throbber
Case No. IPR2019-00500
`Patent No. 9,737,154
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`AMERICAN NATIONAL MANUFACTURING INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SLEEP NUMBER CORPORATION
`f/k/a SELECT COMFORT CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case No. IPR2019-00500
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`Patent No. 9,737,154
`____________
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE (PAPER 93)
`
`
`
`
`WA 14737375.1
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`

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`Case No. IPR2019-00500
`Patent No. 9,737,154
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................... 1
`
`III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 1
`
`A. Dr. Phinney’s Testimony should not be excluded ....................................... 1
`
`1. Dr. Phinney is a duly qualified expert and POSA ................................... 1
`
`2. Dr. Phinney’s testimony is duly supported ............................................. 3
`
`3. Dr. Phinney’s fluid-circuit diagram is admissible ................................... 4
`
`B. Supporting exhibits re ANM’s opposition to PO motion for additional
`discovery should not be excluded ....................................................................... 5
`
`1. Exs. 1028–29 and 1033 are not inadmissible hearsay ............................. 5
`
`2. Exs. 1028–34 and 1036 are also admissible ............................................ 6
`
`C. Miscellaneous arguments should be disregarded ........................................ 7
`
`1. The Declaration of Mr. Craig Miller should not be excluded .................. 7
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`2. The Declaration of Dr. Lynde should not be excluded ...........................11
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`3. Deposition Transcripts ..........................................................................13
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION .........................................................................................14
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`Case No. IPR2019-00500
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Federal Cases
`
`Donlin v. Phillips Lighting N. Am. Corp.,
`581 F.3d 73 (3rd Cir. 2009) ............................................................................... 9
`
`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumia Cambridge Ltd.,
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 11
`
`LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank,
`374 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 9
`
`Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp,
`No. 17-cv-04405-HSG, 2020 WL 1455830 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25,
`2020) ................................................................................................................. 2
`
`Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC v. Immunex Corp.,
`No. IPR2017-01884, Paper 96 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019) ....................................... 1
`
`Ward v. Dixie Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
`595 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 11
`
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`Case No. IPR2019-00500
`Patent No. 9,737,154
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner American National Manufacturing, Inc. (“ANM” or “Petitioner”)
`
`files this Opposition in response Patent Owner Sleep Number Corp.’s (f/k/a Select
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`Comfort Corp.) (“PO” or “Sleep Number”) Motion to Exclude (Paper 93) (the
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`“MTE”).
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`PO’s motion should be denied.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`“The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proving that it is
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`entitled to the relief requested—namely, that the material sought to be excluded is
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`inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”).” Sanofi-Aventis U.S.
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`LLC v. Immunex Corp., No. IPR2017-01884, Paper 96 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019) (citing
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`37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c) and 42.62(a)).
`
`
`
`III. ARGUMENT
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`A. Dr. Phinney’s Testimony should not be excluded
`
`1.
`
`Dr. Phinney is a duly qualified expert and POSA
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`In 2005, Dr. Phinney earned a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the
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`Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), among other degrees. Ex. 1009, ¶
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`5. While at MIT, he worked for the Laser Interferometric Gravitation Wave
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`Observatory (LIGO) experiment, where he designed and tested hydraulic systems
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`for an experimental apparatus for out-stage seismic isolation. Id. Since 2005, he
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`has worked for Exponent, where he continued to perform engineering duties,
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`including related to control systems. Id., ¶ 6–14; see also Ex. 1010. He has the
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`educational qualifications and “equivalent” work experience that qualifies him as an
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`expert under FRE 702 as well as a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”). See,
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`generally, Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp, No. 17-cv-04405-HSG, 2020
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`WL 1455830 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (discussing cases and concluding expert is
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`qualified).
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`It is unclear how PO can credibly challenge Dr. Phinney’s credentials when
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`PO’s lead expert, Dr. Messner, also lacks per se air mattress experience. See Ex.
