Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 1 of 35 PageID #: 1392
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`LUMINATI NETWORKS LTD.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`UAB TESONET,
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 2:18-cv-299-JRG
`
`LUMINATI’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`(LOCAL PATENT RULE 4-5(a))
`
`i
`
`CODE200 ET AL. EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 1 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 2 of 35 PageID #: 1393
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
`
`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................................................... 1
`
`A. The Patents-in-Suit........................................................................................................... 1
`
`B. The Asserted Claims ........................................................................................................ 2
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ........................................... 4
`
`LEVEL OF ONE OR ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ........................................... 7
`
`AGREED UPON TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION ..................................................... 7
`
`DISPUTED TERMS FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................... 8
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`A. Preamble .......................................................................................................................... 8
`
`B. Device ............................................................................................................................ 10
`
`C. Identifier ......................................................................................................................... 11
`
`D. Content ........................................................................................................................... 13
`
`E. Content Identifier ........................................................................................................... 14
`
`F. “Simultaneous” and “Concurrently” .............................................................................. 15
`
`G. Past Activities ................................................................................................................ 19
`
`H. The timing of an event ................................................................................................... 20
`
`I. Group Device Identifier ................................................................................................. 21
`
`J. Content Slice .................................................................................................................. 21
`
`K. Content Slice Identifier .................................................................................................. 22
`
`L. Partitioning ..................................................................................................................... 22
`
`M. Constructing ................................................................................................................... 24
`
`N. Client Device ................................................................................................................. 25
`
`O. Part of the content is included in two or more content slices ........................................ 25
`
`VII. THE “INDEFINITENESS” ARGUMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANTS DO NOT
`REALLY RELATE TO INDEFINITENESS AND ARE NOT PROPER FOR
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................................... 26
`
`A. Claim terms “by a first device,” “from a second server,” “via a second device,” and
`“using a first server” are not indefinite. ....................................................................... 28
`
`B. “Past activities” is not indefinite. ................................................................................... 29
`
`C. “Partitioning the content” and “constructing the content” are not indefinite. ............... 29
`
`VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 30
`
`i
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 2 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 3 of 35 PageID #: 1394
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`3-D Matrix, Inc. v. Menicon Co., Civil Action No. 14-cv-10205-IT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096
`(D. Mass. Jan. 11, 2016)............................................................................................................ 27
`
`Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................... 8
`
`AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................... 17
`
`Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................ 8
`
`Aloft Media, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:08-CV-50, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24124 (E.D. Tex.
`Mar. 24, 2009) ........................................................................................................................... 11
`
`Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................... 12, 13
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., 919 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ......................................... 9
`
`Astute Tech., LLC v. Learners Digest Int’l LLC, No. 2:12-CV-689-JRG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`45526 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014) ............................................................................................ 5, 15
`
`Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ....................... 27
`
`Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341 (Fed.
`Cir. 2001) ........................................................................................................................ 5, 18, 19
`
`Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Chongqing Rato Power Co., No. 5:13-CV-0316 (LEK/ATB), 2014
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138088 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2014)................................................................ 26
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ...................... 8
`
`Cheetah Omni LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent Inc., 939 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Tex. April 11, 2013) ........ 6
`
`Cox Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc'n Co. LP, 838 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2016 ......................... 29
`
`Danco, Inc. v. Fluidmaster, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-73-JRG-CMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155936
`(E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2017) ............................................................................................................ 7
`
`EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................... 20, 23
`
`Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ......................... 27
`
`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................... 11, 13, 20
`
`ii
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 3 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 4 of 35 PageID #: 1395
`
`Gilead Scis. v. Mylan Inc., No. 1:14CV99, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44558 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 6,
`2015).......................................................................................................................................... 27
`
`Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00057-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`96097 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2017) .......................................................................................... 5, 15
`
`In re Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ............................................................................ 29
`
`In re Miller, 441 F .2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1971)................................................................................. 29
`
`Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ................................................................. 4
`
`Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 9
`
`MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ......................... 6, 7
`
`Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ..................... 5
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ............................................... 26
`
`Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................... 27
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............. 4, 5
`
`On-Line Tech. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer, 386 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ........................... 7
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) .................................. 4, 5, 6, 18
`
`Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 739 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................ 8
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .......................... 5
`
`Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. Corp., 374 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................ 17
`
`Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................. 27
`
`Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ................................. 6
`
`Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc. 279 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ... 28
`
`Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................... 19
`
`Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz, 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) ........................................................ 4
`
`TomTom Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................... 9
`
`iii
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 4 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 5 of 35 PageID #: 1396
`
`Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Huawei Techs. USA, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00042-RWS-RSP, 2019 U.S.
