`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`YITA LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MACNEIL IP LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2020-01139
`Patent 8,382,186
`____________
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`Submitted Electronically via the Patent Review Processing System
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REPLY TO PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO STRIKE
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`YITA’S REPLY ARGUMENT REGARDING REASONABLE
`EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS IS A NEW THEORY THAT
`SHOULD BE STRICKEN .............................................................................. 2
`III. YITA’S NEW OBVIOUSNESS THEORIES ON MATERIALS
`SHOULD BE STRICKEN .............................................................................. 7
`A. Yita’s argument that Rabbe discloses thermoplastic elastomers
`should be stricken. ................................................................................. 7
`Yita’s reliance upon Yung’s three-layer structure and/or an
`individual foam layer should be stricken. ............................................. 8
`IV. PORTIONS OF YITA’S EXHIBITS 1041, 1042 AND 1044 THAT
`ARE HEAVILY INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE SHOULD BE
`STRICKEN ...................................................................................................... 9
`
`B.
`
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`i
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`CASES
`Adobe Inc. v. RAH Color Techs. LLC,
`IPR2019-00628, Paper 124 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2020) ....................................... 10
`Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu,
`889 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 7
`Andrea Elecs. Corp, 949 F.3d 697, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................... 5
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs.,
`LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12, 9-10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2014) ...................... 10
`Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`901 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................................ 4, 5
`Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc.,
`825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 6
`Great West Casualty Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`No. IPR2015-01706, 2020 WL 754868 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2020)....................... 5
`Haag-Streit AG v. Eidolon Optical, LLC,
`IPR2018-01311, Paper 31 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2019) ............................................. 6
`Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................... 2, 4, 8
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ...................................................................................... 1, 7
`Trane U.S. Inc. v. SEMCO, LLC,
`IPR2018-00514, Paper 36 (P.T.A.B. April 17, 2019) ........................................ 10
`Vimeo, Inc. v. Brit. Telecommunications Plc,
`No. IPR2019-00833, 2020 WL 4529709 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5, 2020) ...................... 5
`
`
`
`ii
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`
`
`STATUTES
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ................................................................................................. 2
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) cceecccssecsccssscsccssssecssuccsssuecssussesssssccsrsussersusecessuescersuseersnseecseseeten 2
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`iii
`ill
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner Yita LLC (“Yita”) filed 55 new exhibits with its Reply (Paper 60
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`(“Reply”)), including hundreds of pages of new expert testimony from Dr. Koch,
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`Mr. Strachan, and Mr. Perreault that are improperly incorporated by reference in the
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`Reply. Despite the prohibitions against petitioners raising new arguments and
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`theories for the first time in a reply brief, Yita’s Reply improperly raises new
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`arguments and theories concerning reasonable expectation of success, what Rabbe
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`discloses to a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”), and how Yung is used
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`in the proposed combination. Yita’s Opposition (Paper 74 (“Opposition”)) does not
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`dispute that the vast majority of the new evidence filed with its Reply could have
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`been filed with the Petition. Rather, the Opposition attempts to frame Yita’s
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`improper new arguments as (1) following from Yita’s contentions in the Petition, (2)
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`responsive to arguments raised in Patent Owner MacNeil IP LLC’s (“MacNeil”)
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`Response, and (3) documenting the alleged state of the art. See generally
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`Opposition. Yita’s attempts to explain away its new arguments are unavailing.
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`The Board’s rules are clear: “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or
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`argument in reply that it could have presented earlier . . . .” PTAB Consolidated
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`Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) (“CTPG”), 73 (emphasis added); see also SAS
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`Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (explaining that “the petitioner’s
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`petition . . . is supposed to guide the life of the litigation”) (emphasis added).
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`
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`1
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`
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`Indeed, the law requires a petition to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence
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`that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)
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`(emphasis added).
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`Permitting Yita to change its theories at this late stage of the proceeding would
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`be prejudicial to MacNeil. “Unlike district court litigation—where parties have
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`greater freedom to revise and develop their arguments over time and in response to
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`newly discovered material—the expedited nature of IPRs bring with it an obligation
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`for petitioners to make their case in their petition to institute.” Intelligent Bio-Sys.,
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`Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming
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`Board’s refusal of reply brief and expert declaration). Accordingly, the Board
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`should strike the new theories and evidence advanced by Yita in the Reply and the
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`respective declarations. See generally Paper 72 (“MTS”).
