4:18-34
`
`, 4:35 to 5:22
`
`5:23-34 - Blank
`
`5:25 "SUMMARY OF THE INVENTTO/'4"
`
`5:26-34
`
`5:35 to 6:9
`
`6:10 - Blank
`
`6:1T "DETAILED DESCR1PTTOW'
`
`6:12 -to 7:18
`
`7:19-36
`
`8:1-24
`
`8:25 to 9:21
`
`9:22 to 10:6
`
`10:7-11:8
`
`11:9,24
`
`11:25-34
`
`11:35 to 12:2
`
`12:3-35
`
`12:36 to 13:22
`
`13:23-30
`
`13:31 to 14:34
`
`14:35 to 15:17
`
`15:18-26
`(DiscLosuRE ENDS AT 15:26)
`
`1V.
`
`Jurat
`
`2:64 to 3:12
`
`3:13-36
`
`7:22-29
`
`7:30-49
`
`11:17-55
`
`11:56 to 12:4
`
`12:545
`
`12:26-55
`
`12:56 to 13:8
`
`13:9-44
`
`13:45-59
`
`13:60-67
`
`14:1-6
`
`14:7-34
`
` 14:35-56
`
`14:57-64
`
`14:65 to 15:35
`
`15:36-53
`
`i 5;54-61
`
`.
`
`.
`
`..
`
`-............
`
`1 have been warned that-willful false statements and the like are punishable by firm or
`22.
`imprisonment, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001) and may jeopardize the validity of the application or any
`
`Page 15 of 16
`
`Attachment 11 Page 15 of 16
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0301
`
`

`

`patent. i5suing thereon. AI staternenk; n make in the declaration 1 either know to be true or on
`information fInd belief f believe them to be true.
`
`4');
`
`SCOTI:M. PiKOW 117,
`•
`
`a
`
`5 of 16
`
`Attachment 11 Page 16 of 16
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0302
`
`

`

`U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
`PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`PATENT APPLICATION TRANSMITTAL LETTER
`
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NUMBER:
`1607,6
`
`istant Commissioner for Patents.
`hington D.C. 20231
`
`unsmitted herewith for filing is the patent application of
`
`Invent° s.
`
`Scott A. Moskowitz
`
`o 1.4
`
`to
`4"!
`
`For
`
`METHOD FOR COMBINING TRANSFER FUNCTIONS WITH PREDETERMINED KEY
`CREATION
`
`Enclosed are:
`
`1. 17 sheets of specification, 8 sheets adclairns, and I sheet of abstract
`
`2.
`
`1 sheet(s) of drawings.
`
`3. Executed Declaration/Power of Attorney.
`
`4, Executed Verified Statement (Declaration) Claiming Small. Entity Status -Independent Inventor.
`
`The filing fee has been calculated as shown below:
`
`NUMBER FILED
`
`NUMBER
`EXTRA'
`
`RATE (8)
`
`FEE (S)
`
`BASIC FEE
`
`TOTAL CLAIMS
`
`INDEPENDENT CLAIMS
`
`6
`
`MULTIPLE DEPENDENT CLAIM
`PRESENT
`
`FEE FOR RECORDATION OF ASSIGNMENT
`
`Number extra must be zero or larger
`
`20
`
`9
`
`3
`
`790.00
`
`22..00
`
`82.00
`
`270.00
`
`40.00
`
`TOTAL
`
`If applicant is a small entity under :37 C.F.R. § 1.9
`and 1.27, then divide total fee by 2, and enter amount here.
`
`SMALL ENTITY
`TOTAL
`
`5 790.00
`
`S 198.00
`
`246.00
`
`1,234.00
`
`5 617.00
`
`The Office is authorized to charge the filing fee of $ 617,00 to Deposit Account No. 11-0600. The Office is
`further authorized to charge any additional fees or credit any overpayments to the above deposit account number.
`A copy of this letter is being submitted to facilitate processing of this application.
`
`at,641
`
`eig.101/
`
`Patrick J. Buckley (Reg. No. 40,928)
`
`Dated: March 24, 1998
`
`KENYON & KENYON
`1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W_
`Suite 600
`Washington, D.C. 20036-5405.
