VIETNAM STUDIES
`
`Division-Level
`Communications
`1962—1973
`
`‘F be
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`DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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`library of Gongres Camloging in Publication Dasa
`
`Mya, Charlie R.
`Divistion-level communications, 1963-1975.
`
`(Vietnam studies)
`Includes index.
`Supt. of Docs, oo: D 101. 749073 /S982-75
`l. Vietnamee Gonfict, 196) -1975—Communicatons.
`? Vietnamese Conflict, 196)-1975—Unierd Stans.
`L. Tithe. 00. Serica.
`S39. 6CBAs
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`969.704" Ss:
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`a1-a7 125
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`First Printed '982—CMH Peb 2-11
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`Fon sade by te Sugerriierierst of Deere. USS. Cece pester Pporetieeg ¢ Te
`Ingerert: boutpoe Pome (DOE) 2-1 Pew8 S-2
`Maxi): Step S50" Wahi, Cel” Bo] ee)
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`
`Foreword
`
`‘The United States Army met an unusually complex challenge
`in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the otber services, (he Army
`fought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging
`nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free
`of oumide coercion. Im addition to the usual problems of waging
`armed conflict,
`the assignment
`in Southeast Asta required
`supoimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modern
`army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to
`demands covering a wide spectrum, These involved helping to
`fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the
`frusirations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conven-
`tional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular
`ulmits.,
`the U.S. Anmy mois
`Now that this assignment has ended,
`prepare for other challenges that may lie abead. While cognizant
`that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever
`profited from trying to meet a new challenge in werms of the old
`one, the Army mevertheless stands to benelit immensely [rom a
`study of its experience, its shortoomings no less than its achiewe-
`merits.
`Aware that some years must clapsec before the official histories
`will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in
`Southeast Asia, we hawe sought a forum whereby some of the more
`salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the
`request of the Chief of Stall, a representative growp of senior
`officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still
`cary a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities have prepared a
`series of monographs. These studies should be of great walue in
`helping the Army develop future operational concepts while atthe
`same tine contnibuting to the historical reoord and providing the
`American public with an interim report on the performance of men
`and officers who hawe responded. as others have through our
`history, to exacting and trying demandes.
`The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was
`accomplished while the war in Vietnam was wt its peak, and the
`
`ia
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`monographs frequently refer to ewents of the past as if they were
`taking place im the present.
`All monographs in the series are based primarily on official
`records, with additional material from published and unpublished
`secondary works, from debricling reports and interviews with key
`participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To
`facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography
`have been omited from the published version; a fully documented
`account with bibliography is filed with the U.S. Army Center of
`Military History.
`
`Lieutenant General Charles Robert Myer, one of the top
`communicators in the United States Anny, was a professional
`communicator during his entire career and served in a wariety of
`asigoments with nonprofessional
`as well
`as professional
`communicators. From 1960 to 1965 he was
`involwed in
`communications combat dewclopmenis as a stalf officer in the
`Directorate of Organization and Training of the Army Office of the
`Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, In 1964 be assumed
`command of the 69th Signal Baitalion wi Fort Eustis, Virginia. bn
`November 1965 the battalion was deployed to Vietnam, where it
`renained under Gcneral Myers command unl he returned to the
`United States in September 1966, Following command assign-
`ments included the | lth Signal Group at Fort Huachuca, Arizona,
`July 1968-August 1969; the U.S. Army Strategic Communications
`Command, Europe, January 1970-May 1972;
`the Ist Signal
`Brigade, Vietnam, June 1972-Nowember 1972; and the US. Army
`Signal School,Training Center and Fort C-ordon, Georgia, August
`1973-Sepiember 1974. On | October 1974 General Myer's title
`became Commandam, United Sates Army Signal School, and
`Commander, United Staves Army Signal Genter and Fort Gordon.
`In this post General Myer served as the training and combat
`development proponent for communications maticrs within the
`U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and worked closely
`with the commuandanis of all the other Army schools to sce that the
`communications aspects of their fields of doctrinal responsibility
`were inoegrated into future operational concept and developments.
`General Myer subsequently served as Director, Telcoomunications
`and Command and Gonuol; Depury Chief of Sulf for Operations
`and Plans, Sepocmber 1977-October 1978; Assistant Chief of Stall,
`Automation and Communications, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C,
`October 1978-July 1979; and Deputy Director General of NATO
`
`iv
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`Iniegaicd Communicanons Management Agency, July 1979-31
`March (98). He was promoted to lieutenant general on 1 August
`1979, and he retired from service on 3) March 1981.
