`
`Filed on behalf of Valencell, Inc.
`By:
`Justin B. Kimble (JKimble-IPR@bcpc-law.com)
`Nicholas C Kliewer (nkliewer@bcpc-law.com)
`Jonathan H. Rastegar (jrastegar@bcpc-law.com)
`Bragalone Conroy PC
`2200 Ross Ave.
`Suite 4500 – West
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Tel: 214.785.6670
`Fax: 214.786.6680
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VALENCELL, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00318
`Pat. No. 8,886,269
`
`I. 
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`V. 
`
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
`A. 
`Summary of Patent Owner Valencell’s Argument ............................... 1 
`B. 
`Background ........................................................................................... 2 
`OVERVIEW OF THE ’269 PATENT ............................................................ 4 
`II. 
`III.  OVERVIEW OF THE PETITION .................................................................. 7 
`IV.  CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 8 
`A. 
`“generally cylindrical” (Claim 1) .......................................................... 9 
`B. 
`“cladding material” (Claim 1) ............................................................. 11 
`C. 
`“a layer of cladding material near the inner body portion inner surface”
`(Claim 1) .............................................................................................. 12 
`LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................. 15 
`A. 
`Standard for Instituting Petition .......................................................... 15 
`B. 
`Obviousness ......................................................................................... 16 
`VI.  PETITIONER FAILS TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF PROVING THE UNPATENTABILITY OF ANY CHALLENGED
`CLAIM........................................................................................................... 20 
`A. 
`Petitioner Offers Weak or Non-existent Rationales to Modify and Fails
`to Treat the Claims As a Whole Using Impermissible Hindsight
`Analysis to Purportedly Arrive at the Claimed Invention. .................. 20 
`1. 
`Ground 1: Petitioner Does Not Demonstrate that Claim 1 is
`Obvious Based on Asada. ......................................................... 20 
`Ground 6: Petitioner Fails to Show that Goodman Renders Claim
`1 Obvious. ................................................................................. 32 
`Petitioner Proposes Redundant Grounds for Challenging Claims 3-4,
`and 8-10. .............................................................................................. 42 
`VII.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 44 
`
`
`2. 
`
`B. 
`
`ii
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00318
`Pat. No. 8,886,269
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`
`Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
` 340 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 10
`
`AOL Inc. & Cloudera, Inc., v. Coho Licensing LLC,
` No. IPR2014-00966, 2014 WL 6666765 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2014) ................... 18
`
`Apple, Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
` No. IPR2015-00357, 2015 WL 9899009 (P.T.A.B. June 29, 2015) ............ 16, 18
`
`Apple, Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
` No. IPR2015-00358, 2015 WL 9899010 (P.T.A.B. July 2, 2015) ...................... 17
`
`ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.,
` 159 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1998).............................................................................. 18
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
` 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) ........................................................................................... 9
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
` 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ................................................................................................. 16
`
`Heart Failure Tech. v. Cardiokinetix, Inc.,
` No. IPR2013-00183, Paper 12 at 9 (P.T.A.B. July 31, 2013) ...................... 17, 32
`
`In re Chaganti,
` 554 Fed. Appx. 917 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................ 16, 26
`
`In re Fine,
` 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)..................................................................... 19, 27
`
`In re Gorman,
` 933 F.2d 982 (Fed. Cir. 1991).............................................................................. 17
`
`In re Kahn,
` 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006).............................................................................. 16
`
`iii
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00318
`Pat. No. 8,886,269
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
` 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................... 14, 15, 24
`
`In re Morris,
` 127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .............................................................................. 9
`
`In re Ratti,
` 270 F.2d 810 (CCPA 1959) ................................................................................. 15
`
`In re Trans logic Tech., Inc.,
` 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007).............................................................................. 9
`
`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
` 550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................ 15, 17, 32
`
`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
` No. CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at 3 (P.T.A.B. October 25, 2012) ...................... 34
`
`N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.,
` 415 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................ 10
`
`Neil Ziegman, N.P.Z., Inc. v. Stephens,
`
`IPR2015-1860, Paper 11 at 18 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2016) .................................... 14
`
`Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC,
` No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180 (P.T.A.B. June 13, 2013) ................... 34
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,
` 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998).............................................................................. 9
`
`Rolls Royce PLC v. United Techs. Corp.,
` 603 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................ 18
`
`Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc.,
` 810 F.2d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987).............................................................................. 9
`
`Ube Maxell Co., Ltd. v. Celgard, LLC,
`
`IPR2015-01511, Paper 10 at 20-23 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2016) ............................... 15
`
`Vandenberg v. Dairy Equipment Co.,
` 740 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984)............................................................................ 17
`
`iv
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00318
`Pat. No. 8,886,269
`W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
` 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)............................................................................ 27
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ............................................................................................... 35
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ............................................................................................ 14, 36
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ................................................................................................... 14
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ................................................................................................... 14
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) .............................................................................................. 36
`
`Other Authorities
`
`MPEP § 2143.01 ...................................................................................................... 15
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 14
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00318
`Pat. No. 8,886,269
`
`PATENT OWNER’S EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Exhibit No. Description
`2001
`S. LeBoeuf, et al., Earbud-Based Sensor for the Assessment of
`Energy Expenditure, HR, and VO2max, OFFICIAL J. AM. C.
