IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________________
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`DODOTS LICENSING SOLUTIONS LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`Case IPR2023-00701
`U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407 B1
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
`INTER PARTES REVIEW OF UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 8,510,407
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION. .......................................................................................... 1
`THE ’407 PATENT. ........................................................................................ 4
`A.
`Background of the claimed invention. .................................................. 4
`B.
`The previous Lenovo ’407 IPR. ............................................................ 7
`III. THE LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART. .................................10
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. .........................................................................10
`V.
`THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR OBVIOUSNESS. ....................................11
`VI.
`INSTITUTION SHOULD BE DENIED FOR TWO THRESHOLD
`REASONS. ....................................................................................................12
`A.
`Petitioner applies the incorrect claim construction standard under
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). .........................................................................12
`Petitioner fails to meet the requirements of §§ 37 C.F.R.
`42.104(b)(3) and 42.104(b)(4). ...........................................................14
`1.
`Petitioner violates both 42.104(b)(3) and 42.104(b)(4). ...........15
`2.
`Petitioner fails to identify specific portions of the specification
`that describe the structure for a supposed means-plus-function
`limitation. ..................................................................................17
`VII. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO SHOW A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF SUCCESS FOR ANY OF GROUNDS 1A, 1B, 1C AND 2. ..................20
`A.
`Petitioner does not explain defect in prior consideration of Brown. ..20
`B.
`Petitioner fails to demonstrate how a local HTML file in Shimada that
`includes content that is presented on an alleged NIM meets “a content
`reference that comprises a network location at which content for the
`first networked information monitor is accessible via a TCP/IP
`protocol.” .............................................................................................21
`
`B.
`
`i
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`

`B.
`
`C.
`
`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`VIII. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED IN THE DISCRETION OF THE
`BOARD UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 314(A). .........................................................26
`A.
`The district court case is not stayed nor is there any evidence that a
`stay will be granted if the IPR were instituted. ...................................28
`Proximity of the district court’s trial date to the Board’s projected
`statutory deadline for a final written decision. ....................................28
`Both the district court and the parties have made significant
`investments in the parallel district court case. ....................................29
`There is significant overlap between the issues raised in the petition
`and in the parallel district court case. ..................................................30
`Petitioner and defendant in the parallel litigation are the same
`party. ....................................................................................................31
`Other circumstances favor the Board exercising its discretion to deny
`institution, including the merits. ..........................................................31
`IX. CONCLUSION. .............................................................................................32
`
`
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`ii
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH,
`IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) ................................................ 21
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. 2020) .................................................passim
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 12
`Canadian Solar Inc. v. The Solaria Corporation,
`IPR2021-00095, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. 2021) ........................................................ 30
`Carefusion Corporation v. Baxter International, Inc.,
`IPR2016-01456, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2017) .............................................. 19
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Ramot at Tel Aviv Univ. Ltd.,
`IPR2020-00122, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 2020) ......................................... 29
`Clickbooth.com LLC v. Essociate, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00464, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. July 9, 2015) .............................................. 18
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.,
`800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... 14
`Floteck Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Oilwell DHT, L.P.,
`IPR2015-01210, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2015) ........................................... 17
`Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys, LLC,
`918 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 11
`Google, LLC. v. Personalized Media Comm., LLC.,
`IPR2020-00723, Paper 22, 7 (P.T.A.B. 2020) .................................................... 29
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .......................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`iii
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................... 13, 14
`Hebert v. Lisle Corp.,
`99 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 13
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Telefex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................ 11
`Lenovo Holding Co. v. DoDots Licensing Sols. LLC,
`2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 36126 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) ................................... 1, 5
`Lindsay Corporation v. Valmont Industries,
`IPR2015-01039, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2015)........................................... 17
`Medshape, Inc. v. Cayenne Med., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00848, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Sep 14, 2015) ............................................. 18
`Ex parte Miyazaki,
`89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1207 (BPAI Nov. 19, 2008) ....................................................... 18
`Next Caller Inc. v. TrustID, Inc.,
`IPR2019-00961, -00962, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2019) ............................ 29
`NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-plex Technologies,
`IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. 2018) .......................................................... 27
`Phillips v AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ........................................ 10, 12, 15, 16
`Sand Rev’n II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp. – Trucking LLC,
`IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 (P.T.A.B. 2020) ........................................................ 31
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00226, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2013) ........................................... 17
`Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,
`IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020) ........................... 3, 27, 30, 31
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................ 15
`
`iv
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 .................................................................................................. 10, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 112(f) .................................................................................................... 14
`35 U.S.C. § 282(b) ............................................................................................. 10, 12
`35 U.S.C. § 314(A) .............................................................................................. 3, 26
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) ....................................................................................... 28, 29
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ................................................................................................... 14
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.62 ....................................................................................................... 2
`37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100 ................................................................................................. 31
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) .............................................................................. 2, 10, 12, 14
`37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3) .................................................................................passim
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .................................................................................. 2, 3, 16
`Fed. R. Evid. 702 ................................................................................................. 2, 13
`
`
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`
`PATENT OWNER’S EXHIBIT LIST
`Description
`Lenovo Holding Co, Inc. et al. v. DoDots Licensing Sols.,
`IPR2019-01279 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 19, 2021)
`Lenovo Holding Co. v. DoDots Licensing Sols. LLC, 2021 U.S.
