IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
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`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO, INC.
`
`Petitioner
`v.
`
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Patent No. 8,155,342
`Issue Date: April 10, 2012
`Title: MULTIMEDIA DEVICE INTEGRATION SYSTEM
`__________________________________________________________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`Case No. IPR2016-01473
`__________________________________________________________________
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`I.
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`II.
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................... 1
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`III. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PETITIONER
`HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF SUCCESS FOR GROUNDS 1-7 .............................................................. 4
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`A.
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`B.
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`Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. §
`103. ........................................................................................................ 4
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`Grounds 1-3 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Obvious Over Marlowe, Plagge, Riggs, and/or
`Bhogal.................................................................................................... 7
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`Petitioner Does Not Demonstrate that Marlowe Discloses
`an “Integration Subsystem” ........................................................ 7
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`The Combination of Marlowe and Plagge Does Not
`Disclose the Claimed Integration Subsystem ............................. 9
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`Under Petitioner’s Interpretation, the Marlowe Reference
`Supports the Claims in Ground 1 and is Not Prior Art ............. 11
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`C.
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`Grounds 2 and 3 Should Be Denied. ................................................... 13
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`D. Ground 7 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Obvious Over Simon in View of Bhogal .................. 15
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`E.
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`F.
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`Grounds 1-3 and 5-7 Should Not Be Instituted Because
`Petitioner Fails To Establish Fundamental Requirements for
`Proving Obviousness ........................................................................... 17
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`Ground 4 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Anticipated By Silvester ........................................... 23
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`G. Grounds 5-6 Should Not Be Instituted Because Simon and
`Kandler Are Not Offered To Disclose, Nor Do They Disclose,
`“Audio Generated By the Portable Device,” As Required By
`The Challenged Claims ....................................................................... 25
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`IPR2016-01473
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 27
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ ..27
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`IV.
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`iii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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` Page(s)
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`Cases
`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00355 (PTAB, June 26, 2015) .............................................................. 5
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`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.,
` IPR2013-00387 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014) ............................................................. 6
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`Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-00454 (PTAB, Aug. 29, 2014) ........................................................ 6, 24
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`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 17
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`Indus. v. Zipshade Indus.,
`IPR2015-00488 (PTAB, July 24, 2015) ............................................................... 5
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`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 5
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .............................................................................. 5, 6, 17, 22
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`Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00939 (PTAB, Dec. 17, 2014) .............................................................. 6
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`Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
`868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .......................................................................... 23
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`Unified Patents Inc., v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`IPR2016-00118 (PTAB, April 27, 2016) ....................................................... 8, 25
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`Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California,
`814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ............................................................................ 23
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................... 23
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 .......................................................................................................... 4
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 4
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ...................................................................................... 4, 6, 18
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ...................................................................................... 3, 22
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`v
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Patent Owner, Blitzsafe Texas, LLC (“Patent Owner”), submits this
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`Preliminary Response to the Petition filed by American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
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`(“Petitioner”) requesting inter partes review of Claims 49, 53, 54, 56, 57, 62, 66,
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`70, 73, 77, and 78 (the “Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,155,342 (“the
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`’342 Patent”). The Petition is deficient on each alleged ground and should not be
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`instituted.
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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`II.
`Grounds 1-3 and 7 suffer from oversimplification. Petitioner consistently
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`advances the argument that a wired system can be seamlessly overlaid with
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`“wireless capability” to achieve the ’342 Patent’s claimed invention. Petitioner
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`makes such arguments without any explanation as to how one of ordinary skill in
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`the art would specifically combine the references to meet each portion of the
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`claimed invention.
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`Grounds 1-3 and 5-7 present incomplete, unpatentability arguments that
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`disregard well-established requirements for determining obviousness. The Petition
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`makes no reference to the required “level of ordinary skill in the art” despite
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`supporting its obviousness arguments with what would have been obvious to a
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`person having ordinary skill in the art. Further, Petitioner submits contradictory
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`statements in its obviousness Grounds 1-3 and 7, resulting in a failure to: identify
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`and explain the differences of the claims and the references; show how the
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`combinations teach each claimed element; provide a fact-based rationale for
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`combining the references; and explain the specific ways the references are to be
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`combined. For example, Petitioner admits that Marlowe does not disclose wireless
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`interface and wireless communication link limitation and attempts to cure the
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`admitted deficiencies by advancing the Plagge reference, but inexplicably argues
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`that Marlowe discloses the “said wireless communication link” elements in
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`subsequent limitations.
