` #:20691
`
`
`
`
`Jeffrey Francis Craft SBN 147186
`jcraft@devlinlawfirm.com
`DEVLIN LAW FIRM LLC
`1731 Fox Springs Circle
`Newbury Park, CA 91320
`
`Timothy Devlin (pro hac vice)
`tdevlin@devlinlawfirm.com
`James M. Lennon (pro hac vice)
`jlennon@devlinlawfirm.com
`DEVLIN LAW FIRM LLC
`1306 N. Broom St., 1st Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19806
`Telephone: (302) 449-9010
`Facsimile: (302) 353-4251
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs Blue Spike LLC,
`Blue Spike International Ltd., and
`Wistaria Trading Ltd.
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`Judge:
`
`David O. Carter
`
`
`
`
`
`BLUE SPIKE LLC, BLUE SPIKE
`INTERNATIONAL LTD., and
`WISTARIA TRADING LTD.,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`VIZIO, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0001
`
`
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`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 2 of 31 Page ID
` #:20692
`
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`B.
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`C.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1
`I.
`BACKGROUND OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS ......................................... 1
`II.
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS ......................................................................................... 2
`IV. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ............................................... 4
`V. AGREED TERMS ................................................................................................ 4
`VI. DISPUTED TERMS OF THE SECURE SERVER PATENTS....................... 5
`A.
`“AUTHENTICATION/AUTHENTICATED” – CLAIMS 17, 25, 31
`OF THE ’246 PATENT ............................................................................... 5
`AUTHORIZATION/AUTHORIZED – CLAIMS 17, 20, 24, 31 OF
`THE ’246 PATENT; CLAIMS 4, 12 OF THE ’561 PATENT ................... 7
`“LEGACY”/ “LEGACY CONTENT” – CLAIMS 17, 20, 24, 31 OF
`THE ’246 PATENT; CLAIMS 1, 9 OF THE ’561 PATENT; CLAIM
`13 OF THE ’295 PATENT .......................................................................... 8
`The Intrinsic Evidence Supports Blue Spike’s Proposed
`
`Construction of “Legacy” and “Legacy Content” ........................... 8
`Vizio’s Proposed Construction Is Not Supported by the
`Intrinsic Evidence ............................................................................ 9
`“SAID LCS . . . [CONFIGURED TO DETERMINE /
`DETERMINING] . . . A QUALITY LEVEL AT WHICH TO
`TRANSMIT SAID FIRST CONTENT, WHEREIN SAID QUALITY
`LEVEL IS ONE OF AT LEAST UNSECURE, SECURE, AND
`LEGACY” – CLAIMS 1, 9 OF THE ’561 PATENT; CLAIM 13 OF
`THE ’295 PATENT.................................................................................... 12
`“SAID LCS . . . [CONFIGURED TO DETERMINE /
`DETERMINING] . . . A FIRST DATA SET STATUS VALUE OF
`SAID FIRST DATA SET TO BE AT LEAST ONE OF UNSECURE,
`SECURE, AND LEGACY” – CLAIM 1 OF THE ’561 PATENT;
`CLAIM 13 OF THE ’295 PATENT .......................................................... 13
`“WATERMARK” – CLAIMS 17, 20, 21, 24, 25 OF THE ’246
`PATENT; CLAIMS 1, 2, 9, 10 OF THE ’561 PATENT; CLAIM 19
`OF THE ’295 PATENT ............................................................................. 14
`“[PERMITTING USE OF / DELIVERING] THE CONTENT DATA
`SET” – CLAIMS 17, 20 OF THE ’246 PATENT ..................................... 16
`“IF THE CONTENT DATA IS NOT CAPABLE OF
`AUTHENTICATION, ACCEPTING THE DATA”- CLAIM 31 OF
`THE ’246 PATENT; .................................................................................. 17
`VII. DISPUTED TERMS OF THE TRUSTED TRANSACTIONS
`PATENTS ............................................................................................................ 18
`
`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`G.