`App. LEXIS 36126, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2021)
`Defendants’ Proposed Claim Constructions, dated March 1,
`2023, submitted in DoDots Licensing Solutions LLC, v.
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd et al., Case No.: 6:22-cv-00535-
`ADA-DTG (W.D. Tex)
`Relevant portions of Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No.
`8,510,407
`June 21, 2022, Memo Regarding Interim Procedure for
`Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with
`Parallel District Court Litigation
`Agreed Scheduling Order, dated December 29, 2022
`
`Exhibit No.
`2001
`
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`
`2005
`
`2006
`
`
`
`vi
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`Patent owner DoDots Licensing Solutions LLC (“DoDots” or “patent
`
`owner”) submits this Patent Owner Preliminary Response to Samsung Electronics
`
`Co., Ltd.’s (“petitioner” or “Samsung”) petition (Paper No. 2, “Petition”) and
`
`requests the Board to deny institution of inter partes review of claims 1-24 (“the
`
`challenged claims”) of U.S. patent no. 8,510,407 (“’407 patent,” Ex. 1001).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION.
`Petitioner asks the Board to institute an inter partes review of the ’407
`
`patent, which DoDots has asserted in a concurrently pending district court
`
`litigation. But this Board has once before already determined that the ’407 patent is
`
`not unpatentable in a previous IPR brought by Lenovo Holding Co (“Lenovo ’407
`
`IPR”). Ex. 2001. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s final written decision.
`
`See Lenovo Holding Co. v. DoDots Licensing Sols. LLC, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
`
`36126, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2021).
`
`In the Lenovo ’407 IPR, the Board and the Federal circuit inter alia honed in
`
`on the Petitioner’s attempt to conflate Network Information Monitor (“NIM”) and
`
`Network Information Monitor Template (“NIM Template”). And in affirming the
`
`Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit held a NIM Template is “a data structure that
`
`defines the characteristics of a NIM, including the NIM frame, view and control
`
`characteristics, and that excludes executable applications/compiled code.” See Ex
`
`2001 at page 19-20. See Ex. 2002.
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`1
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`Here, there are at least four reasons why the Board should deny institution.
`
`First, the Board should deny institution because the petition rests on a
`
`completely wrong legal standard. The evidence petitioner submits through the
`
`declaration of Dr. Schmidt relies on the incorrect broadest-reasonable-
`
`interpretation (BRI) standard for claim construction. See. Exhibit 1003, Page 17.
`
`Thus, petitioner’s entire invalidity analysis is legally flawed, and Dr. Schmidt’s
`
`declaration should be disregarded under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.62. This defect in the petition affects all claims challenged in the IPR.
`
`For this reason alone, the petition cannot meet the threshold requirements set forth
`
`in 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.104(b)(3), and 42.104(b)(4) and institution should be
`
`denied.
`
`Second, independent of the inapplicable BRI standard, petitioner fails to
`
`meet its threshold burden of production requirements set forth in 37 C.F.R. §§
`
`42.104(b)(3), and 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner has taken up contradictory and
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`irreconcilable positions on claims terms in the district court and even within this
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`IPR. To preserve its rights in the district court, petitioner adopts the patent owner’s
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`construction “only for this IPR,” but then fails to offer a construction as required
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`under 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3) for a means-plus-function claim limitation.
`
`Samsung’s failure to set forth a construction it believes is correct, and the failure to
`
`provide any support for the means-plus-function term are independent grounds for
`
`2
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`denial. This defect in the petition affects all challenged claims. The Board has
`
`consistently denied IPR petitions that fail to meet the threshold requirements set
`
`forth in 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3) and 42.104(b)(4).
