throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC LUXEMBOURG S.A.,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`IPR2017-02087
`PATENT 8,995,433
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`Table of Contents
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`PETITIONER DOES NOT SATISFY THE MANDATORY
`NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
`Petitioner Fails to Identify All Related Matters
`Petitioner Fails to Identify Each Real Party-In-Interest
`
`III. THE ’433 PATENT
`Effective Filing Date of the ’433 Patent
`Overview of the ’433 Patent
`
`IV. THERE IS NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT EVEN ONE
`OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS 1-8 IS UNPATENTABLE
`Petitioner Relies on Incorrect Claim Constructions
`1.
`Petitioner’s Proposed Construction for “instant voice
`messaging application” Is Incorrect and Unnecessary
`Petitioner’s Proposed Construction for “client platform
`system” Is Incorrect and Unnecessary.
`No Prima Facie Obviousness
`1.
`Claim 1 is not rendered obvious because Clark does not
`disclose or suggest “wherein the instant voice message
`is represented by a database record including a unique
`identifier”
`Claims 1-8 are not rendered obvious because
`Petitioner’s proposed combination of Zydney with
`Clark results in messages being deleted once they are
`sent to the server
`No prima facie obviousness for “an instant voice
`messaging application” and a “client platform system”
`No prima facie obviousness for “wherein the instant
`voice message messaging application includes a file
`
`2.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`ii
`
`1
`
`2
`4
`7
`9
`9
`9
`
`11
`11
`
`12
`
`15
`17
`
`17
`
`22
`
`24
`
`

`

`V.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`manager system performing at least one of storing,
`deleting and retrieving instant voice messages from the
`message database in response to a user request”
`Claims 2-5 and 7-8 are not rendered obvious by virtue
`of their dependence from Claim 1
`CONCLUSION
`
`5.
`
`25
`
`30
`37
`
`Exhibit No.
`2001
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`
`List of Exhibits
`
`Description
`Declaration of Dr. Val DiEuliis
`Invalidity Contentions Submitted on March 28, 2017 in the
`underlying consolidated case of Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Samsung
`Electronic America’s, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-642
`Invalidity Contentions Submitted on December 16, 2016 in the
`underlying consolidated case of Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Samsung
`Electronic America’s, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-642
`“‘App’ voted 2010 word of the year by the American Dialect
`Society (UPDATED)", American Dialect Society (Jan. 8,
`2011), available at http ://www.americandialect.org/app-voted-
`2010-word-of-the-year-by-the-american-dialect-society-
`updated (printed Aug. 23, 20 17).
`
`iii
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §313 and 37 C.F.R. §42.107(a), Uniloc USA, Inc. and
`Uniloc Luxembourg S.A. (the “Patent Owner”) submit this Owner’s Preliminary
`Response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review (“Pet.” or “Petition”) of U.S. Patent
`No. 8,995,433 (“the ’433 Patent” or “EX1001”) filed by LG Electronics, Inc.
`(“Petitioner” or “LGE”). Petitioner moves to join the proceeding in IPR2017-1427.
`Joinder is not warranted, however, because the instant Petition is procedurally and
`substantively defective for at least the reasons set forth herein.
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4), “[a] petition filed under section 311 may be
`considered only if … the petition provides such other information as the Director
`may require by regulation.” The instant Petition fails to satisfy the mandatory notice
`provisions set forth in Rule 42.8. At a minimum, Petitioner fails to provide notice of
`all related administrative matters. In addition, there is also sufficient evidence to
`conclude, based on public filings, and even at this preliminary stage, that Petitioner
`failed to identify all real parties-in-interest.
`Even if the Board were to overlook the numerous procedural defects of the
`Petition and reach its substantive merits, the Petition should be denied in its entirety
`because it fails to meet the threshold burden of proving that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that even one challenged claim is unpatentable. Patent Owner has seized
`the opportunity, as is its right, to expand and further explain the positions originally
`set forth in its preliminary Response to the petition in IPR2017-1427, a related
`matter. Denial is warranted for the multiple and independent procedural and
`substantive defects of the Petition identified herein.
`
`1
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`
`US. Patent 8,995,433
`
`II.