`Dist. LEXIS 2130 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2019) ................................................................................ 8
`
`Traxxas LP v. Hobby Prods. Int’l, No. 2:14-CV-945-JRG-RSP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114148
`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2015) ......................................................................................................... 26
`
`Trilogy Communs., Inc. v. Times Fiber Communs., Inc., 109 F.3d 739 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ............ 17
`
`Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
` ............................................................................................................................................. 12, 13
`
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed Cir. 2014) .................................................... 7
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ....................................... 6, 7
`
`X One, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-06050-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132746 (N.D.
`Cal. Aug. 18, 2017) ..................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 5 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 6 of 35 PageID #: 1397
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Derry Shribman and Ofer Vilenski, founders of Plaintiff Luminati Networks Ltd.
`
`(“Luminati”), are the sole inventors of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,241,044 (the “‘044 patent”), and
`
`9,742,866 (the “‘866 patent”) (collectively the “Patents-in-Suit” or “asserted patents”). Their
`
`inventions essentially created a new method for fetching content from a target server over the
`
`Internet using intermediary third-party residential devices, such as an individual’s cell phone, in
`
`order to make the request from the third-party instead of the original requestor. Such a service is
`
`useful where a target server such as a website server might block or return fake responses. For
`
`example, a retailer can use this service to request pricing data from a competitor by appearing to
`
`that competitor as a potential customer.
`
`The claims are straight-forward and the terms used in the claims generally carry their plain
`
`and ordinary meaning. Defendant UAB Tesonet (“Tesonet”), upon information and belief now
`
`known as UAB Teso LT (“Teso”) following a post-complaint corporate restructuring (collectively
`
`“Defendant”), falls into the trap of attempting to deviate from the plain meaning of the claim terms
`
`by replacing them with lists or otherwise attempting to read embodiments into the claims, when
`
`the terms are easily understood by applying plain and ordinary meaning. Defendant has also
`
`asserted indefiniteness, but the Patent Office issued the claims because they were definite, and
`
`Defendant’s argument is baseless.
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The Patents-in-Suit
`
`The two Patents-in-Suit are directed to methods for fetching content over the Internet.
`
`They are divisionals sharing the same inventors, specification and title: “System and Method for
`
`1
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 6 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 7 of 35 PageID #: 1398
`
`Improving Internet Communication by Using Intermediate Nodes.” Their applications were filed
`
`on August 26, 2014 and claim priority to August 28, 2013.
`
`A problem in the art was the fact that certain websites with public information nevertheless
`
`create technological roadblocks to obtaining that information from certain requesting devices, such
`
`as the routine practice of competitors seeking publicly available pricing information. To overcome
`
`these artificial hinderances to information voluntarily made public to others, the residential proxy
`
`service of the claims sends requests through one or more of a large group residential proxy devices,
`
`such as individual cell phone devices. As the proxy devices belong to real people who otherwise
`
`send such requests to target web servers as customers, the target will allow the queries and not
`
`artificially block them. Additional dependent claims of the inventions divide requests among a
`
`pool of residential proxy devices and select proxy devices for example based upon past activities,
`
`timing and geographic location, all of which makes it much harder for the target server to identity
`
`requests from a proxy device that originated from a competitor.
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Claims
`
`In the present action, Luminati asserts infringement of independent claims 81 and 108 and
`
`dependent claims 82-107 of the ‘044 patent, and independent claim 15 and dependent claims 16-
`
`28 of the ‘866 patent.