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`Grounds 4-6 fail because Silvester is silent regarding “audio generated by
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`the portable device” and an “integration subsystem” as required by the claims.
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`Petitioner admits that Silvester’s media player merely transfers a “playback signal”
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`to the system, instead of sending the required generated audio. Silvester expressly
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`describes, and Petitioner admits that the received playback signal is encrypted and
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`compressed at the media player; that the received playback signal is decompressed
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`and decoded only at the system’s decoder; and that playing back audio is achieved
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`by converting the playback signal into an audio signal at the system’s signal
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`converter.
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`Moreover, Silvester does not disclose an “integration subsystem.” Petitioner
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`labels components of the automobile entertainment system 100 as a “subordinate
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`integration subsystem” when, in fact, Silvester discloses no subordinate
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`relationship between the identified components of the automobile entertainment
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`system and those which Petitioner does not include in the “integration subsystem.”
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`Petitioner’s choice of components to label as the “integration subsystem” is an
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`exercise in hindsight in an attempt to meet the limitations of the Challenged
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`Claims.
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`Last, in addition to the above deficiencies, Petitioner’s request for inter
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`partes review should be denied for at least the following reasons addressed more
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`fully below in this Preliminary Response:
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`(1) The Petition does not “specify where each element of the claim is found
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`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon,” as required by
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), because the Petition has at least one of the following
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`deficiencies: (i) failing to map each claim term to a specific teaching from an
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`asserted reference; (ii) providing citations to the asserted references that do not
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`teach the claim elements against which such citations are applied; and
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`(iii) mischaracterizing the citations to the asserted references.
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`(2) The Petition fails to identify the difference(s) between the claims and the
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`asserted references as required by Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
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`(1966).
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`(3) The Petition fails to identify the level of skill in the art as required by
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`Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18.
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`(4) The Petition improperly attempts to support its assertions of obviousness
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`with mere conclusory statements and by impermissibly incorporating by reference
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`arguments from the Geier Declaration (Ex. 1007) in violation of 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.6(a)(3).
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`Due to at least these deficiencies, the Petition does not establish “a
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`reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one
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`of the claims challenged in the Petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Patent Owner
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`explicitly reserves the right to provide further distinctions between the prior art and
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`the Challenged Claims. The deficiencies of the Petition noted herein, however, are
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`sufficient for the Board to find that Petitioner has not met its burden to
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`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing
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`unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Patent Owner, therefore,
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`respectfully requests denial of the Petition.
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`III. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PETITIONER
`HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF SUCCESS FOR GROUNDS 1-7
`A. Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
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`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any
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`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of
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`skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations.
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Graham, 383 U.S. 1, at 17–18. The Board has held that a failure to identify the
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`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art is fatal to an
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`obviousness challenge. See, Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc., IPR2015-
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`00355, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 9 at 9–10
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`(PTAB, June 26, 2015) (denying institution for failure to identify the differences
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`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art).
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`Furthermore, in proposing that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
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`of the invention would have combined the references in a particular way to meet
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`the claimed invention, an obviousness analysis must support the proposed
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`combination with “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning.”
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441
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`F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). A proposed combination cannot be supported
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`based on “mere conclusory statements.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
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`In a petition seeking institution of an inter partes review, “articulated
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`reasons with rational underpinnings” must be found in the petition itself. Whole
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`Space Indus. v. Zipshade Indus., IPR2015-00488, Decision Denying Institution of
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`Inter Partes Review, Paper 14 at 15 (PTAB, July 24, 2015) (“[C]onclusory labels
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`do not substitute for a fact-based analysis in the Petition establishing what is being
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`modified, and why it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to
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`make the modification”). Id. at 17. The arguments needed to support a conclusion
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`of obviousness may not be incorporated by reference to another document. 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one
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`document into another document.”); Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
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`IPR2014-00454, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 12 at
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`10 (PTAB, Aug. 29, 2014); see also, Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
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`IPR2014-00939, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 8 at
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`15 (PTAB Dec. 17, 2014).