`
`Washington, DOC.
`20 July 198)
`
`ROBERT M. JOWCE
`Brigadicn Cecmeral, LSA
`The Adjutant General
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`Preface
`
`Concentrating on the Vietnam communications expericnce at
`division lewel and lower, this monograph is a companion volun:
`to Major General Thomas M. Rienzi's comprehensive Commiuns-
`cations-Electronics, Communications
`in Vietnam were 40
`interrelated and interwoven that familianty with the owerall and
`sUpPPOTLINg Miuation as portrayed by General Rienzi will promote
`better understanding and appreciation of the divisional communi-
`cqallons story.
`Communications is the primary mission of the Signal Corps
`and its member. Onwson-Level Communications is a story not
`only of some very fine Signal Corps units and individuals but also
`ol many other communicators from the Infantry, Armor, Artillery,
`and all other branches of the Army. lt is a combined arms sory; on
`the bauthelield, communications is everybody's business.
`The scope of this study includes the stateside alert and readying
`of units for Vietnam duty and the reaction of the Army training
`base to supply the volume of trained specialists needed to man the
`equipment associated with a modern communications system. The
`transition from peacetime status to bawulefield effectiveness is
`always diffecult, normally made more so because of severe shortages
`of time, equipment, and skilled men.
`The study points out examples of errors and shorfalls without
`losing sight of the things than went right. Vietnam unit alter-action
`reports and senior officer end-ol-tour debriefing reports were
`notable in their paucity of complaints about communications
`difficulties: things did go right in the communications field mow
`of the time. Communications, mobility, and firepower lonmed the
`triad upen which Vietnam tactical operations were based.
`Data for this monograph was drawn primarily from after-
`action reports and interviews, documented lessons learned, official
`reports, and recent
`interviews and letters
`from numerous
`individuals who served with the sewen divisions and five separate
`brigades and regimens which were the heart of divisional
`communications. Simeere appreciation gors
`to the many
`communicators and commanders, active and retired, who shared
`
`vill
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`their expericnces, photographs, and papers so that this volume
`could be writen. A special word of thanks ts reserwed for those
`members of the Signal School stall who assisted in rescarching and
`organizing this monograph.
`
`20 July 1981
`
`CHARLES RB. MYER
`Lituirnant General, LS. Army
`
`vill
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`Contents
`
`Chaporr
`
`Ps 8
`
`l. EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND
`DEVELOPMENTS.
`....0se0e0:
`at aii
`ll. COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN GROU ND
`COMBAT FORCES3vncccccacccncwcsncnee iat
`I. BLUNTING THE ENEMY DRIVE ......c00cnaaas
`IV. SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE ..nccccccccccccnans
`VY. RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND THE
`CAMBODIAN INCUBSION ...cceccceecccass
`Aiwering Operations
`....06-00e cece eeennee
`Cambodian Mmcursion .....0ccceveenenenene
`Vi. PRASEA TD cccecece ccc cdes cs cece ee ceeeev eee we
`Vil. COMMUNICATIONS SECAIRITY THREAT .....
`VEIL. SECURITY RESPONSE wcccsctetscacwnescensccue
`IX. THE ART AND PROCESS OF
`COMMUNICATING ....-ccsccesenes es ea as
`Me LASTcece ces cecereseseceneseeeneeeenerens
`AL. ADMINISTRATION wn ccccecsessausecceucnuseces
`XIl. THE TRAINING BASE ......
`che be oe oe ee
`XI. COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS IN
`RETROSPECT ....«.. jee peek Rees hee ae
`APPENDIX A: SOME DIVISIONAL ENLISTED
`MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES,
`COMMUNICATIONS3.nccccccesecetvecarececccecas 10
`SL cece ba wed kee caw ede eke ce keaeeeees |e
`
`iSEYURLBRESSBS
`
`oy
`
`Aven
`
`‘Table
`
`1. Phase-Out of Remaining U.S. Army Tactical Units,
`October 1970-June 1972 ee ee ee fal
`
`Maps
`
`» Sethe ASM wee neue Lei benes rie tees Peek
`
`2 Geographic Regions, Southee 6
`
`4
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`1x
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`Page
`Ne
`a
`5. American Unies in Vietmam ......622ececececcceecces
`4, Major Combat Operations, July 1965-)June (sce. 26
`
`Dlustrations
`
`ae
`
`Radio Telephone Operatoree uy
`Early Command Communicanons Gonsole With Aircraft
`ee ee ertenedaneeikale:
`Early Command Communications Console With VRC-12
`Series EAie eke ieee ics ch ee cece eed
`.
