Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 5928
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00553-JRG
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`PATENT CASE
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF OF UNILOC 2017
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`James L. Etheridge
`Ryan S. Loveless
`Etheridge Law Group, PLLC
`2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324
`Southlake, TX 76092
`Tel.: (817) 470-7249
`Fax: (817) 887-5950
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`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Uniloc 2017 LLC
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`Page 1 of 20
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`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1004
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 2 of 20 PageID #: 5929
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 1
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`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ............................................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
`
`Claim Construction ................................................................................................. 1
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`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term ........................................ 4
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`III. NO AGREED TERMS ............................................................................................................ 5
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`IV. THE DISPUTED PATENT TERMS ....................................................................................... 5
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`8.
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`9.
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`“keyfact” (all claims) ........................................................................................ 6
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`“keyword” (claim 6) ......................................................................................... 7
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`“extracting keywords without part-of-speech ambiguity” (claim 6) ................ 8
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`“keyfact extracting step for analyzing a document collection and a user
`query, and extracting keywords without part-of-speech ambiguity from
`said document collection and said user query, and respectively extracting
`keyfacts of said document collection and said user query from said
`keywords” (claim 6) .......................................................................................... 9
`
`“keyfact indexing step for calculating the frequency of said keyfacts of
`said document collection and generating a keyfact list of said document
`collection for a keyfact index structure” (claim 6) ......................................... 10
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`“keyfact retrieving step for receiving said keyfact of said user query and
`said keyfacts of said document collection” (claim 6) ..................................... 11
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`“keyfact retrieving step for . . . defining a keyfact retrieval model in
`consideration of weigh factors according to a keyfact pattern” (claim 6) ...... 11
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`“keyfact retrieving step for . . . generating a retrieval result” (claim 6) ......... 11
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`Order of steps of claim 6 of the ’908 patent (claim 6) .................................... 13
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`10.
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`Order of steps of claim 11 of the ’908 patent (claim 11) ................................ 13
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`i
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`Page 2 of 20
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 3 of 20 PageID #: 5930
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................ 4
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................................... 1
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg.,
`73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`Avid Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc.,
`812 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC,
`771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 1
`
`Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
`262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .......................................................................................... 1
`
`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ....................................................................................... 1, 3
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................... 6
`
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.,
`848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag,
`210 U.S. 405 (1908) ............................................................................................................ 2
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG,
`564 Fed. Appx 599 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 6, 2014) ....................................................................... 6
`
`Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG,
`745 F.3d 490 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................. 6
`
`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`ii
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`Page 3 of 20
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 4 of 20 PageID #: 5931
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`Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`In re Hiniker Co.,
`150 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998).......................................................................................... 2
`
`Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................................... 1
`
`Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
`256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)......................................................................................... 13
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................................. 2
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) .............................................................................. 2
`
`Mobile Telecommunications Techs., LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`2014 WL 10726788 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2014) .................................................................... 6
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 6
`
`On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
`442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ......................................................................................... 5
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................................................................. 1, 2, 3
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................... 2, 4
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002)........................................................................................... 7
`
`Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Const.,
`172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................. 9, 10, 12
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................... 7
`
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
`299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) .......................................................................................................... 3
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................... 4
`
`Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp.,
`
`iii
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`Page 4 of 20
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 5 of 20 PageID #: 5932
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`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 5
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................ 2
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................................... passim
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`35 U.S.C. § 112(f) ......................................................................................................... 9, 10, 11, 12
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`iv
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`Page 5 of 20
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 6 of 20 PageID #: 5933
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,366,908 (“the ’908 patent”) describes keyfact-based search techniques.
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`Words in a document of a document collection (or words in a search query) can be analyzed to
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`extract keywords. ’908 patent, 5:19-6:4, Fig. 3, Abstract. Keyfacts can then be extracted from
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`the keywords. ’908 patent, 6:5-55, Fig. 3, Abstract. Indexing of the document collection can
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`result in a list of keyfacts for a document and statistics regarding those keyfacts. ’908 patent,
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`4:66-5:6, Fig. 4, Abstract. Queries can be parsed for keyfacts and information can be retrieved
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`from the document collection based on keyfacts. ’908 patent, 7:36-8:24, Fig. 5, Abstract.
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`A.