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`As set forth below, this Petition is deficient because it fails to meet the
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`fundamental requirements for demonstrating invalidity. First, the Petition does not
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`explain how the combinations of references teach each element of each claim. See,
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`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V., IPR2013-00387, Paper 43 at
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`30–31 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014). Second, the Petition fails to satisfy the tests of KSR
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`and Graham because it does not identify the differences between the claims and
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`the asserted references; neglects to provide a fact-based rationale for combining the
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`references; and does not explain the specific ways the references are to be
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`combined. Whole Space Indus., IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 at 9 (“[R]egarding the
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`grounds based on obviousness, the Petition does not articulate specific
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`modifications of the references that support its asserted obviousness grounds, nor
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`does it provide a persuasive rationale for the proposed combinations of
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`references.”). Finally, in plain violation of the Graham and KSR tests, no level of
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`ordinary skill in the art is provided in the Petition.
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`B. Grounds 1-3 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged Claims
`Are Not Obvious Over Marlowe, Plagge, Riggs, and/or Bhogal
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`Petitioner incorrectly argues that the Challenged Claims are obvious over
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`“Marlowe in view of Plagge” (Ground 1)(Pet. at 9), “Marlowe in view of Plagge
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`and further in view of Riggs” (Ground 2) (Pet. at 22), and “Marlowe in view of
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`Plagge and in further view of Bhogal” (Ground 3) (Pet. at 23). In all three of these
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`Grounds, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to “apply the wireless
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`capability of the interface emulator of Plagge” to Marlowe. Pet. at 17. Essentially,
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`Petitioner submits that Marlowe’s interface can simply be overlaid with “wireless
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`capability” to achieve the ’342 Patent’s claimed elements. Petitioner’s argument
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`fails for several reasons. First, Petitioner’s “add wireless” argument is not
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`supported by the references and fails to demonstrate how one of ordinary skill in
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`the art would have modified the references to meet the claimed invention. Second,
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`with regard to the “integration subsystem” limitations, Petitioner’s support is
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`deficient because it only cites to Marlowe even though the integration subsystem
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`includes several specific wireless limitations.
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`1. Petitioner Does Not Demonstrate that Marlowe Discloses an
`“Integration Subsystem”
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`For Grounds 1-3, Petitioner admits that Marlowe does not disclose “a first
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`wireless interface in communication with said integration subsystem, said first
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`wireless interface establishing a wireless communication link with a second
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`interface in communication with a portable device external to the car audio/video
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`system” as recited in Claim 49. Pet. at 12. Petitioner attempts to cure the admitted
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`deficiencies by alleging that Plagge discloses “a first wireless interface,” “a second
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`wireless interface,” and “a wireless communication link” as recited in Claim 49.
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`But Petitioner glosses over several other limitations in its analysis. Petitioner fails
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`to explain how the combination teaches (1) an “integration subsystem,” (2)
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`“wireless link” limitations (“obtains, using said wireless communication link,
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`information about an audio file stored on the portable device,” and “receives audio
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`generated by the portable device over said wireless communication link for playing
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`on the car audio/video system”). Ex. 1001 at Claim 49.
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`Petitioner argues that Marlowe’s interface is an “integration subsystem”
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`under the claims, Pet. at 11-12, 14, but nowhere does Petitioner explain how the
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`interface of Marlowe is a “subsystem,” i.e., “subordinate to another system” as
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`required by the Board. See, Unified Patents Inc., v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
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`IPR2016-00118, Paper No. 19, Decision Denying Institution at 10, (P.T.A.B.,
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`April 27, 2016) (finding that the plain meaning of “subsystem” requires that the
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`subsystem be subordinate to another system). Petitioner simply labels the interface
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`of Marlowe as a subsystem and describes how the interface performs the functions
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`of the integration subsystem, Pet. at 11, without identifying the system to which it
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`is subordinate. Petitioner has, therefore, failed to point to the claimed “integration
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`subsystem” in Marlowe.