`14
`Men of the 15th Signal Battalion Operate Airborne Relay . 2
`Nui Ba Den, June 1966 ...cccncccccavscnturesenetsessss
`90
`MEC-344 Configuration ..ccccccescessccsseweseeneeneen
`om
`Division Tactical Operauons Center Switchboard ........
`High Frequency Radio Bunker 2.0.1... e cece eee eeeas
`SS
`Radio Wire Integration Sitio wo... eae 4?
`Rotaiable AM@QMME ...2ccccce eee eed eee pee eteeeeeseeesss
`«=O
`AN/SGRC/TCC-3 Multichannel Equipmem ..........-+-
`53
`SH-22 Switcisboard oc cccccvcccccteuetetecetereresnsance
`58
`Stodenas Erect Ameena .2es ee eeee cece sees eerste eee eee)
`=6BD
`Brant Hall
`..ccesnas TTC eT Te TTT re o7
`
`All ihustrations are from Department of Defense files.
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`DIVISION-LEVEL
`COMMUNICATIONS
`1962-1973
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`CHAPTER I
`
`Early Involvements and Developments
`
`On 24 November 1965 a large Viet Cong force attacked the
`Speck Forces Camp at Hiep Hoa, Republoc of Vietnam. Sergeam
`First Class Aenoeth M. Rorabeck, working in the radio rowmn,
`immediacly notified higher headquarters of the situation. Heavy
`enemy fire damaged his gear and knocked out a portion of the radio
`room, but Sergeant Roraback remained at his station armel
`aliempted two repair his radio, When it became apparent that tbe
`radio was beyond repair, he destroyed what was left of
`the
`equipment, mancuvered through hostile fire, and used a light
`machine gun to cower withdrawal. He was taken by the Viet Cong
`and died in captiviny. He was awarded posthumously the Silwer
`Star for gallantry im action.
`Sergeant Roraback’s story points wp more than his bravery.Che
`carly date, 1965, is a reminder that Army communicators were on
`duty in Vietnam, advising and supporting the Vietnamese Anmy,
`well before American toctical units were commited in 1965. The
`technical proficiency of Sergeant Roraback exemplifies the
`Gaining and dedication of the American combat communicator—
`the very fiber of communications in Viewinam, His courageous fight
`ence he had accomplished his technical mission says that combat
`communicators were lighters as well as technicians who played
`vital parts in opcrating and maintaming the links that held
`American combat forces together,
`In mont tectical operations in Vietnam, radia was the primary
`means of communication. Telephone, ccletypewriter, data, lacsim-
`He, television, visual, amd sound communications were also used.
`The climate and terrain of the Republic of Vietnam challenged
`these means of commnunicaion and the men who wperated them.
`Vietnam is located squaarcly in the torrid sone. (Afap /) High tem-
`Poture prevail throughout the year, except in a few mountain-
`ous arcas, Dhe average annual temperature varies only a few de-
`grees between Hue in the north (77°F) and Saigon in the south
`(S1.5°F), with generally high humidity. Phe annual rainfall is
`heavy in all regions, torrential im some; it averages 128 inches at
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`DMViSiON-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, )i2- 197s
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`SOUTHEAST ASIA
`
`SO AE ikee.
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`0
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`q
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`|
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`i) Kika
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`MAP I
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`EARLY ISVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS
`
`5
`
`Hue and abou 80 inches ao Saigen. Dhese conditions had their
`effects on delicate electronic equipment and tompcrate core Loupe.