`
`Representative independent claim 81 of the ‘044 patent claims as follows (with terms that
`
`are the subject of this claim construction proceeding underlined):
`
`81. A method for fetching over the Internet a first content, identified by a first
`content identifier, by a first device, identified in the Internet by a first identifier,
`from a second server identified in the Internet by a third identifier via a second
`device identified in the Internet by a second identifier, using a first server, the
`method comprising the steps of:
`(a) sending the first identifier to the first server;
`(b) sending a first request to the first server;
`(c) receiving the second identifier from the first server;
`
`2
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 7 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 8 of 35 PageID #: 1399
`
`(d) sending a second request to the second device using the second identifier, the
`second request includes the first content identifier and the third identifier; and
`(e) receiving the first content from the second device.
`
`
`
`Dependent claim 82 adds to claim 81 the step of “(f) sending the first content identifier to
`
`the second server using the third identifier.” Dependent claims 85 and 86 add the limitations of
`
`“wherein step (f) is simultaneous with steps (d) – (e)….” Dependent claim 87 adds limitations
`
`regarding a second proxy device to the steps of independent claim 81, and claim 89 adds limitations
`
`regarding a group of proxy device to the steps of independent claim 81. Dependent claim 101 adds
`
`the limitation of the first device also serving as a proxy device for a third device to the steps of
`
`independent claim 81. Dependent claims 88, 90, 91, and 107 add further limitations to claims 87,
`
`89, and 101 of “wherein steps (f) to (h) are executed concurrently with steps (d)-(e)….” Dependent
`
`claim 99 adds the limitation of “wherein the second device is selected based on past activities” to
`
`claim 89. Dependent claim 100 adds the limitation of “wherein the second device is selected
`
`based on the timing of an event” to claim 89.
`
`Representative independent claim 108 of the ‘044 patent claims as follows:
`
`108. A method for fetching over the Internet a first content, identified by a first
`content identifier, by a first device, identified in the Internet by a first identifier,
`from a second server identified in the Internet by a third identifier via a second
`device identified in the Internet by a second identifier, using a first server, the
`method comprising the steps of:
`(a) sending the second identifier to the first server;
`(b) receiving a second request from the first device, the second request includes the
`first content identifier and the third identifier;
`(c) in response to receiving the second request, sending the first content identifier
`to the second server using the third identifier;
`(d) receiving the first content from the second server; and
`(e) in response to receiving the first content, sending the first content to the first
`device using the first identifier.
`
`Representative independent claim 15 of the ‘866 patent claims as follows:
`
`15. A method for fetching a content over the Internet from a first server identified
`in the Internet by a second identifier via a group of multiple devices, each identified
`in the Internet by an associated group device identifier, the method comprising the
`
`3
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 8 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 9 of 35 PageID #: 1400
`
`step of partitioning the content into a plurality of content slices, each content slice
`containing at least part of the content, and identified using a content slice identifier,
`and for each of the content slices, comprising the steps of:
`(a) selecting a device from the group;
`(b) sending over the Internet a first request to the selected device using the group
`device identifier of the selected device, the first request including the content
`slice identifier and the second identifier;
`(c) in response to receiving the sent first request by the selected device, receiving
`over the Internet the content slice from the selected device; and
`wherein the method further comprising the step of constructing the content from
`the received plurality of content slices,
`and wherein each of the devices in the group is a client device.
`
`Dependent claim 22 adds the limitation of “wherein part of the content is included in two
`
`or more content slices” to claim 15.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`The proper construction of any disputed terms within a patent claim is exclusively within
`
`the province of the court. Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Although
`
`the ultimate issue of claim construction is a question of law, claim construction may contain
`
`evidentiary underpinnings; thereby involving questions of fact. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v.
`
`Sandoz, 135 S.Ct. 831, 838 (2015).
`
`A threshold issue is to determine whether a claim term even needs to be construed. “[T]he
`
`ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily
`
`apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the
`
`application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips v. AWH
`
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Claim terms that form key disputes
`
`between the parties require construction. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521
`
`F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, simple, understandable terms, as with a number of
`
`terms Defendants have placed in dispute, do not require construction. See Biotec Biologische
`
`Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
`
`4
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 9 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 10 of 35 PageID #: 1401
`
`(declining to construed “melting”) (cited in O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362); Mentor H/S, Inc. v.
`
`Medical Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (declining to construe
`
`“irrigating” and “frictional heat”) (cited in O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360).