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`H.
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`i
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`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0002
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 3 of 31 Page ID
` #:20693
`
`
`A.
`
`“STEGANOGRAPHIC CIPHER” – CLAIM 14 OF THE ’116
`PATENT; CLAIMS 35, 36 OF THE ’011 PATENT ................................. 18
`“STEGANOGRAPHICALLY CIPHERED SOFTWARE
`APPLICATION” – CLAIMS 35, 36 OF THE ’011 PATENT .................. 20
`“MEANS FOR UNIQUELY IDENTIFYING INFORMATION” –
`CLAIM 14 OF THE ’116 PATENT .......................................................... 20
`“MEANS FOR VERIFYING AN AGREEMENT TO TRANSACT
`BETWEEN THE PARTIES” – CLAIM 14 OF THE ’116 PATENT ....... 22
`“SERIALIZATION” – CLAIMS 35, 36 OF THE ’011 PATENT ............ 23
`E.
`VIII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 24
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0003
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 4 of 31 Page ID
` #:20694
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`CASES
`Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
`314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 3, 13, 14, 17
`
`ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp.,
`700 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 4
`
`Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
`632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ........................................................................................ 3
`
`Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd.,
`715 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`Biosig v. Nautilus
`783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................ 3
`
`Epos Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
`9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .............................................................................................. 3
`
`i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,
`598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`Kara Tech. Inc. v.Stamps.com Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................ 3
`
`Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) ......................................................................................................... 2
`
`Masco Corp. v. United States,
`303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................ 4
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................... 11
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.,
`131 S. Ct. 22238 (2011) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................ 3
`
`One-E-Way, Inc. v. ITC,
`859 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................ 3
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 2, 3, 11
`
`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20458 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2007) ............................................. 13
`
`
`iii
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`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0004
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 5 of 31 Page ID
` #:20695
`
`
`SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.,
`775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................... 17
`SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`709 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 7, 16, 20
`
`Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`829 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... passim
`
`Vitronics Corp. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 4, 21, 23
`
`
`STATUTES AND RULES
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ 4, 21, 23
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`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0005
`
`
`
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`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 6 of 31 Page ID
` #:20696
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant to Dkt. 213, Plaintiff Blue Spike LLC (“Blue Spike”) respectfully submits
`this Opening Claim Construction Brief related to the disputed terms in the five patents in
`suit: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,475,246 (“’246 patent”), 8,171,561 (“’561 patent”), and
`8,739,295 (“’295 patent”) (“Secure Server Patents”); and U.S. Patent Nos. 7,159,116
`(“’116 patent”), and 8,538,011 (“’011 patent) (“Trusted Transactions Patents”) (Exs. 1, 2,
`3, 4, and 5 respectively).1
`II. BACKGROUND OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`Scott Moskowitz, the inventor and co-inventor of the patents in suit, is a prolific
`inventor with over on hundred patents in the areas of forensic watermarking, data
`security, software watermarks, and product license keys, among others.
`The three Secure Server Patents are from the same patent family, and each is titled
`“Secure Personal Content Server.” They resulted from the pioneering efforts of Mr.
`Moskowitz in the area of creating a secure environment for the disclosure of digital
`content. The ‘296 patent is a continuation of the ’561 patent, which in turn is a
`continuation of the ’246 patent. Because the Secure Server Patents share similar
`specifications, the claim terms should be given consistent constructions.
`The Trusted Transactions Patents are titled “Systems, Methods and Devices for
`Trusted Transactions” and resulted from the pioneering efforts of Mr. Moskowitz in the
`area of transferring information between parties. The ’011 patent is a divisional of the
`’116 patent, and thus shares the same specification. Because the Trusted Transaction
`Patents share the same specification, the claim terms should be given consistent
`constructions.