`(202) 429-1776 (202)429-0796 (fax)
`
`Attachment 13 Page 1 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0303
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`METHOD FOR COMBINING TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
`WITH PREDETERMINED KEY CREATION
`
`FIELD OF THE .INVENTION
`
`The invention relates to the protection of digital information. More particularly, the
`
`invention relates to a method for combining transter. functions with predetermined key creation.
`
`COS
`
`E
`
`'E TO R
`
`D
`
` PLICATIONS
`
`This application claims the benefit of U.S. patent application Serial No. 08/587,943, filed
`
`January 17, 1996, entitled "Method for Stega-Cipher Protection of Computer Code," the entire
`
`disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference.
`
`lo
`
`is
`
`BA I.t Rt3I_ 1C3 t?'TIiI INVENTION
`
`increasingly, commercially vvaluable information is being created and stored in "digital"
`
`form. For example, music, photographs and video can all be stored and transmitted as a series of
`
`20
`
`numbers, such as is and O's. Digital. techniques let the original information be recreated in a
`
`very accurate manner. Untbrtunately„ digital techniques also let the infommtion be easily copied
`
`without the infortnati
`
`owner's permission.
`
`it',32C0
`
`Attachment 13 Page 2 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0304
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`Because unauthorized copying is clearly a disincentive to the digital distribution of
`
`valuable information, it is important to establish responsibility for copies and derivative copies of
`
`such works. For example, if each authorized digital copy of a popular song is identified with a
`
`unique number, any unauthorized copy of the song would also contain the number. This would
`
`allow the owner of the information, such as a song publisher, to i
`
`-stigate who made the
`
`unauthorized copy. Unfortunately, it is possible. that the unique number could be erased or
`
`altered if it is simply tacked on
`
`he beginning or end of the digital information.
`
`As will be described, known digital "watermark" techniques give creators and publishe
`
`of digitized multimedia content localized, secured identification and authentication of that
`
`content. In considering the various forms of multimedia content, such as "master." stereo,
`
`National Television Standards Committee (NTSC) video, audio tape or compact disc, tolerance
`
`of quality will vary with individuals and affect the underlying commercial and aesthetic value of
`
`the content. For example, if a digital version of a popular song sounds distorted, it will be less
`
`valuable to users. It is therefore desirable to embed copyright, rwwnership or purchaser
`
`15
`
`information, or some. combination of these and related data, into the content in a way that will
`
`damage the content if the watermark is removed without authorization.
`
`To achieve these goals, digital watermark systems insert ownership information in a way
`
`that causes little or no noticeable effects, or "artifacts, in the underlying content signal. For
`
`example,
`
`digital watermark is inserted into a digital version of a song, it is important that a
`
`20
`
`listener not be bothered by the slight changes introduced by the watermark. It is also important
`
`for the watermark technique to maximize the encoding level and "location sensitivity" in the
`
`Attachment 13 Page 3 0 1
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0305
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 160716
`
`signal to force damage to the content signal when removal is attempted. Digital watermarks
`
`address many of these concerns, and research in the field has provided e ctreritely robust z . )d
`
`secure implementations.
`
`What has been overlooked in many applications described in the art, however, are
`
`5
`
`systems which closely mimic distribution of content as it occurs in the real world. For instance,
`
`many watermarking systems require the original un-watermarked content signal to enable
`
`detection r decode operations. These include highly publicized efforts by NEC, Digimarc and
`
`others. Such techniques are problematic because, in the real world, original master copies reside
`
`in a rights holders vaults and are not readily available to the public.
`
`With much activity overly focused on wateimark. survivability, the security of a digital
`
`watermark is suspect. Any simple linear operation for encoding info
`
`n into a signal may be
`
`used to erase the embedded signal by inverting the process. This is not a difficult task, especially
`
`when detection software is a plug-in freely available to the public, such as with Digimarc. in
`
`general, these systems seek to embed cryptographic information, not cryptographically embed
`
`15
`
`information into target media content.
