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`Case IPR2022-01227
`Patent 9,762,636
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`______________________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________________________________
`
`
`
`THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, DISNEY STREAMING SERVICES LLC,
`HULU LLC, AND NETFLIX INC.,
`
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`U.S. Pat. No. 9,762,636
`
`
`
`_______________________________________
`
`Inter Partes Review Case No. IPR2022-01227
`
`_______________________________________
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`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S SUR-REPLY
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`

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`Case IPR2022-01227
`Patent 9,762,636
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
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`II. POSITA DEFINITION ...................................................................................... 3
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ISSUES ................................................................ 3
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`A. Construction: Program (Reply, 3) ................................................................. 3
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`B. Construction: Connection data rate limitation [h] (Reply, 4-5) .................... 5
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`C. Construction: No server dependency limitation [j] (Reply, 6) ...................... 6
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`IV. Argument ............................................................................................................ 8
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`A. Connection rate limitation [h] (Reply, 7) ...................................................... 8
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`1. No collateral estoppel on connection rate limitation ................................. 8
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`2. Carmel does not meet the connection rate limitation [h] ........................... 9
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`B. Limitation [j] (no server dependency on record of last element sent) ........13
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`C. Limitation [k] ..............................................................................................18
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`1. Alleged collateral estoppel .......................................................................18
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`1. Carmel does not limitation [k] (each element sent is responsive to request
`by serial ID) .....................................................................................................19
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`D.
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`Inherency .....................................................................................................22
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`E. No motivation to modify Carmel ................................................................25
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`F.
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`Shteyn ..........................................................................................................25
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`V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................26
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`–ii–
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`Case IPR2022-01227
`Patent 9,762,636
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`LIST OF PATENT OWNER’S EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit
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`Description
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`2001
`
`WAG Acquisition, LLC v. WebPower, Inc., 781 F. App’x 1007
`(Fed. Cir. 2019)
`
`2002
`
`IETF RFC 1945
`
`2003
`
`Declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D. Regarding Claims 1-17 of U.S.
`Patent No. 9,729,594, IPR2022-01346, Exhibit 1002
`
`2004
`
`IETF RFC 2068
`
`2005
`
`April 10, 2023, Remote Deposition of Henry Houh, IPR2022-
`01227-28
`
`2006
`
`Declaration of W. Leo Hoarty
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`2007
`
`IETF RFC 1738
`
`2008
`
`Redline comparison of claims of ’824 and ’636 patents
`
`2009
`
`2010
`
`April 10, 2023, (First) Remote Deposition of Henry Houh,
`IPR2022—01227-28
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`August 21, 2023, (Second) Remote Deposition of Henry Houh,
`IPR2022—1227-28
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`
`
`–iii–
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Patent 9,762,636
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`As noted in the POR, Petitioner has not shown where Carmel (EX1004), on
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`which it principally relies, discloses a client that makes successive individual
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`requests to the server for each of the media data elements that comprise a program
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`stream. Nor does the Reply point to any such identified evidence it claims the POR
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`overlooked. In short, the record herein points to no express disclosure in Carmel of
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`any such individual requests.
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`In instituting review, the Board cited the fact that Petitioner’s expert said that
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`such individual requests were “inherent when using the HTTP protocol to
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`download each of the slice files,” noting that “[a]t this stage of the proceeding,
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`Patent Owner does not introduce rebuttal testimony.” Inst. Dec. at 44.
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`That situation has now changed. Patent Owner’s expert has appeared and
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`rebutted the assertion of inherency.
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`The Reply (e.g., Reply-1:16-18) refers over and over again to what it asserts is
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`“Carmel’s repeated disclosure of the client requesting each slice by identifier,” yet
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`never cites anything in Carmel that says this. The most Petitioner ever does is
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`merely to characterize what is shown in Figs. 6A and 6B of Carmel and then, as
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`illustrated on page 19 of the Reply, segue into referring to this as “express
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`disclosure.” It is a piecewise bootstrap argument, which leaps from an insufficient
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`disclosure to a characterization, which then labels the characterization as “express
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`disclosure” for the remainder of the submission.