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`1062 at 10:17–11:13 (Dr. Messner testifying he has no air-mattress work experience
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`but that he believes he is qualified to testify here based on his engineering work in
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`analogous fields of “controls, extensive background in mechanical engineering, in
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`design, in automatic control systems, all of which are relevant to this case.”); see
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`also Ex. 1052 at 189:9–190:5 (similar). Moreover, Dr. Phinney has testified
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`cogently throughout this proceeding and demonstrated his competence. See, e.g.,
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`Ex. 2041 at 2:2–25 (for example, Dr. Phinney accurately conducted conversions of
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`pressure units without calculator or aid of scratch paper). In contrast, PO’s experts
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`have waffled throughout and demonstrate competence. See, e.g., Ex. 1054 at 32:10-
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`38:15 and 176:10-180:6 (PO’s expert for mechanical arts, Dr. Abraham, destroyed
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`physical evidence by unscrewing solenoid valve in prior art pumps in possession of
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`third-party Tempur Sealy and he could not put the solenoid back where it was; which
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`was memorialized by both parties counsel in contemporaneous emails (Ex. 9 to that
`
`deposition); then at his deposition, had no recollection of those events).
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`2.
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`Dr. Phinney’s testimony is duly supported
`
`As an initial matter, PO has failed to preserve its objections here. The MTE
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`(at 4) provides citation to PO’s objections, but the arguments in the MTE (see § I.B,
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`¶ 1) do not appear in the cited objections. PO’s style of using “for example”
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`throughout its objections is insufficient to preserve objections not explicitly
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`described. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1) (objection must be “with sufficient
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`particularity to allow correction”).
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`Further, the MTE (see § I.B, ¶ 2) attempts to raise objections to numerous
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`paragraphs without explanation. This is an improper form of objecting and briefing
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`as ANM cannot reasonably respond and correct; PO cannot carry its burden without
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`briefing. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) (a motion to exclude “must explain the
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`objections”).
`
`Setting those issues aside, PO asserts that Dr. Phinney’s testimony is
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`unsupported by facts or data. However, Dr. Phinney’s testimony is based on
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`evidence—prior art references Gifft, Mittal, Ebel, Pillsbury, etc.—coupled with
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`detailed explanation contained in his declarations. See, e.g., generally, Ex. 1009.
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`This Board has already found Dr. Phinney’s testimony cogent. See, generally,
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`Papers 11 and 77 (Institution Decision and Preliminary Guidance vetting Dr.
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`Phinney’s testimony and finding it persuasive at least for the purposes of those
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`preliminary decisions).
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`PO’s arguments are specious. Dr. Phinney properly cites and supports his
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`discussion of pneumatic impedance. See, e.g., Ex. 1009, ¶ 100 and n. 7 (Dr. Phinney
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`citing Bhai, Ex. 2013). PO misrepresents deposition testimony and other evidence.
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`See MTE at 3 (asserting Dr. Phinney was unable to point to a reference that disclosed
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`pneumatic impedance when he in fact did identify, inter alia, Ebel, Ex. 1006, which
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`discloses the concept of pneumatic impedance in FIG. 2). PO’s arguments are also
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`based on over narrowly limiting the relevant field to air mattresses per se; an
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`argument this Board has rejected. See Paper 11 at 27–28 (reasoning the relevant
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`field is “pneumatic control systems”) .
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`In sum, PO fails to make credible arguments for excluding any of Dr.
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`Phinney’s testimony and cannot carry its burden on this motion.
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`3.
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`Dr. Phinney’s fluid-circuit diagram is admissible
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`Dr. Phinney’s fluid-circuit diagram (also called an electrical equivalent
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`diagram) is a derived diagram and helpful to explain a pneumatic system. Dr.
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`Phinney’s testimony properly explained the diagram and how it was derived in part
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`based on Ebel, FIG. 2, among other references. See, e.g., Ex. 1009, ¶¶ 52–56
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`(explaining the diagram with citation to Ebel). An electrical equivalent diagram is
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`commonly used in the field. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, FIG. 3; Ex. 1006, FIG. 2; Ex. 1052
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`at 108:22–109:3 (PO’s lead expert, Dr. Messner, agreeing “it [is] normal to use
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`electrical diagrams to model fluidic systems”); Ex. 1062 at 42:7–13 (Dr. Messner
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`stating by the time he completed his masters in 1989 he was capable of drawing
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`electrical equivalent diagrams for pneumatic systems). It is admissible. See FRE
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`703 (experts are permitted to rely on information if experts in the particular field
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`would reasonably rely on the same).