`
`Another consideration is whether adopting a particular claim construction would be helpful
`
`to the jury. See, e.g., Astute Tech., LLC v. Learners Digest Int’l LLC, No. 2:12-CV-689-JRG, 2014
`
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45526, at *76-77 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014) (denying request to construe term
`
`when court was not convinced that the proposed construction was “more helpful to the jury as
`
`opposed to the plain meaning”); Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00057-
`
`JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96097, at *33 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2017) (decision to construe
`
`claim term was based in part on whether the construction would be “helpful to the jury”). Further,
`
`when there are competing proposals, it is appropriate for the Court to consider which “would be
`
`more clear and helpful to the jury.” X One, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-06050-LHK, 2017
`
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132746, at *46 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2017).
`
`If a term requires construction, the claim terms themselves are very important, especially
`
`if clear without reference to other material. “Quite apart from the written description and the
`
`prosecution history, the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of
`
`particular claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. As such, “the claims define the scope of the
`
`right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the
`
`actual words of the claim ….” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243,
`
`1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary
`
`meaning,” as would be understood by a “person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time
`
`of the filing of the patent application in question. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13.
`
`Different claim terms may result in different meanings or may in context result in similar
`
`5
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 10 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 11 of 35 PageID #: 1402
`
`meanings, and “there is nothing improper about construing two different terms in similar
`
`manners.” Cheetah Omni LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent Inc., 939 F. Supp. 2d 649, 668 (E.D. Tex. April
`
`11, 2013). Applicants can use different terms to define the exact same subject matter, so two
`
`claims with different terminology can cover the same scope. Id. Additionally, claims may use
`
`different phrases but nonetheless result in the same scope. See, e.g., Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l
`
`Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
`
`For claim construction courts will look to intrinsic evidence (claim language, specification,
`
`and prosecution history), and, if helpful and needed, extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, treatises,
`
`experts, and the like). Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`
`“[E]xtrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable
`
`interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.”
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
`
`With respect to the written description, i.e., the patent specification, it is “entirely
`
`appropriate for a court, when conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written
`
`description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “[W]e cannot
`
`look at the ordinary meaning of [a] term … in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary
`
`meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.” Id. at 1313.
`
`However, it is not appropriate to import the specification into the claims. “[A]lthough the
`
`specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
`
`warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. It is also
`
`improper to import specific depictions of the invention from the figures into the claims. MBO
`
`Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`Finally, extrinsic evidence “may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a
`
`6
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 11 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 12 of 35 PageID #: 1403
`
`reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic
`
`evidence.” Id. at 1319. It “cannot be used to alter a claim construction dictated by a proper analysis
`
`of the intrinsic evidence.” On-Line Tech. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer, 386 F.3d 1133, 1139
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed Cir. 2014).
`
`Courts may not use dictionaries or other extrinsic evidence in a way that is inconsistent with the
`
`usage in the patent and describing the invention. For example, “[c]laim constructions that read out
`
`a preferred embodiment are rarely, if ever, correct.” Danco, Inc. v. Fluidmaster, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-
`
`73-JRG-CMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155936, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2017) (citing Vitronics,
`
`90 F.3d at 1583-84).
`
`IV.
`
`LEVEL OF ONE OR ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`Consistent with Plaintiff’s P.R. 4-3 disclosures, with regard to the Patents-in-Suit, “a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would be an individual who, as of August 28, 2013,
`
`the filing date of the provisional application, had a Master’s Degree or higher in the field of
`
`Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science or as of that time had a
`
`Bachelor’s Degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet
`
`communications.” Rhyne Declaration at ¶ 4. As of this brief, Defendant has not disclosed what it
`
`considers to be the level of one or ordinary skill in the art in its P.R. 4-3 disclosures.
`
`V.
`
`AGREED UPON TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION
`
`The parties jointly ask the Court to include these constructions in its order:
`
`Claim Term / Phrase
`
`Agreed Proposed Construction
`
`Using multitasking or multiprocessing
`
`‘044 Pat. Claims 86, 88, 91, and 107
`
`“performing multiple tasks in overlapping
`time periods using common processing
`resources”
`
`The physical geographical location
`
`“location on earth”
`
`7
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 12 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 13 of 35 PageID #: 1404
`
`‘044 Pat. Claims 96 and 97
`
`The physical geographical proximity to the
`second server
`
`“distance from second server based on
`physical geographical location”
`
`‘044 Pat. Claim 97
`
`
`
`VI. DISPUTED TERMS FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`A.