`‘The Republic of Vietnam has three major regions: the Mekong
`Delia, the Highlands, and the Central Lowlands. (Map 2) Dhe
`Mekong Delta comprise the southern two-fifths of the counwry. Dos
`fertile alluvial plains, lavored by heavy rainfall, make 1 ome of the
`great rice-growing areasof the world oo ecomomis ts—and one ol the
`world’s largest mudholes to troops trying to operate there, The
`deli is interlaced wah a scrics of rivers consisting ofl the five
`branches ofthe Mekong, which total) ale SOO no ihes in bewgeths, crv
`three smaller rivers: the Dong Nai, the Sanggon, and the Vien Cao
`Deng. Dhis low, bewel plain is seldom more than ten beet abowe sea
`lewe!, and, during the Mood scason, the only cbry land to be bound is
`generally that forming the banks of the rivers amd canals. Dhese
`lewees ana! dikes, built for Nood contol, are used extensively as
`Village site, Despite its shortage ol solid ground, the delta regain is
`very heavily populated, with more than 2,000 people per square
`mile in some areas. he water network of rivers, streams, and
`canals: tbe flat, solt cerraim; anil the dense population influenced
`the nature of military operations that were undertaken to combat
`enemy foros there,
`The Highhonds (or the Chaine Annamitiquc) dominate the area
`of Vietnam northward (rom the Mekong Delta so the demarcation
`line, Che Chaine Annamitique, with its several high plateaus,an
`exticnsion of the rugged mountains that origingte in Tibet and
`China. The Chaine forms the border between the Republic of
`Vietnam and the Khmer Republic (Cambadia) to a point about
`fifty miles nonh of Sagen. This natural border is irregular in
`height and shape with numerous spur dividing the coasaal sarip
`into a serie: of compartments that make north-south communica-
`tions difficult, Included in the Chaine is a plateau region known as
`the Central Highlands that covers approximately 20,000 square
`miles, The nenhern part extends from Ban Me Thu abou 175
`miles north to the N@oc An peak. It varies in height from 600 to
`L.GOO feet with a lew peaks rising much higher.his 5,400-square-
`mile area is cowered mainly with bamboo and tropical broadlbeal
`forests interspersed with farms and rubber plantations, The
`southern part of the Central Highlands is generally more than
`5,000 feet abowe sea lewe) and features broadleaf evergreen forests at
`the higher elevations and bamboo on the lower slopes. Monte Lang
`Vian, near the mountain reson civy of Da Lat, is 7.380 feet high.
`This sparsely populated, rugged terrain of the Genwral Highlands
`was the scene lor major action as American units and their allies
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`OIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1982-1975
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`GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
`
`ADAP 2
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`EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS
`
`7
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`wied to keep the cocmy from moving meen and materic! in force
`rower the Central Liow lanals.
`Phe Gontral Lowlands consist of a marrow coastal strip wedged
`berween the slopes of the Chaine Annamiliquec to its west and the
`South China Sea co the cast. Dhe exeensive culiuvaton of rice and
`other cops in this fertile region and an active fishing fleet support
`the heaviest population comeentration other
`than that of the
`Sagen and delim regions. Numerous ports, airfichds, and military
`bases were developed im the Central Lowlands to suppewt U.S.
`milimrw oprmtions both then ond in the Coeniral Hightlames,
`Quang Tn, Huc, Pho Bai, Da Nang. Chu Lai, Quang Ngai, Plow
`Can, Qui Nhon, Duy Hoa, Ninh Hoa, Sha Trang, (am Ranh Bay,
`Phan Rang. and Phan Dheet are but @ few of the Central Lowlands
`places which became familiar to U.S. soldiers and the news media.
`The land affected tactical communications in seven divisions,
`four scparate brigades, and one armored cavalry regiment, (Map 7)
`
`The comminment of major LS, combar forces oo Viewam in
`1965 followed a derprning Ametican involvement which had
`begun in 1950. In 1960 Vienamese Proeident Ngo Dinh Diem,
`faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in the countryside,
`declared a state of all-out war against the Viet Coong and asked for
`increased Amencan ard. In hae 1961) Presedent John F. Kennedy
`sanctioned the operational support of Vietnamese forces by
`American forces, Eight compuny-size aviation units, Iwo specialty
`aviation detachments, and two MaMienance suppor companies
`were deployed to Vietnam during the following twelve months,
`The sive of the new deployments and the new mission made an
`increase in OOM nications support imperaiive. Che first wnil of
`the US. Army ground forces
`to arrive in Vieinam was a
`communications unit, the 39th Signal Bauwalion, commanded by
`Licwionant Colonel Lots B, Blackwell. Fira contingents of the
`battalion arived im Vietnam in February 1962;
`the complete
`battalion was there by July.
