throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
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` Paper No. 9
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` Filed: July 16, 2019
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`UNIFIED PATENTS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`MV3 PARTNERS LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2019-00474
`Patent 8,863,223 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and CHRISTOPHER M.
`KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Unified Patents, Inc. (“Petitioner” or “Unified”) filed a Petition
`requesting inter partes review of claims 1–6, 8, 10–21, 23–38, 40, 42–53,
`and 55–61 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,863,223 B2
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’223 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Petitioner filed a
`Declaration of Anthony Wechselberger (Ex. 1003) with its Petition. MV3
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`Partners, LLC (“Patent Owner”), filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6
`(“Prelim. Resp.”). Patent Owner filed a Declaration of Dan Schonfeld,
`Ph.D. (Ex. 2001) with its Preliminary response. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §
`42.4(a), we have the authority to determine whether to institute review.
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted
`unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
`least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” On April 24, 2018, the
`Supreme Court held that, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, we may not institute
`review of fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v.
`Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). For the reasons expressed below,
`we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable
`likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged
`claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged
`claims on all grounds of unpatentability presented.
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’223 patent is involved in MV3 Partners
`LLC v. Roku, Inc., Civil Action No. 6:18-cv-00308 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
`2018); MV3 Partners LLC v. Kohl’s Corp., Civil Action No. 6:18-cv-00373
`(W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2018); and MV3 Partners LLC v. Best Buy Co., Civil
`Action No. 6:18-cv-00374 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2018). Pet. 66; Paper 4, 2.
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`B. The ’223 Patent
`The ’223 patent relates to a mobile set top box (“STB”) for
`forwarding and presenting on a large screen of an external display (e.g.,
`HDTV monitor) multimedia content including packets using predefined
`protocols (e.g., MPEG, IP) transmitted from various networks (e.g., 3G,
`satellite) via unicast or multicast broadcasts to a small screen of an
`authenticated user’s mobile computing device. Ex. 1001, Abstract, 1:11–13,
`2:58–61, 3:39–41, 4:5–8, 4:56–66, 5:15–17, 6:11–12. Figure 2 below is
`illustrative.
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`Figure 2, reproduced above, depicts mobile STB (10) facilitating the
`display in standard television (14) of data broadcast in unicast or multicast to
`mobile computing device (20). Id. at 4:47–51.
`In particular, as shown in Figure 2 above, the ’223 patent describes
`that mobile device (20) provides received multimedia content to mobile STB
`(10) via a docking port of docking station (22). Id. at 4:47–60. Upon
`determining the native size format of the multimedia content received from
`mobile device (20), mobile STB (10) determines the size format capable of
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`being displayed by external display (14), and upconverts the multimedia
`content from a small size format to a larger size format for display on
`external display (14). Id. at 4:15–27, 33–39, 5:35–43.
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 30, and 32 are independent.
`Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below with disputed limitations
`emphasized:
`1. A mobile set top box comprising:
` a docking port configured to accept a mobile computing
`device that has a native resolution of a first size format and
`receives media content from at least two different types of
`communications networks;
`a mobile device input that receives media content from the
`mobile computing device accepted in the docking port;
`
`a television signal input that receives at least one type of
`television signal;
`a video processor configured to receive and process the
`media content from the mobile device input, the video processor
`including adaptive circuitry to process the media content
`transmitted from unicast and multicast broadcasts, and the video
`processor including circuitry and instructions operable to process
`a predefined protocol stack of video packets forming at least a
`portion of the media content;
`a processor coupled to an electronic storage, the electronic
`storage comprising instructions that, when executed, cause the
`processor to:
`execute an upconversion process by processing first media
`content from the mobile computing device, wherein the first
`media content
`includes digital video
`image
`information
`comprising a series of digital video frames, and is modified for
`display on a display device that is separate from the mobile set
`top box, the display device having a native display resolution of
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`a second size format that is larger than the first size format of the
`mobile computing device, the upconversion process further
`comprising:
`receiving the first media content in the first size format
`from the mobile device input,
`querying the mobile computing device to determine the
`first size format,
`querying the display device,
`determining the native display resolution of the second
`size format of the display device based on a response resulting
`from the query of the display device,
`authenticating the validity of a user associated with the
`mobile computing device,
`determining, based on the validity of the user, that the
`received first media content is permitted to be provided to the
`display device, and
`upscaling the received first media content from the first
`size format to the second size format to generate upconverted
`first media content, wherein upscaling includes increasing a total
`number of horizontal and vertical pixels in each video frame of
`the series of digital video frames so that pixel dimensions in each
`video frame match the native display resolution of the second
`size format of the display device; and
`render a television signal into second media content for
`display on the display device, comprising:
`receiving the television signal from the television input;
`decoding the television signal into second media content;
`
`and
`
`rendering the second media content based on the native
`display resolution of the display device to generate rendered
`second media content; and
`an output configured to deliver the upconverted first media
`content and the rendered second media content from the mobile
`set top box to the display device.