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`Although Petitioner does not argue in the body of the Petition or the claim
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`chart that Plagge discloses an integration subsystem, Petitioner does make one
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`passing reference to Plagge disclosing an integration subsystem:
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`Claim 49 also requires “a first wireless interface in communication
`with said integration subsystem.” Marlowe does not disclose this
`limitation, but Plagge does. Plagge discloses that interface emulator 4
`(the integration subsystem) includes a wireless interface 5.
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`Pet. at 12. Even if Petitioner had explicitly relied on the interface emulator 4 as
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`embodying the integration subsystem, Petitioner’s argument would fail for the
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`same reason as its argument with respect to Marlowe: Petitioner does not show
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`that the interface emulator 4 is a subsystem of, or subordinate to, any other system.
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`Accordingly, neither Marlowe nor Plagge disclose the claimed “integration
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`subsystem.”
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`2. The Combination of Marlowe and Plagge Does Not Disclose the
`Claimed Integration Subsystem
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`The combination of Marlowe and Plagge does not disclose the claimed
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`integration subsystem because the “wireless communication link” of Plagge, when
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`substituted for the wired connection between Marlowe’s interface and portable
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`device, does not “receive[] audio generated by the portable device over said
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`wireless communication link for playing on the car audio/video system” as
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`required by the claims. In Plagge, the audio from the portable device is transmitted
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`directly from the portable device 7 to the car audio/video system 1 through an
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`audio input 3, which is disclosed to be a wired connection. See Ex. 1011 ¶ [17].
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`Therefore, Plagge does not teach a wireless communication link to a portable
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`device that receives audio generated by the portable device as set forth in the
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`Challenged Claims. In fact, Plagge teaches away from using the limited bandwidth
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`of a wireless communication link to send audio in addition to the control signals
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`and data transmitted through the wireless link in Plagge.
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`Even if Plagge supplied the “wireless communication link” of the
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`Challenged Claims, Petitioner fails to explain how the interface of Marlowe is
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`modified by one of ordinary skill in the art to work with the wireless interfaces and
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`communication link of Plagge to arrive at the claimed invention. Petitioner simply
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`assumes that the wired connections and electrical connectors of Marlowe’s
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`interface can be replaced with the wireless interfaces and wireless link of Plagge
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`without any modifications to the interface of Marlowe to account for wireless
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`communications. Petitioner provides no basis for this assumption and no
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`reasoning to support the combination of the structures of Marlowe and Plagge to
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`implement the interface of Marlowe in a wireless configuration. Accordingly,
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`Grounds 1-3 should be denied because Petitioner failed to explain how one of
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`ordinary skill in the art would specifically combine the references.
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`3. Under Petitioner’s Interpretation, the Marlowe Reference
`Supports the Claims in Ground 1 and is Not Prior Art
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`In its chart comparing the prior art to independent Claim 49, Petitioner only
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`cites to the Plagge reference to allegedly teach the “first wireless interface” and
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`“second wireless interface.” Pet. at 15. Petitioner attempts to justify this
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`combination because of the prevalence of wireless technologies as replacements
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`for connections. Petitioner cites to a 2002 publication:
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`wireless technologies such as Bluetooth were well known in the art as
`a substitute for cables that traditionally connected portable devices.
`Id.; see JENNIFER BRAY & CHARLES F. STURMAN,
`BLUETOOTH 1.1 CONNECT WITHOUT CABLES xxiii, 1, 2nd ed.
`2002, Ex. 1017.
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`Pet. at 17. The Bray reference further states:
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`Why the title? Well, “Connect Without Cables” is basically what
`Bluetooth started out doing. It's a short range wireless communication
`system, and the word “wireless” pretty much says it all. The first
`applications people came up with were all about throwing away the
`clutter of cables that plagues modern portable devices—Bluetooth
`took away the cable dangling from a headset, removed the clutter of
`wires at the back of a PC, and let a phone talk to a PDA without
`needing a cable that took up more pocket space than either device.
`Now there are more imaginative uses than straight cable replacement,
`from small wireless office networks to the much hyped Personal Area
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Network, or PAN. But the basic functionality that Bluetooth provides
`is still the same: connection without cables.