`
`PETITIONER DOES NOT SATISFY TI-IE MANDATORY NOTICE
`
`REQUIREMENTS
`
`The ’433 patent is in a family of patents including United States Patent Nos.
`
`7,535,890 (“the ’890 patent”); 8,243,723 (“the ’723 patent”); 8,199,747 (“the ’747
`
`patent”); and 8,724,723 (“the ’622 patent”), as shown in the diagram below.
`
`App. No.: 10,-‘740030
`Filed: 12-18-2003
`
`Pat. NO: 7.535.890
`
`App. No.: 125398063
`Filed: 03-04-2009
`
`App. No.: 12.:‘398.076
`Filed: 03-04-2009
`
`Pat. No: 8243523
`
`Pat. No: 8.199.747
`
`
`
`App. No.: 13.35-16.68
`Filed: 07-11-2012
`
`Pat. No: 8.724.622
`
`App. No.: 14.:‘224.125
`Filed: 03-25 2014
`
`Pat. No: 8.995.433
`
`Petitioner has filed three of the thirty-six IPRs filed against this related family
`
`of patents, as highlighted below. As shown in the table below, most of the IPR
`
`petitions filed against these related patents predate the present Petition-
`
`Apple
`
`1m “—
`IPR2017-0220
`14-Nov-16
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`
`US. Patent 8,995,433
`
`Apple
`
`Apple
`
`p-pv—ppN
`
`pp—pv—ppN
`
`Apple
`
`pp—pv-ppN
`
`
`Apple
`IPR2017-0224
`14-Nov-16
`’622
`
`Apple
`
`IPR2017-0225
`
`14-Nov-16
`
`Facebook / wpppApp
`
`Facebook / WhatsApp
`
`11-May-17
`
`
`Facebook / WhatsApp
`IPR2017-1428
`11-May-17
`’433
`
`Facebook / WhatsApp
`
`2-Jun-17
`
`Facebook / wpppApp
`
`
`
`
`Snap
`IPR2017-1612
`16-Jun-17
`’890
`
`Facebook / WhatsApp
`
`16-]un_17
`
`Facebook , wpppApp
`
`Samsung Elec
`
`20-Jul-1 7
`
`
`Samsung Elec
`IPR2017-1798
`20-Jul-17
`’622
`
`Samsung Elec
`
`Samsung Elec
`
`20-Jul-17
`
`20-Jul-17
`
`Samsung Elec
`
`IPR2017—1801
`
`20—Jul—17
`
`Samsung Elec
`
`IPR2017-1802
`20-Jul-17
`
`
`Apple
`
`IPR2017-1804
`
`20-Jul-17
`
`’622
`
`Apple
`
`IPR2017-1805
`
`20-Jul-17
`
`’622
`
`
`
`

`

`US. Patent 8,995,433
`
`IPR2017-2087
`
`Petitioner
`
`Date
`
`Patent
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola—__
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola
`
`
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola
`
`IPR2017—2083
`
`11-Sep-17
`
`’890
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola
`
`Google/Huawei/Motorola
`
`A.
`
`Petitioner Fails to Identify All Related Matters
`
`Under 35 U-S.C. § 312(a)(4), “[a] petition filed under section 311 may be
`
`considered 0_nILi[ . .. the petition provides such other information as the Director
`
`may require by regulation.” Under this statutory authority, the Director issued 37
`
`CPR. § 42.8(b)(2), which mandates that a petition for inter partes review must
`
`identify all other judicial and administrative matters that would affect, or be affected
`
`by, a decision in an IPR proceeding. “Administrative matters include every
`
`application and patent claiming, or which may claim, the benefit of the priority of
`
`the filing date of the party’s involved patent or application as well as any ex parte
`
`and inter partes reexaminations for an involved patent.” Trial Practice Guide, 77
`
`Fed. Reg. 157, at 48760 (Aug. 14, 2012). This instruction is a more specific way of
`
`saying a petition must identify all administrative matters concerning all patents
`
`within a patent family which claim the benefit of the same effective filing date.
`
`Notably, 35 U.S.C- § 312(a)(4) does not have the discretionary language of
`
`§ 325(d). The Board need not and should not consider the substantive merits of a
`
`petition that incurably fails to satisfy the mandatory notice provisions (Rule 42.8)
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`promulgated under the authority of § 312(a)(4). This is true regardless whether a
`Patent Owner brings such a procedural defect to the Board’s attention in a response.