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`Claim Construction
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`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
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`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
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`by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388
`
`F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
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`262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
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`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
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`861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim
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`term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
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`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy presumption
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`that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.”)
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`(vacated on other grounds).
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`1
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`“The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of
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`the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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`“[I]n all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v. Motorola,
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`Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1998)). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning,
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`because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among
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`the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For example, when a
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`dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent
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`claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. (quoting
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he
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`specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive;
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`it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
`
`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299
`
`F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in
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`interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples
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`appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc.
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`v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-
`
`Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[I]t
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`is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if
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`it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the
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`patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,
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`913 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Care must be taken to avoid limiting the claims to the embodiments described
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`in the specification as it is the claims, not the specific that defines the scope of the patent right.
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`Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908); see also Comark
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`Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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`2
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`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction
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`because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent
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`and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
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`However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO
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`and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the
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`specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at 1318; see also
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`Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous
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`prosecution history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic
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`record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
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`court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
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`use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too
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`broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Generally,
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`extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how
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`to read claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
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`construction:
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`In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the
`patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order
`to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of
`a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period. See, e.g.,
`Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546 (1871) (a patent may be “so
`interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that the testimony
`of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of
`its meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute,
`courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that
`extrinsic evidence. These are the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim
`construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary
`factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.
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`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 41 (2015).
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`3
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 9 of 20 PageID #: 5936
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`B.
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`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
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`There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed
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`according to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts
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`as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term
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`either in the specification or during prosecution.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758
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`F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
`
`1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d
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`1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure
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`from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for finding
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`lexicography or disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
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`To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
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`disputed claim term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner,
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`669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must
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`appear “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. To
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`disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the specification
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`or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis Corp. v.
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`Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366
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`(“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of
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`a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
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`representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”) “Where an applicant’s statements are amenable
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`to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M
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`Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Avid
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`Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc., 812 F.3d 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“When the prosecution history
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`is used solely to support a conclusion of patentee disclaimer, the standard for justifying the
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`conclusion is a high one.”).
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`Although a statement of lexicography or disavowal must be exacting and clear, it need
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`not be “explicit.” See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
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`4
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 10 of 20 PageID #: 5937
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`2016) (“a patent applicant need not expressly state ‘my invention does not include X’ to indicate
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`his exclusion of X from the scope of his patent”). Lexicography or disavowal can be implied
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`where, e.g., the patentee makes clear statements characterizing the scope and purpose of the
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`invention. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
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`2006) (“[W]hen the scope of the invention is clearly stated in the specification, and is described
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`as the advantage and distinction of the invention, it is not necessary to disavow explicitly a
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`different scope.”). Nonetheless, the plain meaning governs “[a]bsent implied or explicit
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`lexicography or disavowal.” Trs. of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1364 n.2.
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`III. NO AGREED TERMS
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`Uniloc and Google have not agreed to constructions of any terms of the ’908 patent.
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`IV. THE DISPUTED PATENT TERMS
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`It is plaintiff’s contentions that the Markman claim construction process was created to
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`resolve latent ambiguities in a claim, and to determine when principles of equity should foreclose a
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`patentee from asserting a scope surrendered in the patent or the prosecution history. Claim
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`construction was never intended to provide a mechanism by which an accused infringer can redefine
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`the scope of the patent to create a basis to assert non-infringement. It is plaintiff’s view that re-
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`definition of a claim term should be undertaken sparingly as even a good interpretation of an
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`existing claim term can change the scope of the claim allowed by the Patent Office.
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`Here, the parties dispute the meaning of 8 claim terms in the ’908 patent and dispute the
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`order of steps in claims 6 and 11. As a general matter, Google’s proposed constructions
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`improperly seek to incorporate limitations discussed in certain exemplary embodiments of the
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`’908 patent’s specification. Google either does that directly, by seeking to graft elements from
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`the specification into its constructions, or indirectly by seeking to interpret method claims as
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`“step-plus-function” elements.
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`5
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 11 of 20 PageID #: 5938
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`1.
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`“keyfact” (all claims)
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`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`“fact contained in sentences”; not indefinite
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2)
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`The ’908 patent describes a “keyfact-based” index and retrieval method. The ’908 patent
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`explains what a keyfact is (e.g., 1:15-16), how it can be represented (e.g., 1:16-17), how a keyfact
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`can be extracted (e.g., 5:15-18), how it can be used to retrieve documents (e.g., 5:7-14), and how
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`it can be used to create an index (e.g., 6:58-64). See also ’908 patent, 1: 51-2:2, 2:10-3:36, 3:49-
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`67, 4:22-5:19, 5 29-57, 6:5-7:45, 8:25-42. In fact, the ’908 patent plainly states: “A keyfact means
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`an important fact contained in sentences which constitute a document,” ’908 patent, 1:15-16,
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`which hews closely to Uniloc’s proposed construction.
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`Google has effectively waived its alternate theory of indefiniteness by failing to preserve
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`the right to rely on expert testimony in its Patent Rule 4-2 and 4-3 disclosures. The Supreme Court
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`reiterated in Nautilus that “[d]efiniteness is measured from the viewpoint of a person skilled in
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`[the] art at the time the patent was filed.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898,
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`908 (2014). Here, Google has waived any reliance on any expert declaration or testimony to
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`establish how the challenged claim terms would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
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`art. Because attorney argument is not evidence, Google will not be able to meet its burden to prove
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`indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence. See Mobile Telecommunications Techs., LLC v.
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`Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 2:12-CV-832-JRG-RSP, 2014 WL 10726788, at *29 (E.D. Tex. May 2,
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`2014) (“Defendants have failed to present any evidence of the understanding of a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art, such as through an expert declaration or expert testimony. Defendants
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`have therefore failed to meet their burden of proving indefiniteness by clear and convincing
`
`evidence.”) (citing Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 745 F.3d 490, 505-06 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
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`vacated on other grounds (settlement), 564 Fed. Appx 599, 600 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 6, 2014)); see also
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`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “‘typically’
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`expert testimony will be necessary in cases involving complex technology.”) (quoting Schumer v.
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`6
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 128 Filed 01/09/20 Page 12 of 20 PageID #: 5939
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`Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Sonix Tech. Co. v.
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`Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Indefiniteness must be proven by clear
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`and convincing evidence.”). Google thus cannot show that the claims do not “inform those skilled
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`in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty” without evidence of how a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.
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`2.
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`“keyword” (claim 6)
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`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`“a noun expressed within a query used to retrieve
`documents”
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`“Keyword” has a plain and ordinary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
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`Consistent with Google’s extrinsic dictionaries provided with its Rule 4-2 statement, “keyword”
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`has an understood meaning as a reference word. See, e.g., Ex. 2, The Computer Desktop
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`Encyclopedia, (c. 1996) (defining “key word” as a “word used in a text search” or a “word in a
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`text document that is used in an index to best describe the contents of the document.”). The term
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`to be construed is “keyword,” not “keynoun,” and Google’s attempt to limit keywords of the ’908
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`patent to nouns is unsupported by the plain language of the term.
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`The ’908 patent’s specification also provides keywords other than nouns. It describes that
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`a “sentence in the document is divided into words and morphological analysis is performed with
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`dictionaries.” ’908 patent, 5:21-22. The dictionaries “include a noun dictionary, a verb dictionary,
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`an adjective dictionary, an adverb dictionary, a preposition dictionary, a conjunction dictionary,
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`and a stop-word lexicon.” ’908, 5:24-28. In fact, in the next disputed term, Google’s proposed
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`construction requires “extracting keywords tagged with a single part-of-speech,” suggesting that
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`different keywords can be different parts-of-speech, i.e. nouns and verbs, e.g. Moreover, the ’908
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`patent criticizes keyword-based methods system using only nouns as keywords. ’908 patent, 1:19-
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`26 (“the meaning of the document is not precisely represented and the representativeness of
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`document expression is low because the document is represented by keywords, which are nouns”).
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`7
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`Thus, there is no basis to limit a keyword in the context of the ’908 patent’s improvement to a
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`“noun.”
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`Google is also wrong to limit a keyword to a “query.” The ’908 patent analyzes words
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`found in documents in a document collection (e.g., 5:15-18) as well as queries (e.g., 8:26-29).
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`Claim 6, in fact, recites “extracting keywords … from said document collection and said user
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`query.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, Google’s attempt to define a “keyword” as only applying
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`to nouns “expressed within a query” should also fail.