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`Ex. 1017 at 15. However, Petitioner cannot have it both ways. If Petitioner were
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`correct, and if such wireless connections were truly as ubiquitous as Petitioner and
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`its expert contend, then by Petitioner’s own admissions, the Marlowe application
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`itself would have full written description support for at least the claims listed in
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`Ground 1 of the Petition. In this case, the claims listed in Ground 1 would be
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`entitled to the earlier December 11, 2002 priority date of the Marlowe ’786 Patent,
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`which would remove the Marlowe reference and nearly all of the other prior art in
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`the Petition.
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`Based on Petitioner and its experts’ statements, one of ordinary skill in the
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`art would have understood that the inventor was in possession of the invention in
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`2002. The specification of the earlier ’786 Patent states that the interface can use
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`any known type of connection. (2:29-32; 8:37-39; 9:31-34; 10:41-48; 11:24-25).
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`Thus, under Petitioner and its experts’ interpretation, one of ordinary skill in the art
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`would have known that a disclosure of any “known type of connection” would
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`have included wireless connections such as Bluetooth.
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`Accordingly, the Petition should be denied as to Grounds 1 for at least this
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`additional reason that the Marlowe reference is not prior art.
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`IPR2016-01473
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`C. Grounds 2 and 3 Should Be Denied.
`Regarding Ground 2, Petitioner does not assert that Riggs discloses any
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`wireless capabilities or any of the “said wireless communication link” limitations
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`that are missing from the combination of Marlowe and Plagge. Thus, Ground 2
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`and the Riggs reference fail to set forth a sufficient obviousness analysis for the
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`same reasons described above with regard to Ground 1.
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`Regarding Ground 3, Petitioner states that, in addition to the Marlowe and
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`Plagge references, Bhogal discloses “receiv[ing] audio generated by the portable
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`device over [a] wireless communication link for playing on the car audio/video
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`system.” Petitioner alleges that Bhogal discloses an “emulator” unit that “receives
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`and forwards commands from the [car stereo] to the CD-changer unit and also
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`receives and forwards data from the CD-changer unit to the [car stereo].” Pet. at
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`24. However, Petitioner does not explain how Bhogal discloses “receiving audio
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`generated by the portable device over said wireless communication link for playing
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`on the car audio/video system.”
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`Claim 49 expressly requires: “wherein said integration subsystem . . .
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`receives audio generated by the portable device over said wireless communication
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`link for playing on the car audio/video system.” First, Bhogal does not disclose
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`“said integration subsystem” as recited in Claim 49 because Petitioner admits that
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`the “emulator unit” resides as an “intermediary” between the car stereo and the
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`CD-changer, and, therefore, is not a “subsystem.” Pet. at 24. Second, Petitioner
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`never discusses the transfer of “audio generated by the portable device over said
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`wireless communication” because Petitioner solely describes receiving commands
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`and data to and from a CD-changer. Pet. at 24-25. Nowhere does Petitioner point
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`to a portable device in Bhogal, nor does Petitioner argue that Bhogal’s CD-changer
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`is a portable device, which it is not. Petitioner does not attempt to reconcile the
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`differences between Bhogal and the claimed invention and as a result, all that
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`remains is a wireless communication link, in isolation, with no portable device or
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`audio generated by the portable device. Even if Petitioner were to propose that the
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`combinations meet the claimed limitations, which they do not, the Petition does not
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`set forth how the references teach each of the claim limitations. Thus, Petitioner
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`fails to meet its burden in explaining how Bhogal discloses the claimed limitations,
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`and Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success.
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`Claims 53, 54, 56, 62, 66, and 70 depend from Claim 49 are not obvious for
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`at least the same reasons above. Because Petitioner admits that Claim 73 is
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`identical with respect to the above limitations, Claim 73 and its dependent Claims
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`77 and 78 also fail to show obviousness for the same reasons.
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`Accordingly, Grounds 1-3 should be denied.