`
`Third, petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success for
`
`ground 2 because petitioner does not explain how a local HTML file of Shimada
`
`that includes content that is presented on a purported NIM meets “a content
`
`reference that comprises a network location at which content for the first
`
`networked information monitor is accessible via a TCP/IP protocol,” as all
`
`challenged claims require. For this reason alone, the petition should be denied
`
`based on petitioner’s failure to show a reasonable likelihood of success for ground
`
`2.
`
`Fourth, the petition should be discretionarily denied notwithstanding the
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`merits under 35 U.S.C. § 314(A) because petitioner asks the Board to institute an
`
`inter partes review of the ’407 patent, which DoDots has asserted in a concurrently
`
`pending district court litigation. Samsung’s Sotera waiver is inadequate and will
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`not prevent concurrent proceedings from wasteful duplication. Also, it is expected
`
`that the Board’s final written decision will come two months after the underlying
`
`district court litigation goes to trial and is resolved.
`
`3
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`II. THE ’407 PATENT.
`A. Background of the claimed invention.
`In the late 1990s, more than seven years before the first iPhone was released,
`
`the inventors John and George Kembel (twin brothers and Stanford University
`
`alumnae) developed “dot” technology, which today is known as the mobile app.
`
`The ’407 patent, titled “Displaying Time-Varying Internet Based Data Using
`
`Application Media Packages,” discloses the fundamental technology used in
`
`modern-day mobile apps and the stores used to download and install those apps
`
`onto mobile devices (e.g., Apple App Store and Samsung Galaxy Store).
`
`At that time of the invention, accessing Internet content involved the use of
`
`downloaded web browsers running on a personal computer or mobile device. But
`
`web browsers were limiting and hindered the way in which web content was
`
`viewed on mobile devices. For example, users and application developers had
`
`limited control over the presentation of internet content; content was essentially
`
`trapped within the frame of the browser. See Ex. 1001 at 2:25-30. The Kembels
`
`recognized early on that there was dissatisfaction with web browsers and there was
`
`a “growing desire for individual users to fully control the aggregation and
`
`presentation of content and web applications that appear on a client computer.” See
`
`Id. at 2:30-36. The Kembels sought to eliminate the need for web browsers. To do
`
`so, they developed an approach of delivering content over the Internet outside a
`
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`web browser. Notably, when the Kembels conceived of their patented technology,
`
`there was no word for mobile apps. So, the Kembels coined the terms “dot” or
`
`“Network Information Monitor (NIM)”—which today are colloquially referred to
`
`as an app. These “dots” are “fully configurable frame[s] with one or more
`
`controls” through which content is presented on the display of a device and viewed
`
`by the user. See Id. at 5:21-28.
`
`At the time of invention described in the ’407 patent (i.e., in the late 1990s),
`
`web browsers (e.g., Microsoft Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator) were
`
`installed on computers and used to retrieve and display websites and their
`
`webpages. A person would manually navigate between the different webpages of a
`
`website by e.g., (1) entering a webpage in a URL entry field, or (2) using forward
`
`and backward browsing buttons to move between web pages. The ’407 patent
`
`changed this paradigm.
`
`As the Federal Circuit noted in Lenovo Holding Co., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
`
`36126, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2021), DoDots’ patents “relate to a method for
`
`accessing and displaying Internet content in a graphical user interface (“GUI”).”
`
`The NIM (mobile app), which is generated by the NIM template, is a “fully
`
`configurable frame with one or more controls; the frame through which content is
`
`optionally presented. The configurable frame used in accordance with the
`
`invention stands in contrast to present web browsers, which are branded by the
`
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`browser vendor and which have limited means by which to alter the controls
`
`associated with the browser.” Ex. 1001 at 5:42-48. And a NIM developer (Mobile
`
`App Developer) “has full control over all aspects of the appearance and
`
`functionality of NIM frame 137. Thus, a NIM developer has the ability to control,
`
`for example, the functionality located at any corner of frame 137, functionality
`
`placed along the top or bottom of the frame, or on the sides of the frame.” Id. at
`
`17:32-37. Such customizability provided added flexibility over traditional web
`
`browsers.
`
`Figure 12 of the ’407 patent further describes how a NIM template is
`
`delivered to user’s device to eventuate the installation of a NIM (i.e., an app):
`
`
`
`See Id. at Fig. 12.
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`The process is similar to how users today download and execute apps from the
`
`Samsung Galaxy Store or the Apple App Store. Specifically, a NIM template is
`
`transmitted by TCP/IP as XML to define the Dot that will receive content and
`
`interaction for a user over a network. When the user “clicks on the name of a NIM”
`
`[i.e., the name of the app], a request is sent “to the applications server 50 via the
`
`transmission channel 44 (step 241).” Id. at 20:8-13. The client computing device
`
`then retrieves the “NIM definition from the NIM template database” (app store),
`
`installs the app using information in the .apk file (NIM template) and, when the
`
`user runs the app, creates a frame in the display of the user interface. Id. at 20:18-
`
`42. Put another way, the patent lays out the process for delivering both the data
`
`defining the creation of a NIM and also retrieving the content to be displayed
`
`within the frame of the NIM.