`SPORTS M., 2014, 1046–1052
`Biometrics Lab: Performance of Leading Optical Heart Rate
`Monitors During Interval Exercise Conditions
`Valencell website (http://valencell.com/customers/)
`CTA - It Is Innovation (i3) Magazine 2016 Innovation-
`Entrepreneur Awards
`
`2003
`2004
`
`2002
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Valencell Inc. (“Valencell” or “Patent Owner”) respectfully
`
`submits this Preliminary Response in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.107, responding to the Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) (Paper
`
`2) of U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269 (the “’269 Patent”) (Ex. 1001) filed by Apple Inc.
`
`(“Apple” or “Petitioner”). Valencell requests that the Board deny institution of inter
`
`partes review for several reasons summarized below.
`
`While it is not required to file a Preliminary Response (37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a)),
`
`Valencell takes this limited opportunity to point out certain substantive and
`
`procedural reasons the Board should not institute trial. For purposes of this
`
`Preliminary Response, Patent Owner has limited its identification of deficiencies in
`
`the Petition and does not intend to waive any arguments not addressed in this
`
`Preliminary Response.
`
`Summary of Patent Owner Valencell’s Argument
`
`A.
`Petitioner fails to demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood of proving
`
`the unpatentability of any challenged claim. First, Petitioner fails to show sufficient
`
`rationales to combine or modify the prior art references, picks and chooses elements
`
`from disparate embodiments, and does not undertake a proper analysis of the
`
`Graham factors – indicating the failure to treat the claims as a whole and use of
`
`impermissible hindsight analysis to purportedly arrive at what the claimed invention
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`is. Second, Petitioner fails to show that elements are disclosed by the prior art. Third,
`
`Petitioner proposes redundant grounds for the unpatentability of claims 3-4 and 8-
`
`10.
`
`Background
`
`B.
`Valencell was founded in 2006 by three Ph.D. electrical engineers with more
`
`than 50 years of combined experience in research and development. Since its
`
`founding, Valencell has steadily grown to roughly 30 employees and has become a
`
`leading innovator in biometric wearables. Valencell’s technology is used to power
`
`the most accurate wearable biometric heart rate sensors on the market. For example,
`
`when benchmarked against a chest strap, Valencell’s sensors were far more accurate
`
`than the leading industry competitors’ products:
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`
`
`See Ex. 2002. Valencell powered products have received industry praise and won
`
`numerous awards from CES, Red Dot, Stuff TV, and more. See, e.g., Ex. 2004 at 2-
`
`3. Valencell’s ground-breaking technology has served and continues to serve as an
`
`industry benchmark and has been independently validated by the Center for Living
`
`of Duke University, North Carolina State University, the Human Performance
`
`Laboratory, and a fellow of the American College of Sports Medicine. See Ex. 2001.