`Nevertheless, Patent Owner identifies herein gross omissions in the instant Petition
`with respect to the mandatory notice provisions.
`The Petition should be denied as failing to identify all related administrative
`matters pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2). See Pet. 1-2. On its face, the ’433 patent
`claims the benefit of the priority of the filing dates of the ’622, ’723, and ’890
`patents. Each of those interrelated patents ultimately claim the same effective filing
`date as that of the parent ’890 patent (Dec. 18, 2003). The interrelated nature of this
`patent family is further evident by the fact that the thirty-six IPR petitions filed
`against this patent family often attempt to map the same art using the same
`arguments to the same (or similar) claim language recited across multiple patents.
`Accordingly, Rule 42.8(b)(2) requires that the Petition itself expressly provide
`notice of all related administrative matters involving at least those interrelated
`patents. The Petition is deficient, therefore, for failing to provide the requisite notice
`regarding at least the following twenty-one related administrative matters: IPR2017-
`0220; IPR2017-0221; IPR2017-0222; IPR2017-0223; IPR2017-0224; IPR2017-
`1257; IPR2017-1365; IPR2017-1523; IPR2017-1524; IPR2017-1667; IPR2017-
`1612; IPR2017-1635; IPR2017-1636; IPR2017-1797; IPR2017-1798; IPR2017-
`1799; IPR2017-1800; IPR2017-1802; IPR2017-1804; IPR2017-1805; and IPR2017-
`2090. The failure to provide notice regarding IPR2017-2090 is especially glaring
`given that LGE itself filed that petition concurrently with the instant Petition.
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`In addition, the Petition makes no mention of the petition concurrently filed
`in IPR2017-2067 by Huawei, with whom Petitioner admittedly coordinated in filing
`other IPR petitions at that same time. See IPR2017-2090 and IPR2017-2088. The
`related administrative matter in IPR2017-2067 challenges the same ’433 patent at
`issue in the instant Petition. Petitioner LGE no doubt was aware of its co-petitioner’s
`intent to concurrently file a related and redundant petition, which adopts many of the
`same arguments.
`Each instance of this procedural defect (multiplied twenty-two times here) is
`ground for denial of the instant Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4); 37 C.F.R. §
`42.8(b)(2); Apple, Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., IPR2015-00355, Paper 9 at
`8 (June 26, 2015) (denying petition on other grounds, but noting that “[t]he Petition’s
`failure to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2), and thus also 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4),
`could be ground for denial of the Petition.”) (citing Reflectix, Inc. v. Promethian
`Insulation Tech. LLC, IPR2015-00039, Paper 18 at 9 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2015)
`(denying institution because petition did not comply with parallel requirement, under
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), to identify all real parties-in-interest).).
`Any attempt by Petitioner to cure this deficiency would be futile at least
`because the Original Petition suffers from the same procedural defect (and therefore
`cannot properly be considered for analogous reasons). At a minimum, the Original
`Petitioners (Facebook and WhatsApp) in IPR2017-01427 failed to provide the
`mandatory notice of at least the following earlier-filed and related administrative
`matters: IPR2017-0220, IPR2017-0221, IPR2017-0222, IPR2017-0223, IPR2017-
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`0224, IPR2017-0225, IPR2017-1257, and IPR2017-1365.1 These multiple
`omissions are especially glaring given that the Original Petitioners themselves
`previously filed the petitions in IPR2017-1257 and IPR2017-1365. Thus, both the
`Original Petition (IPR2017-1428) and the instant Joinder Petition (IPR2017-2087)
`should be dismissed for indisputably failing, on their faces, to satisfy the mandatory
`notice requirements.
`
`Petitioner Fails to Identify Each Real Party-In-Interest
`Parties filing a petition for inter partes review must identify all the real
`parties-in-interest. 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1). Among other purposes, this requirement
`assists “members of the Board in identifying potential conflicts” and assures “proper
`application of the statutory estoppel provisions.” Trial Practice Guide, 77 F.R.