`
`B. The previous Lenovo ’407 IPR.
`In the Lenovo ’407 IPR, the Board found that the ’407 patent discloses, in
`
`part, a software component for accessing and displaying network content. See Ex.
`
`1012 at 4. This component, termed an “Networked Information Monitor” (NIM) is
`
`“a fully configurable frame with one or more controls with content optionally
`
`presented through the frame.” Id (internal quotations omitted). When a user opens
`
`a NIM, the frame is presented in the user’s display, and network content is
`
`retrieved and presented in a viewer enclosed by the frame. Id. The network content
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`may be identified via URLs included in the Dot. Id. The Specification describes
`
`that the frame according to the invention “stands in contrast to present web
`
`browsers, which are branded by the browser vendor and which have limited means
`
`by which to alter the controls associated with the browser.” Id.
`
`One key dispute in the prior Lenovo IPR proceeding related to the
`
`construction of the term “networked information monitor template” (“NIM
`
`template”). The Board concluded (and the Federal Circuit affirmed) that this term
`
`means “a data structure that defines the characteristics of a NIM, including the
`
`NIM frame, view, and control characteristics, [which] excludes executable
`
`applications/compiled code.” See Id. at 14. Though the construction itself is
`
`important, the reasons for reaching this construction are equally important.
`
`The Board noted that according to the specification, claims, and prosecution
`
`history, a NIM template is a data structure that defines the characteristics of a
`
`NIM, including the NIM frame, view and control characteristics, and that excludes
`
`executable applications/compiled code. See Id. at 13-14. According to the claims,
`
`the NIM template, stored in electronic storage of a client computing device (1.A),
`
`includes the definition of a NIM (1.C) / “viewer graphical user interface having a
`
`frame.” See Id. at 14.
`
`Though the Board noted that the meaning of a NIM template is not
`
`specifically defined in the ’407 patent specification, the patent makes clear that
`
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`each NIM template “defines the characteristics of a specific NIM, including fully
`
`configurable frame characteristics, viewer and control characteristics, and
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`Application Media Package content references.” Id.
`
`The Board acknowledged that the ’407 specification, “does not indicate that
`
`the data structure for the NIM template contains compiled code.” Ex. 1012 at 15.
`
`As a result, the Board agreed that the definition of a NIM “the definition of the
`
`NIM is content, rather than compiled code.” Id. at 16 (emphasis in the original).
`
`The Board further noted the specification’s teaching that “[a]n application–type
`
`NIM, such as a web calendar or web mail, may be changed by the user, by the
`
`content provider, or by other content, while advantageously avoiding the need to
`
`distribute and support a hard-coded compiled application.” Id. at 16 (emphasis in
`
`the original) (internal quotes omitted).
`
`The Board concluded that “[f]rom these disclosures, we understand that the
`
`Specification prohibits the NIM template from using compiled code or being an
`
`executable application. Our review of the Specification did not identify disclosure
`
`of use of compiled code or an executable application as the NIM template.” Id.
`
`In summarizing its position, the Board stated, “[t]he Specification does not
`
`describe any NIM template that uses compiled code or executable applications.”
`
`Id. at 18. Rather, the Specification provides that “each NIM Definition contains
`
`just enough information to define, layout, and initialize a NIM’s components
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`(frame, controls, etc.)” and “[t]he definition is content, rather than compiled code.”
`
`Id.
`
`Based on its constructions, the Board found that the prior art Lenovo relied
`
`on did not render the ’407 patent unpatentable.
`
`III. THE LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART.
`In the Lenovo ’407 IPR, the Board found that a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer Engineering,
`
`Computer Science, or a related field and have three or more years of corresponding
`
`industry work experience.” Ex. 1012 at 8. DoDots agrees that this is the correct
`
`standard for a POSITA.
`
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION.
`In an inter partes review, claims are construed using the same claim
`
`construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil action
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claims in accordance with the
`
`ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as understood by one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.100(b). The proper claim construction standard is the one set forth in Phillips v
`
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`
`Here, as discussed below, petitioner relies on Dr. Schmidt to argue that
`
`claims 1-24 of the ’407 patent are allegedly invalid as being obvious under Section
`
`10
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
`PO’s Preliminary Response
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`103. But Dr. Schmidt applies the completely wrong claim construction standard in
`
`forming his opinions. Because petitioner’s grounds for invalidity are framed and
`
`supported under a completely wrong legal standard, its petition must be denied.
`
`V. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR OBVIOUSNESS.
`The question of obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual
`
`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of
`
`skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so called secondary considerations.
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). A claim is
`
`only unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject
`
`matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
`
`whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
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`having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co.
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`v. Telefex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. §103).
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`“An invention is not obvious simply because all of the claimed limitations
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`were known in the prior art at the time of the invention. Instead, we ask ‘whether
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`there is a reason, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would lead one of
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`ordinary skill in the art to combine the references, and that would also suggest a
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`reasonable likelihood of success.’” Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys,
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`LLC, 918 F.3d 928, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Of course, concluding that the
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`IPR2023-00701 (U.S. Patent No. 8,510,407)
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`references are within the scope and content of the prior art to be considered for
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`obviousness does not end the inquiry. Graham makes clear that the obviousness
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`inquiry requires a determination whether the claimed invention would have been
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`obvious to a skilled artisan” at the time of the invention. Apple Inc. v. Samsung
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`Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1050 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`VI.
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`INSTITUTION SHOULD BE DENIED FOR TWO THRESHOLD
`REASONS.
`Samsung’s petition should be denied for two threshold reasons: (1) the
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`petitioner uses the incorrect BRI claim-construction standard to analyze whether
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`the disclosures in the prior art render the challenged claims obvious; and (2) the
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`petitioner fails to meet its burdens set forth in §§ 37 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3) and
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`42.104(b)(4).
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`A. Petitioner applies the incorrect claim construction standard under 37
`C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
`For an inter partes review proceeding, 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) states that “a
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`claim of a patent shall be construed using the same claim construction standard
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`that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b),
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`including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary
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`meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the
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`prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” In other words, in an IPR, the PTAB
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`should construe a claim term using the Phillips standard that both the Federal
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`Circuit and district courts use in litigation. Samsung acknowledges as much in its
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`petition. See petition at 3. Because attorney argument is not evidence, however,
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`Samsung relies entirely on the declaration of its expert Douglas C. Schmidt to
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`support all of its invalidity grounds. Indeed, throughout its petition, Samsung cites
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`to and incorporates Dr. Schmidt’s opinions on what the prior art supposedly
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`discloses and why those disclosures allegedly render the challenged claims
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`obvious. But in his declaration, Dr. Schmidt unequivocally states that he uses the
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`BRI standard to interpret the challenged claims:
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`I understand that, for purposes of my analysis in this inter partes
`review proceeding, the terms appearing in the patent claims should be
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in
`light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.
`Ex. 1003 at 17 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).
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`Dr. Schmidt’s failure to apply the correct legal standard when construing
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`claim terms disqualifies his testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 702(d) (requiring an expert
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`“reliably appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the case”); See Hebert
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`v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that expert testimony
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`should be excluded when it applies wrong legal standard.)
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`Construing a challenged claim under an incorrect legal standard is an error
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`of law and results in the Petitioner failing to meet its burdens of production and
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`persuasion. See e.g., Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016) (holding that in an IPR, “the petitioner has the burden from the onset to
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`show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”) See also
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`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015) (holding that “[i]n an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the
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`petitioner to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, 35 U.S.C. §
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`316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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`In other words, based on Dr. Schmidt’s failure to apply the right claim construction
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`standard, Samsung necessarily cannot meet its burden of production and burden of
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`persuasion under 37 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3). Having failed to use the appropriate
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`claim construction standard, the petitioner cannot, as required in Dynamic
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`Drinkware, prove “unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”
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`Samsung’s failure to comply with 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b) warrants denial of
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`Samsung’s petition.
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`B. Petitioner fails to meet the requirements of §§ 37 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3)
`and 42.104(b)(4).
`42.104(b)(3) requires Petitioner to provide a statement detailing “[h]ow the
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`challenged claim is to be construed.” This provision also requires, “[w]here the
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`claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function
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`limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must
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`identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure,
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`material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” As is apparent,
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`42.104(b)(3) compels the petitioner to (1) set forth how the challenged claim is to
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`be construed; and (2) when a claim contains a means-plus-function, the
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`construction must identify the specific portion of the specification that describes
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`the structure for each claim function. Here, Samsung fails to meet either of these
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`prerequisites in its petition.
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`Separately, 42.104(b)(4) directs the petitioner to provide a statement
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`detailing “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds
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`identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section (i.e., 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103). The
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`petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art
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`patents or printed publications relied upon.” As detai