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`Nowhere in Carmel, from beginning to end, is there express disclosure of
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`individual element requests that Petitioner has attributed to it. Rather, the case here
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`rests entirely on alleged inherent disclosure.
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`Inherency fails as well because inherency implies necessity. Persion
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`Pharmaceuticals v. Alvogen Malta Oper., 945 F.3d 1184, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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`Under the evidence of record, Petitioner fails to make a showing, as to any
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`embodiment disclosed in Carmel, that Carmel must, as a matter of technical
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`necessity, implement streaming by means of successive individual requests for
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`each of the stream elements.
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`The above-noted lack of individual element requests in Carmel is an
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`overarching shortcoming of the Petition. Numerous other shortcomings of Carmel
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`will be addressed herein as well.
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`Reply-1:19-20 asserts that, as to the secondary reference, Shteyn, PO argues
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`contrary to Shteyn’s “express disclosure.” However, all the Petition seeks to rely
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`on Shteyn for is the server’s selection of elements to send, allegedly without
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`depending on its own record of what it has previously sent. Petitioner claims there
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`is express disclosure for this, but as discussed below, has failed to substantiate any
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`such disclosure.
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`–2–
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`II.
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`POSITA DEFINITION
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`Patent 9,762,636
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`Petitioner argues for a “POSITA” who lacks familiarity with basic internet
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`protocols and tools for working with dynamic content and creating interactive web
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`sites—a person who lacks the skill to see through its flawed inherency arguments.
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`It is clear from the argument at page 2 of the Reply that Petitioner would prefer a
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`POSITA that wasn’t aware of the practice of scripting applications for a streaming
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`media server.
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`Yet, Dr. Houh himself confirmed that a POSITA would know the basics of TCP
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`and HTML. EX2009-38:11-39:16 (TCP), 43:3-44:5 (HTTP). It is curious to see
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`Disney trying to argue against this, to get by with a POSITA who doesn’t even
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`meet those minimal qualifications and wouldn’t recognize the use of then currently
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`improved protocol standards by Carmel.
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
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`A. Construction: Program (Reply, 3)
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`(Reply-3:5-7) (“Program”) Disney does not offer its own construction. It
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`appears from its argument that a connection’s ability to send any single media data
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`element during the course of transmission, faster than the playback rate, would
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`meet this limitation. This extreme construction does not square with the claim
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`language and other intrinsic as well as extrinsic evidence.
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`–3–
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`The specification addresses a process of streaming a program as a result of a
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`series of individual element requests. It describes that “the user computer …
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`continues with additional data requests for the duration of playing the audio/video
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`material.” EX1001-14:56-58. Reducing the requirements for a connection that can
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`accommodate those continued requests, so that they are satisfied by the sending of
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`merely a single element, results in a claimed feature (the connection) that is not
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`capable of performing as described in the specification and fails to address the
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`stated object of performing “without disruption.” EX1001-3:49-50.
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`(Reply-3:16:19) (“all of the media data elements that are sent”). The Reply
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`argues that only “one or more” elements must be sent, but argues as if “one or
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`more” reduces to one element. But the claim recites “one or more,” and if more
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`than one element is sent, then, by the literal claim language, the rate requirement
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`must apply to all of the “more” elements. The Reply repeatedly fails to address
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`this.
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`(Reply-4:1-15) (“delivering a program to the extent you wish to consume it”) It
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`is hard to see how Disney finds breathing room in the fact that a server need not
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`continue streaming a program after a user leaves. The claim addresses the steps the
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`server must perform to stream a program. Disney does not show how the fact that a
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`user may leave in mid-stream alters the substance of the claimed method.
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`–4–
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`(Reply-4:1-15) (“program” in the ’141 patent) Disney is still arguing here
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`against claim 10 of the ’141 patent, which is different, as addressed below.
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`B. Construction: Connection data rate limitation [h] (Reply, 4-5)
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`(Reply-5:1-5) Significantly, Disney does not dispute that in order for it not to
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`fail during transmission, the “connection” in this claim must be capable of sending
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`the elements comprising the program to be transmitted, more rapidly than the
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`playback rate. EX2006 ¶¶ 20, 24-25, 46.