`48759 (Aug. 14, 2012). The latter reason “seeks to protect patent owners from
`harassment via successive petitions by the same or related parties, to prevent parties
`from having a ‘second bite at the apple,’ and to protect the integrity of both the
`USPTO and Federal Courts by assuring that all issues are promptly raised and
`vetted.” Id.
`Even at this preliminary stage, there is sufficient evidence to conclude
`Petitioner failed to name each “real parties-in-interest” or “privy.” Petitioner joined
`with its co-defendants in the submission of invalidity contentions filed on March 28,
`2017. Those contentions are largely duplicative of the invalidity contentions filed on
`
`1 The Original Petitioners Facebook and WhatsApp were both served with Patent
`Owner’s complaints in the underlying litigation in July, 2016, well over one year
`ago. The Original Petitioners are therefore both outside the statutory time window
`to refile with the appropriate notices.
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`December 16, 2016 by other members of the same joint-defense group. See EX2002
`and EX2003. In addition to the coordination evident on the face of those joint
`invalidity contentions, members of this same joint defense group admittedly
`coordinated in various IPR filings. See table, supra. These filings have been based
`on references and arguments set forth in the joint invalidity contentions and known
`before the original IPR was filed.
`Using the joint invalidity contentions as a playbook, LGE admittedly
`coordinated at least with Huawei in filing IPR petitions challenging the ’433 and
`’622 patents. See IPR2017-2088 and IPR2017-2090, respectively. The first
`approximately thirty-one pages of the two related and concurrently-filed petitions in
`IPR2017-2087 and 2088 are substantially the same (with the sole exception of less
`than three pages which describe certain secondary references). Notably, the claim
`construction arguments are virtually identical. Given that LGE admittedly
`coordinated with at least Huawei in filing the related petition in IPR2017-2088
`(which has many overlapping arguments), at a minimum, Huawei should also have
`been identified as a real party-in-interest in the instant Petition.
`Huawei, in turn, admittedly coordinated with at least Google and Motorola in
`challenging the same ’433 and ’622 patents based on the same or substantially
`similar application of overlapping art (also applied in a similar manner in the joint
`invalidity contentions). See IPR2017-2067, IPR2017-2080, and IPR2017-2081. The
`significant, substantive overlap in those petitions, and the parallel arguments in the
`jointly-filed invalidity contentions, confirm that each petition should have named
`the same group of colluding co-defendants.
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`The failure to name all real parties-in-interest provides independent grounds
`for denial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) (requiring petitioners to identify each real party-
`in interest); Reflectix, Inc. v. Promethian Insulation Tech. LLC, IPR2015-00039,
`Paper 18 at 9 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2015) (denying institution because petition did not
`identify all real parties-in-interest).
`III. THE ’433 PATENT
` Effective Filing Date of the ’433 Patent
`The ’433 Patent is titled “System and Method for Instant VoIP Messaging.”
`The ’433 Patent issued March 31, 2015 from United States Patent Application
`No. 14/224,125, which is a Continuation of Application No. 13/546,673, filed on
`Jul. 11, 2012, now Pat. No. 8,724,622, which is a Continuation of Application No.
`12/398,063, filed on Mar. 4, 2009, now Pat. No. 8,243,723, which is a Continuation
`of Application No. 10/740,030, filed on Dec. 18, 2003, now Pat. No. 7,535,890.
` Overview of the ’433 Patent
`The ʼ433 Patent notes that conventional circuit-switched communications
`enabled traditional telephony yet had a variety of technical disadvantages that
`limited developing other forms of communication over such networks. According to
`the ʼ433 Patent, “[c]ircuit switching provides a communication path (i.e., dedicated
`circuit) for a telephone call from the telephone terminal to another device 20 over
`the [public switched telephone network or] PSTN, including another telephone
`terminal. During the telephone call, voice communication takes place over that
`communication path.” EX1001, 1:30-35.
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`The ʼ433 Patent expressly distinguishes circuit-switched networks from
`packet-switched networks (e.g., the Internet). For example, only the latter routes
`packetized digital information, such as “Voice over Internet Protocol (i.e., ‘VoIP’),
`also known as IP telephony or Internet telephony.” Id. at 1:36-38. Because legacy
`circuit-switched devices were unable to communicate directly over packet-switched
`networks, media gateways were designed to receive circuit-switched signals and
`packetize them for transmittal over packet-switched networks, and vice versa. Id. at
`2:9-22. The conversion effected by media gateways highlights the fact that
`packetized data carried over packet-switched networks is different from and is
`incompatible with an audio signal carried over a dedicated packet-switched circuit.
