Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page1 of 20
`
`
`
`PAUL J. ANDRE (State Bar No. 196585)
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`LISA KOBIALKA (State Bar No. 191404)
`lkobialka@kramerlevin.com
`JAMES HANNAH (State Bar No. 237978)
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 752-1700
`Facsimile: (650) 752-1800
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FINJAN, INC.
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`
`
`Case No.: 13-CV-03999-BLF
`
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
`Corporation,
`
`Defendant.
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`
`
`
`
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`____________________________________________________________________________________
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
`
` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Blue Coat Systems - Exhibit 1033
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`

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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page2 of 20
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1
`
`II. FINJAN’S PROPOSED TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION ............................................................. 1
`
`A.
`
`“Mobile Protection Code” Should Be Construed as “code capable of monitoring
`or intercepting potentially malicious code.” ..................................................................... 1
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Finjan’s construction of Mobile Protection Code is derived directly from
`the specification of the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents and should be adopted. ................ 1
`
`Blue Coat’s attempt to change the explicit definition of “mobile
`protection code” as provided in the intrinsic record must be rejected as a
`matter of law. ........................................................................................................ 2
`
`B.
`
`“Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in the received
`Downloadable” Should Be Construed as “a profile that identifies hostile or
`potentially hostile operations in the Downloadable.” ....................................................... 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The phrase “Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious
`code in the received Downloadable” only requires minimal clarification. ........... 4
`
`Blue Coat’s attempts to rewrite and narrow the plain language of the
`phrase are unwarranted. ........................................................................................ 5
`
`C.
`
`The Function for “means for causing mobile protection code to be
`communicated to at least one information-destination of the downloadable-
`information, if the downloadable-information is determined to include
`executable code” Should Contain the Same Limitations as Recited in the Claim............ 6
`
`D.
`
`Finjan Has Set Forth the Correct Structures for “means for determining whether
`to trust the first Downloadable security profile” and “means for comparing the
`first Downloadable security profile against the security policy if the first
`Downloadable security policy is trustworthy.” ................................................................. 9
`III. BLUE COAT’S PROPOSED TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION .................................................. 10
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Blue Coats Concedes that “information-destination” and “downloadable-
`information destination” Do Not Need to be Construed. ................................................ 10
`
`Blue Coat Offers No Reasons to Rewrite the Easily Understood Phrase “causing
`mobile protection code to be executed by the mobile code executor at a
`downloadable-information destination such that one or more operations of the
`executable code at the destination, if attempted, will be processed by the mobile
`protection code.” ............................................................................................................. 10
`
`The Preamble “A computer program product, comprising a computer usable
`medium having a computer readable program code therein, the computer
`readable program code adapted to be executed for computer security, the method
`comprising: providing a system …” Should be Corrected by the Court. ....................... 11
`
`i
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page3 of 20
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`
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`D.
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`The Phrase “before [a/the] web server make[s] the Downloadable available to
`web clients” Does Not Need Construction. .................................................................... 12
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`E.
`
`The Terms “network gateway” and “computer gateway” Do Not Require
`Construction. ................................................................................................................... 14
`IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 15
`
`
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`
`
`ii
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page4 of 20
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
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`
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`
`
`Cases
`
`Deep9 Corp. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.,
`No. C11-0035JLR, 2012 WL 4336726 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2012) ............................................. 11
`
`Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC,
`703 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012)........................................................................................................... 5
`
`Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`566 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009)........................................................................................................... 7
`
`Ex Parte Bo Li,
`Appeal No. 2008-1213, 2008 Pat. App. LEXIS 27 (BPAI Nov. 6, 2008) ........................................ 12
`
`Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp.,
`616 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010)....................................................................................................... 3, 8
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................... 11, 14
`
`Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
`607 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................................... 11
`
`Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd.,
`78 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996)............................................................................................................. 3
`
`In re Am. Acad, of Sci Tech. Ctr.,
`367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)......................................................................................................... 13
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................................... 7
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................................... 12
`
`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc.,
`724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013)........................................................................................................... 7
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)........................................................................................................... 5
`
`Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc.,
`473 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2006)......................................................................................................... 13
`
`iii
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page5 of 20
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`
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ....................................................................................................................................... 12
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`Other Authorities
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`Patent Case Management Judicial Guide (Federal Judicial Center 2009) ................................................ 6
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`
`
`iv
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page6 of 20
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`In claim construction, the presumption is that patent claims are attributed the meaning the
`
`patentee gives them and the Court should only construe those terms that are not readily understood.