`The battalion's first pob was to establish and maintain a
`countywide cOmMMUNICatiOns sysiem to provide command amd
`control for the new operational suppor and expanded advisory
`missions. CGode-named BACK PORCH, a tropospheric scatecr radio
`systom cxtended the length of the country, trom the demilitarized
`fone in the nerth tothe Mekong Delta in the south, and marked the
`first time this type of “mountain hopping” equipment was used in
`a combat environment. The battalion also operated telephone
`exchanges and communications centers throughout the country to
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`8
`
`DIVSION-LEVEL COMMUNTCATIONS, 1962-1973
`
`AMERICAN UNITS IN VIETNAM
`
`a
`
`200 aoeetern,
`
`=
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`[aK] » cow
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`MAP 2
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`FARLY [INVOLVEMESTS AND DEVELOPMENTS
`
`uy
`
`Ramo TELEPHONE OPFEATOR
`
`He the Military Assistance Advuory Group headquarters bo
`escniial subordinate organizations and Vietnamese agencies,
`Although much of this mission involved communications well
`above the division bevel. the 59h Signal Battalion was the pioneer
`for many divisional operations that followed.
`An early assignment of the 39h was to belp install a special
`radio met for the willage defense forees, The met tying the units
`together employed the amplitude modulaicd radio set AN
`GRC-109 at several subordinate stations in cach broad operational
`area, all controlled from a central headquarters in Saigon.
`Although the met contol station remained open around the clock
`for emergency reception, normal raclo contact was made only ona
`echediuled basis using international More code.
`Within the operational areas, an internal communications
`system employed commercial amplitude modulated (AM) voice
`radios, TR-20's, with other interesecd agencies, subordinate
`oprratbonal bases, and selecord villages. These lower nets worked
`twenty-four hours a day but with wallic controlled wo save bauery
`power and to permit emergency traffec. Phe net control station was
`eenerally cather manned or monitored by American advisers; the
`Village and other net
`radios were operated by trained local
`Vietnamese. Light manpack sew, which would have enabled
`roving patrols to tic into the village radio nets, were in short supply
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`10
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`DIVISION - LEVEL. COMMUNICATIONS, 19G2-1975
`
`at the time. Acoording to ome of the carly advisers, Major Ran
`Shackicoon, the ok! model AN/PRC-6 and AN’ PRC-10 radios
`were Dried but were too short mong: they did see sone bint use,
`however, by close-in observation teams and listening posits. Within
`opermional bases, tclephoanme wire was installed between defensive
`points and command posts,
`Village defense radios had been installed largely as part of a
`apocial project spsonsored by the LU nied States Operations Mission,
`a component of the Agency for laternmational Development Chief
`Warrant OUficeer George BR. MicSparren and a team of twenty
`enliseed men from the 242d Signal Gampany, #oth Signal
`Battalion. worked on the propect for about six months during 1O62,
`but more help was oeeded. “Mhen the 72d Signal Demchmens
`(Provisional), consisting of sewenty-noco enlisted men under the
`commund of CapiaidY Rebert A, Wiggins, wis sen on Iomporr©ry
`dury to Viemam. kt was attached to the Shh Signal Battalion
`churning: lace 1962 amd carly 1963 10 take ower radio operations im the
`hamlets throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Im five nvonths the
`opormiion was well under way, and the unit was awarded the
`Meritorious Unit Citation for tts efforts,
`Another carly communications assignment involved avionics,
`the application of electronics to aviation and astronautiecs. Much of
`the carly opcrmtional support of ithe Vicwnamese anmed forces
`conmicned on airmobiliny, which ploced the highest premium on
`kood communications between aincralt, particularly helicopiers,
`aod beowern oaircralt and ground, “To ensure higher colerlon
`WwiOMoS Mmainticnance support for the aviation units, six signal
`tetachmenia (avionics) arrived in Vietnam during 1962: whe 60h,
`Ttih, 2550h, 25tah, 257ih, amd 25th. Diese deiachmenes filled a
`vital need im supporting the communications amd chectranics
`equipment of the aviation units already in Victnam and of thos
`that followed. “Chis activity cume uncer the signal officer of the
`Unie Stats Anny Support Group, Victim, ihe compeanene LS.
