Claim Construction Issues, Apple’s
`Construction Improperly Inserts the Word “Directly” into the Claim
`Language.
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`Even if the Court were to improperly take up the claim construction issue at this phase of
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`the case, Apple’s construction is incorrect. Apple repeatedly adds the word “directly” into its
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`construction of “impact on said mounting surface.” E.g., Motion at 3 (“Although the specification
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`discusses two types of impacts . . . the claims plainly require impacts that are directly ‘on’ the
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`mounting surface.”); Motion at 11 (“The claims require a user to directly ‘impact’ or tap ‘on’ the
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`claimed ‘mounting surface.’”).
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`1 Haptic also disputes Apple’s characterization of the ’738 Patent in the “Introduction” and “Factual Background”
`sections of its Motion. Apple uses phrases that do not appear in the claim language, including “an entirely separate
`device,” “an exterior mounting surface,” and an “associated surface.”
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 10 of 20
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`But Apple’s Motion omits that the claim language does not contain the word “directly.”
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`Claim 1 provides in relevant part:
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`A control system comprising:
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`a housing having an engagement means for a mounting surface;
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` a
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` sensor contained within said housing, said sensor forming an interactive
`zone defined by a range of said sensor, said sensor being comprised of an
`accelerometer, said interactive zone being aligned with said mounting
`surface and overlaying said mounting surface outside a perimeter of said
`housing, said sensor being in a fixed position relative to said engagement
`means, wherein a contact interaction associated with said mounting
`surface within said interactive zone is detected by said sensor as data
`signals, said contact interaction being comprised of an impact on said
`mounting surface, said data signals being comprised of vibration data of
`said contact interaction;
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`’738 Patent at Claim 1 (emphasis added). This language requires only an “impact on” the mounting
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`surface. It does not require an “impact directly on” the mounting surface, as Apple argues.
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`Consistent with that claim language, the specification describes embodiments of the
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`invention that have indirect impacts “on” a mounting surface. The specification’s description of
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`Figures 7–9 identifies several types of impacts “on” a mounting surface, including (a) an impact
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`that is “not always directly on” the mounting surface and (b) an impact “on the wall surface
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`opposite the mounting surface that is transmitted to the mounting surface”:
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`The contact interaction is associated with the mounting surface 22 and the contact
`interaction is detected through the mounting surface 22, even if the contact
`interaction is not always directly on the mounting surface 22.
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`Id. at 7:64–8:1.
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`The contact interaction is on the wall surface opposite the mounting surface 22,
`but the knocking on the wall surface is transmitted to the mounting surface 22 and
`then to the sensor 30.
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`Id. at 7:54–56. As shown in Figure 9, the first point of the contact interaction can be “associated
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`with” the mounting surface, and the contact interaction also has an impact “on” that surface:
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`The contact interaction is associated with the
`mounting
`surface 22 and
`the contact
`interaction is detected through the mounting
`surface 22, even if the contact interaction is not
`always directly on the mounting surface 22.
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`Further, Apple’s construction requiring a direct “impact on said mounting surface” renders
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`superfluous the language in Claim 10 of the patent in suit. Claim 1 states: “wherein a contact
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`interaction associated with said mounting surface within said interactive zone is detected by said
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`sensor as data signals, said contact interaction being comprised of an impact on said mounting
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`surface.” Claim 10, in contrast, requires “making a physical impact on said mounting surface so
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`as to generate a contact interaction.” If Apple’s construction were correct, there would have been
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`no reason to include an entirely separate claim of a physical impact on the mounting surface.
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`It is no surprise that the patent specification and claims recognize that impacts can originate
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`from another location and cause an impact to occur on the mounting surface. The Patent’s use of
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`the term “impact” follows from that term’s plain and ordinary meaning. The McGraw-Hill
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`Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms defines “impact” as a “forceful collision between
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`two bodies which is sufficient to cause an appreciable change in the momentum of the system on
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`which it acts.” Such contact interactions do not necessarily create an impact only on one point of
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`contact. Rather, a contact interaction can have an impact on the target of the contact in a manner
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`that causes an appreciable change in the momentum of the system. For example, in Crane Co. v.
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`Sandenvendo Am., Inc., the district court construed the term “severe impact forces.” 2009 WL
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`1586704, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 5, 2009). The court explained that such impacts could “cause
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`immediate effervescence and overflowing of carbonated beverages upon opening” or could cause
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`“damage to a container/product such that the container or product is no longer suitable for
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`consumption or sale.” These different types of “impacts” confirm that an “impact” can be either
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`direct or indirect.
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`Apple’s argument that an impact must be “directly” on a mounting surface is inconsistent
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`with the claim language, ignores embodiments described in the specification, and renders
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`superfluous the phrase “contact interaction associated with said mounting surface” in the
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`immediately preceding clause. See SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Comm’s AB, 820 F.3d
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`419, 429 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the claim language
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`superfluous are disfavored.”).