`Id. at 30-35.
`The ʼ433 Patent further notes that, notwithstanding the advent of instant text
`messages, at the time of the claimed invention there was no similarly convenient
`analog to leaving an instant voice message over a packet-switched network. Id. at
`2:35-48. Rather, “[c]onventionally, leaving a voice message involves dialing the
`recipient’s telephone number (often without knowing whether the recipient will
`answer), waiting for the connection to be established, speaking to an operator or
`navigating through a menu of options, listening to a greeting message, and recording
`the message for later pickup by the recipient. In that message, the user must typically
`identify himself or herself in order for the recipient to return the call.” Id. at 2:27-
`34.
`
`In certain disclosed aspects, the ʼ433 Patent discloses that a user-accessible
`client is configured for instant voice message (“IVM”) and for direct communication
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`over a packet-switched network (e.g., through an Ethernet card). Id. at 12:13-16.
`Certain clients are specially configured to “listen[] to the input audio device 212,”
`“record[] the user’s speech into a digitized audio file 210 (i.e., instant voice message)
`stored on the IVM client 208,” and “transmit[] the digitized audio file 210” as
`packetized data (e.g., using TCP/IP) over a packet-switched network (e.g., network
`204) “to the local IVM server 202.” Id. at 8:12-26, FIG. 2.
`
`IV. THERE IS NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT EVEN ONE OF
`THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS 1-8 IS UNPATENTABLE
`Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish it is entitled to their requested
`relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Because the Petition only presents theories of
`obviousness, Petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that at least one of
`the challenged patent claims would have been obvious in view of the art cited in the
`Petition. Petitioner fails to meet this burden and the Petition should, therefore, be
`denied.2
`
`
`Petitioner Relies on Incorrect Claim Constructions
`Petitioner relies on incorrect claim construction proposals to argue that Claims
`1-8 would have been obvious. Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions for “instant
`voice messaging application” and “client platform system” of independent Claims 1
`and 6 are incorrect—Petitioner proposes that they both may exclusively cover
`hardware. However, neither term requires hardware and neither term requires any
`contrived construction because a person having ordinary skill in the art would
`
`2 While certain deficiencies in the Petition are addressed here, Patent Owner reserves
`the right to address other deficiencies of the Petition in a full Response if an inter
`partes review is instituted
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`understand both terms and would agree that both terms should carry their customary
`and ordinary meaning.3 Declaration of Dr. Val DiEuliis (“EX2001), ¶¶ 44-57.
`Under the proper construction, Zydney does not teach or suggest either an “instant
`voice messaging application” or a “client platform system.”
`In the absence of “persuasive evidence” that a term or word has “a specially
`defined meaning in the field of art” encompassed by the patent, “the ordinary and
`customary meaning attributed to this term by those of ordinary skill in this art at the
`time of invention ‘involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
`meaning of commonly understood words.’” Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528
`F.3d 871, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314
`(Fed. Cir. 2005)).4
`1.
`Petitioner’s Proposed Construction for “instant voice messaging
`application” Is Incorrect and Unnecessary
`
`Petitioner’s obviousness theory relies on an unreasonable expansion of the
`term “application” (as recited in “instant voice messaging application”) to
`
`
`3 The concern that “plain and ordinary meaning” can be at times unhelpful to juries
`has no applicability to this forum. Uniloc expressly reserves its right to dispute
`Petitioner’s proposed constructions if the Board institutes trial. Patent Owner does
`not concede that Petitioner’s offered construction is correct.
`4 Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard used by the Board, claim
`terms carry their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one
`of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic
`Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
`LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144-46 (2016) (upholding the use in IPRs of the
`broadest reasonable interpretation).
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`encompass hardware alone. Pet. at 10-13. Petitioner does not support that proposed
`construction.5 EX2001 ¶¶ 45-53.