`
`
`
`
`1 Unless otherwise indicated, Exhibits cited in the Brief refer to the Exhibits attached to
`the Declaration of Jeffrey Francis Craft in Support of Plaintiff Blue Spike LLC’s
`Opening Claim Construction Brief.
`1
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0006
`
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 7 of 31 Page ID
` #:20697
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S.
`370, 384 (1996), and must always begin with the words of the claim itself. Phillips v.
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). There is a “heavy
`presumption that claim terms are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning”
`because “the words of the claims themselves . . . define the scope of the patented
`invention.” Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
`2013).
`In the context of claim construction, “ordinary and customary” means how a
`person of skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term as it
`is used in the claim. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Claim terms are generally given their
`ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art
`when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Unwired Planet,
`LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There are only two exceptions
`to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in
`the specification or during prosecution. Id.
`When it is necessary to construe a claim, intrinsic evidence is typically “the single
`best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 413 F.3d at 1315 (citing Vitronics
`Corp. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Of course, the claims are
`“read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
`Generally, however, it is a “cardinal sin” to read a limitation from the specification into
`the claims. Id. at 1320. This holds even if the specification describes only one
`embodiment. Epos Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
`2014).
`The prosecution history is part of the intrinsic evidence and consists of the
`complete record of the proceedings before the Patent Office. Phillips v. AWH
`Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Although a patent’s prosecution
`
`2
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0007
`
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 8 of 31 Page ID
` #:20698
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`history is relevant to the claim construction analysis, any disclaimer of claim scope based
`on prosecution history must be “clear and unmistakable.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek
`Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`Limitations should not be imported from the specification or prosecution history
`into the claims without a “clear intention to limit the claim scope.” Arlington Indus. v.
`Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011); i4i Ltd. Partnership v.
`Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Kara Tech. Inc.
`v.Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“a patentee is entitled to the
`full scope of his claims and [a court] will not limit him to his preferred embodiment or
`import a limitation from the specification into the claims.”).
`Extraneous words that obscure, rather than clarify the meaning are also disfavored.
`Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) citing
`Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is improper
`for a court to add extraneous limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added wholly apart
`from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the
`claim.”).
`A patent is presumed valid and an invalidity defense of indefiniteness must be
`proved by clear and convincing evidence. Biosig v. Nautilus 783 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed.
`Cir. 2015) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 22238 (2011)). Although they
`are permitted “some modicum of uncertainty,” a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the
`specification and prosecution history, must inform those skilled in the art about the scope
`of the invention with reasonable certainty. One-E-Way, Inc. v. ITC, 859 F.3d 1059, 1062-
`63 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`Extrinsic evidence can play a role in the claim construction process. Phillips, 415
`F.3d at 1320-21. But a court should not rely upon such evidence to interpret the claim
`terms where their meaning is clear from the intrinsic sources. Extrinsic evidence “may
`not be ‘used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic
`
`3
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0008
`
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 9 of 31 Page ID
` #:20699
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`evidence.’” ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 700 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) (quotations omitted).
`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶
`6; Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`Section 112 provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means . . . for performing a
`specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for performing a specified
`function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`IV. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`The level of ordinary skill in the art applicable to the Secure Server Patents and the
`Trusted Transactions Patents is a person with a good working knowledge of network
`security, digital watermarking, and packet watermarking. The person would have gained
`this knowledge through an undergraduate Bachelor of Science degree in Computer
`Science or an equivalent degree, and three to five years of experience working in the field
`of network security, digital watermarking, and packet watermarking. Additional
`education or experience may serve as a substitute for these requirements. (Ex. 6, Lee Op.
`Report at ¶ 25.)
`V. AGREED TERMS
`The parties agree on the construction of the following terms in the Secure Server
`Patents:
`Claim Term
`“Local Content Server (LCS)”
`(claims 20, 24, 31 of the ’246 patent;
`claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 of the
`’561 patent; claims 13, 19, 20, 23 of
`the ’295 patent)
`“Satellite Unit”
`
`Agreed Construction
`“a device or software application which can
`securely store a collection of value-added digital
`content, wherein the LCS has a unique ID”
`
`“a portable medium or device which can accept
`secure digital content from an LCS through a
`
`4
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0009
`
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 10 of 31 Page ID
` #:20700
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`(claims 20, 24, 25, 31 of the ’246
`patent; claims 3, 4, 11, 12 of the ’561
`patent)
`“LCS Domain”
`(claims 1, 9 of the ’561 patent; claim
`13 of the ’295 patent)
`
`physical, local connection and which can either
`play or make playable the digital content,
`wherein the satellite unit has a unique ID”
`“a secure medium or area where digital content
`can be stored, with an accompanying rule
`system for transfer of digital content in and out
`of the LCS Domain”
`
`
`
`VI. DISPUTED TERMS OF THE SECURE SERVER PATENTS
`“Authentication/Authenticated” – claims 17, 25, 31 of the
`A.
`’246 patent
`Blue Spike’s Proposed Construction
`no construction necessary
`
`or
`
`“ascertain/ascertained the authenticity
`of”
`
`Vizio’s Proposed Construction
`“the acts of ascertaining the origin of a
`message” / “origin of a message has been
`ascertained”
`
`
`No construction of the terms “authentication/authenticated” are necessary, but
`should the Court decide to construe these terms, Blue Spike’s alternative construction
`(“ascertain/ascertained the authenticity of”) is consistent with the specifications of the
`Secure Server Patents.
`The specification provides several examples of “authentication” that are consistent
`with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. (Ex. 1 at 2:54-56 (“The digital data set
`may be embedded with at least one robust open watermark, which permits the content to
`be authenticated.”); Ex. 1 at 3:52-54 (“All parties in a transaction must authenticate
`information that is perceptually observable before trust between the parties can be
`established.”); Ex. 1 at 10:39-40 (“The act of entering the LCS Domain includes a
`verification of the content (an authentication check).”).) The specification also utilizes
`the term “ascertaining” in a variety of contexts, namely: ascertaining the origin of a
`
`5
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0010
`
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 11 of 31 Page ID
` #:20701
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`message or an origin of a carrier with which a message is stored; ascertaining the identity
`of the sender of the message; ascertaining whether a message has original content or
`tampered content; and having the option of using message authentication codes or value-
`added data to ascertain whether the message is original:
`Authentication: A receiver of a “message' (embedded or otherwise within
`the value-added information) should be able to ascertain the original of the
`message (or by effects, the origin of the carrier within which the message is
`stored). An intruder should not be able to successfully represent someone else.
`Additional functionality such as Message Authentication Codes (MAC) could be
`incorporated (a one-way hash function with a secret key) to ensure limited
`verification or subsequent processing of value-added data.
`(Ex. 1 at 9:13-21; Ex. 2 at 9:28-36; Ex. 3 at 9:28-36.)2
`Each of these various examples is consistent with Blue Spike’s proposed
`construction of ascertaining the authenticity of the message.
`In contrast, Vizio’s proposed construction is inconsistent with multiple
`embodiments of the specification and would improperly exclude several examples of
`authentication cited above. For example, Vizio attempts to limit the construction only to
`ascertaining only the origin of the message, but does not include other relevant examples
`such as ascertaining the identity of the sender of the message (“intruder should not be
`able to successfully represent someone else”), ascertaining whether a message has
`original content or tampered content (ascertaining the “original of the message”), and
`does not include the use of message authentication codes or value-added data to ascertain
`whether the message is original. Vizio’s definition also fails to square with the patent’s
`use of “authenticate” to describe a connection between two devices. (Ex. 1 at 11:69-12:2
`(“A protocol must exist for the SU and LCS to authenticate any connection made
`between them.”).)
`
`
`2 Unless otherwise indicated, emphasis within this Brief has been added.