`
`These principles underlie Finjan’s claim construction. Most of the terms at issue do not require
`
`construction or only require clarification. Where possible, the patentee drafted the claims of the Finjan
`Patents1 in clear language, so they are understandable by laypersons. Accordingly, a person of
`ordinary skill in the art easily understands the claims. For the few terms needing construction, the
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`patentee disclosed the meaning of the terms in the specification, which are Finjan’s constructions. As
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`such, Finjan’s constructions can properly be adopted.
`
`In stark contrast, Blue Coat adulterated its claim construction proposals on the shifting sands of
`
`its litigation strategy. After receiving Finjan’s opening claim construction brief, Blue Coat changed
`
`almost all of its claim construction proposals, which it only revealed to Finjan for the first time in its
`response claim construction brief.2 Blue Coat’s untimely revisions speak volumes, particularly
`because the intrinsic record has not changed since Blue Coat submitted its original proposed
`
`constructions. Blue Coat shoehorn’s its litigation positions into the claim construction process instead
`
`of staying faithful to the intrinsic record. Because Blue Coat’s proposed constructions are factually
`
`and legally incorrect, it should not be allowed to rewrite the claims to avoid liability.
`
`II.
`
`FINJAN’S PROPOSED TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION
`A.
`
`“Mobile Protection Code” Should Be Construed as “code capable of monitoring or
`intercepting potentially malicious code.”
`Finjan’s construction of Mobile Protection Code is derived directly from
`1.
`the specification of the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents and should be adopted.
`To construe Mobile Protection Code (“MPC”), the Court need only look to the specification
`
`1 U.S. Patent Nos. 7,058,822 (the “‘822 Patent”), 7,647,633 (the “‘633 Patent”), 6,804,780 (the “‘780
`Patent”), 7,418,731 (the “‘731 Patent”), and 6,965,968 (the “‘968 Patent”). See Dkt. No. 65-2
`(Declaration of James Hannah in Support of Finjan’s Opening Claim Construction Brief (“Hannah
`Decl.”), Exs. 1-2, 4-6).
`
` 2
`
` Attached as Exhibit A is a chart with the parties’ proposed constructions, including both Blue Coat’s
`original and revised language. To assist the Court, the changes in the revised constructions are
`underlined (new language) and struck through (deletions).
`
`1
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page7 of 20
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`where MPC is defined. Both the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents state that “mobile protection code for causing
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`one or more predetermined malicious operations or operation combinations of a Downloadable to be
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`monitored or otherwise intercepted.” Hannah Decl., Ex. 1 (‘822 Patent, Col. 3, ll. 6-10). This
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`definition is consistent with Finjan’s construction, which is “code capable of monitoring or
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`intercepting potentially malicious code.” This straightforward construction—derived from the
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`patentee’s definition of MPC—should be adopted as it was in the previous litigation involving the ‘822
`Patent.3
`
`2.
`
`Blue Coat’s attempt to change the explicit definition of “mobile protection
`code” as provided in the intrinsic record must be rejected as a matter of
`law.
`Blue Coat’s proposed construction, introduced in its response brief, reads in new and
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`unnecessary limitations from the specification, a cardinal sin of claim construction. Blue Coat’s new
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`construction adds more unnecessary verbiage, ballooning three words into 41 words. The resulting
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`claims are unreadable, will not assist the fact finder, and should therefore be rejected.
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`To support its position that MPC is runtime code, Blue Coat simply ignores those embodiments
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`in the specification where MPC is static code, i.e. code that is not running or executing. See Hannah
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`Decl., Ex. 1 (‘822 Patent, Col. 2, l. 37 to Col. 4, l. 41). As explained in the specification of the ‘822
`and ‘633 Patents, MPC can exist as static code.4 Id. (‘822 Patent, Col. 2, ll. 42-47 (“[e]mbodiments
`also provide for delivering static, configurable and/or extensible remotely operable protection policies
`to a Downloadable-destination, more typically as a sandboxed packaged including the mobile
`protection code…”) (emphasis added)). In several examples, the systems described in the ‘822 and
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`‘633 Patent can create MPC with a static packing system and the MPC will not be running. Id. (‘822
`
`Patent, Col. 2, l. 37 to Col. 4, l. 41; Col. 10, ll. 52-60). Blue Coat’s proposed construction is improper
`
`
`3 Blue Coat opening argument that it is somehow detrimental to Finjan’s construction that only one
`sentence succinctly and accurately defines the term is a red herring. In this instance, only one sentence
`is required because the patentee acted as his own lexicographer to define the term.