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`3.
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`“extracting keywords without part-of-speech ambiguity” (claim 6)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`
`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`“Extracting keywords tagged with a single part-
`of-speech”
`
`Claim 6 of the ’908 patent requires “extracting keywords without part-of-speech
`
`ambiguity.” As discussed in the ’908 patent regarding a document in a document collection:
`
` A
`
` document is supplied at stage 31 and morphological analysis is
`performed at stage 32. A sentence in the document is divided into
`words and the morphological analysis is performed with dictionaries
`36 at stage 32. The morphological variation is considered in order
`to recover prototypes. The dictionaries 36 include a noun dictionary,
`a verb dictionary, an adjective dictionary, an adverb dictionary, a
`preposition dictionary, a conjunction dictionary, and a stop-word
`lexicon. In some cases, a part-of-speech of a word is determined by
`rules without dictionaries.
`
`’908 patent, 5:19-28. Thus, the “morphological analysis” described in the preferred embodiment
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`analyzes the words of the document (or query) to resolve ambiguities in their part of speech. This
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`can be done using a “part of speech tag in dictionaries” (5:29-30) or “a part-of-speech of a word
`
`is determined by rules without dictionaries” (5:27-28). Accordingly, the ’908 patent broadly
`
`teaches, in a manner consistent with the understanding of person of ordinary skill in the art, that
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`the extraction of keywords resolves ambiguities in their part of speech. Nothing more is required
`
`by claim 6.
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`Google’s proposed construction is unsupported and inconsistent with the ’908 patent. The
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`words in a document found in a document collection or found in a query does not have tags, so
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`requiring a document collection or query to have “keywords tagged with a single part-of-speech,”
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`as suggested by Google finds no support in the ’908 patent. Further, while the specification does
`
`use tagging, there is no basis for requiring claim 6 to use tagging as part of the claimed
`
`“extracting.”
`
`4.
`
`“keyfact extracting step for analyzing a document collection and a user query,
`and extracting keywords without part-of-speech ambiguity from said
`document collection and said user query, and respectively extracting keyfacts
`of said document collection and said user query from said keywords” (claim 6)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`Not governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f); Plain
`and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`This limitation is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6.
`
`Function: analyzing a document collection and a
`user query, and extracting keywords without part-
`of-speech ambiguity from said document
`collection and said user query, and respectively
`extracting keyfacts of said document collection
`and said user query from said keywords
`
`Act: Acts specified at 5:20 to 6:55.
`
`Google errs by asking that the claimed “keyfact extracting step” be construed under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 112(f). While the claim element does use the phrase “step for,” the element then recites
`
`acts that perform keyfact extraction. “In general terms, the ‘underlying function’ of a method
`
`claim element corresponds to what that element ultimately accomplishes in relationship to what
`
`the other elements of the claim and the claim as a whole accomplish. ‘Acts,’ on the other hand,
`
`correspond to how the function is accomplished.” See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court
`
`Const., 172 F.3d 836, 849-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (J. Rader, concurring). Where the claim element
`
`recites acts, 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) should not be applied.
`
`In the keyfact extracting step, the “what” aspect of the element is “analyzing a document
`
`collection and a user query,” and the element then recites the acts to perform such an analysis,
`
`including the acts of “extracting keywords…” and “extracting keyfacts…from said keywords.”
`
`Confirming that these elements are “acts,” Google’s passage of patent text describing “acts” (’908
`
`patent, 5:20-6:55) includes the act of extracting. For example, the specification describes at 6:8-
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`9
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`12: “the stage of keyfact pattern extraction 34 … extracts meaningful keyfact patterns necessary
`
`for keyfact generation.” Thus, as the element recites acts, 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) should not apply.
`
` Moreover, Google’s construction is fundamentally flawed as it merely recites the claim
`
`element verbatim and, thus, fails to identify any claimed “function.” Google also cites no specific
`
`act as corresponding to the “function,” and, instead, would require a jury to parse more than full
`
`column of patent text to identify “acts” contained therein, many of which do not perform the
`
`actions related to the language of the keyfact extraction step.
`
`5.
`
`“keyfact indexing step for calculating the frequency of said keyfacts of said
`document collection and gener