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`PO’s argument here is truly rich. On one hand, the MTE (§ I.B) criticizes Dr.
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`Phinney for failing to support his opinions. On the other hand, the MTE (§ I.C)
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`criticizes Dr. Phinney’s support.
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`With respect to PO’s remaining arguments (MTE, § I.C, ¶ 2), PO failed to
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`properly raise these objections as PO put forth its arguments as “and/or” and “for
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`instance.” This is an improper form of briefing, and PO cannot carry its burden. See
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) (a motion to exclude “must explain the objections”).
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`B.
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`Supporting exhibits re ANM’s opposition to PO motion for
`additional discovery should not be excluded
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`1.
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`Exs. 1028–29 and 1033 are not inadmissible hearsay
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`Exs. 1028–29 are screenshots from Dun & Bradstreet related to corporate
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`financial information. These exhibits fall squarely within the ambit of FRE 803(17)
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`hearsay exception for market reports and commercial publications.
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`With respect to Ex. 1033, PO objects to ¶¶ 3–4 and 8–9 of Mr. Miller’s
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`declaration without elaborating why these statements are believed to be inadmissible
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`hearsay. A review those paragraphs reveal the testimony generally relates to PO
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`itself. This testimony is not inadmissible hearsay because any underlying
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`statements are used against a party opponent (see FRE 801(d)(2)) or an exception
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`applies (see FRE 804(b)(3) or 807). Other testimony (Ex. 1033, ¶ 9) is not hearsay
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`because Mr. Miller is providing factual information (e.g., how much he was paid) of
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`which he had personal knowledge.
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`2.
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`Exs. 1028–34 and 1036 are also admissible
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`First, Exs. 1028–29 (publicly available reports) were authenticated by a
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`supplemental declaration of Mr. Elliott. See Ex. 1064, ¶¶ 3-4. Ex. 1034 was duly
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`authenticated by Mr. Miller as a business record. See 1033, ¶ 4.
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`Second, PO does not explain how Ex. 1036 is “irrelevant and/or prejudicial.”
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`See Practice Guide, § II.K(d) (a motion to exclude evidence must “[e]xplain each
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`objection”).
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`Third, Ex. 1030 (PO’s discovery response) shows PO lacked any evidence to
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`support its secondary indicia arguments, which it should have investigated as part of
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`its pre-suit Rule 11 diligence and disclosed; alternatively, it shows PO intentionally
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`withheld information in discovery. Either way, it bears on PO’s credibility (or lack
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`thereof) here. Ex. 1032 (letter regarding deficiencies in PO’s infringement
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`contentions) demonstrates that PO’s contentions were highly contested and is
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`consistent with ANM’s position that later versions of PO’s contentions are also
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`highly contested. Regarding Ex. 1033 (Mr. Miller’s declaration), PO does not
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`appear to make any legal argument why the entirety of the exhibit should be
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`excluded; to the extent PO had issue as to Mr. Miller’s deposition, PO should have
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`dealt with that at that time.
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`PO simply has not carried its burden to exclude any of these exhibits.
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`C. Miscellaneous arguments should be disregarded
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`1.
`
`The Declaration of Mr. Craig Miller should not be excluded
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`PO tried to establish commercial success based on ANM’s sales. PO relied
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`on an expert, Carl Degen, whose opinion was unreliable because he did not properly
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`examine causation. Mr. Degen admitted the deficiency in his analysis (ANM MTE
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`at 8-9). ANM duly moved to exclude Mr. Degen’s declaration. See Paper [ANM
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`MTE] at 6. ANM’s motion was supported by declarations from ANM’s President,
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`Mr. Craig Miller, and an independent expert, Dr. Matthew Lynde. PO’s attempt to
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`exclude portions of these declarations here is flawed.