`
`Other methods embed ownership information that is plainly visible n the media signal,
`
`such as the method described in US Patent No. 5,530,739 to Braudaway et al. The system
`
`described in Braudaway protects a digitized image by encoding a visible w ateimark to deter
`
`piracy. Such an implementation creates an immediate weakness in securing the embedded
`
`20
`
`information because the watermark is plainly visible. Thus, no search for the embedded signal is
`
`necessary and the watermark can be more easily removed or altered. For example, while
`
`3
`Attachment 13 Page 4 o 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0306
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`certainly useful to some rights owners, simply placing the symbol "0" in the digital information
`
`would only provide limited protection. Removal by adjusting the brightness of the pixels
`
`forming the V" would not be difficult with respect to the co p rational resources required.
`
`Other relevant prior art includes US Patents No. 4,979,210 and 5,073,925 to Nagata et
`
`which encodes information by modulating an audio signal. in the mplitudeltime domain. The
`
`modulations introduced in the Nagata process arry a "copy/don't copy" message, whiCh is easily
`
`found and circumvented by one skilled in the art. The granularity of encoding is fixed by the
`
`amplitude and frequency modulation limits required to maintain inaudibility. These limits are
`
`relatively low, making it impractical to encode more information using the Nagata process.
`
`Although US Patent No, 5,664,018 to Leighton describes a means to prevent collusion
`
`attacks in digital watermarks, the disclosed method may not actually provide the security
`
`described. For example, in cases Where the watermarking technique is linear, the"insertion
`
`envelope" or 'watermarking space" is well-defined and thus susceptible to attacks less
`
`sophisticated than collusion by unauthorized parties. Over-encoding at the watermarking
`
`15
`
`encoding level is but one simple attack itt such linear implementations. Another consideration
`
`not made by Leighton is that commercially-valuable content may already exist in a un-
`
`watermarked fonn somewhere, easily accessible to potential pirates, gutting the need for any type
`
`of collusive activity. Digitally signing the embedded signal with preprocessing of watermark
`
`data is more likely to prevent successful collusion. Furthermore, a "baselinewatermark as
`
`20
`
`disclosed is quite subjective. It is simply described elsewhere in the art as the "perceptually
`
`significant" regions of a signal. Making a watermarking function less linear or inverting the
`
`tf,<I1n,e)
`
`4
`Attachment 13 Page 5 o 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0307
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`insertion of watermarks would seem to provide the same benefit without the additional work
`
`required to create a "baseline" watermark. Indeed, watermarking algorithms should already be
`
`capable of detinim, a target insertion envelope or region with nit additional steps, What is
`
`evident is the Leighton patent does not allow for initial prevention of attacks on an embedded
`
`watermark as the content is visibly or audibly unchanged.
`
`It is also important. that any method for providing security also function with broadcasting
`
`media over networks such as the Internet, which is also referred to as `'streaming." Commercial
`
`"plug-in" products such as RealAudio and RealVideo, as well as applications by vendors
`
`VDONet and Xtreme, are common in such network environments. Most digital watermark
`
`implementations focus on common file base signals and fail to anticipate the security of streamed
`
`signals. It is desirable that any protection scheme be able to function with a plug-in player
`
`a
`
`without advanced knowledge of the encoded media stream.
`
`Other technologies focus solely on file-based security. These technologies illustrate the
`
`varying applications for security that must be evaluated for different media and distribution
`
`15
`
`environments. Use of cryptolopes or cryptographic containers,as proposed by IBM in its
`
`CryTtolope product, and InterTrust, as described in U.S. Patents No. 4,827,508, 4,977,594,
`
`5,050,213 and 5,410,598, may discourage certain forms of .piracy. Cryptographic containers,
`
`however, require a user to subscribe to particular decryption software to decrypt data. IBM's
`
`InfoMarket and InterTrusts DigiBox, among other implementations, provide a generalized
`
`20
`
`model and need prop
`
`architt-tt - to function. Every user must have a subscription or
`
`registration with the party which encrypts the data. Again, ass a form of general encryption, the
`
`5
`Attachment 3 Page 6 o 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0308
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 160716
`
`data is scrambled or encrypted without regard to the media and its formatting. Finally, control
`
`over copyrights or other neighboring rights is left with the implementing party, in this case, IBM,
`
`lnterTrust or a similar provider.
`
`Methods similar to these "trusted systems" exist, and Cerberus Central. Limited and
`
`Liquid Audio, among a number of companies, offer systems which may functionally be thought
`
`of as subsets of IBM and Inter T'rust's more generalized security offerings. Both Cerberus and
`
`Liquid Audio propose proprietary 1 y software which is registered to the user and "locked" in
`
`a manner parallel to the locking of content that is distributed via a cryptographic container. The
`
`economic trade-off in this iriodel is that users arc required to use each respective companies'
`
`proprietary player to play or otherwise anipulate content that is downloaded. If, as is the case
`
`presently, most music or other media is not available via these proprietary players amid more
`
`companies propose non-compatible player formats, the proliferation of players will continue.
`
`Cerberus and Liquid Audio also by way of extension of their ambit -tures provide for "near-CIS
`
`quality" but proprietary compression. This requirement stems from the necessity not to allow
`
`4
`
`pis
`
`15
`
`content that has near-identical data make-up to an existing consumer electronic standard, in
`
`Cerberus and Liquid Audio's case the so-called Red Book audio CD standard oft 6 bit 44.1 kHz,
`
`so that comparisons with the proprietary file may not yield how the player
`
`secured..
`
`Knowledge of the player's file format renders its security ineffictive as a file may he replicated
`
`and played on any common player, not the intended proprietary player of the provider of
`
`20
`
`previously secured and uniquely formatted content. This is the parallel
`
`akness to public key
`
`1 32
`
`6
`Attachment 3 Page 7 o 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0309
`
`

`

`Docker No.: 1607/6
`
`crypto-systems Which have gutted security if enough plain text and cipher ext comparisons
`
`enable a pirate to determine the user's private key.
`
`Many approaches to digital watermarking leave detection and decoding control with the
`
`implementing party of the digital watermark, not the creator of the work to be protected. A set of
`
`secure digital watermark implementations address this fundamental control issue forming the
`
`basis of key-based approaches. These are covered by the following patents and pending
`
`applications, the entire disclosures of which are hereby incorporated by reference: US Patent No.
`
`5,613, 004 entitled "Steganographic Method and Device" and its derivative US patent application
`
`Serial No. 08/775,216, US patent application Serial No. 08/587,944 entitled "Human Assisted
`
`Random Key Generation and Application for Digital Watermark. System," US Patent Application
`
`Serial No. 08/587,943 entitled "Method for Stega-Cipher Protection of Computer Code," US
`
`patent application Serial No. 08/677,435 entitled "Optim.iz non Methods for the Insertion,
`
`Protection, and Detection of Digital Watermarks in Digitized Data," and US Patent Application
`
`Serial No. 08/772,222 entitled "I-TranstbrmImplementation of Digital Watermarks." Public
`
`I5
`
`key ernto-systems are described in US Patents No. 4,200,770, 4,218,582, 4,405,829 and
`
`4,424,414, the entire disclosures of which are also hereby incorporated by reference.
`
`in particular, an improved protection scheme is described in "Method for Stega-Cipher
`
`Protection of Computer Code," US patent application Serial No. 08/587,943. This technique
`
`uses the key-based insertion of binary executable computer code within a content signal that is
`
`20
`
`subsequently, and necessarily, used to play or otherwise manipulate the signal in which it is
`
`encoded. With this system, however, certain coi ptrtatronal requirements, such as one digital
`
`7
`Attachment 1 Page 8 o 1
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0310
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`player per digital copy of content, may be necessitated. For instance, a consumer may download
`
`many copies of watermarked content. With this technique, the user would also be downloading
`
`as many copies of the digital player program. While this form of security a, be desirable for
`
`some applications, it is not appropriate in many circumstances.
`
`Finally, even when digital information is distributed in encoded form, it may be desirable
`
`to allow unauthorized users to play the information with a digital player, perhaps with a reduced
`
`level of quality. For example, a popular song may be encoded and freely distributed in encoded.
`
`form to the public. The public, perhaps • sing commonly available plug-in digital players, could
`
`play the encoded content and hear the music in sorrae degraded form. The music may sound
`
`choppy, or fuzzy or he degraded in some other way. This lets the public decide, based on the
`
`available lower quality version of the song, if they want to purchase a key from the publisher to
`
`decode, or "clean-cap," the content. Similar approaches could be used to distribute blurry pictures
`
`or low quality video. Or even "degraded" text, in the sense that .only authenticated portions of
`
`the text can be determined with the predetermined key or a validated digital signature For he
`
`15
`
`intended message.
`
`In view of the foregoing, it can be appreciated that a substantial need exists for a method
`
`allowing encoded content to be played, with degraded quality, by a plug-in digital player, and
`
`solving the other problems discussed above.
`
`1532t0
`
`8
`Attachment 13 Page 9 o 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0311
`
`

`

`SUMMARY OF THE Rsi " NT
`
`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`The disadvantages of the art are alleviated o a great extent by a method for combining
`
`transfer functions with predetermined key creation. In one embodiment, digital information,
`
`including a digital sample and format information, is protected by identifying and encoding a
`
`portion of the format information. Encoded digital information, including the digital sample and
`
`the encoded format information, is generated to protect the original digital information.
`
`In another embodiment, a digital signal., including digital samples in a file format having
`
`an inherent granularity, is protected by creating a predetermined key. The predetermined key is
`
`comprised of a .tr.: .sfer function-based mask set to manipulate data at the inherent granularity of
`
`the tile format If the underlying digitized samples.
`
`With these and other advantages and features of the invention that will be o,
`
`hereinafter apparent, the nature of the invention may be more clearly understood by reference to
`
`the f011owing detailed description of the invention, the appended claims and to the several
`
`5
`
`drawings attached herein.
`
`BRIEF DESCRIDION_ F THE DRA
`
`FIG. 1 is a block flow diagram of a method for copy protection or authentication of
`
`digital information
`
`ccording
`
`an embodiment of the present
`
`,ention,
`
`1$7,nr$
`
`Attachment
`
`9
`Page 10 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0312
`
`

`

`DETAILED DESCRIPTION
`
`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a method combines transfer
`
`functions with predetermined key creation. Increased security is achieved in the method by
`
`5
`
`combining elements of "public-key steganography" with cryptographic protocols, which keep
`
`in-transit data secure by scrambling the data with "keys
`
`r
`
`r that is not apparent to those
`
`with access to the content to be distributed. Because different forms of randomness are
`
`combined to oiler robust, distributed security, the present invention addresses an architectural
`
`gray space" between two important areas of security: digital watermarks, a subset of the more
`
`general art of steganography, and cryptography. One form of randomness exists in the mask sets
`
`that are randomly cicated to map watermark data into an otherwise unrelated digital signal. The
`
`second fo of random mess is the random permutations of data formats -ed with digital players
`
`to manipulate the content with the predetermined keys. These forms can be thought of as the
`
`transfer function versus the mapping function inherent to digital watermarking processes.
`
`15
`
`According to an embodiment of the present nvvention, a predetermined, or andomly
`
`generated, key is used to scramble digital information in a way that is unlike known "digital
`
`watermark" techniques and public key crypto-systems. As used herein, a key is also referred to
`
`as a "mask set" which includes one or more random or pseudo-random series of hits. Prior to
`
`encoding, a mask can be generated by any cryptographically secure random generation process.
`
`20
`
`A block cipher, such as a Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm, in combination with a
`
`sufficiently random seed value, such as one created using a Message Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm,
`
`Ms"ZOO
`
`10
`Attachment 3 Page 11 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0313
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`emulates a cryptographically secure random hit generator. The keys are saved in a database,
`
`along with information matching them to the digital signal, for use in descrambling and
`
`subsequent viewing or playback. Additional file format or transfer property information is
`
`prepared arld made available to the encoder, in a bit addressable manner„ks well, any
`
`5
`
`authenticating function can be combined, such as Digital Signature Standard (DSS) or Secure
`
`Flash Algorithm (SHA).
`
`Using the predetermined key comprised of a transfer function-based mask set, the data
`
`representing the original content is manipulated at the inherent granularity of the file format of
`
`the underlying digitized samples. Instead of providing, or otherwise distributing, watermarked
`
`content that is not noticeably altered, a partially "scrambled" copy of the content is distributed.