`
`As a result of its unparalleled accuracy, Valencell powers more biometrics
`
`wearables than any other company in the world. Valencell’s innovations have
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`resulted in industry recognition, numerous awards, and dozens of U.S. patents,
`
`including U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269, the patent at issue in this proceeding. Valencell
`
`also licenses its patent portfolio to consumer electronics manufacturers, mobile
`
`device and accessory makers, sports and fitness brands, gaming companies, and
`
`military suppliers for integration into their products. Numerous consumer
`
`electronics manufacturers have recognized the need for this patented technology and
`
`partnered with Valencell. Such partners include major technology companies like:
`
`Samsung, LG, Sony, Bose, and Intel. See, e.g., Ex. 2003.
`
`II. OVERVIEW OF THE ’269 PATENT
`The ’269 Patent, entitled “Wearable Light-Guiding Bands for Physiological
`
`Monitoring,” relates to an apparatus having an improved configuration for
`
`physiological monitoring. ’269 Patent, Ex. 1001, Field of the Invention, 1:20-23;
`
`Claim 1. In particular, the ’269 Patent discloses a novel monitoring device including
`
`a band capable of encircling a portion of the body. ’269 Patent, Abstract. The band
`
`includes a particular arrangement of light transmissive material in optical
`
`communication with an attached optical emitter and optical detector and is
`
`configured to effectively deliver light from the optical emitter at least one location
`
`of the subject’s body and to collect light from at least one location of the subject’s
`
`body and deliver the collected light to the optical detector. Id. at 30:30-53. The
`
`monitoring device band has a particularly claimed arrangement of a window formed
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`in the cladding material that serves as a light-guiding interface to the subject’s body.
`
`Id.
`
`Figures 22A and 22B show an embodiment of the apparatus:
`
`
`
`The “monitoring device 70 includes a generally circular band capable of encircling
`
`a finger F of a subject, with a cylindrical outer body portion 72 and a generally
`
`cylindrical inner body portion 74” Id. at 27:58-28:10.
`
`As shown in the example above, “the base 50 supports an optical emitter 24,
`
`an optical detector 26, and an optical noise detector 26′.” Id. at 28:11-17. The inner
`
`body portion 74 includes light transmissive material (highlighted yellow) for
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`example, a soft, resilient material, such as silicone that can deform when a finger of
`
`a subject is inserted therethrough. Id. at 28:18-25.
`
`A layer of cladding material 21 (outer blue layer) is applied to (or near) the
`
`outer surface 74a of the inner body portion and a layer of cladding material 21 (inner
`
`blue layer) is applied to (or near) the inner surface 74b of the inner body portion as
`
`illustrated, to define a light-guiding region 19. As such, the inner body portion serves
`
`as a light guide that delivers light from the optical emitter to the subject’s finger F
`
`at one or more predetermined locations and that collects light from the finger and
`
`delivers the collected light to the optical detectors.
`
`As shown, windows 74w are formed in the cladding material and serve as
`
`light-guiding interfaces to the finger. Though there may be any number of these
`
`windows, as may be required for sufficient optical coupling, and the windows may
`
`include lenses 74wL to focus light emitted by the optical emitter onto one or more
`
`portions of a finger and/or to focus collected light on the light detectors. Similarly,
`
`the windows may include optical filters 74wF to selectively pass one or more optical
`
`wavelengths and reflect and/or absorb other optical wavelengths.
`
`As shown, the light-guiding region includes light blocking members 80 that
`
`isolate the light emitter and light detector from each other. In some embodiments,
`
`for example, an additional blocking member, as illustrated, allows the only light
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`reaching the optical detector to be light passing through at least one portion of the
`
`finger.
`
`The Petition attempts to characterize the ’269 patent as doing “nothing more
`
`than recit[ing] what was already in the public domain.” Pet. at 1. But, as discussed
`
`above and further analyzed below, the Petition mischaracterizes the prior art and the
`
`reasons that persons of ordinary skill would have modified or combined them. While
`
`the cited prior art discloses some of the same basic elements of an optical biosensor,
`
`none of the prior art references disclose, teach, or suggest, separately or in
`
`combination, all of the limitations of any of the claims. Thus, no prima facie case of
`
`obviousness is made because the Petitioner has not shown that one having ordinary
`
`skill in the art would have combined the cited art since the proposed combinations
`
`of prior art do not result in disclosure of the claimed invention.