`It is clear from the claim language itself that the instant voice messaging
`application of claims 1-8 does not encompass (let alone require) hardware. Id. ¶¶
`50-51. As explained below, the “displaying” cited by Petitioner is encompassed by
`software instructions that control data sent to a monitor, it does not require a light-
`emitting display. Petitioner selectively plucked snippets from the ’433 Patent
`specification to argue its unreasonable proposed constructions. Id. ¶¶ 52-53.
`Petitioner’s approach is impermissible. The Board must consider the specification
`as a whole. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(en banc) (claims must be construed as a whole consistent with the entire
`specification); Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 906
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[C]laims must be construed so as to be consistent with the
`specification, of which they are a part”) (citation omitted).
`Petitioner admits that “the term ‘application’ to a person of ordinary skill in
`the art typically refers to computer software for performing a particular function.”
`Pet. at 10 (citing EX1009, Microsoft Computer Dictionary (3d ed. 1997), at p. 27
`(defining “application” as “[a] program designed to assist in the performance of a
`specific task, such as word processing, accounting, or inventory management.”));
`
`
`5 Petitioners’ argument that the ’433 Patent supposedly “does not identify any
`particular software program” (Pet. 11) goes only to written description and is
`therefore irrelevant here. Indeed, Petitioners in effect ask the Board not to look at
`the disclosure of the ’433 Patent for its description of “instant voice messaging
`application.” Pet. 10 n.1.
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`see also EX2001, ¶ 15; EX2004 (noting “App” voted 2010 word of the year by the
`American Dialect Society). The customary and ordinary definition is software, as
`Petitioner admits.
`Nonetheless, Petition argues that “instant voice messaging application” must
`include “hardware such as a general purpose computer and display device 216”
`because Claims 1 and 6 each recite:
`
`wherein the instant voice messaging application displays a list of one
`or more potential recipients for the instant voice message
`Pet. 13. Petitioner’s argument is meritless.
`The ’433 Patent makes it clear that when the instant voice messaging
`application displays a list of one or more potential recipients for the instant voice
`message, that function is controlled by software that is executable by a processor to
`instruct a display device to do the displaying. The ’433 Patent describes that the
`displaying function (albeit under the command of software) is merely carried out by
`a hardware device—i.e., display device 216 connected to IVM client 208. “The IVM
`client 206 displays a list of the one or more IVM recipients on its associated
`display.” EX1001, 17:1-3. The fact that software controls a printer, for example,
`does not convert the software into hardware. EX2001 ¶¶ 50-53.
`The Board should reject Petitioner’s proposed construction, and therefore
`should reject Petitioner’s dependent corollary argument that the claimed “instant
`voice messaging application” is somehow made obvious by hardware in the Zydney
`or Clark references.
`
`14
`
`

`

`2.
`
`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`Petitioner’s Proposed Construction for “client platform system”
`Is Incorrect and Unnecessary.
`Petitioner’s equally-contorted argument that the term “client platform
`system” encompasses hardware should likewise be rejected as unsupported and
`contrary to the customary and ordinary meaning of “client platform.” Cf. Pet. at 33
`(“hardware including the client device (e.g., personal computer) and the
`microphone….”). Petitioner relies explicitly upon its incorrect construction to argue
`that the claimed client platform system is disclosed by Zydney. Pet. at 31-34;
`EX2001 ¶¶ 55-57.
`Petitioner’s claim construction should be rejected as inconsistent with at least
`the following description of the “client platform system” in the specification of the
`’433 Patent:
`
`the instant voice message client 208 comprises a client platform 302 for
`generating an instant voice message. . .. The client platform 302
`comprises a client engine 304, which controls other components,
`namely the document handler 306, file manager 308, audio file creation
`312, signal processing 314, encryption/decryption 316, and
`compression/decompression 318.
`EX1001 at 12:8-23 (underlining added). Fig. 3 of the ’433 Patent illustrates:
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`
`EX1001, Fig. 3 (red box added). Thus, Fig. 3 illustrates that the instant voice
`messaging client 208 includes a client platform 302 for generating an instant voice
`message. The client platform 302 includes a client engine 304 that controls other
`components that include the document handler 306 and the file manager 308 and
`components that handle audio file creation 312, signal processing 314, encryption
`and decryption 316, and compression and decompression 318. Further, the claimed
`client platform system is included in the claimed instant voice message application,
`which does not encompass hardware, as explained above. Thus, the claimed client
`platform system refers to software (as opposed to hardware). EX2001 ¶¶ 55-57.