`
`II. Yita’s Reply Argument Regarding Reasonable Expectation of Success Is
`A New Theory That Should Be Stricken
`Yita’s attempts to tie its new Reply argument regarding expectation of success
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`back to the argument Yita originally presented in the Petition lack credibility. See
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`Opposition, 6-7. Yita argues that the Petition’s mere reference to “three-dimensional
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`data modeling of the vehicle footwell” provides adequate support for its new
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`theory—i.e., that a POSITA would have: used a portable FaroArm to measure a
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`vehicle footwell; used computer-aided design software to create a 3D-representation
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`of the desired product; and created a mold to manufacture the product. Id., 6. But
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`2
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`
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`that is not the case. Plainly, the Petition’s statement concerning “three-dimensional
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`data modeling of the vehicle foot well” referred only to the process of gathering
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`three-dimensional data from the vehicle foot well. Petition, 67. Specifically, the
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`sole paragraph in the Petition addressing this theory discusses only the process of
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`gathering data points from the vehicle footwell and then “downloading the
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`coordinates to a 3D milling machine.” Id.
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`Thus, Yita’s suggestion that its new theory “expressly follow[s]” from Yita’s
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`contentions raised in the Petition is false, as is Yita’s assertion that “the Petition
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`never argued for a direct download of scan data to a machine to make the mold.”
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`Opposition, 6-7. The Petition and Dr. Koch’s declaration (EX1003) never mention
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`using computer-aided design software, and never suggest that a POSITA would have
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`used such software to process data from a CMM scan to form an accurate 3D
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`representation of the desired product so that an accurate mold for a closely
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`conforming floor tray could be created as Yita contends in its Reply.1 Reply, 23-25.
`
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`1 The ’186 Patent defines “close conformance” as a difference of about 1/8 of an
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`inch or less with respect to 90 percent of the surface of the upper 1/3 of the area of
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`the tray panels. See Paper 70, 14; EX1001, 7:61-8:1. MacNeil’s characterization of
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`the claimed conformance as “within one-eighth of an inch” in the MTS inadvertently
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`omitted the qualifier “about” in describing the claimed conformance. MTS, 4-5.
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`3
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`Yita asks the Board to believe that its mention of “three-dimensional data
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`modeling of the vehicle foot well” and “creat[ing] a 3D computer model” in the
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`Petition presented the intermediate design steps in Yita’s new expectation of success
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`theory with sufficient particularity. Opposition, 7. But the Petition in fact merely
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`alleged that “[m]any prior-art CMM machines were suitable to conduct a step-by-
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`step touch and record process that created a 3D computer model of parts with
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`complex shapes/curvatures, scanning the floor of an existing vehicle and
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`downloading the coordinates to a 3D milling machine.” Petition, 67 (emphasis
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`added). This statement, considered alone or in combination with the rest of the brief
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`paragraph on this topic in the Petition, does not support the new theory in Yita’s
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`Reply. To find otherwise would render the Board’s rules requiring that arguments
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`be presented with particularity in the petition, and prohibiting advancing new
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`theories in reply briefs, meaningless. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d at 1369
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`(“While the Board’s requirements are strict ones, they are requirements of which
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`petitioners are aware when they seek to institute an IPR.”).
`
`Yita’s reliance on Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 901 F.3d 1374
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`(Fed. Cir. 2018), is misguided. Opposition, 6, 8. In that case, the petitioner “cite[d]
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`no new evidence and merely expand[ed] on a previously argued rationale” that was
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`“expressly contemplated” in the petition. Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380-81. Here, in
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`contrast, Yita’s new theory directly conflicts with the theory set out in the Petition,
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`4
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`
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`and Yita relies on 31 pages of improperly incorporated new expert testimony from
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`Mr. Perreault and 15 new exhibits. MTS, 6. Moreover, the Federal Circuit
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`acknowledged that Ericsson “was a special case” because the applicable claim
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`construction standard changed after institution—which is not the case here—and
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`explained that the holding in Ericsson “should not be viewed as changing or
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`challenging the Board’s practice of limiting the scope of replies pursuant to its
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`regulations.” Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380. Indeed, the Board has repeatedly
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`distinguished Ericsson on that basis. See, e.g., Vimeo, Inc. v. Brit. Telecomms. Plc,
`
`No. IPR2019-00833, 2020 WL 4529709, at *23 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5, 2020)
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`(distinguishing Ericsson based on change in claim construction standard); Great W.
`
`Cas. Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2015-01706, 2020 WL 754868, at
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`*12 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2020) (same).2
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`Neither is Yita’s argument properly responsive to MacNeil’s arguments in its
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`Response. Opposition, 7-8. Yita presents no evidence or argument in its Reply brief
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`to support its original theory that a POSITA would have scanned the vehicle footwell
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`2 Apple Inc. v. Andrea Elecs. Corp. is similarly distinguishable. 949 F.3d 697 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2020). Unlike Yita, the petitioner’s reply in Apple “[did] not cite any new
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`evidence” and merely “relie[d] on the same algorithm from the same prior art
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`reference to support the same legal argument,” not present a new theory. Id. at 706.
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`5
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`
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`and downloaded the coordinates to a 3D milling machine. Instead, Yita abandons
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`its original theory in favor of a new theory that relies on the ’186 Patent as a roadmap.
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`Thus, to the extent Yita’s argument is responsive to MacNeil’s arguments at all, it is
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`only in the sense that Yita responds by presenting a new theory of expectation of
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`success. But the Board’s rules prohibit raising new arguments in reply that are part
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`of a petitioner’s prima facie case, which Yita has done here. See CTPG at 73.
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`Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d
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`1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which Yita relies on to suggest that the Board can
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`properly consider Yita’s new expectation of success argument and new supporting
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`evidence, is inapposite. Opposition, 8. In Genzyme, the patent owner did not allege
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`that the petitioner changed its theory mid-proceeding; rather, the patent owner
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`contended that the Board violated the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) by
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`relying on two references in its final written decision that were not part of the
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`instituted grounds or discussed in the Board’s institution decision. Genzyme, 825
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`F.3d at 1365-66. The Federal Circuit found that the Board properly considered the
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`references in that particular case. Id. at 1369. But Genzyme “does not stand for the
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`proposition that the Board must consider the teachings of a reference identified for
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`the first time in a petitioner’s reply, even if ostensibly used to show the state of the
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`art at the time of the invention.” Haag-Streit AG v. Eidolon Optical, LLC, IPR2018-
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`6
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`
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`01311, Paper 31 at 7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2019).3 Accordingly, the Board should strike
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`Section IV of Yita’s Reply and the supporting testimony of Mr. Perreault (¶¶31-77
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`of EX1044) improperly incorporated by reference therein.
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`A.
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`III. Yita’s New Obviousness Theories on Materials Should Be Stricken
`Yita’s argument that Rabbe discloses thermoplastic elastomers
`should be stricken.
`Yita fails to rebut the fact that the Petition did not contend that Rabbe discloses
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`thermoplastic elastomers. MTS, 8-9. The Petition claimed that “[b]ecause Rabbe is
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`silent on the exact materials and process for making its floor tray, a POSA would
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`have looked to common materials and processes known in the art[,]” including
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`thermoplastic materials purportedly taught by Yung. Petition, 36. In its Reply,
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`however, Yita shifts positions, arguing that “a POSA would have considered
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`Rabbe’s teachings to include thermoplastic elastomers” and “that thermoplastic
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`materials would qualify as Rabbe’s other ‘material having the same properties.’”
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`Reply, 13.
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`3 Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, relied upon by Yita, also concerns alleged APA
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`violations by the Board. 889 F.3d 1372, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Unlike Anacor,
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`Yita’s new evidence is not “a legitimate reply to evidence introduced by” MacNeil
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`or used to document the knowledge of a skilled artisan, but rather to support Yita’s
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`new theory of expectation of success that was not in the Petition. Id. at 1380-81.
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`7
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`This is not an innocuous shift in position—it changes Yita’s theory of
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`obviousness. Yita previously relied-upon Yung as allegedly disclosing the claimed
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`“thermoplastic material,” but now—in view of the many deficiencies of Yung—Yita
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`argues that Rabbe alone discloses this limitation (despite Rabbe only disclosing
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`thermoset semi-rigid, natural rubber and other materials having the same properties).
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`This improper new argument does not expressly follow from the arguments
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`presented in the Petition and, like Yita’s new reasonable expectation of success
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`argument, is responsive to MacNeil’s arguments only in the sense that Yita responds
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`by changing its theory of obviousness. Yita’s Reply presents an improper new
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`theory of how a POSITA would have interpreted Rabbe that was not presented and
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`developed in the Petition and should be stricken.
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`B.
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`Yita’s reliance upon Yung’s three-layer structure and/or an
`individual foam layer should be stricken.
`Yita asserts that “Patent Owner mischaracterizes the Petition,” (Opposition,
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`11) but fails to rebut that, in combining Yung, the Petition did not rely upon any kind
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`of foam or laminate as the material to be used to form Rabbe’s floor tray. MTS, 9-
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`10. Having failed to identify these materials with particularity in the petition, Yita
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`cannot shift positions and rely upon them now whether they respond to arguments
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`made by MacNeil or not. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d at 1370 (reply
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`stricken where characterization of reference changed in response to arguments by
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`patent owner).
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`
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`8
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`
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`IV. Portions of Yita’s Exhibits 1041, 1042 and 1044 that are Heavily
`Incorporated by Reference Should Be Stricken
`Yita asserts that “[t]he Reply provides thorough arguments that are supported
`
`by the cited evidence.” Opposition, 15. Even a cursory review of the Reply,
`
`however, reveals that Yita’s arguments are conclusory and dependent upon improper
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`incorporation by reference of arguments presented in the cited expert declarations.
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`Yita’s treatment of Dr. Koch’s baseless opinions regarding Yita’s and
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`MacNeil’s translations of Rabbe are a prime example. As discussed in the MTS,
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`despite being admittedly unqualified to do so, Dr. Koch opined on the Rabbe
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`translations, going so far as to suggest that there is ample context to translate a term
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`differently in a disputed sentence. MTS, 1, 12; EX1041, ¶¶40-47. Yita cites to
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`paragraphs 40-47 of Dr. Koch’s declaration (EX1041)—testimony that spans 7
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`pages—at the end of a conclusory statement that “any mistranslation was
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`immaterial.” Reply, 6. Yita’s Reply does not discuss the substance of Dr. Koch’s
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`testimony in the cited paragraphs, and the only other citation to this portion of Dr.
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`Koch’s testimony in the Reply is part of a citation to more than 30 paragraphs of Dr.
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`Koch’s declaration. Id., 3 (citing EX1041, ¶¶18-53). Accordingly, Yita’s argument
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`that “any mistranslation was immaterial” and the portion of Dr. Koch’s declaration
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`(¶¶40-47 of EX1041) incorporated by reference should be stricken. Reply, 6.
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`Similarly, Yita’s conclusory statement
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`that “even under MacNeil’s
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`constructions, the claims would have been obvious” is supported solely by a citation
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`
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`9
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`
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`to paragraphs 13-16 of Dr. Koch’s declaration. Reply, 2 n.1. Yita’s Reply does not
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`discuss the substance of Dr. Koch’s testimony in paragraphs 13-16 of his declaration,
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`or MacNeil’s constructions, anywhere in the Reply. Thus, Yita’s argument that
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`“even under MacNeil’s constructions, the claims would have been obvious” should
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`be stricken along with paragraphs 13-16 of Dr. Koch’s declaration.
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`These are merely examples of the numerous instances of improper
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`incorporation by reference in Yita’s Reply. MTS, 12-15. Yita’s practice of citing
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`declarations “to support conclusory statements that are not otherwise supported”
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`amounts to improper incorporation by reference. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs.,
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`LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 at 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2014). Contrary to Yita’s
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`suggestion (Opposition, 1), the Board has repeatedly granted motions to strike based
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`on improper incorporation by reference. See, e.g., Trane U.S. Inc. v. SEMCO, LLC,
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`IPR2018-00514, Paper 36 at 9 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 17, 2019) (striking portion of response
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`for including “nothing more than improper incorporation by reference”); Adobe Inc.
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`v. RAH Color Techs. LLC, IPR2019-00628, Paper 125 at 28 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31,
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`2020) (striking declaration for including “attorney argument that ultimately is
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`incorporated by reference in Petitioner’s papers”). The Board should do so here.
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`Dated: October 6, 2021
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`By: /Chad C. Walters/
`Chad C. Walters (Reg. No. 48,022)
`Counsel for Patent Owner MacNeil IP
`LLC
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`10
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies that on the
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`6th day of October 2021 a complete and entire copy of this PATENT OWNER’S
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`REPLY TO PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
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`MOTION TO STRIKE was served on Petitioner via email at the following
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`correspondence addresses:
`
` walters@LoweGrahamJones.com;
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` tpowers-PTAB@sternekessler.com;
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` jfitzsimmons-PTAB@sternekessler.com;
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` smerrill-PTAB@sternekessler.com; and
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` PTAB@sternekessler.com.
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`
`
`/Crystle Garbade/
`Crystle Garbade
`Senior Paralegal
`
`BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
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`Date: October 6, 2021
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`11
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