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`3.
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`Haptic Did Not Disavow the Claim Scope During Prosecution.
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`The standard for importing limitations from prosecution history statements is “exacting”
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`and requires a “clear and unmistakable” disavowal of claim scope. 3M Innovative Properties Co.
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`v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal Circuit has “cautioned . . .
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`that ‘because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the
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`applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the
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`specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.’” Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel
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`Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Liqui-Box Corp. v. Scholle
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`IPN Corp., 449 F. Supp. 3d 790, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“Deciding that prosecution history estoppel
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`bars Plaintiff from asserting infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents is also premature at
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`this [Rule 12(b)(6)] stage.”).
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`Apple cannot meet this exacting standard. Apple asserts that Haptic disclaimed any
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`interpretation of Claim 1 in which an impact is not directly on a mounting surface. Apple states:
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`“Despite initially drafting the claims broadly, Haptic amended the claims during prosecution to
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`capture only impacts that are directly ‘on’ the ‘mounting surface.’” Motion at 5. Apple exaggerates
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`the scope of Haptic’s amendment. A close reading of the File History shows that Haptic (1) did
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 13 of 20
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`not delete the term “a contact interaction associated with said mounting surface” from the claims
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`and (2) did not add the word “directly” to the claims:
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`Dkt. No. 13-2 (2018-02-26 Amendment at 7). This type of amendment does not expressly redefine
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`the claim term in a manner that amounts to a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer of claim scope.
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`Apple cites several statements in Haptic’s remarks accompanying that amendment
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`describing the contact interaction in Claim 1 as a “physical impact on a mounting surface.” Motion
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`at 6. For the same reasons an impact “on” a mounting surface does not require an impact “directly”
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`on a mounting surface, a “physical impact” likewise does not require a “direct impact” on the
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`mounting surface.
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`Even if “physical impact” meant the same thing as “direct impact” (it does not), the final
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`claim language undermines Apple’s arguments regarding these prosecution statements. The final
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`language in Claim 1 does not include a “physical impact” requirement. That is notable in
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`comparison to Claims 10, 11, and 13, which do require a “physical impact” on the mounting
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`surface:
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`Claim 10 provides: “making a physical impact on said mounting surface so as to
`generate a contact interaction.”
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`13
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 14 of 20
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`Claim 11 provides: “The method of controlling the terminal device according to
`claim 10, wherein the step of making a physical impact on said mounting surface
`further comprises making a plurality of physical impacts on said mounting surface,
`said contact interaction being associated with more than one physical impact.”
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`Claim 13 provides: “The method of controlling the terminal device according to
`Claim 12, wherein the step of making a physical impact on said mounting surface
`further comprises making a plurality of physical impacts on said mounting surface,
`said contact interaction being associated with more than one physical impact.”
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`’738 Patent. The lack of a requirement in one claim as compared with other claims in the same
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`patent undermines Apple’s arguments. See In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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`(“[T]he principle that the same phrase in different claims of the same patent should have the same
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`meaning is a strong one, overcome only if ‘it is clear’ that the same phrase has different meanings
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`in different claims.”).
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`Apple has not carried its burden to establish that Haptic’s February 2018 amendment and
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`prosecution statements regarding “physical impact” meet the exacting standards to establish
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`disavowal of claim scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366
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`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Absent a clear disavowal in the specification or the prosecution history, the
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`patentee is entitled to the full scope of its claim language.”).
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`4.
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`Apple’s Back Tap Feature Infringes the ’738 Patent, Even Under
`Apple’s Strained Claim Construction.
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`Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of “impact on said mounting surface,” Haptic has
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`sufficiently alleged direct infringement. The plain language of the ’738 Patent requires a contact
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`interaction “associated with” a mounting surface that is comprised of an impact “on” the mounting
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`surface. See Claim 1 (“[W]herein a contact interaction associated with said mounting surface
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`within said interactive zone is detected by said sensor as data signals, said contact interaction being
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`comprised of an impact on said mounting surface.”). In the Accused Products, a user double- or
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`triple-taps on the back of an iPhone to activate the Back Tap feature. This contact interaction within
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 15 of 20
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`the interactive zone is “associated with” the mounting surface and creates vibrations that have an
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`impact “on” the mounting surface. In short, by tapping on the back of the iPhone, a user causes an
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`impact to occur on the mounting surface.
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`This relationship between the contact interaction associated with the mounting surface and
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`the impact on the mounting surface is described in Haptic’s claim charts:
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`. . .
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`Dkt. No. 1-2 at 10, 18.