`
`Ex. 1001, 8:9–9:3.
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`D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–6, 8, 10–21, 23–38, 40, 42–53, and
`55–61 are unpatentable under § 103(a)1 as obvious over Wang.2 Pet. 5.
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–6, 8, 10–21, 23–38, 40, 42–53, and
`55–61 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of
`Wang, Balram,3 and Bennett.4 Id.
`
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`A. Claim Construction
` Because this inter partes review is based on a petition filed after
`November 13, 2018,5 we construe each claim “in accordance with the
`ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of
`
`
`1 Because the claims at issue have an effective filing date prior to
`March 16, 2013, the effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
`Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), we apply the pre-AIA
`version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in this Decision.
`2 Wang et al. (US 7,957,733 B2, filed May 22, 2007, iss. June 7, 2011)
`(“Wang”) (Ex. 1004).
`3 Balram (US 2008/0198264 A1, filed Feb. 19, 2008, pub. Aug. 21, 2008)
`(“Balram”) (Ex. 1006).
`4 Bennett et al. (US 2006/0031889 A1, filed Oct. 11, 2005, iss. Feb. 9, 2006)
`(“Bennett”) (Ex. 1005).
`5 On October 11, 2018, the USPTO revised its rules to harmonize the
`Board’s claim construction standard with that used in federal district
`court. CHANGES TO THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD FOR
`INTERPRETING CLAIMS IN TRIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL
`AND APPEAL BOARD, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018). This rule change
`applies to petitions filed on or after November 13, 2018.
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`ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the
`patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Accordingly, our interpretation of the
`claims is similar to that of a district court. See id. Under the standard
`applied by district courts, claim terms are generally given their plain and
`ordinary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
`art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent
`disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(en banc). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a
`patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when
`the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the
`specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am.
`LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any express
`construction for any of the terms in the challenged claims of the ’223 patent.
`Pet. 5; Prelim. Resp. 9. We determine that no explicit construction of any
`term is necessary to resolve the issues before us at this stage of the
`proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,
`868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe
`terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy,’ . . . we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] . . .
`where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citations
`omitted)).
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`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
`may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
`prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
`made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
`workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`(internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner’s
`Declarant, Anthony Wechselberger, testifies that a person with ordinary skill
`in the art at the time of the invention
`would have been a person having . . . : (i) at least an
`undergraduate degree
`in electrical engineering, computer
`science, computer engineering, or a similar technical field; and
`(ii) two years of experience in analysis, design, or development
`related to digital video processing systems, distribution networks
`and communications protocols, and signal formatting, with
`additional education substituting for less experience and vice
`versa.
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 31. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s suggested level
`for the ordinarily skilled artisan in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp.
`8.
`
`On this record, we observe that Petitioner’s proffered undisputed
`assessment of a person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent
`with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as
`reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Therefore, for purposes of this
`Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.
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`C. Obviousness over Wang
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–6, 8, 10–21, 23–38, 40, 42–53, and
`55–61 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Wang.
`Pet. 11–63. Patent Owner opposes. Prelim. Resp. 27–35.