`Army bealquarters withtn the Military Assistamce Advisory
`Group, who omploved a qualified avionics af oer to ooordinate all
`IviONMics su pportuctivities, Although serious shortages al cyuslified
`Personnel beset the program at the start, the problem was resclwee
`and the avionics detachments became an invaluable peart of the
`COMMUN ions been,
`As aviation support expanded and the enenvy began to waljus
`his operations amd tactics to counter the helicopter threat, heawier
`and more frequent ground fire was encountered both in the air ane
`eon landing sones, causing a marked increase in damaged ane
`
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`UNIFIED PATENTS EXHIBIT 1014
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`

`EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS
`
`il
`
`destroyed aircralt. Aircralt aml avionics mechanic and ober
`availible ground crewmen took toms ciding ““shotgeum’’
`cet
`helicopicr doorway Posilians to suppress the hostile fire. Mhe
`practice had an meveble all cilect on avionics wand helioopter
`muinicnwnce, and, in the fall ot 1962, when the Military Assislance
`Advisory Group isked for help. a program wus started to train men
`for specific duty as werial door gunners, Phe 25h Infaniry Division
`in Hawai
`lem carly issitance by prowiding specially cained
`volunteers on temporary duty as dow gunmcrs; they pormitoed
`VionMainicnance permonmel to return bo their specialties.
`As
`the scope and complexiy of American involvement
`increased, a need arose for an organization that could apply, vest,
`and evaluate new methods and techniques (mncluding communica-
`tions) called for in the combat cavionment of coUunicrinsurerncy
`watlare. his bee, io late 1962, to the evtablishenen of the Anny
`Gonceyat Team in Vietnam under Brigadier General Edward L.
`Rowny. One of the team’s carliest projects was generated by pleas
`from US. advisers for a better way to contool pod coordinate ihe
`ommunicnions tmconms avilable wo
`the South Vieuurmese
`communiders they were assisting.
`With the role of airmobility vastly expanding. command and
`control hal assumed anew importance, Because the usage reaction
`to the hit-and-run tactics of the Viet Cong was a quick ainmobile
`reponse, i demanded a helicopter command post from which the
`Virtnmmear communier, together with his adviser andl a limived
`sall, could get quickly to an area under attack, develop a plan of
`action, and commit reaction forces rapedly. Chat procedure often
`mean briefing the reecion forces en rouse to the objective,
`cnmidinating with other
`friendly
`forces, and husbhanding
`additional support as needed: in short, usimg seweral rackios at the
`same time. Drying to do that within the confines of a helicopecr
`Passenger compartment, where space, weight, amd power were al a
`premium, wos no small cask. Che commander and his stall had to
`compete with the high noise lewel in the cabin to talk to cach ether
`and to the crew members, Dhew also needed same sort of work
`suriace for map layouts and owerlays.
`An curly attempt to mect these needs was made by lishing down
`three FM (frequency modulated) radias (AN/ PR (C-10) together in
`the passenerr compartment and mounting the antennas at 45-
`degree angles on the skids. Although such a “lash up” was used
`with some sucorss, it was cumbemome and provided only FM
`channels when very high frequency and high frequency single
`sideband were also needed because of the extensive range and
`
` 
`
` 
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`12
`
`DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, [62-1973
`
`varicty of activities involved. Dhe expedicnt also failed to provide
`for communications within the helicopter,
`Feam defined the
`In carly
`$1963,
`the Army Comeept
`requirements for an acrial command post for command control of
`ground and wir operations and submited a propoved ewaluation
`plan, Phe plan was approved by the Commanding General of the
`U.S Army Combai Developments Command and the U.S. Anmy
`Electronics Research and Developmcnt Agency at Form Monmouth,
`New Jersey, which dispatched a two-man team to Vietnam in
`August to determine how the Electronics Laboratory might wssist.
`In the end, four command post communications system consoles
`for UH-IB helicopecrs were fabricated. Each included an
`opeamions table and a compact five-position interphone system
`independent of the aircralt interphone but capable of eniry into
`that system. Fach console abo prowded eqjuipment
`for
`two
`differemt frequency modulated radio channels, an independent
`wery high frequency amplitude modulated radio circuit, a high
`brequency single sideband circuit, and access to the aircralt’s ultra
`Preguency amplitude modulated command radio—coecrnainly a full
`spectrum of radio coverage bo oect almost any comingency.