`
`III. OVERVIEW OF THE PETITION
`Apple’s Petition requests review of claims 1-10, which comprise the apparatus
`
`claims of the ’269 Patent. Pet. at 6. Claim 1 is the sole independent claim. See Ex.
`
`1001, 30:30-31:30. Petitioner asserts twelve separate Grounds for review, all based
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.1 Pet. 6. The following table summarizes the
`
`Grounds for each claim that Petitioner is asserting:
`
`Ground References Combined
`
`Claim(s)
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`
`Asada
`Asada & Hicks
`Asada & Hannula
`Asada & Delonzor
`Asada & Al-Ali
`Goodman
`Goodman & Hicks
`Goodman & Hannula
`Goodman, Hannula, Asada
`Goodman & Asada
`Goodman & Delonzor
`Goodman & Al-Ali
`
`1-2, 6-7
`3
`4-5
`8
`9-10
`1-2
`3
`4
`5
`6-7
`8
`9-10
`
`Basis
`
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`In an inter partes review, “[a] claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its
`
`broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
`
`it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
`
`
`1 Because the application ultimately granted as U.S. Pat. No. 8,886,269 was
`
`filed prior to March 16, 2013, Patent Owner refers herein to the Pre-AIA statutes
`
`unless otherwise indicated.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`2131, 2142 (2016). Although claim terms are given their broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation, claims are not interpreted in a vacuum but are part of and read in light
`
`of the specification. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1987). The terms are also given their ordinary and customary meaning, as
`
`would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the
`
`specification. In re Trans logic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with
`
`the inventor’s description is likely the correct interpretation. Renishaw PLC v.
`
`Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`A claim term is presumed to be given its ordinary and customary meaning
`
`absent the patent clearly setting forth a different definition of the term in the
`
`specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`Petitioner proposes the construction of three claim terms “generally
`
`cylindrical,” “cladding material,” and “near.”
`
`“generally cylindrical” (Claim 1)
`
`A.
`Petitioner suggests that this term be construed as “having a convex shape.”
`
`Pet. at 13. Petitioner cites its expert declaration: “This clarifies that the term is not
`
`limited to a precise cylinder shape.” Id. at 13-14. Patent Owner agrees that a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that the modifier ‘generally’
`
`indicates that the term being modified is not precise,” therefore, the ’269 patent
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`claims do not require that the inner and outer body portions are precisely
`
`“cylindrical.” Pet. at 14.
`
`But Petitioner’s proposed construction of “generally cylindrical” deprives the
`
`term of its plain and ordinary meaning. The phrase generally cylindrical “envisions
`
`some amount of deviation from exactly” cylindrical. See Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
`
`Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“we hold
`
`that the phrase ‘generally parallel’ envisions some amount of deviation from exactly
`
`parallel.”). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “words of approximation, such as
`
`‘generally’ and ‘substantially,’ are descriptive terms commonly used in patent
`
`claims to avoid a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter.” Id. at 1310-
`
`11 (internal quotations omitted).
`
`Nevertheless, Petitioner’s proposed construction ignores the understanding of
`
`a person having ordinary skill in the art that “generally” is understood as not
`
`requiring something precisely, and attempts to broaden the meaning of “cylindrical”
`
`such that no amount of cylindrical-ness is required, thus broadening the element
`
`beyond a reasonable interpretation and effectively disregarding the limitation. Prior
`
`construction rulings from the Federal Circuit also bely such a construction. For
`
`example, the Federal Circuit found that “generally convex” required that the
`
`“majority of points be convex.” N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.,
`
`415 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Patent Owner does not believe that this term
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`requires construction; however, to the extent that the Board wishes to construe this
`
`term, Patent Owner proposes that the construction should be “having the
`
`predominant shape of a cylinder.”
`
`“cladding material” (Claim 1)
`
`B.