` 4 If Blue Coat intended some other meaning for “runtime code,” it is unclear because all code can be
`“run,” and is “executed.” This is the primary purpose of code. Blue Coat’s added ambiguity to its
`claim construction proposal is yet another ground to reject Blue Coat’s proposal because it would only
`confuse the fact finder.
`
`2
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`as a matter of law because its narrow proposal excludes statically packaged code, a preferred
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`embodiment explicitly described in the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents. Id.; Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs.
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`Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78
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`F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) for the proposition that “a claim construction that excludes a
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`preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever, correct”).
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`Blue Coat relies heavily on the fact that the word “runtime” is used in the title of the ‘822 and
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`‘633 Patents to support its argument that “runtime code” should be read into MPC. The term runtime,
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`however, is only used twice in the specification and never to describe or in conjunction with MPC. See
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`Hannah Decl., Ex. 1 (‘822 Patent, Title, Col. 5, ll. 30-34) (in both instances, the term is used generally
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`to refer to “runtime monitoring systems and methods” without further explanation). Thus, Blue Coat’s
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`coupling of “runtime” with MPC should be rejected because it is not supported by the intrinsic record.
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`Furthermore, all of Blue Coat’s citations in support of its construction actually cut against its
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`position. In each of the citations in Blue Coat’s Response Brief, the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents explicitly
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`state that they are one of several embodiments that are disclosed in the intrinsic record. Blue Coat
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`Response Brief at 16 (“[e]mbodiments also provide…”; “[a] sandbox protection system according to
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`an embodiment…”; “[e]mbodiments further provide…”). In fact, Blue Coat does not provide any
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`citation where the patentee narrowed the definition of mobile protection code in the manner that it
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`suggests. Because there is no support for such a restrictive construction, Blue Coat’s proposal should
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`be rejected.
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`Blue Coat’s argument that Finjan’s construction does not provide protection is another red
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`herring. Finjan’s construction, consistent with the intrinsic record, specifically provides that the MPC
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`intercepts potentially malicious operations. Hannah Decl., Ex. 1 (‘822 Patent, Col. 2, ll. 49-53).
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`Naturally, if a potentially malicious operation is intercepted, the device will not be harmed by the
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`operation because it never occurs. As such, Finjan’s construction of MPC plainly provides protection
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`because it intercepts malicious operations before they infect a computer with harmful software.
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`In its brief, Blue Coat conflates the function of the protection policies and mobile protection
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`code. Specifically, Blue Coat argues that the mobile protection code must perform an action in
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`3
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`response to another operation. Blue Coat Response Brief at 17. However, the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents
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`disclose that the MPC can be used only to monitor or intercept potentially malicious operations while
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`the protection policies, by themselves, can cause one or more predetermined operation to be performed
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`if undesirable operations are intercepted. Hannah Decl., Ex. 1 (‘822 Patent, Col. 3, ll. 6-15). Thus,
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`Blue Coat’s proposal to conflate the functionality of the protection policies and the mobile protection
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`code reads out a preferred embodiment of the system and should be ignored.
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`Blue Coat offers the nonsensical argument that Finjan’s construction would not protect against
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`code that contains “actually malicious” operations. But Blue Coat’s argument defies common sense.
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`An actual malicious operation is a potentially malicious operation that was properly categorized as
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`malicious. As such, all malicious operations are potentially malicious operations. Thus, Blue Coat’s
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`argument is misguided because Finjan’s construction states that potentially malicious operations,
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`which include malicious operations, are monitored or intercepted.
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`Because Finjan’s construction is based directly on the specification’s definition and Blue Coat
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`adds unnecessary limitations that are contradictory to the intrinsic record, Finjan’s construction is
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`proper.
`
`B.
`
`“Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in the received
`Downloadable” Should Be Construed as “a profile that identifies hostile or
`potentially hostile operations in the Downloadable.”
`The phrase “Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in
`1.
`the received Downloadable” only requires minimal clarification.
`The phrase “Downloadable5 security profile that identifies suspicious code in the received
`Downloadable” only requires “suspicious code” to be clarified as “hostile or potentially hostile
`operations.”6 Indeed, there is no dispute that this is the correct interpretation of “suspicious” as Blue
`
`
`5 Finjan and Blue Coat have already agreed on the proper construction of Downloadable as “an
`executable application program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on the
`destination computer.”