`
`The key is necessary both to register the ought-afte content and to descramble the content into
`
`its original form_
`
`The present invention uses methods disclosed in "Method for Stega-Cipher Protection of
`
`Computer :ode," US Patent. Application Serial No. 08/587,943, with respect to transfer
`
`functions related to the common file formats, such as NCT, TIFF, AIFF, WAV, etc,
`
`Additionally, in cases where the content has not been altered beyond being encoded with such
`
`functional data, it is possible for a digital player to still play the c ontent because the file format
`
`has not been altered. Thus, the encoded content could still be played by a plug-in digital player
`
`as discrete, digitally sampled signals, watermarked or not. That is, the structure of the file can
`
`20
`
`remain basically unchanged by the watermarking process, letti
`
`g
`
`tc n file format based
`
`players work with the "scrambled" comer
`
`153200
`
`Attachment
`
`11
`Page 12 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0314
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`For example, the Compact Disc-Digital Audio (CD-DA) format stores audio information
`
`as a series of frames. Each frame contains a number of digital s mples representing, for
`
`example. music, and a header that contains Ile format information. As shown in FIG. 1,
`
`according to an embodiment of the present invention some of the header information can be
`
`identified and "scrambled" using the predetermined key at steps 110 to 130. The music samples
`
`can remain unchanged. Using this technique, a traditional CD-DA player will be able to play a.
`
`distorted version of the music in the sample. The amount of distortion wi11 depend on the way,
`
`and extent, that the header, or file format, information h s been scrambled. It would also be
`
`possible to instead scramble some of the digital samples while leaving the header information
`
`alone. In general, the digital signal would be protected by manipulating data at the inherent
`
`granularity, or "frames," of the CD-DA file format: To decode the inforrttation, a predetermined
`
`key is used before playing the digital information at steps 140 and 150.
`
`A key-based decoder can act as a "plug-in" digital player of broadcast signal streams
`
`without foreknowledge of the encoded media stream. Moreover, the data format orientation is
`
`15
`
`used to partially scramble data in transit to prevent unauthorized descrambled access by decoders
`
`that lack authorized keys. A distributed key can be used to unscramble the scrambled content
`
`because a decoder would understand how to process the key. Similar to on-the-fly decryption
`
`operations, the benefits inherent in this embodiment include the fact that the combination of
`
`watermarked content security, which is key-based, and the &scrambling of the data, can be
`
`20
`
`performed by the saute key which can be a plurality of mask sets. The mask sets may include
`
`primary, convolution and message del€miter masks with file format data included.
`
`12
`Attachment 3 Page 13 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0315
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`The creation of an optimized "envelope" for insertion of watermarks provides the basis of
`
`much watermark security, but is also a complementary goal of the present invention. The
`
`predetermined or random key that is generated is not only an essential map to access the hidden
`
`information signal, but is also the descrambler of the previously scrambled signal's format for
`
`playback or viewing.
`
`In a system requiring keys for watermarking content and validating the distribution of the
`
`content, different keys may be used to encode different information while secure one way hash
`
`functions or one-time pads may be incorporated to secure the eimbedded signal. The same keys
`
`can be used to later validate the embedded digital signature, or even fully decode the digital
`
`9
`
`watermark if desired. Publishers can easily stipulate that content not only be digitally
`
`watermarked but that distributors must check the validity of the watermmmarks by perforrmtiztg
`
`digital signature checks with keys that lack any other fun tionality. The system can extend to
`
`simple authentication of text in other emmmbodimmments.
`
`Before such a market is economically feasd le, there are other methods for deploying
`
`15
`
`key-based watermarking coupled with transfer functions to partially scramble the content to be
`
`distributed without performing full public key encryption, i.e., a key pair is not necessarily
`
`generated, simply, a predetermined key's function is created to re-map the data of the content file
`
`in a lossless process. Moreover, the scrambling performed by the present invention may be more
`
`dependent on the file in question. Dissimilarly, encryption is not specific to army particular media
`
`20
`
`but is performed on data. The file format remains unchanged, rendering the file .useable by any
`
`conventional
`
`r:player, but the signal quality can be intentionally degraded in the absence of
`
`;no
`13
`Attachment 3 Page 14 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0316
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 160716
`
`the proper player and key. Public-key encryption seeks to completely obscure the sensitive
`
`"plaintext" to prevent comparisons with the "ciphertext" to determine a users private keys.