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`PO challenges portions of Mr. Miller’s declaration on the basis of personal
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`knowledge. See MTE at 9-10. Mr. Miller stated his personal knowledge of the facts
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`in his declaration. (Ex. 1057, ¶ 1). Mr. Miller’s personal knowledge hardly seems
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`controversial, since he is the President of ANM and also a manager of Dires, LLC.
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`Further, PO knows Mr. Miller personally as PO previously hired Mr. Miller as a
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`consultant to give research and development advice and to work with PO’s top
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`executives. (See Ex. 1048). Notwithstanding these circumstances, Mr. Miller
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`provided more details of his personal knowledge through a supplemental
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`declaration. (Ex. 1063). Below are PO’s challenges and Mr. Miller’s basis for his
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`personal knowledge:
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`PO withdrew from the market a brand which it owned and
`which competed with Petitioner’s air beds. This resulted
`in an increase in ANM sales. PO challenges Mr. Miller’s
`personal knowledge of these facts. MTE at 9. PO publicly
`announced its withdrawal from the market. Mr. Miller
`confirmed the coincident increase in ANM sales by
`studying official company records and by setting up the
`new customer accounts. (Ex. 1063, ¶ 16).
`
`PO told Google that it held a trademark rights in “number
`bed” and, based on PO’s complaints, Google suspended
`hundreds of ads that used the term “number bed” and were
`placed by ANM’s sales affiliate, Dires, Inc. In fact, PO
`held no trademark rights in “number bed.”. PO challenges
`Mr. Miller’s knowledge of these facts. Mr. Miller stated
`that most of facts were admitted by PO’s high-level
`employees testifying at a trademark trial that he attended.
`(Ex. 1063, ¶ 9). Mr. Miller has personal knowledge of the
`facts regarding suspension by his study of Dires, LLC
`business records (Id.).
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`ANM purchased source code (a component embedded
`within an air controller) from a supplier. For a time, the
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`supplier identified the source code only by a numeric
`range, “1.5-1.8”. PO says Mr. Miller claims to, but does
`not have, knowledge of when a particular version was
`used. In fact, Miller said exactly the opposite. (Ex. 1064,
`¶ 7). Mr. Miller, who does not read source code, does not
`know when any particular version was used by the
`supplier. (Id.).
`
`Issues with Mr. Degen’s analysis include an under-count
`and a separate over-count of controllers; failing to
`consider that ANM was just starting its business in 2012
`and had a plan for growth; that ANM had supply problems
`in connection with controllers; that the suspension by
`Google ads affected Dires, LLC on-line sales; and that
`ANM sales increased when it published a YouTube video
`comparing its product with PO’s. PO challenges Mr.
`Miller’s personal knowledge on each of these facts. MTE
`at 10. Mr. Miller knows these facts because he examined
`each of them and he explains the basis for his knowledge,
`in detail, in his supplemental declaration. (Ex. 1063, ¶¶ 5,
`6, 8, 12, 15).
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`PO argues that Mr. Miller may not give opinion evidence regarding his own
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`business. MTE at 10–11. That is not the law. FRE 701 allows lay opinion testimony
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`that is “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” The Advisory Committee
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`notes say that the Rule allows opinion testimony by business owners due to the
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`particular knowledge they develop. Federal cases are in accord. See, e.g., Donlin v.
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`Phillips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 81-82 (3rd Cir. 2009); LifeWise Master
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`Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 929-30 (10th Cir. 2004).
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`Mr. Miller is the business owner and has 22 years of experience in the
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`industry. Ex. 1072, ¶ 1; 1063 ¶¶ 1 and 18. Mr. Miller attests that he is fully involved
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`in “virtually all activities, including the activities of sales, marketing, finance,
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`production, purchasing and recordkeeping. Ex. 1063 ¶ 1. Mr. Miller’s experience
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`in these business functions are the basis for his opinions which are rationally based
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`on his perceptions and are admissible.
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`In particular, PO argues that Mr. Miller may not state his opinion that
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`advertising contributes to Petitioner’s sales; that Petitioner had a plan for business
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`growth; and that a certain supplier to Petitioner was more reliable than its
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`predecessor. (MTE, p. 10). These all are the topics in which a business owner has
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`knowledge. PO’s argument disregards Rule 701 and normal practice in courts where
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`corporate representatives testify as corporate matters.