` 6 Blue Coat takes issue with Finjan’s uses of the term “operation” instead of “code.” Finjan made the
`substitution simply to avoid confusion, as examples of code are typically discussed in the patent in
`reference to the “operation” they perform. As such, “operation” is appropriate because the ‘844 Patent
`describes code and operation interchangeably, and operation is the more easily understood term,
`particularly when viewed in light of the specification.
`4
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
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` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page10 of 20
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`
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`Coat admits that the ‘844 Patent defines suspicious as hostile or potential hostile. Blue Coat Response
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`Brief at 6.
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`Blue Coat’s only dispute with Finjan’s construction is the replacement of the word “code” with
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`“operations.” However, such substitution is fully supported by Blue Coat’s intrinsic record citations.
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`In each of the citations Blue Coat offers for support, the term “operation” is used or substituted for
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`“code.” Id. at 7-8. In fact, Blue Coat’s own construction equates code with operations. Id. (“code that
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`performs…operations.). Thus, there should not be a genuine dispute that Finjan’s proposed
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`construction is proper.
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`2.
`
`Blue Coat’s attempts to rewrite and narrow the plain language of the
`phrase are unwarranted.
`Blue Coat unapologetically argues to narrow the phrase against the established rules of claim
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`construction. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir.
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`2012) (“[t]he patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and
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`ordinary meaning….”). Specifically, Blue Coat includes a requirement that the list of operations
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`includes at least one of a file, network, registry or operating system operations although no explicit
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`disavowal exists in the intrinsic record. Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2012) (claim construction should not import limitations from the specification that are not part of
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`the claim). Notably absent is Blue Coat’s support for narrowing the claim scope. The patentee
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`(including in all of the Blue Coat’s citations to the intrinsic record) stated that these types of operations
`were examples in the specification, and not limitations.7 Hannah Decl., Ex. 3 (‘844 Patent at Col. 4, ll.
`20-33) (“An Example List of Operations Deemed Suspicious.”). And most of Blue Coat’s citations do
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`not mention the operations Blue Coat insists should be part of the construction. Blue Coat Response
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`7 Blue Coat’s construction also does not include all of the examples listed in the intrinsic record. For
`example, the specification of the ‘844 Patent also includes “Resource usage thresholds: memory, CPU
`and graphics” as examples of operations deemed suspicious, which Blue Coat inexplicitly does have in
`its construction. Hannah Decl., Ex. 3 (‘844 Patent, Col. 4, l. 34). There is no reason to read exemplary
`embodiments into the claims as Blue Coat proposes, especially when the construction does not cover
`all of the preferred embodiments disclosed in the intrinsic record.
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`5
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
`
` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Brief at 6-9. As such, Blue Coat’s attempt to triple the length and complexity of the phrase, without
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`out any proper basis, should be rejected.
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`Blue Coat argues rewriting and narrowing the term is necessary because “identifies” can have
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`meanings beyond its understanding of the patent and is concerned that Finjan may apply the full scope
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`of the claim. Id. Blue Coat’s rationale is wrong as a matter of law—a claim means what it says.
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`There is nothing tricky here; “identifies” is a common word and the word chosen by the patentee.
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`There is no reason to replace it with “specifies,” especially since the term does not appear anywhere in
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`the intrinsic record. See Declaration of Hannah Reply in Support of Finjan’s Reply Claim
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`Construction Brief filed herewith (“Hannah Reply Decl.”), Ex. 1 (Patent Case Management Judicial
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`Guide (Federal Judicial Center 2009) § 5.1.4.3, at 5-23 (“If a claim term is non-technical, is in plain
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`English, and derives no special meaning from the patent and its prosecution history, then the court has
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`no need to function as a thesaurus. … The ‘ordinary’ meaning of such terms should speak for itself,
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`and the court should avoid merely paraphrasing claim language with less accurate terminology.”)). As
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`such, no construction of “identifies” is necessary, and the plain and ordinary meaning should be
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`applied.
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`Additionally, Blue Coat provides no concrete explanation of how “specifies’” is different in
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`scope than “identifies.” Blue Coat complains that “identifies” can have different meanings, but does
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`not rationalize how “specifies” is more accurate or appropriate, presumably because it cannot. The
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`Court should reject Blue Coat’s construction because it is not appropriate to replace “identifies” with
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`“specifies,” particularly where there is no technical basis or evidentiary support in the intrinsic record.
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`C.
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`The Function for “means for causing mobile protection code to be communicated
`to at least one information-destination of the downloadable-information, if the
`downloadable-information is determined to include executable code” Should
`Contain the Same Limitations as Recited in the Claim.