`Petitioner improperly proposes that the term “cladding material” should be
`
`construed as “a material that blocks or reflects at least some light.” This proposed
`
`construction is fundamentally flawed and should be rejected. Specifically,
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction distorts the plain and ordinary meaning found
`
`within the intrinsic record. Petitioner proposes that “cladding material” be limited to
`
`the blocking or reflection of some of the light. But Petitioner’s argument
`
`unnecessarily focuses on a few words in the specification and distorts the context.
`
`By contrast, the specification for the ’269 patent describes that the cladding
`
`material confines the light to a certain region. In particular, the ’269 patent discusses
`
`that what qualifies as cladding material is a function of the index of refraction of the
`
`light guiding region and defines the light guiding region. For example, where the
`
`light-guiding region is “silicone or other soft material,” the outer cladding “may be
`
`air, a polymer, plastic, or a soft material having a lower index of refraction than
`
`silicone.” ’269 patent at 13:46-52.
`
`11
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`

`

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`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
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` “The light guiding region 19 of the light guide 18 in the illustrated
`
`embodiment of FIG. 3 is defined by cladding material 21 that helps confine light
`
`within the light guiding region 19.” ’269 patent at 14:58-61 (emphasis added).
`
`A layer of cladding material 21 is applied to (or near) the outer surface
`74a of the inner body portion 74 and a layer of cladding material 21 is
`applied to (or near) the inner surface 74b of the inner body portion 74,
`as illustrated, to define a 45 light-guiding region 19.
`’269 patent at 29:42-46.
`
`The cladding 21 may be a layer of material applied to one or more
`portions of the inner and/or outer surfaces 18a, 18b of the light guide
`18. In some embodiments, the outer surface 16a of the earbud housing
`16 may serve as cladding that confines light within the light-guiding
`region 19.
`’269 patent at 14:65-15:3 (emphasis added).
`
`Thus, as supported by the intrinsic record, and as a person having ordinary
`
`skill in the art would have understood, “cladding material” should be construed as
`
`“a material that confines light within a region.”
`
`C.
`
`“a layer of cladding material near the inner body portion inner
`surface” (Claim 1)
`
`Claim 1 requires, among other limitations, “a layer of cladding material near
`
`the inner body portion inner surface.” As best illustrated in the embodiment shown
`
`in Figure 22B, the ’269 patent describes that a “layer of cladding material 21 is
`
`applied to (or near) the outer surface 74a of the inner body portion 74 and a layer of
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`cladding material 21 is applied to (or near) the inner surface 74b of the inner body
`
`portion 74.” ’269 patent at 28:26-29. Claim 1 specifically recites the latter (annotated
`
`in dark blue below).
`
`
`
`’269 patent, Fig. 22B (annotated).
`
`Without providing any reasoning, Petitioner asserts that “near” means “within
`
`a short distance.” Pet. at 16. Petitioner is seeking to construe the term in a way that
`
`strips the term “near” of any meaning. Indeed, Petitioner counts on employing this
`
`vague construction to include a region that lies completely outside the outer surface
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-00318
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
`
`of the inner body portion. The following image illustrates the area that Petitioner
`
`seeks to encompass with its proposed construction of “near”:
`
`
`
`’269 patent, Fig. 22B (annotated).
`
`Patent Owner does not consider that the term “near” needs to be construed.
`
`However, if the Board should decide to construe the term, it should be construed as
`
`“on or next to” as it would have been used in its ordinary meaning by a person having
`
`ordinary skill in light of Fig. 22B above and the associated text in the specification.
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`See ’269 patent at 29:42-46; 14:65-15:3.
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`V. LEGAL STANDARDS
`A.
`Standard for Instituting Petition
`An IPR is improper unless “the information presented in the petition . . . shows
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`that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to
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`at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “[T]he
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`petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a
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`preponderance of the evidence.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Thus, the review should not be
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`instituted unless Petitioners have shown a likelihood of success on the invalidity
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`grounds as presented in the Petition. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d
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`1364, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Board must base its decision on arguments
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`that were advanced by a party, and to which the opposing party was given a chance
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`to respond.”). “The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found
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`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)
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`(emphasis added).