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`Finally, PO incorrectly characterizes as “opinion” what is merely Mr. Miller’s
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`observation that Mr. Degen omitted certain facts from his declaration. See MTE at
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`10. For each observation of Mr. Degen’s omissions, Mr. Miller provided facts
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`within his personal knowledge. Ex. 1063, ¶¶ 1–8 and 15–16.
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`PO makes hearsay objections to parts of Mr. Miller’s testimony and two
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`exhibits he sponsors (see MTE at 10), but those objections are misplaced as
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`explained:
`
`Mr. Miller recounts PO’s admissions at the trademark trial
`regarding its false accusation of trademark violations by
`Dires. (Ex. 1063 ¶ 9, 12). None of these statements are
`hearsay. F.R.E. 801(d)(2). Mr. Miller refers to a decision
`by the International Trade Commission. (Ex. 1072, ¶ 10).
`Public documents are not hearsay, F.R.E. 803(8), and PO
`makes no allegation that the record is not genuine. Mr.
`Miller also recounts PO’s public statement that it was
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`removing its competing product from the market. (Ex.
`1063, ¶ 16). PO does not deny the accuracy of its public
`statement.
`
`PO objects to a summary of notices from Google ads. (Ex.
`1060/1075). This pertains to the issue of PO’s false claim
`of trademark violations. The summary is offered only to
`show notice to Petitioner that the ads were disallowed. It
`is not offered for the truth because there was no trademark
`violation. Finally, PO objects to a summary of Dires
`advertising expenses. (Ex. 1059/1074). Petitioner
`supplied the original records from which the summary was
`made. (Ex. 1063, ¶ 18). PO’s complaint is moot.
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`2.
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`The Declaration of Dr. Lynde should not be excluded
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`PO argues the bizarre proposition that a rebuttal witness cannot present
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`evidence of errors and omissions in an opponent’s statement of alleged facts. PO
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`cites Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumia Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369-
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`70 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That case does not support PO’s legal proposition. Rather, it
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`pertained to a petitioner who attempted to change its petition after a patent owner’s
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`response. By contrast, Dr. Lynde’s declaration is submitted as rebuttal to the
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`commercial success argument first raised by PO in its response.
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`PO further contends that Dr. Lynde may not rely on hearsay information.
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`F.R.E. 703 and authorities approve an expert’s reliance on hearsay statement by
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`those who are in a position to know the facts. See, e.g., Ward v. Dixie Nat. Life Ins.
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`Co., 595 F.3d 164, 181-82 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392,
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`395-96 (7th Cir. 1987).
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`Dr. Lynde relied on information he received from Mr. Miller regarding ANM
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`invoices, sales, advertising and product supply. Mr. Miller certainly is in the
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`position to know these things because he personally reviewed the invoices, the sales
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`records, and the advertising records and because he is fully engaged in ANM’s
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`purchasing operations. See Ex. 1063, ¶¶ 1, 5, 15, and 18. Mr. Miller is a person in
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`the position to know the facts. Of particular note is that PO deposed Mr. Miller at
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`length about all these topics. See, generally, Ex. 2083 at 31:10-34:8, 39:14-40:8,
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`52:12-19, and 66:23-68:5. PO does not challenge Mr. Miller’s veracity.
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`Finally, PO mischaracterizes parts of Dr. Lynde’s deposition testimony. MTE
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`at 14. Contrary to PO’s statement, Dr. Lynde testified that he received information
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`regarding supply problems from Mr. Miller. See Ex. 2084 at 29:10-17. Mr. Miller
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`also testified about the supply problems. Ex. 2083 at 52:12-16. Also contrary to
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`PO’s statement, Dr. Lynde’s analysis demonstrated the correlation between
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`advertising spending and ANM’s unit sales. Ex. 1056, FIG. 3 and ¶ 46. Finally,
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`contrary to PO’s statement, Dr. Lynde explained that in economics, variations above
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`or below a growth trend line are not meaningful; it is the growth trend line that is
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`important for measurement of statistical significance. See Ex. 1056, ¶ 40-42; Ex.
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`2084 at 103:1-7, 104:19-105:1, and 104:2-11).