`
`encryption and
`Centralized encryption only differs iri the utilization of a single key for both encry
`
`decryption making the key even more hig ly vulnerable to attacks to defeat the encryption
`
`process. With the present invention, a highly sought after photograph may be hazy to the viewer
`
`using any number of commonly available, nonproprietary software or hardware, without the
`
`authorized key. Similarly, a commercially valuable song may sound poor.
`
`The benefit of • me form of cryptography is not lost in the present invention. In fact,
`
`some piracy can be deterred when the target signal may be known but is clearly being protected
`
`through scrambling. What is not anticipated by known techniques, is an ala carte method to
`
`change various aspects of file formatting to enable various "scrambled states" for content to be
`
`subsequently distributed. An image may lack all red pixels or may not have any of the most
`
`significant bits activated.
`
`audio sample can similarly he scrambled to render it
`
`less-than-commercially viable.
`
`15
`
`The present invention also provides improvements over known network-based methods,
`
`such as those used for the streaming of media data over the Internet. By manipulating file
`
`formats, the broadcast media, which has been altered to "fit" within electronic distribution
`
`parameters, such as bandwidth availability and error correction considerations, can be more
`
`effectively utilized to restrict the subsequent use of the content while in transit as well as
`
`20
`
`real-time viewing or playing.
`
`14
`Attachment 3 Page 15 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0317
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`The mask set providing the transfer function can be read on a per-use basis by issuing an
`
`authorized or authenticating "key" for descrambling the signal that is apparent to a viewer or a
`
`player or possessor of the authenticating key. The mask set cafe be read on a per-computer basis
`
`by issuing the authorized key that is afore generalized for the computer that receives the
`
`5
`
`broadcast signals. Metering and subscription models become viable advantages over known
`
`digital watermark systems which assist in designating the ownership of a copy of digitized media
`
`content, but do not prevent or restrict the copying or manipulation of the sampled signal in
`
`question,. For broadcast or streamed media, this is especially the case. Message authentication is
`
`also possible, though not guaranteeing the same security as an encrypted file as with general
`
`crypto systems.
`
`The present invention thus benefits from the proprietary player model without relying on
`
`proprietary players. No new players will be necessary and existing multimedia file formats can
`
`be altered to exact a measure of security which is further increased when coupled with digital
`
`watermarks. As with most consumer arkets for media content, predominant file formats exist,
`
`15
`
`de facto, and corresponding formats for computers likewise exist. For a commercial compact
`
`disc. quality audio recording, or 16 bit 44.1 kHz, corresponding file formats include: Audio
`
`Interchange File Format (RIFF), Microsoft WAV, Sound Designer II, Sun's .au, Apple's
`
`Quicktime, etc. For still image media, formats are sirriilarly abundant: TIFF, PICT, SPEG,
`
`etc. Requiring the use of additional proprietary players, and their complementary file .formats,
`
`20
`
`for limited benefits in security is wastefitl. Moreover, almost all computers today are
`
`multimedia-capable, and this is increasingly so with the popularity of Intel's MMX chip
`
`15
`is ma
`Attachment 3 Page 16 of 31
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-602
`Exhibit 1005, Page 0318
`
`

`

`Docket No.: 1607/6
`
`architecture and the PowerPC line of microchips. Because file formatting is fundamental in the
`
`playback of the underlying data, the predetermined key can act both as a map, for information to
`
`be encoded as watermark data regarding ownership and a descrambler of the file that has been
`
`distributed. Limitations will only exist in how large the key must be retrofitted for a given
`
`5
`
`application, but any manipulation of file format information is not likely to exceed the size of
`
`data required versus that for an entire proprietary player.
`
`As with previous disclosures by the inventor on digita
`
`terinarking techniques, the
`
`present invention may be implemented with a variety of cryptographic protocols to increase both
`
`confidence and security in the underlying system. A predetermined key is described as a set of
`
`masks. These masks may include primary, convolution and message delimiter mask. ht
`
`previous disclosures, the functionality of these masks is defined solely for mapping. The present
`
`invention includes a mask set which is also controlled by the distributing party of a copy of a
`
`given media signal. This mask set is a transfer function which is limited only by the parameters
`
`of the tile format in question. To increase the uniqueness or security of each key used to
`
`15
`
`scramble a given i mi edia file copy, a secure one way hash function can be used subsequent to
`
`transfer properties that are initiated to present the forging of a particular key. Public and priva