`The firs consoles arrived in Vietnam in December 1963 and
`were issued tothe 145th Aviation Batealion and the Delta Aviation
`Battalion (Provisional) for evaluation. Dhe battalions found the
`original design vo be veo ambitious. Because of the size anal weighs
`mM the conseale, Iwo single seats normally occupied by the acrial
`door gunners had to be removed. and the additional weight upset
`the belicopeer’s center of gravity. Newertheless, when the map
`boord and wble were climinated and the single ssdeband mdio
`relocated, the comsole performed so well that in July 1964 the LS.
`Alilitary Assisiance Command sated an urgent requirement lor a
`beliborne command post (HCP) for cach Victnamese diviseon and
`one cach for the Vietnamese 1], 111, and TV Goorps,
`The console was ultimately designated the AN’ ASC-6, “The
`thirteen required, along with two for beckup, were fabricated at the
`Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot
`om Kentucky and rushed to
`Viewam, They were tested from late 1964 bo carly 165 and were
`succesfully used in all sections of Vieinam from Da Nang in the
`north to Pleiku in the Central Highlands and the Mekong Delta in
`the south. Headed by Lieutenant GCobonel Clarence H. Ellis, Jr. a
`five-man team conducting the evaluation included two communi-
`cators, Major Cecil E. Wroenand Capiain Wilmer L. Preston, The
`test report commended the assistance of another communicator,
`Captain James A. Weatherman, and the Avionics Office of the LS.
`
` 
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`Page 22 of 119
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`

` 
`
`FARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS
`
`1%
`
`EARLY COMMAND COMMUN DATHONS (Os S0LE wath aorcraff redeos
`
`Army Support Command, Vietnam. Eighty-five more consoles of
`the AN /ASC-6 model would be obtained and deploved to Vietnam
`omer the mext four years.
`Among conclusions moted in the test report was that standard
`aircraft radios and antennas were better suited for installation in
`the helibornce command post
`than wer grownd radios anal
`antennas, a controversial conclusion that would arise again Later.
`The report also noted that
`the command post functioned most
`effectively at aluiwudes between |.500 and 2.500 fert, a compromise
`between observing activity onthe ground and awoiding ground fire
`and other aircralt.
`ln response to another conclusion that the
`command post had to be capable of longer Might time than troop
`transports or armed hchoopicrs, a lilty-gallon auxiliary gas tank
`was placed in the space under the passenger sciuts.
`The wtthitv of the beliborne command frost wis so apparent that
`even at the test was going on, fifteen more were procured and
`Placed in rowine usc, The beliborme command post, wroir
`Brigadict General John K. Boles, Jr.. in forwarding the test report,
`»
`«
`«
`is the single picce of new matericl which should have the
`most imllucence on pmproving the conduct of the war on Viectnam.”
`While these socps to im prowe ainmobiliry operations were being
`taken in Vietnam, parallel cfforu were under way at For Benning,
`eorgisz. The llth Air Assauhl: Division was activated at Form
`Benning on 15 February |963 following recommendations made by
`a apectal board acudying tactical mobilitw requincmecnts, known as
`
` 
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`14
`
`DIVISION-LEVEL (COMMUNICATIONS, 62-1975
`
`
`
`EARLY COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS ConNSDLFE with PRO-/2 series
`macprea.
`
`the Howve Board (its chic was Lacutenant General Hamilton H.
`Howee). This extraordinary division was given a high priority on
`personnel! and equipmeht; 1 was tasked to develop newand radical
`airmobile concepts and operational procedures.
`As an action officer working in combat development on the
`Department of Army stall, [had the good fortune to serve on a team
`that wisited the Ilih Air Assault Division during this time. The
`division commander, Major General Harry W. 0). Kinnard, inwited
`Our cam io a Saturday morning “think tank” seasion, a weekly
`practice within the division. At these sessions commanders and
`stall kicked around ideas, no matter how far-fetched, that pertained
`to airmeobile operations and improved command and control. Our
`team was deeply impresacd to see an enure division dedicated to
`walking through and then trying owt bold tactical airmobile
`concepts that were no more than vague ideas a few years before.
`From those sessions emerged much of the embryonic doctrine that
`later guided the redesignated iat Cavalry Divison (Airmobile) io
`is dramatic combat sucorsses in Vietnam.
`Communications in ainmobile operations received considerable
`thought and ateention. In carly 1964,
`the division signal officer,
`Liewtenant Golonel Tom M. Nicholson, asked