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`3.
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`Deposition Transcripts
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`Turning to PO’s first argument, Dr. Messner’s testimony that “offsets” were
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`well known in 2006 is relevant, in particular, because the term offset is functionally
`
`the same as claim term adjustment “factor” as Dr. Messner explained:
`
`So is there a particular term of art for the
`Q
`multiplicative factor, multiplicative factors? Excuse me.
`
`You know, offhand, I can’t think of one. I
`A
`mean, an offset is a widely used way of doing calibration,
`which is partly why it's so widely known for -- or widely
`used for, say, like in Mittal, where one of the first things
`that’s done is, there’s an offset to correct for the
`atmospheric pressure.
`
`Q Were offsets widely used in 2006?
`
` MR. TOFT: Object to form.
`
`I would say that offsets were widely used in
`A
`a variety of different fields.
`
`BY MR. ELLIOTT:
`
`Q
`
`A
`
`In 2006?
`
`In 2006.
`
`Ex. 1052 at 297:3–297:19. In addition to Mittal (being in the relevant filed of
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`pneumatics), Dr. Messner also testified “offsets” also applied to Gifft, which is from
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`the air-mattress field. Id. at 297:20–298:18 (stating that offsets could be used to
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`continuously monitor as discussed in Gifft). Such testimony is admissible.
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`Turning to PO’s next argument, PO again attempts to define the relevant field
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`narrowly to only include the air-mattress field. However, PO’s own actions are
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`WA 14737375.1
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2019-00500
`Patent No. 9,737,154
`
`inconsistent. See, e.g., Ex. 1051 at 14:14–25:6 (PO hired Mr. Mahoney—first
`
`named inventor—particularly because his experience with medical devices
`
`involving pneumatics (i.e., ventilators) that involved analogous problems to those in
`
`the air-mattress field). This Board should consider inconsistencies in PO’s
`
`arguments and PO’s credibility here.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the MTE should be denied.
`
`- 14 -
`
`
`WA 14737375.1
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2019-00500
`Patent No. 9,737,154
`
`Date: May 6, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`SPENCER FANE LLP
`
`By /s/Kyle L. Elliott .
`Kyle L. Elliott, Reg. No. 39,485
`Kevin S. Tuttle, Reg. No. 52,307
`Brian T. Bear (pro hac vice)
`Mark A. Thornhill (pending pro hac vice)
`Spencer Fane LLP
`1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400
`Kansas City, Missouri 64106-2140
`Telephone: (816) 474-8100
`
`Jaspal S. Hare, Reg. No. 66,988
`jhare@spencerfane.com
`Spencer Fane LLP
`5700 Granite Pkwy, Suite 650
`Plano, TX 75024
`
`Counsel for Petitioner American National
`Manufacturing, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`- 15 -
`
`
`WA 14737375.1
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2019-00500
`Patent No. 9,737,154
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned hereby certifies that a copy
`
`of the foregoing PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE (PAPER 93) is served in its entirety on May 6, 2020, by
`
`electronic mail, as authorized by Patent Owner’s Updated Mandatory Notices,
`
`directed to the attorneys of record for Patent Owner at the following correspondence
`
`address of record:
`
`Steven A. Moore
`stevemoore@zhonglun.com
`ZHONG LUN
`4322 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200
`Los Angeles, CA 90010
`
` Kecia J. Reynolds
`kecia.reynolds@pillsburylaw.com
`PILLSBURY WINTHORP SHAW
`PITTMAN LLP
`1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`
`Luke Toft
`ltoft@foxrothschild.com
`
`
`
`
`
`Andrew Hansen (pro hac vice)
`ahansen@foxrothschild.com
`
`Archana Nath (pro hac vice)
`anath@foxrothschild.com
`
`Elizabeth A. Patton (pro hac vice)
`epatton@foxrothschild.com
`
`FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
`222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2000
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`
`Date: May 6, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/Kyle L. Elliott .
`Kyle L. Elliott (Reg. No. 39,485)
`.
`Attorney for Petitioner
`American National Manufacturing, Inc.
`
`- 16 -
`
`
`
`

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