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`Disney argues here that the limitation is satisfied where the connection can meet
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`the playback rate instantaneously, for any one element. The Reply includes the
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`words “or more” in its quote but fails to give effect to the words “or more” where a
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`response comprises more than one element.
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`Disney’s argument is more directed at claim 10 of the ’141 patent than the claim
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`here. The prior claim recited “[a] server for distributing streaming media” as
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`opposed to the claims here, e.g., for “[a] method for distributing a program,”
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`further reciting steps including without limitation a plurality of requests, moreover
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`successive requests (referencing the “last media data element sent”), and a
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`connection that possesses a specified rate characteristic for “the one or more media
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`data elements sent via that connection” – clearly not satisfied by the rate at which
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`the connection might send a single element. It would be perverse (and legally
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`incorrect) to disregard all of this further language, as well as the specification
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`–5–
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`disclosure of the object of continuous delivery and how the invention meets it, to
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`interpret this claim as having the same scope the Board previously attributed to the
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`differently worded claims in the ’141 patent.
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`(Reply-5:6-10) Petitioner is ascribing an instantaneous inference to “data
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`connection,” implying that “data connection” is a transient operating characteristic
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`rather than referring to physical hardware. The physical characteristics of the “data
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`connection” are unchanging, even though the operating characteristics vary—as
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`explicitly contemplated by the ’636 patent. E.g., EX1001-2:34-40.
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`(Reply-5:11-18) The transfer is over the internet, which the Patent states (and
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`POSITAs appreciate) simply does not guarantee locked-in transmission rates. But
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`specified connections (such as, in the specification, the user’s connection with a
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`56K modem) are understood. The Reply’s argument at 5 seems to argue that the
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`variability of the internet supports its “instantaneous” construction, where if
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`anything it is to the contrary. The variability of the internet is the very reason why
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`a mere instantaneous rate is not sufficient.
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`C. Construction: No server dependency limitation [j] (Reply, 6)
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`(Reply-6:2-6) Petitioner did not initially, and does not in its Reply, dispute that
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`limitation [j] literally applies to where more than one element is selected, and that
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`in that case, per limitation [j], the elements in excess of one must each be selected
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`by the server without the specified dependency. The Reply seeks to shift the
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`–6–
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`discussion here to its “entire program” arguments, which do not address the
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`construction of limitation [j]. Disney has not articulated any actual dispute with
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`PO’s position on construction of limitation [j].
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`(Reply-6:7-12) The Reply seeks to argue “client-side control” which is not a
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`claim term, and which Petitioner doesn’t define.
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`(Reply-6:14-17) (Limitation [k]: “all” and “each”) Disney takes issue with PO’s
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`construction, but does not state its own. PO raised this construction in its POR to
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`address the Board’s suggestion in a later Google institution decision (IPR2022-
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`01412), that the word “all” in limitation [k] did not imply “each.” The difference at
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`stake in these constructions of limitation [k] may be illustrated as follows:
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`Assume the prior art discloses (as PO asserts Carmel does) one request, which
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`specified only ID-1 (as a starting slice), and not any other IDs, which then spawns
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`a response of elements with IDs ID-1 .. ID-100.
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`Construction A: “all” including “each” –
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`Prior art fails, because ID-2 .. ID-100 were not specified in “the request.”
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`Construction B: “all” but not necessarily “each” –
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`Since all slices sent were “requested” (though not necessarily by individual
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`ID), the prior art would be asserted to apply.
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`–7–
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`Patent 9,762,636
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`However, to be consistent with the ’636 specification (EX1001-14:42-62) and
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`surrounding claim language, interpretation “B” (push a stream of elements from a
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`specified starting point) must be incorrect.
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`(Reply-6:18-20) To the extent the Reply can be taken as in favor of the Board’s
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`suggestion in the separate Google IPR, the words “or more” in limitation [k] is the
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`problem for Disney, not the separate question that Disney again presses in this
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`context, of whether the entire program must be sent.
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`PO does not discern any argument by Disney that disputes that where a
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`response does comprise more than one media data element, per limitation [k], each
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`of the “more” data elements in the response must have been sent responsive to “the
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`requests,” the antecedent for which is “requests … each received request
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`specifying one or more serial identifiers of the requested one or more media data
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`elements.”
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`IV. Argument
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`A. Connection rate limitation [h] (Reply, 7)
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`1.
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`No collateral estoppel on connection rate limitation
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`(Reply-7:12-17) (Alleged collateral estoppel on the connection rate limitation
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`[h]) This assertion assumes the connection rate limitation is met by the ability to
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`make an instantaneous transfer of one element faster than the playback rate,
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`contrary to the proper construction.
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`–8–
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`(Reply-7:18-8:5) (comparing ’636 and ’141 claims) The ’636 claims go to a
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`characteristic of the connection that applies over the elements sent via the
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`connection, while the prior case (’141 patent) addressed the step of “sending” an
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`element.
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`The claims have different wording and thus presumptively have different scope.
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`(Reply-8:6-9) (issue preclusion) The “issue” litigated here is different, since, as
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`noted above, the issue concerns a physical characteristic of a data connection with
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`respect to a program (’636 patent), sent over the connection in tranches of “one or
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`more” media data elements, versus how, at instantaneous points in time, a stream
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`element may be sent.
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`2.
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`Carmel does not meet the connection rate limitation [h]
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`(Reply-8:17-20) (Alleged previous finding) The Board previously found only
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`that Carmel discloses that during normal operation the “data rate” may be
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`sometimes faster than the playback rate.
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`However, the claims here all go to the “data rate” of the “connection between
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`the server system and each requesting user system.”
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`(Reply-8:19-20) (No “concession”) To the extent the POR at 31 can be read to
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`attribute to Carmel that the data connection “generally should be equal to or faster”
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`than the playback rate, this was an error and not intended. The related disclosure
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`–9–
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`Patent 9,762,636
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`from Carmel is that “the data rate [without stating of what] should be generally
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`equal to or faster than the [playback] rate.” EX1004-2:56-59.
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`(Reply-9:1-4) (“data rate should be generally equal to or faster”) Carmel’s
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`disclosure of a mere “data rate” that should be equal to or faster than the playback
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`rate does not disclose that “the data connection” between the server and each client
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`should have a data rate that is generally equal to or faster than the playback rate.
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`Carmel’s reference at 2:56-59 addresses a rate of data transfer but does not tie it
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`to a single connection.
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`The very next paragraph in Carmel (EX1004-1:60-67) spells out that such a
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`“data rate” may be met, for example, by aggregated connections, even though no
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`single connection meets this limitation. The Federal Circuit in fact reversed in the
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`prior case when the Board found the corresponding limitation could be met by
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`aggregating connections. EX2001 at 9-10. The Board here cannot rest its reliance
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`on this language, with regard to limitation [h].1
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`(Reply-9:7-19) (client “chooses … quality level appropriate to the bandwidth”)
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`Choosing a quality level to meet a currently observed bandwidth is not the same as
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`choosing a connection with a data rate more rapid than the playback rate, which the
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`1 Carmel also teaches that the data rate can also be accommodated by changing the
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`data to a lower encoding (EX1004-3:5-13).
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`–10–
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`Patent 9,762,636
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`client can expect the server to sustain. The cited disclosure is yet another example
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`of Carmel seeking to match the playback rate, with no expectation that any
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`connection will actually sustain performance at greater than the playback rate. The
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`words “appropriate to” do not necessarily mean less than and do not teach
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`choosing a connection faster than the playback rate. The concept of matching the
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`data and transmission bandwidth pervades Carmel and does not teach a connection
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`having a data rate in excess of the playback rate.2
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`(Reply-10:11-19) The mere existence of other applications that specified fast
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`connections does not address motivation to combine. Petitioner’s urging the Board
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`to dispense with any showing of motivation to combine to support a challenge to
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`patentability under § 103 courts error. The Reply also seeks to invoke Mr. Hoarty’s
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`testimony, but this does not stand up. Mr. Hoarty is simply misquoted here. He was
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`clearly commenting on the requirements of the claims, not the disclosure of
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`Carmel. EX1029-62:2-15.
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`It would be error to infer that merely because a POSITA would have known that
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`connections of various specified speeds could have been procured, at increasing
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`2 The Reply at 10 cites TCP. However, the mere use of TCP says nothing about the
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`“data rate” of the “connection” that TCP is used over. The Reply here conflates
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`limitations [h] and [i].
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`–11–
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`cost, the POSITA would therefore have known, without more, to have specified
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`such a connection for using a certain method of streaming. The POSITA, in
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`addition to devising the new streaming method based on individual element
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`requests by serial identifier, would also have had to have realized a method based
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`on individual element requests would technically require such a connection. The
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`Petition fails to address this.
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`The Reply also fails to dispute Mr. Hoarty’s testimony that consistently sending
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`faster than the playback rate in Carmel would cause Carmel to fail, since Carmel
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`has no disclosure of a buffer. EX2006 ¶¶ 18, 106; POR at 32. The same can be seen
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`in Figs. 6A and 6B, in which Petitioner points to no mechanism in the loop to
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`regulate how rapidly the assumed “requests” would be made.
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`(Reply-11:1-3) (Petition’s failure to provide a motivation to combine) The
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`Reply cites the Petition at 35, but neither that page in the Petition, nor ¶¶ 102-107
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`of the expert declaration that the Petition would (improperly) seek to incorporate
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`by reference, address any motivation to combine the different examples cited with
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`Carmel.
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`(Reply-11:4-12) Petitioner cannot rely on limitation (i) to satisfy limitation (h).
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`Limitations (h) and (i) are separate limitations and it would be error to conflate
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`them. What the connection will allow is a separate fact from the data rate of the
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`connection.
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`–12–
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`B.
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`Limitation [j] (no server dependency on record of last element
`sent)
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`(Reply-11:17-21) (collateral estoppel) The term “pointer” is narrower than
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`“record” – there are records that are not pointers. This being a negative limitation,
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`the broader negative limitation (“record”) makes the present claim of narrower
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`scope in this respect. There is thus no collateral estoppel.
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`(Reply-12:1-9) (“client-side control) Disney repeats the words “client-side
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`control” (which it does not define) throughout its Reply as if they were part of the
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`claim language, which they are not. All the client in Carmel “controls” is to request
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`a program stream and a starting slice for the server’s transmission of that stream.
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`General terms such as “client-side control” cannot substitute for pointing to where
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`the prior art discloses the actual claim limitations at issue, which require individual
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`requests of each of the media data elements comprising the stream, by their serial
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`IDs. When the server autonomously streams a continuing sequence of such
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`elements in response to a request that identified only a single starting ID, the server
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`must maintain a record of what it sent in order to determine the next element to
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`send. The Reply does not dispute this basic point, but tries to evade it with words
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`such as “client-side control.”
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`(Reply-12:18-20) (limitation [j] allegedly follows from client-side control) The
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`general phrase “client-side control” is not helpful without the ability to distinguish
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`individual requests by a client from a single client request that starts a stream from
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`–13–
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`Case IPR2022-01227
`Patent 9,762,636
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`a starting point designated by the client, as Carmel does. Nor does mere “lack of
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`specialized server software,” as what is involved is only software that makes use of
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`open standards, such as HTTP 1.1.
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`(Reply-12:18-20) (downloads over one or two HTTP links) What is missing
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`here is any disclosure of individual requests as required by the claims. Disney
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`needs to show individual requests by serial ID in order to negate the otherwise
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`certain conclusion that the server must be determining the elements to send. But it
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`does not point to any such disclosure. The fact that a client downloads slices over a
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`link, or over two links “in successive alternation,” does not show that the client is
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`requesting the slices over the link(s). As pointed out in the POR (at 38, 40), the
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`server could equally well determine which elements to send and send them over
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`the link(s), either on an individual link, or on a plurality of links that have been
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`opened, in successive alternation, which will equally well result in the client
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`“downloading” the slices. The disclosure simply does not reflect any client
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`requests to the server for individual slices by slice ID, other than the single request
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`that starts the stream of slices.
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`(Reply-13:6-10) (“push” reading of Carmel is “wrong”). This argument fails to
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`point to disclosure in Carmel of other than a push system.
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`Dr. Houh insists that Fig. 6B represents the same “individual request” behavior
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`he reads into Fig. 6A. In Fig. 6A, he interprets the words “one or two links, over
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`–14–
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`Case IPR2022-01227
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`which files … are downloaded” as if it said “one or two links, over which the client
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`requests files”—which Carmel does not disclose.3
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`When he gets to Fig. 6B and is asked about “[r]esponsive to the [client’s]
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`selection, server 36 begins to transmit data slices,” he maintains that the words
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`“server … begins to transmit” actually means that the client is making individual
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`requests for what the server is transmitting. See EX2010-38:25-40:24.
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`Neither passage actually states that the client “requests” anything, let alone
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`successive slices, individually.
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`Dr. Houh dismisses the even more clear statement in Carmel with regard to Fig.
`
`6B attributing the successive “transmit” action to the server as “high level”
`
`(EX2010-38:25-39:17), as if Carmel at this point in its disclosure was merely
`
`glossing over critical details.
`
`It is Dr. Houh that is glossing over details, by writing off express disclosure in
`
`the reference that is contrary to his hypothesis, as “high level.”
`
`
`3 Dr. Houh also confirmed that even if serving over multiple links the server-side
`
`process would have information identifying a user’s links and the slices sent to the
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`user. EX2010-90:10-98:25.
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`–15–
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`The Fig. 6B embodiment is expressly preferably over a single HTTP link. Dr.
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`Houh did not dispute that HTTP could in fact “push” over a single link. EX2010-
`
`71:23-25.
`
`Dr. Houh does not even contend, and could not plausibly explain, why two
`
`illustrative figures illustrating alternate embodiments would operate by two
`
`completely different mechanisms, which would impact the bandwidth requirements
`
`if they indeed differed, with no mention of any such difference.
`
`The fact is also that Carmel claimed these two alternatives in one series of
`
`claims of diminishing scope—totally consistent with the alternatives having a
`
`common base mechanism (and difficult to explain if otherwise). Dr. Houh indeed
`
`maintains that the Fig. 6B embodiment is an enhancement of the Fig. 6A
`
`embodiment that works by the same underlying mechanism. EX2010-42:11-43:7.
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`But he wants to read “download,” which simply reflects a transfer of data, as
`
`implying an unstated “request” for the data from the receiving end, and then
`
`disregard “server 36 begins to transmit” as “high-level” gloss that doesn’t really
`
`mean what it says.
`
`By maintaining these disclosures are fundamentally the same, Dr. Houh must
`
`not only address the word “download,” which he appears to find easier to bend to
`
`his preferred reading, he must also address the more difficult (for him) “server
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`begins to transmit,” but he fails to do so.
`
`–16–
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`Carmel also has approximately two dozen disclosures, each of which states that
`
`the data rate may be “equal to” the playback rate. E.g., EX1004 Abstract, 4:2, 3:39,
`
`3:59, 4:2, 4:24, 4:62 etc. (numerous like disclosures). Petitioner does not dispute
`
`Mr. Hoarty’s testimony (EX2006 ¶ 25) that a data rate merely “equal to” the
`
`playback rate will not work for a sliced, individual request streaming mechanism.
`
`By failing to take any issue with this, and yet arguing that both Figs. 6A and 6B
`
`(i.e., the entirety of Carmel) represent individual slice request implementations,
`
`Disney could only say that the repeated “equal to” disclosures of Carmel would be
`
`inoperable. Of course, streaming successive slices from a specified starting point
`
`can work with a data rate generally equal to the playback rate.
`
`Dr. Houh also cannot claim that both the single and multi-level Carmel
`
`embodiments operate on the same principle and claim that it is “inherent” that that
`
`principle is an individual request mechanism in both cases, and yet argue for
`
`“necessity” to support inherency with respect to only one of the implementations
`
`(Fig. 6A). If “individual requests” are inherent in the operating principle of the
`
`one, it must be inherent in the principle of the other, where he claims the
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`–17–
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`underlying mechanisms of the two to be equivalent. He cannot just ignore the
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`embodiment he finds troublesome.4
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`(Reply-13:11-18) (again pursuing “client-side control”) The client in Carmel
`
`controls where to start the stream, and how to synchronize playback after the
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`stream is received. But reading the claim to cover this would make the claim much
`
`broader than its terms.
`
`Merely repeating the mantra “client-side control” does not satisfy the need for
`
`actual citations. It begs the question of client control of what? It is not a substitute
`
`for finding disclosure of the actual claimed features.
`
`C. Limitation [k]
`
`1.
`
`Alleged collateral estoppel
`
`(Reply-14:2-19) The heading here as well as the argument that follows glosses
`
`the limitations of the prior and present claims to argue that they are identical,
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`where they are not.
`
`
`4 Dr. Houh says both embodiments are allegedly pull by reason of inherency yet
`
`does not dispute that there is no inherency on the preferred (one link) form of the
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`6B embodiment. The only interpretation that is fully consistent is “push” streaming
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`from a specified starting point—it accounts for every disclosure, even multicast
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`(EX1004-8:9-11). Pull by individual slice requests is not inherent in any disclosed
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`embodiment.
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`–18–
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`The Reply at 14-20 glosses over the (k) limitation, the actual effect of which is
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`to add a further “wherein” limitation that the server sends no elements other than
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`those requested by serial ID.
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`The claim at issue with respect to the ’141 patent did not recite this. With such
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`differences, there can be no collateral estoppel on Carmel meeting this limitation of
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`the ’636 or ’824 patents.
`
`1.
`Carmel does not limitation [k] (each element sent is
`responsive to request by serial ID)
`
`(Reply-15:1-15) (alleged “clear” teaching of individual requests). The argument
`
`ties this to “an” HTTP link as well as “two” HTTP links, and claims “clear”
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`disclosure that the client is making individual slice requests, without citing one
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`statement to that effect.
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`(Reply-15:16-20) (client opens links allegedly means it is making requests over
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`the links) The fact that the client opens the link is irrelevant to the issue of how the
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`link is used; in either case the client or server could stage alternation over a link
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`initially opened by the client. The client opened the first link as well, and this is
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`clearly immaterial. The argument still begs the question posed in the POR.
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`(Reply-16:1-4) (Fig. 6A) The Reply fails to point out where this flow chart
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`shows “requests” for the individual elements, and it does not.
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`–19–
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`On each loop traversal there may be a singular slice, but this does not reflect
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`whether the slice got there because it was individually requested or simply because
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`the server sent it as part of a series.
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`(Reply-17:3-8) (HTTP FROM SERVER) As the Reply notes, the client receives
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`the HTTP elements from the server. There is nothing disclosed here about requests
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`to the server.
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`(Reply-17:9-15) (Fig. 6B) Carmel’s disclosure at EX1004-11:9-18 is that the
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`embodiment corresponding to Fig. 6B can select a new encoding rate. All this
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`means is that the client, by doing so, is asking the server to push elements with a
`
`different encoding than the server is currently pushing. No individual element
`
`request is shown.
`
`(Reply-17:16-20) (re: “Yes” loop) This is mere attorney argument trying to
`
`interpret the figure where its expert failed to do so.
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`It is also incorrect by presupposing that “HTTP FROM SERVER” means
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`“HTTP Request to server.” Of course, the loop must go to the second box “HTTP
`
`FROM SERVER” since the client must receive the data that is being decoded.
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`Furthermore, the Reply’s explanation provides no way for the supposed
`
`individual “requests” to be redirected to another quality level without revising the
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`disclosed scheme of element numbering. EX2006 ¶¶ 111, 125. The Reply is
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`–20–
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`completely silent with regard to pages 42-43 of the POR and EX2006 ¶ 125, which
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`point out Dr. Houh’s error.
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`(Reply-18:2-6) (cit

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