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`“In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding . . . the Director
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`may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same
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`or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the
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`Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added); see also Neil Ziegman, N.P.Z., Inc.
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`v. Stephens, IPR2015-1860, Paper 11 at 18 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2016) (“Under these
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`facts, we are unpersuaded that adjudicating such a dispute on an already-considered
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,269
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`issue is an efficient use of Board resources.”); c.f. Ube Maxell Co., Ltd. v. Celgard,
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`LLC, IPR2015-01511, Paper 10 at 20-23 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2016) (finding that the
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`existence of multiple prior PTO proceedings “weigh[s] in favor of denying the
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`Petition”).
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`“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ
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`mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific
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`reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of
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`obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools, 829 F.3d at 1380. “If the proposed
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`modification or combination of the prior art would change the principle of operation
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`of the prior art invention being modified, then the teachings of the references are not
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`sufficient to render the claims prima facie obvious.” MPEP § 2143.01 (citing In re
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`Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959)).
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`B. Obviousness
`The standard for finding a claim to be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
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`well-established:
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`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are
`such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the
`time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
`to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
`U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the
`basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and
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`content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject
`matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in
`evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere
`Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).2
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`Apple, Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., No. IPR2015-00357, 2015 WL
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`9899009, at *4 (P.T.A.B. June 29, 2015).
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`In making such factual determinations, “rejections on obviousness Grounds
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`cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
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`articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
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`conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
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`(emphasis added). See also In re Chaganti, 554 Fed. Appx. 917, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
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`(“It is not enough to say that there would have been a reason to combine two
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`references because to do so would ‘have been obvious to one of ordinary skill.’ Such
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`circular reasoning is not sufficient—more is needed to sustain an obviousness
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`rejection.”).
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`Furthermore, the petition “must show some reason why a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art would have thought to combine particular available elements of
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`knowledge, as evidenced by the prior art, to reach the claimed invention.” Heart
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`Failure Tech. v. Cardiokinetix, Inc., No. IPR2013-00183, Paper 12 at 9 (P.T.A.B.
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`
`2 These factors are referred to as the “Graham factors” or “Graham analysis.”
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`July 31, 2013) (emphasis added); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
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`398, 418 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious
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`merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the
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`prior art.”). Finally, “[i]t is impermissible, however, simply to engage in a hindsight
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`reconstruction of the claimed invention, using the applicant’s structure as a
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`template and selecting elements from references to fill the gaps.” In re
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`Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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`When combining references, a petitioner must provide a discussion “showing
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`how the prior art renders obvious any particular claim, as a whole, being
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`challenged.” Apple, Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., No. IPR2015-00358, Paper
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`9 at 10 (P.T.A.B. July 2, 2015) (emphasis in original). See also Vandenberg v. Dairy
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`Equipment Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that, to find a claim
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`obvious, even if “all of the elements in the claimed invention are disclosed in the
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`prior art, . . . the invention as a whole must have been obvious to one skilled in the
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`art at the time it was made, and, in order to combine the teachings of the prior art
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`references, the prior art must suggest the desirability of the combination”) (emphasis
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`added).
`
` Obviousness is a question of law “based on underlying factual findings,
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`including the differences between the claims and the prior art.” AOL Inc. &
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`Cloudera, Inc., v. Coho Licensing LLC, No. IPR2014-00966, 2014 WL 6666765, at
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`*6 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2014). Thus, “[a] petitioner who does not state the differences
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`between a challenged claim and the prior art, and relies instead on the Patent Owner
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`and the Board to determine those differences risks having the corresponding Ground
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`of obviousness not included for trial for failing to adequately state a claim for relief.”
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`Id. Failure to analyze the differences between the challenged claims and prior art, or
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`any of the other Graham factors, constitutes a failure to perform the Graham analysis
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`and is sufficient reason to deny a petition. See Apple, Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings,
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`Inc., No. IPR2015-00357, 2015 WL 9899009, at *4 (P.T.A.B. June 29, 2015); see
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`also ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Graham fac