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`11
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`15
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 16 of 20
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`All of Apple’s other arguments rely on Apple’s assertion that an impact “on” the mounting
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`surface requires a direct impact on the mounting surface. See Motion at 10 (“Haptic’s direct
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`infringement claim should be dismissed because the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to
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`show that Apple’s Back Tap feature for iPhone meets the “impact on said mounting surface”
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`limitation.”). But Apple’s own directions to its users prove Apple knows full-well that Haptic’s
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`construction is correct and that its product practices the claimed invention. Apple instructs users
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`to “double or triple tap on the back of your iPhone to trigger the action you set.” Apple, Use Back
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`Tap on your iPhone, https://support.apple.com/en-us/111772. But Back Tap works while an
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`iPhone is in a case. See Macworld, ‘Back Tap’ Feature in iOS 14 Turns Rear of iPhone into a
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`Button (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.macworld.com/article/675545/back-tap-feature-in-ios-14-
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`turns-rear-of-iphone-into-a-button.html (“Back Tap also works through a cover.”). Like the
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`embodiment described at 7:64–8:1 and Figure 9, a contact interaction with an iPhone case is not
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`“directly” on the mounting surface, but rather is a contact interaction “associated with” the
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`mounting surface that results in an impact on the mounting surface. Because the iPhone case is
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`connected to the iPhone that contains the mounting surface, the contact interaction with the case
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`is both “associated with” the mounting surface and creates an impact “on” the mounting surface.
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`B.
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`Haptic Has Sufficiently Pleaded Contributory Infringement Based on Apple’s
`Sales and Monetization of HomeKit and HomeKit Certified Devices.
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`Contributory infringement occurs if a party sells, or offers to sell, “a component of a
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`patented . . . combination, . . . or a material . . . for use in practicing a patented process, constituting
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`a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
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`use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
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`for substantial noninfringing use.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 17 of 20
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`Haptic alleges at Paragraphs 60–61 that Apple is liable for contributory infringement
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`because “Apple controls and monetizes the technical architecture for Apple’s ‘HomeKit,’ which
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`enables Back Tap to control other devices and allows Apple to set the rules for how third-party
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`devices can work with Back Tap.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶60–61. Haptic alleges that HomeKit enables
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`other devices to be controlled by Back Tap and that Apple’s Shortcuts software enables Back Tap
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`to control HomeKit-certified devices. Shortcuts is pre-installed on every iPhone that has the Back
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`Tap feature and is seamlessly integrated into the Back Tap interface. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 15. Haptic’s
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`claim charts also identify examples of HomeKit-compatible devices:
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`Dkt. No. 1-2 at 15–16.
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 18 of 20
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`Apple asserts that these pleadings are conclusory. Motion at 15–17.
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`Consistent with Haptic’s pleadings, Apple controls the technical and design aspects for
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`Apple’s proprietary smart home platform HomeKit. Haptic alleges that Apple controls and
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`monetizes the technical architecture for HomeKit. Haptic alleges that Apple implemented a
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`requirement that third-party devices that can be controlled by Back Tap must be HomeKit certified.
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`Haptic’s pleadings also describe Haptic’s own interactions with Apple relating to HomeKit
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`integrations (¶¶38–39) and specifically identify HomeKit-certified devices that interact with the
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`Back Tap feature. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-2 at 21. Haptic has adequately pleaded that the Back-Tap
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`interfacing elements of Apple’s HomeKit technology are material infringing components of the
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`Accused Devices that have no substantial non-infringing uses. See Glaston Corp. v. Salem
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`Fabrication Techs. Grp., 2022 WL 16901987, *5–7 (M.D.N.C. 2022) (“Plaintiffs allege that the
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`Northglass furnaces are a material component of the methods claimed within the ’540 Patent. It is
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`not the court’s role to assess the ultimate strength of this claim at this stage, as long as it meets the
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`relatively low threshold of plausibility, which it does.”); Apple Inc. v. AliveCor, Inc., 2023 WL
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`4091287, *2–4 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“At this stage, the Court makes all inferences in favor of Plaintiff,
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`and whether [the plaintiff] eventually will be able to prove that the Accused Products have no
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`substantial non-infringing uses is for another day.”).
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`At this early Rule 12(b)(6) stage, Haptic’s allegations sufficiently state a claim for
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`contributory infringement.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`For the reasons above, the Court should deny Apple’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. In the
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`alternative, if the Court grants Apple’s motion, Haptic respectfully requests that the dismissal be
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`without prejudice.
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`Case 1:23-cv-01351-DII Document 27 Filed 02/05/24 Page 19 of 20
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`Date: February 5, 2024
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` Respectfully submitted,
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` SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
`
` /s/ Brian D. Melton
`Brian D. Melton (Texas 24010620)
`Rocco Magni (Texas 24092745)
`Ace M. Factor (Texas 24118923)
`Thomas V. DelRosario (Texas 24110645)
`Shaleez E. Ozlat (Texas 24110186)
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, Texas 77002
`Tel: (713) 651-9366
`Fax: (713) 654-6666