`
`Preamble
`
`Claim Term
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`
`Defendant’s Proposal
`
`Preamble
`
`Non-limiting
`
`Limiting
`
`(‘044 pat., cl. 81)
`
`
`“Generally, the preamble does not limit the claims.” Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus.,
`
`299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Under Federal Circuit precedent ‘a preamble is not limiting
`
`where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble
`
`only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Huawei Techs.
`
`USA, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00042-RWS-RSP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2130, at *47 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4,
`
`2019) (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2018)). A preamble can be limiting where it “recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary
`
`to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com,
`
`Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There is no indication that such necessary steps or
`
`independent meaning is present in the preamble of the claim here.
`
`Finally, to the extent a term in the preamble serves as an antecedent basis for a term used
`
`in the body of the claim, it may be limiting, but only to the extent the term is “defined in greater
`
`detail in the preamble.” See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 739 F.3d 1367, 1373
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014). Otherwise, usage in the preamble does not add anything to the claim and the
`
`8
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 13 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 14 of 35 PageID #: 1405
`
`preamble is not limiting. An antecedent basis term also does not cause the entire preamble to limit
`
`the claim. “That [a] phrase in the preamble . . . provides a necessary structure for [the] claim . . .
`
`does not necessarily convert the entire preamble into a limitation, particularly one that only states
`
`the intended use of the invention.” TomTom Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
`
`see also id. (“It was therefore error for the district court to use an antecedent basis rationale to
`
`justify converting this independent part of the preamble into a new claim limitation.”); see also
`
`Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he mere fact that a structural term
`
`in the preamble is part of the claim does not mean that the preamble’s statement of purpose or
`
`other description is also part of the claim.”).
`
`The preamble of claim 81 of the ‘044 patent just introduces the claim, and the body of that
`
`claim defines a structurally complete invention. The preamble simply introduces terms without
`
`further restriction, where the actual limiting language to all of the terms if found in the body of the
`
`claim. The preamble states, “A method for fetching over the Internet a first content, identified by
`
`a first content identifier, by a first device, identified in the Internet by a first identifier, from a
`
`second server identified in the Internet by a third identifier via a second device identified in the
`
`Internet by a second identifier, using a first server, the method comprising the steps of….” Thus,
`
`“a first content” is simply any first content with no “further detail” to warrant importing the
`
`description into the body of the claim. Then, in the claim itself, the limitation of receiving the first
`
`content from the second device” appears, and that provides the actual limitation as would be
`
`expected of limiting language in a patent claim. The same is true of all of the terms first raised in
`
`the preamble. Thus, the preamble, despite referring to claim terms for the first time generically,
`
`does not provide more than the statement or purpose or description and is not limiting. See Marrin,
`
`at 1294-95; Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., 919 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (preamble
`
`9
`
`CODE200 ET AL, EXHIBIT 1010
`Page 14 of 35
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00299-JRG Document 61 Filed 06/12/19 Page 15 of 35 PageID #: 1406
`
`language is not limiting when it merely recites an intended use). As a result, there is no reason to
`
`find the preamble of ‘044 patent claim 81 limiting, and the Court should find that, in accordance
`
`with the presumption, it is not limiting.
`
`B.
`
`Device
`
`Claim Term
`Device
`(‘044 pat., cl. 81, 87, 89,
`92-101 & 108; ‘866 pat.,
`cl. 15 & 25-28)
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
`
`
`Defendant’s Proposal
`“a physical computer”
`
`
`While both parties agree that a “device” is not hypothetical or virtual, Defendant’s
`
`construction too broad in some ways and too narrow in others given the context of the claim
`
`language. The claims clearly distinguish between a “first device” and a “first server” for instance,
`
`even though both perform computations and appear to meet Defendant’s proposed construction,
`
`rendering Defendant’s construction too broad. That is consistent with the extensive, different, and
`
`distinguishing uses of these terms throughout the