`Based on the evidence in this record, we determine that Petitioner has
`established that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail
`with respect to this ground of unpatentability. In our discussion below, we
`address the parties’ contentions in turn.
`
`1.
`Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was
`made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
`pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of skill in the art; and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary
`considerations. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`We also recognize that prior art references must be “‘considered together
`with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.’” In re
`Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Samour, 571
`F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)). We analyze Petitioner’s obviousness grounds
`with the principles identified above in mind.
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`2.
`Overview of Wang
`Wang describes a method and system for displaying on an external
`large screen display multimedia content originally destined for the smaller
`screen of a mobile terminal display. Ex. 1004, 3:21–32. In particular, Wang
`describes a set top box, upon receiving the multimedia content from the
`mobile computing device, converting the multimedia data to suit the format
`size of the larger external display. Id. at 14:43–49, 26:10–17. As shown in
`Figure 9 below, Wang discloses mobile terminal signal conversion module
`(MTSCM) 912, upon receiving multimedia content transmitted to mobile
`device (908) by service providers (902) through network (904), reformats
`the multimedia content to display it on external display system (914). Id. at
`14:50–15:3, 15:19–31, 15:52–55, 15:65–16:2, 18:32–37. Wang discloses
`upconverting the signal from mobile device (908) for display to larger
`external device (914). Id. at 17:43–54, 17:63–18:6. Wang describes that
`multimedia data are broadcast to the mobile device via multicast and unicast.
`Id. at 8:45–48, 19:46–49. Figure 9 of Wang, reproduced below, is a
`depiction of a mobile terminal signal conversion system.
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`Figure 9, reproduced above, depicts a system with mobile terminal signal
`conversion. Ex. 1004, 14:43–49.
`
`
`3.
`Obviousness Analysis
`Petitioner provides explanations to account for all of the claim
`limitations required by claims 1–6, 8, 10–21, 23–38, 40, 42–53, and 55–61,
`and reasons for modifying the teachings of Wang, citing Mr.
`Wechselberger’s Declaration for support. Pet. 11–47; Ex. 1003.
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`a. Claim 1
`Independent claim 1 recites, “[a] mobile set top box comprising.” Ex.
`1001, 8:9. Petitioner contends Wang’s disclosure of MTSCM (912)
`contained within housing (910), collectively teaches the “mobile set top
`box.” Pet. 11. According to Petitioner, because the disclosed set top box
`(MTSCM(912)/housing (910) unit) serves as an intermediate device to
`convert a signal received from mobile device (908) to a signal that can be
`displayed to external device (914), Wang’s MTSCM contained in the
`housing teaches the claimed “mobile set top box.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex.
`1003
`¶ 47; Ex. 1004 15:19–21, 15:39–41, 26:10–17).
`Independent claim 1 further recites:
`a docking port configured to accept a mobile computing
`device that has a native resolution of a first size format and
`receives media content from at least two different types of
`communications networks.
`Ex. 1001, 8:10–13.
`Petitioner contends Wang explicitly discloses “the MTSCM may be
`provided in a ‘set top box’ and the mobile device may be accepted into a
`‘seat’ (i.e., ‘docking port’) to directly connect . . . to the MTSCM box.” Pet.
`12 (citing Ex. 1004, 26:10–17, 15:44–46). Further, Petitioner contends that
`Wang’s disclosure of a cellular phone (i.e., “mobile computing device”) that
`receives media content from various providers including 3G or 4G cellular
`networks teaches the computing network receiving media content from at
`least two types of communication networks. Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1004,
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`14:50–15:9; Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Further, Petitioner contends that Wang’s
`disclosure of the mobile device receiving multimedia content intended for
`display on a small screen teaches the mobile device’s native resolution
`referenced as the mobile device’s screen size in the ’223 patent. Id. at 14
`(citing Ex. 1004, 14:54–55, 15:15–18; Ex. 1001, 4:21–27). Therefore,
`Petitioner concludes that a PHOSITA6 would have understood that,
`“consistent with the ’223 Patent, Wang’s cellular phone has a native
`resolution of a first size format based on the cellular phone’s small screen
`size, and . . . this size format would have been smaller than the native
`resolution of the second size format of the larger external display device.”
`Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53).
`Independent claim 1 further recites, “a mobile device input that
`receives media content from the mobile computing device accepted in the
`docking port.” Ex. 1001, 8:14–15. Petitioner contends that Wang’s
`disclosure of mobile terminal signal interface module (1002) using a
`conventional physical interface to connect the MTSCM and the mobile
`device teaches the “mobile device input” because module 1002
`accommodates receiving a multimedia signal from the mobile device. Pet.
`15 (citing Ex. 1004, 16:46–50; Ex. 1004 ¶ 61).
`Independent claim 1 further recites, “a television signal input that
`receives at least one type of television signal.” Ex. 1001, 8:16–17.
`
`
`6 A person having ordinary skill in the art.
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`Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of implementing the MTSCM in
`a set top box for a television teaches the television signal input. Pet. 16
`(citing Ex. 1004, 26:10–17). According to Petitioner, “[a] PHOSITA would
`have understood that a television STB includes a television signal input
`that receives at least one type of television signal.” Id. (citing Ex.
`1003 ¶¶ 74–77). Further, Petitioner contends that, because a television
`signal input is a standard feature in common STBs, a PHOSITA would have
`understood Wang’s STB to include, at a minimum, a television signal input
`to provide television content from a cable or satellite provider. Id. at 16–17
`(citing Ex. 1001, 1:20–28). Furthermore, Petitioner contends that Wang’s
`disclosure of using a button of the STB to select a predetermined “tunable
`channel” for routing media content teaches that the disclosed STB includes a
`television signal input for receiving standard television programming. Id. at
`17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–77).
`Independent claim 1 further recites:
` a video processor configured to receive and process the
`media content from the mobile device input, the video processor
`including adaptive circuitry to process the media content
`transmitted from unicast and multicast broadcasts, and the video
`processor including circuitry and instructions operable to process
`a predefined protocol stack of video packets forming at least a
`portion of the media content.
`Ex. 1001, 8:18–25.
`Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of the MTSCM processing media
`content received from the mobile phone to provide a converted video signal
`to an external device teaches the claimed “video processor.” Pet. 18–19
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`(citing Ex. 1004, 15:65–16:4). In particular, Petitioner contends that
`because the MTSCM utilizes video signal conversion module (1004)
`including Video Compress Decoder (1104a) that receives and decompresses
`the multimedia stream, the Video Compress Decoder teaches the “video
`processor.” Id. at 19–20 (citing Ex. 1004, 17:43–46; Ex. 1003 ¶ 54).
`Further, Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of the MTSCM
`processing media content broadcast to multiple users including the mobile
`terminal with a shared IP address teaches receiving the media content
`transmitted to the mobile device via multicast. Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 40, 55, 56; Ex. 1004, 5:41–47, 8:45–48). Furthermore, Petitioner
`contends that Wang’s disclosure of the MTSCM processing media content
`streamed on-demand to a single user (e.g., the mobile terminal with a unique
`IP address) teaches receiving the media content transmitted to the mobile
`device via unicast. Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40, 55, 56; Ex. 1004,
`1:51–54, 19:46–49, 28:48–62). Consequently, Petitioner submits that a
`PHOSITA would have understood that the multimedia content received by
`Wang’s “MTSCM[] video processor via the user’s cellular phone in Wang
`includes content transmitted via unicast and multicast broadcasts, and
`Wang’s video processor includes adaptive circuitry[7] to process this
`received content.” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 55–56). Additionally,
`
`
`7 “The circuitry is adaptive in many respects, including its ability to process
`different compression formats (e.g., different MPEG formats) and a host of
`other variations in the received multimedia signal to which the video
`processor would adapt.” Pet. 21–22 n.8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56).
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`Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of the mobile device receiving a
`multimedia data stream in “real time” from the Internet using 3G or 4G
`cellular technology via an interface/buffer and using MPEG video
`compression format (e.g., MPEG1, MPEG2, or MPEG4) teaches the video
`processor including circuitry and instructions to process a predefined
`protocol stack of video packets included in the media content. Id. at 22.