`
`6
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0011
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`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 12 of 31 Page ID
` #:20702
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`Stated simply, Vizio’s proposed construction is wrong because it improperly reads
`potential embodiments out of the scope of the claims. It would violate one of the most
`fundamental principles of claim construction—not reading out exemplary embodiments.
`SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“a claim
`construction that excludes the preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever, correct”).
`Authorization/Authorized – claims 17, 20, 24, 31 of the ’246
`B.
`patent; claims 4, 12 of the ’561 patent
`Blue Spike’s Proposed Construction
`Vizio’s Proposed Construction
`“conveying official sanction,
`“the acts of conveying official sanction,
`permitting access or granting legal
`permitting access or granting legal power to an
`power to an entity” / “conveyed
`entity”/”acts have been taken to convey
`official sanction, permitted access or
`official sanction, permit access or grant legal
`granted legal power to an entity”
`power to an entity”
`While both parties’ proposed constructions are similar, Blue Spike’s construction
`is consistent with the use of the terms “authorization” and “authorized” in the claims and
`intrinsic record.
`The patent specification defines “authorization” as “[a] term which is used broadly
`to cover the acts of conveying official sanction, permitting access or granting legal power
`to an entity.” (Ex. 1 at 9:45-47.) This definition is fully consistent with Blue Spike’s
`construction.
`Likewise, Blue Spike’s construction dovetails with the surrounding claim
`language. Substituting Blue Spike’s construction into claim 20 of the ’246 patent would
`result in the phrase “analyzing the message to confirm that the SU is [conveyed official
`sanction, permitted access, or granted legal power to an entity] to use the LCS.” This
`natural reading of the claim is again consistent with the specification and the overall
`invention.
`Vizio’s proposed construction would do the opposite. It would result in the
`incoherent claim recitation of “analyzing the message to confirm that the SU is [acts have
`been taken to convey official sanction, permit access or grant legal power to an entity] to
`use the LCS.”
`7
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0012
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`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 13 of 31 Page ID
` #:20703
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`Vizio’s Proposed Construction
`Legacy/Legacy Content: “unwatermarked
`content which is already in the possession of
`the user”
`
`
`
`Blue Spike’s proposed construction is therefore more consistent with the actual
`language in the claims and the overall intrinsic record.
`“Legacy”/ “Legacy Content” – claims 17, 20, 24, 31 of the
`C.
`’246 patent; claims 1, 9 of the ’561 patent; claim 13 of the ’295
`patent
`Blue Spike’s Proposed Construction
`Legacy: “quality level associated
`with a format that predates the
`format of the first [content/data set]”
`
`Legacy Content: “content format
`that predates the format of the
`content data set”
`Blue Spike’s proposed constructions are consistent with the claims and the intrinsic
`evidence, including the patent specifications and prosecution histories. In contrast, Vizio
`seeks to limit the terms “legacy” and “legacy content” to certain embodiments in the
`specification and would improperly exclude other preferred embodiments.
`The Intrinsic Evidence Supports Blue Spike’s Proposed
`
`Construction of “Legacy” and “Legacy Content”
`The patent specifications demonstrate that “legacy” and “legacy content” refer to
`formats from an earlier time period. For example, in one instance the specification refers
`to “legacy” digital content as “digital content that was commercially distributed before
`the advent of watermarking systems.” (Ex. 1 at 17:57-58; Ex. 2 at 18:9-10; Ex. 3 at
`18:29-30.) Importantly, however, the specifications do not limit legacy content to
`unwatermarked content. For example, in another embodiment the legacy content may
`have a “fragile” watermark even if a robust open watermark is not present. (Ex. 3 at
`17:54-56 (“Legacy content may be admitted, or optionally, may be checked for a fragile
`watermark-and then admitted only if the fragile watermark is present.”); Ex. 1 at 17:19-
`21; Ex. 2 at 17:34-36.)
`The consistent thread of disclosures in the specifications is that “legacy” refers to
`earlier formats that can be associated with particular quality levels. All of these various
`8
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`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0013
`
`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 14 of 31 Page ID
` #:20704
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`examples of “legacy” content and formats in the specification—earlier “commercially
`distributed” examples, “unwatermarked” examples, and examples with “fragile”
`watermarks—are consistent with Blue Spike’s proposed construction of the “legacy”
`phrases at issue.
`The prosecution histories are also consistent with Blue Spike’s proposed
`construction. For example, in the prosecution history of the ’246 patent, the applicant
`explained the concept of legacy content by referring to “the widespread existence of
`content in any number of formats – an example, data released prior to a particular
`protection scheme or without any use restrictions.” (Ex. 7, July 9, 2007 Response to
`Final Office Action at 20.) The applicant further explained that legacy content refers to a
`format that corresponds to a “predetermined quality level”:
`For exemplary purposes, in the case of music, though the present
`invention[s] are not limited to audio, a “predetermined quality level” (i.e., 44.1
`kHz 16 bit) is an example of "legacy content". For purposes of argument, this
`legacy content is arguably not of lesser quality than MP3 or AAC-which were
`introduced after compact discs and are also compressed. And, Windows 95 may
`have arguably less features than Windows XP. But, Windows 95, being legacy
`content, is not arguably of lesser quality than Windows XP.
` (Ex. 7, July 9, 2007 Response to Final Office Action at 20.)
`
`Referring to Windows 95 as “legacy content” supports Blue Spike’s proposed
`constructions, which refer to the time period in which a particular format was released.
`
`
`
`Vizio’s Proposed Construction Is Not Supported by the Intrinsic
`Evidence
`Vizio’s proposed construction would improperly read two limitations from certain
`preferred embodiments into the claims, yet exclude other disclosed embodiments. First,
`Vizio attempts to limit legacy content to “unwatermarked” content. Second, Vizio
`attempts to limit legacy content to content that is “already in possession of the user.”
`
`9
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Case No. 8:17-cv-1172-DOC-KES
`
`
`
`DISH-Blue Spike-246
`Exhibit 1029, Page 0014
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`
`
`
`Case 8:17-cv-01172-DOC-KES Document 215 Filed 05/24/19 Page 15 of 31 Page ID
` #:20705
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`Both of these restrictions are inconsistent with the very examples of the specification and
`other intrinsic evidence.
`The specifications and prosecution histories demonstrate that legacy content is not
`limited to unwatermarked content. The specifications clarify this point by reciting an
`embodiment in which “legacy content” may contain a “fragile watermark”:
`On the other hand, if the ROW is absent, then the LCS will
`understand that the content is ‘legacy.’ Legacy content may be admitted, or
`optionally, may be checked for a fragile watermark—and then admitted
`only if the fragile watermark is present.
`(Ex. 1 at 17:17-23.)
`The prosecution histories further confirm that legacy content is not limited to
`unwatermarked content. The applicant distinguished a prior art reference (“Rhoads”) on
`the basis that it taught away from the invention, “which can admit legacy content and
`unwatermarked content to the LCS without use restrictions.” (Ex. 8, July 3, 2006
`Responsive Amendment at 16.) The applicant also clarified that “[t]he instant
`invention[s] can handle legacy content and unwatermarked content in a seamless
`manner.” (Ex. 8, July 3, 2006 Responsive Amendment at 17.) The discussion of legacy
`content “and” unwatermarked content as separate categories indicates that legacy content
`is not necessarily unwatermarked.
`Vizio appears to place undue reliance on one response to an obviousness rejection
`that actually contradicts its proposed construction. In that response, the applicant
`amended certain claims of the ’561 patent to expressly recite that, for those claims, a
`“legacy” quality level means that the content did not include a watermark. (Ex. 9, May
`18, 2011 Remarks (adding the limitation “wherein a quality