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`D. Ground 7 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged Claims Are
`Not Obvious Over Simon in View of Bhogal
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`Petitioner incorrectly argues that the Challenged Claims are obvious over
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`“Simon in view of Bhogal” (Ground 7) (Pet. at 43). Like Grounds 1-3, Ground 7
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`advances the same “add wireless” obviousness argument: it would have been
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`obvious to “apply the wireless capabilities taught in Bhogal” to Simon. Pet. at 45.
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`In essence, Petitioner submits that Simon’s disclosure can simply be overlaid with
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`“wireless capability” to achieve the Challenged Claims’ limitations. Petitioner
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`advances this bare obviousness argument without any explanation as to how one of
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`ordinary skill in the art would specifically combine the references for each portion
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`of the claimed invention. Petitioner’s reliance on this argument, coupled with the
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`lack of teachings, results in Petitioner’s failure to explain how a person having
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`ordinary skill in the art would modify the references to meet the claimed invention.
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`Petitioner admits that Simon does not disclose “a first wireless interface in
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`communication with said integration subsystem, said first wireless interface
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`establishing a wireless communication link with a second wireless interface in
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`communication with a portable device external to the car audio/video system” as
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`recited in Claim 49. Pet. at 44-45. Petitioner attempts to cure this admitted
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`deficiency by self-referencing its previous Bhogal characterization in Section V-C
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`Pet. at 26-29. Section V-C of the Petition only applies to the limitation “receives
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`audio generated by the portable device over said wireless communication link for
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`playing on the car audio/video system,” and Section V-C does not even attempt to
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`discuss the individual elements “a first wireless interface,” “a second wireless
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`interface,” and “a wireless communication link” or the limitation as a whole as
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`recited in Claim 49. Additionally, Bhogal does not disclose “said integration
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`subsystem” as recited in Claim 49 because Petitioner admits that the “emulator
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`unit” resides as an “intermediary” between the car stereo and the CD-changer.
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`Pet. at 24. Petitioner does not attempt to show that Bhogal discloses the “first
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`wireless interface” and “second wireless interface” limitations. These deficiencies
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`propagate throughout Claim 49. Second, Petitioner never discusses the transfer of
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`“audio generated by the portable device over said wireless communication”
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`because Bhogal solely describes receiving commands and data to and from a CD-
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`changer. Pet. at 24-25. Nowhere does Petitioner point to a portable device in
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`Bhogal, nor does Petitioner argue that Bhogal’s CD-changer is a portable device,
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`which it is not. Petitioner does not attempt to reconcile the differences between
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`Bhogal and the claimed invention, and the Board is left with applying a wireless
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`communication link, in isolation, with no portable device or audio generated by the
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`portable device. Thus, Petitioner fails to meet its burden in explaining how Bhogal
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`discloses the claimed limitations, and Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable
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`likelihood of success.
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`Claims 53, 54, 56, 62, 66, and 70 depend from Claim 49 are not obvious for
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`at least the same reasons above. Because Petitioner admits that Claim 73 is
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`identical with respect to the above limitations, Claim 73 and its dependent claims
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`77 and 78 also fail to show obviousness for the same reasons.
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`Accordingly, Ground 7 should be denied institution.
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`E. Grounds 1-3 and 5-7 Should Not Be Instituted Because Petitioner Fails
`To Establish Fundamental Requirements for Proving Obviousness
`As a preliminary matter, the Petition fails to even acknowledge the Graham
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`and KSR requirements for determining obviousness. Petitioner fails to recite any
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`of these factors, and instead relies on mere conclusory statements regarding the
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`alleged obviousness of each combination.
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`As noted above, the Petitioner must establish obviousness, in part, by
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`explaining “the level of skill in the art.” Graham, 383 U.S. 1, at 17–18. Petitioner
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`never contemplates this requirement as the entire Petition is devoid of a single
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`reference to the requisite level of skill in the art. As a result, it is unclear who
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`meets the definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art, effectively
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`rendering each obviousness argument baseless. Because each argument of
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`Grounds 1-3 and 5-7 is supported by what would have been obvious to a person
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`having ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner’s deficient reasoning renders each
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`argument baseless. The fully-articulated reasoning must be present in the Petition
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`itself, otherwise the obviousness arguments are defici