`According to Petitioner, “[b]ecause MPEG formatted data streams are
`packetized for transport, and also because Internet-sourced content uses IP
`packets to transport data, a PHOSITA would have understood that Wang’s
`real time ‘multimedia data stream’ (see Fig. 9) would have comprised video
`packets.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 57). Further, Petitioner contends the ’223
`patent illustrates a “predefined protocol stack of video packets” as a mere
`grouping of “MPEG” and “IP” protocols. Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:9–
`13). Therefore, Petitioner submits the following:
`Because Wang similarly uses MPEG and IP for receiving
`packetized MPEG video streams, including those received from
`the Internet, a PHOSITA thus would have understood or at least
`found obvious that such packetized MPEG video streams were
`“a predefined protocol stack of video packets forming at least a
`portion of the media content,” and the video processor would
`have instructions for processing it.
`Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58; Ex. 1004, 17:34–54).
`Independent claim 1 further recites:
`a processor coupled to an electronic storage, the electronic
`storage comprising instructions that, when executed, cause the
`processor to:
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`execute an upconversion process by processing first media
`content from the mobile computing device, wherein the first
`media content
`includes digital video
`image
`information
`comprising a series of digital video frames, and is modified for
`display on a display device that is separate from the mobile set
`top box, the display device having a native display resolution of
`a second size format that is larger than the first size format of the
`mobile computing device, the upconversion process further
`comprising.
`Ex. 1001, 8:26–38.
` Petitioner contends Wang’s disclosure of a separate “video card” having
`embodied therein Digital/Analog Video Encoder (DAVE) or Digital/Digital
`Video Encoder (DDVE) functionality would need its own graphic processor
`in addition to the Video Compress Decoder (i.e., video processor) that
`decompresses a digital multimedia signal received by the mobile device, and
`thereby teaches the claimed “processor.” Pet. 23–26 (citing Ex. 1004,
`17:63–18:6). Further, Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of an
`external display that overcomes the limited size and capability of the screen
`on mobile devices to display high-resolution graphics and high quality real-
`time audio/video teaches the claimed upconversion process. Id. at 26–27
`(citing Ex. 1004, 2:41–58, 14:54–63, 15:15–18). In particular, Petitioner
`contends that a PHOSITA would have understood Wang’s description of a
`mobile terminal signal, which is forwarded to the larger external display to
`allow users to view video conferences, HDTV, games, GPS information, and
`video on demand, as teaching the upconversion. Id. at 27–28 (citing Ex.
`1003 ¶¶ 65–68, Ex 1004, 15:10–13, 18:9–10, 19:46–49, 21:45–49, 26:52–
`
`
`18
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`IPR2019-00474
`Patent 8,863,223 B2
`
`55). According to Petitioner, Wang’s disclosure of the MTSCM that
`converts the display signal intended for reproduction by the mobile device to
`a display format and/or signal power level appropriate for display on the
`larger external screen teaches the upconversion. Id. at 28–29 (citing Ex.
`1004, 15:29–31, 15:40–42, 15:55–58, 16:64–67, 17:63–18:17). Therefore,
`Petitioner submits the following:
`Because video content is received in a format intended for the
`cellular phone’s smaller screen size (i.e., a first size format) and
`the MTSCM converts the video content to a different display
`format appropriate for an external display that is larger (i.e., a
`second size format), a PHOSITA would have understood that
`Wang teaches that the MTSCM performs an “upconversion
`process” in which the video content received from the mobile
`device is “modified for display on a display device that is
`separate from the mobile STB, the display device having a native
`display resolution of a second size format that is larger than the
`first size format of the mobile computing device.”
`Id. at 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–64).
`
`A PHOSITA would have understood that the multimedia
`data stream received by the MTSCM from the cellular phone
`would have
`included “digital video
`image
`information
`comprising a series of digital video frames,” at least because
`Wang teaches that the content may be MPEG video, which would
`be understood to comprise digital video frames.
`Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 61; Ex. 1004, 17:34–54).
`Independent claim 1 further recites, “receiving the first media content
`in the first size format from the mobile device input.” Ex. 1001, 8:39–40.
`Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of the MTSCM receiving
`multimedia content from the mobile device having a screen with a native
`
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`IPR2019-00474
`Patent 8,863,223 B2
`
`resolution of a first format teaches the cited claim limitation. Pet. 33 (citing
`Ex. 1004, 15:29–31).
`Independent claim 1 further recites, “querying the mobile computing
`device to determine the first size format.” Ex. 1001, 8:41–42. Petitioner
`contends that the ’223 patent does not describe any specific query, but
`merely determines the size format of the content received by the set top box
`from the mobile device. Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:15–17, 5:35–36).
`Petitioner submits that Wang’s MTSCM similarly determines the size format
`of the media content received from the cellular phone in a format configured
`for the cellular phone’s screen. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 15:29–31, 15:40–42,
`16:53–58). Accordingly, Petitioner submits:
`Because Wang recognizes the received multimedia signal
`format, and that received format is in the first size format of the
`cellular phone screen, Wang teaches that the STB can determine
`the first size format (i.e., of the cellular phone screen) from the
`received signal itself—just like the ’232 Patent. Wang, therefore,
`teaches or at least renders obvious “querying” the mobile device
`to the same extent taught by the ’232 [patent] specification.
`Id. at 34–35 (citation omitted).
`A PHOSITA would have recognized that the first size format
`must be determined to upconvert to the second size format, and
`the particular way of determining the first size format would have
`simply been a mere design choice from a finite number of
`options: the size format could be determined from the received
`signal itself or an initial message could be sent to the device.
`Thus, at a minimum, it would have been “obvious to try” a
`“query” in which an initial message is sent.
`Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
`
`
`20
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`IPR2019-00474
`Patent 8,863,223 B2
`
`
`Therefore, Petitioner submits, to the extent the “querying” requires the
`STB sending an initial message to the mobile device, Wang alone teaches, or
`at least suggests, the claim limitation. Id.
`Independent claim 1 further recites, “querying the display device” and
`“determining the native display resolution of the second size format of the
`display device based on a response resulting from the query of the display
`device.” Ex. 1001, 8:43–46. Petitioner contends that Wang’s disclosure of
`the MTSCM outputting a converted signal to an external display via HDMI
`teaches that the MTSCM queried the HDMI display to determine its required
`resolution through a response provided to the MTSCM. Pet. 38 (citing Ex.
`1003 ¶¶ 69–70; Ex. 1004, 18:9–10, 21:45–49, 26:52–55). According to
`Petitioner,
`A PHOSITA would have understood that to perform the
`upconversion process described for Wang’s MTSCM, it would
`need to determine the size format of the external device. It would
`have been obvious to a PHOSITA this format determination
`would typically be made through known querying processes.
`Such a known querying process was already included in the
`HDMI standard.
`Id. at 37 (citations omitted).
`Independent claim 1 further recites “authenticating the validity of a
`user associated with the mobile computing device” and “determining, based
`on the validity of the user, that the received first media content is permitted
`to be provided to the display device.” Ex. 1001, 8:47–51. Petitioner
`contends that the ’223 patent indicates that the mobile STB is capable of
`“authenticating a user so that the user can receive media service.” Pet. 39
`
`21
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`

`IPR2019-00474
`Patent 8,863,223 B2
`
`(citing Ex. 1001, 3:11–13, 6:11–12). Likewise, Petitioner contends that
`Wang’s disclosure of authenticating a user during a purchase request (e.g.,
`using a mobile device to download media content from the Internet) based
`upon a mobile device Tag ID and password associated with the user to
`validate the user teaches or suggests the cited claim limitation. Id. at 39–40
`(citing 10:31–11:27, 27:48–28:10). According to Petitioner, although
`Wang’s disclosed authentication serves to authenticate the user, and does not
`address the access rights of the individual, Wang, nonetheless, teaches using
`the authentication information “to access an online account.” Id.

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