`In its brief, Blue Coat concedes that Finjan has identified the proper structure for this means-
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`plus-function element as a “re-communicating device.” However, Blue Coat argues that the function
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`should be modified from the plain language of the claims, even though it has advocated and agreed
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`that all other means-plus-function terms should recite the same language for the function as provided
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`6
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
`
` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page12 of 20
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`in the claims. Based on Blue Coat’s inconsistent position alone, Finjan’s construction should be
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`adopted.
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`Blue Coat’s primary argument for its construction, namely that the mobile protection code does
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`not modify the executable code, is directly contrary to the intrinsic record. In its brief, Blue Coat
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`argues that “the Downloadable is never modified” in support of its construction. However, in no
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`unclear terms, the ‘822 and ‘633 Patents state that the MPC can cause one or more predetermined
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`operations to occur, such as “modifying the Downloadable operation.” Hannah Decl., Ex. 1 (‘822
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`Patent, Col 4, ll. 4-10). In light of this explicit disclosure, Blue Coat’s construction requiring no
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`modification of the Downloadable’s executable code falls flat.
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`Consistent with its brief, Blue Coat cites exemplary embodiments in support of its
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`construction. But, as with the rest of its brief, Blue Coat ignores the plain language of the
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`specification that these exemplary embodiments are just that, examples. Blue Coat Response Brief at
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`18-21. Because the patentee did not explicit limit the claims to a particular embodiment, Blue Coat’s
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`construction should be rejected. Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
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`(quoting Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Epistar
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`Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[a] heavy presumption [exists]
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`that claim terms carry their full ordinary and customary meaning, unless [a party] can show the
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`patentee expressly relinquished claim scope.”)).
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`Blue Coat further mischaracterizes the background section of the specification to support its
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`tenuous position that the executable cannot be modified. In discussing the Shuang reference, Blue
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`Coat leaves out the lead sentence of the paragraph, namely “[t]o make matters worse, certain classes of
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`viruses are not well recognized or understood, let alone protected against.” Hannah Decl., Ex. 2 (‘633
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`Patent, Col. 1, ll. 58-59). The paragraph continues, as Blue Coat notes, that “U.S. Pat. No. 5,983,348
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`to Shuang, however, teaches a protection system for protecting against only distributable
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`components.” Id. (‘633 Patent, Col. 1, l. 66 to Col. 2, l. 1 (emphasis added)). As shown, the patentee
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`was not making a distinction as to whether the prior art modified executable code, rather, it was
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`demonstrating that the Shuang reference is inferior because it only protected against a subset of
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`7
`__________________________________________________________________________________
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY
`
` CASE NO. 13-CV-03999-BLF
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

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`Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document67 Filed07/07/14 Page13 of 20
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`programs while the ‘633 Patent protects against any program with executable code. This fact is
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`highlighted in the reexamination of the ‘633 Patent where the primary basis for distinguishing Shuang
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`was not that it modified executable code, but rather that Shuang did not teach the step of determining
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`whether the Downloadable included executable code. Hannah Reply Decl., Ex. 2 (02/19/14 Response
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`to Non-Final Office Action at 12). Accordingly, Blue Coat’s use of the Background of the Invention
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`is out of context, and does not support its restrictive construction.
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`Blue Coat also argues that the claims require the function to include the limitation of
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`“transferring mobile protection code with the downloadable-information.” Blue Coat Response
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`Brief at 20-21 (emphasis added). This argument is, again, directly contrary to the intrinsic
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`record. Indeed, the patent discloses examples where the mobile protection code is transferred
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`separate from the downloadable-information. See Hannah Decl., Ex. 2 (‘633 Patent, Col. 16, ll.
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`1-15 (describing “an initial package might be otherwise configured or sent prior to receipt of a
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`Downloadable” and also that also further MPCs can be sent)). Therefore, Blue Coat’s
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`construction is wrong because it does not cover a preferred embodiment in the specification.
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`Funai, 616 F.3d at 1371.
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`In further support of its position the MPC must be transferred with downloadable
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`information, Blue Coat relies on a preliminary statement the patentee provided when filing the
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`application resulting in the ‘633 Patent. However, Blue Coat reads the preliminary statement
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`out of context. Specifically, the portion of the preliminary statement that Blue Coat relies upon
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`has nothing to do with the claim term in dispute, much less with identifying the proper function
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`of the term. Instead, the cited portion provides a general background of the ‘633 Patent and the
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`Golan reference with respect to a sandbox packaging. In the actual analysis of the claims
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`which do not relate to sandboxes, the pa