`Accordingly, the Board should reject Petitioners’ erroneous construction and
`also reject Petitioner’s dependent corollary arguments that the claimed “client
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`platform system” is somehow made obvious by hardware in the Zydney or Clark
`references. See, e.g., Pet. 33 (arguing that “the software agent in Zydney generates
`a voice container by controlling various other components” such as a microphone
`and processor).
`
` No Prima Facie Obviousness
`For each one of the following independent reasons, Petitioner fails to present
`a prima facie case of obviousness of claims 1-8 challenged under Ground 1 or
`Ground 2. Petitioner offers weak to non-existent rationales to modify Zydney with
`Clark or Appelman and fails to treat the claims as a whole, while impermissibly
`relying on hindsight analysis to purportedly arrive at the claimed inventions. See In
`re Fine, 837 F.2d at 1075 (“One cannot use hindsight reconstruction to pick and
`choose among isolated disclosures … to deprecate the claimed invention.”); W.L.
`Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“To
`imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge of the invention in suit, when
`no … reference or references of record convey or suggest that knowledge, is to fall
`victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the
`inventor taught is used against its teacher.”).
`
`1. Claim 1 is not rendered obvious because Clark does not disclose or
`suggest “wherein the instant voice message is represented by a
`database record including a unique identifier”
`a. Clark lacks a database record in a message database, where that
`database record includes both a unique identifier and an instant
`voice message
`Independent claim 1 unambiguously requires that the claimed “database
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`record” must be part of the claimed “message database,” and the claimed database
`record must itself include both an instant voice message and a unique identifier.6
`The ’433 Patent specifies:
`
`The file manager accesses a message database 310, in which both the
`received and recorded instant voice messages are represented as
`database records, each record comprising a message identifier and the
`instant voice message.
`EX1001 at 12:34-40 (underlining added for clarity). Petitioner admits that Zydney
`lacks this element. Pet. at 48-50. Clark also lacks this element.
`Petitioner primarily cites to Fig. 5A of Clark and its associated description as
`allegedly disclosing the claimed database record. Pet. at 48-49. In particular, the
`Petition asserts that the “message store” of Clark discloses the claimed message
`database and that “StoreMessageID,” which is included in a MessageSummary table
`52, discloses the claimed unique identifier. Id. There are several issues with this
`mapping. First, in FIG. 5A, Clark shows the “MessageSummary table 52” as being
`outside the “message store 23.” EX1008.
`Second, the MessageSummary table 52 does not include any message data at
`all. Clark describes the contents of MessageSummary table 52 as follows:
`
`
`6 The language of the claim itself is the best guide to the meaning of its terms.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (“the context in which a term is used in the asserted
`claim can be highly instructive.”); Alloc, Inc. v. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d
`1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“‘Claim language generally carries the ordinary
`meaning of the words in their normal usage in the field of invention’ at the time of
`invention.”) (citation omitted).
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`The actual contents of the MessageSummary will vary depending upon
`the … implementation, but in a currently preferred embodiment …
`MessageSummary table 52 includes the following fields:
`
`EX1008 16:64-17:23.
`
`
`
`In Clark, the message data is included in a “Message table 54” that is separate
`from the MessageSummary table 52, as clearly shown in Fig. 5A. Petitioner has not
`shown that a single database record in Clark includes both a unique identifier and
`an instant voice message. Indeed, in Fig. 5A of Clark, the MessageSummary table
`and the Message table are in separate data stores (the catalog database 28 and the
`message store 23, respectively). A database record does not span multiple tables, let
`alone multiple tables from different data stores. The Petition notes that the catalog
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2017-2087
`U.S. Patent 8,995,433
`
`database 28 and the message store 23 of Clark can be combined, as in Fig. 5B. Pet.
`49. However, none of the tables shown in Fig. 5B of Clark includes a
`“StoreMessageID,” which is the only item of Clark that the Petition has asserted as
`disclosing the claimed unique identifier. Pet. 48-49; EX20

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket