Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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` Paper 12
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` Entered: June 9, 2016
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SIGNAL IP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-00293
`Patent 5,714,927
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JEREMY M. PLENZLER, PETER P. CHEN, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper 12
`
` Entered: June 9, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SIGNAL IP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-00293
`Patent 5,714,927
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JEREMY M. PLENZLER, PETER P. CHEN, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00293
`Patent 5,714,927
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Petitioner, Toyota Motor Corporation, filed a Petition requesting an
`inter partes review of claims 1, 2, and 6 of U.S. Patent No. 5,714,927
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’927 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). In response, Patent Owner,
`Signal IP, Inc., filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter
`partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in
`the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`petition.”
`For the reasons set forth below, we deny institution of inter partes
`review of the ’927 patent.
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’927 patent also has been asserted in
`various proceedings. Pet. 1–2; Paper 3, 2–3. In addition, claims 1, 2, and 6
`of the ’927 patent were at issue in IPR2015-00968, which was denied
`institution. Pet. 2; Paper 3, 3.
`
`B. The ’927 Patent
`The ’927 patent relates to side detection vehicle radar systems that
`control an alarm or alert indicator to increase the perceived coverage of a
`vehicle’s blind spot. Ex. 1001, 1:7–10. Figure 4 of the ’927 patent is
`reproduced below.
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`Figure 4 of the ’927 patent illustrates radar coverage zones.
`As illustrated in Figure 4 of the ’927 patent, the radar system on the
`host vehicle 50 extends the perceived coverage of the vehicle’s blind spots
`54, 62 by zone extensions 56, 64. Id. at 4:7–21. The system prevents or
`minimizes radar signal dropouts due to signal flickers in order to improve
`the zone of coverage in a vehicle side radar detection system and minimizes
`annoying alert activity when passing stationary or slow moving targets. Id.
`at 2:10–15. The time of alert signal activation is measured and compared to
`a threshold time. Id. at 2:16–17. When the alert time is greater than or
`equal to the threshold time, a variable sustain time is applied to hold the alert
`signal on, which bridges the dropout periods due to low radar signal
`reflectivity. Id. at 2:25–28.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Claim 1 is the only independent claim challenged. Claims 2 and 6
`depend from claim 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative.
`1.
`In a radar system wherein a host vehicle uses radar to
`detect a target vehicle in a blind spot of the host vehicle driver, a
`method of improving the perceived zone of coverage response of
`automotive radar comprising the steps of:
`determining the relative speed of the host and target
`vehicles;
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`selecting a variable sustain time as a function of relative
`vehicle speed;
`detecting target vehicle presence and producing an alert
`command;
`activating an alert signal in response to the alert command;
`at the end of the alert command, determining whether the
`alert signal was active for a threshold time; and
`if the alert signal was active for the threshold time,
`sustaining the alert signal for the variable sustain time, wherein
`the zone of coverage appears to increase according to the variable
`sustain time.
`
`Ex. 1001, 5:28–6:2.
`
`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior art references:
`
`Agravante
`
`US 5,767,793
`Issued June 16, 1998
`Tsou
`
`US 5,508,706
`Issued Apr. 16, 1996
`Pakett1
`
`US 5,325,096
`Issued June 28, 1994
`Kawai2
`
`JP 04-348293
`Published Dec. 3, 1992
`
`(Ex. 1005)
`(Ex. 1006)
`(Ex. 1002)
`(Ex. 1003)
`
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability:
`
`Challenged Claims
`
`Basis
`
`References
`
`1, 2, and 6
`
`§ 103(a) Agravante and Tsou
`
`
`1 Pakett is misidentified on pages iii and 4 of the Petition, and page 5 of Dr.
`Nikolaos Papanikolopoulos’ Declaration (Ex. 1010 ¶ 14) as US 5,517,196.
`The citations in the Petition correspond to US 5,325,096, which appears as
`Exhibit 1002.
`2 A translation of Kawai is provided. Ex. 1004. For purposes of this
`Decision, citations herein are to the translation.
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`Challenged Claims
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`Basis
`
`References
`
`1, 2, and 6
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Pakett and Kawai
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, we construe claim terms in an unexpired
`patent according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see
`also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir.
`2015), cert. granted sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
`890 (2016) (mem.). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction,
`claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as
`understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
`patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed.
`Cir. 2007). Also, we must be careful not to read a particular embodiment
`appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is
`broader than the embodiment. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184
`(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“limitations are not to be read into the claims from the
`specification”). However, an inventor may provide a meaning for a term
`that is different from its ordinary meaning by defining the term in the
`specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re
`Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).3
`
`3 Petitioner acknowledges that “[the] application of either the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard or the claim construction standard
`summarized in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`Petitioner identifies constructions for several claim terms based on
`(1) a related inter partes review (Pet. 8), and (2) a related matter before the
`U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (id. at 6–8).
`Regarding the related inter partes review, the Board previously construed
`the term “alert command” as raw alert data that is used to generate an alert
`signal, and the term “alert signal” as a signal that provides a visual or audio
`alert to a driver. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Signal IP, Inc., Case
`IPR2015-00968, slip op. at 6–7 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2015), Paper 6.
`In order to reach our decision below, we need only construe the terms
`“alert command” and “alert signal.” We, therefore, decline to specifically
`construe any other claim terms at this time.
`We agree with Petitioner’s construction of the terms “alert command”
`and “alert signal,” consistent with our prior construction in IPR2015-00968.
`(See id. for our prior construction of the terms.) Thus, we construe the term
`“alert command” as raw alert data that is used to generate an alert signal, and
`the term “alert signal” as a signal that provides a visual or audio alert to a
`driver. Id. As explained below, even using Petitioner’s construction of
`these terms, Petitioner’s challenge fails to establish a reasonable likelihood
`that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability.
`
`
`would produce the same result.” Pet. 6. Here, we apply the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard because the ’927 patent is still pending.
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
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`B. Principles of Law
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise
`teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
`a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also
`Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259, 1262. A prima facie case of obviousness is
`established when the prior art itself would appear to have suggested the
`claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Rinehart,
`531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (CCPA 1976).
`
`C. Challenge of Claims 1, 2, and 6 Based on Agravante and Tsou
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 2, and 6 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Agravante and Tsou.
`Pet. 13. To support its contentions, Petitioner provides explanations as to
`how the prior art allegedly teaches or suggests each claim limitation. Id. at
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`13–35. Petitioner also relies upon a Declaration of Dr. Nikolaos
`Papanikolopoulos, who has been retained as a declarant by Petitioner for the
`instant proceeding. Ex. 1010.
`
`1. Agravante (Ex. 1005)
`Agravante, titled “Compact Vehicle Based Rear and Side Obstacle
`Detection System Including Multiple Antennae,” describes a radar-based
`obstacle detection system for vehicles. Ex. 1005, Abstract, 5:38–49. When
`determining whether an obstacle exists in the vehicle’s blind spot, Agravante
`considers whether an object “persists over enough thresholding intervals.”
`Id. at 7:24–25. Agravante teaches that reliability of the detection system
`may be improved by using an “adaptive threshold” to determine if an
`obstacle is present, and notes that “[v]arious types of adaptive threshold
`techniques are discussed” in Tsou. Id. at 6:64–7:14.
`
`2. Tsou (Ex. 1006)
`
`Tsou, titled “Radar Signal Processor,” describes a radar signal
`processor for detecting objects, which may be integrated onto a vehicle to
`assist with blind spot detection and crash avoidance. Ex. 1006, Abstract,
`1:43–45. Tsou describes adaptive threshold device 464 used in the adaptive
`threshold techniques referenced in Agravante. Id. at 14:5–15:9. Tsou
`describes target decision device 500 that is connected to adaptive threshold
`device 464 and performs target acquisition and tracking based on data from
`the adaptive threshold device. Id. at 15:3–20. Target decision device 500
`operates in two modes: acquisition mode and tracking mode. Id. at 15:7–9.
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`In the acquisition mode, target decision device 500 determines whether a
`valid target exists. Id. at 15:13–32. Once a valid target is identified, target
`decision device 500 switches to tracking mode. Id. at 15:30–32.
`In the tracking mode, target decision device 500 initializes a tracking
`counter. Id. at 17:44–18:8. During tracking mode, “the tracking counter is
`incremented at each tracking time interval if the tracking signal exceeds the
`tracking threshold signal,” i.e., if a valid target is still present, and “[t]he
`tracking counter is decremented at each tracking time interval if the tracking
`signal is below the tracking threshold,” i.e., the target is lost. Id. at 17:13–
`34, 63–67. Tsou further describes that “[i]f the tracking counter falls to
`zero, then the target is presumed to be lost and the target decision device 500
`. . . returns to the acquisition mode.” Id. at 18:1–5. Using the target counter
`provides hysteresis in the tracking mode and prevents target decision device
`500 from prematurely returning to the acquisition mode if the target is only
`momentarily lost. Id. at 18:5–8.
`
`3. Analysis of Claim 1
`Claim 1 recites, in part, “at the end of the alert command, determining
`whether the alert signal was active for a threshold time.” Ex. 1001, 5:41–42.
`Petitioner acknowledges that Agravante does not disclose these limitations,
`and instead relies on Tsou as allegedly teaching or suggesting these
`limitations. Pet. 23. We are not persuaded that Tsou teaches or suggests
`these limitations.
`We denote the portion of claim 1 at issue as three limitations: (1) at
`the end of the alert command (“first limitation”), (2) determining whether
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`the alert signal was active (“second limitation”) (3) for a threshold time
`(“third limitation”). Ex. 1001, 5:41–42. Regarding the first limitation,
`Petitioner asserts that the determination that a valid target exists in Tsou
`corresponds to the “alert command” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 23 (citing Ex.
`1010 ¶¶ 58, 61). Based on Petitioner’s assertion, it follows logically that the
`scenario when a valid target is no longer detected in Tsou corresponds to the
`claim 1 limitation “the end of the alert command.” Pet. 23.
`As for the second limitation, Petitioner asserts that “whenever Tsou’s
`system is in tracking mode and tracking a previously detected object, it will
`issue signals resulting in provision of an alert to the driver (i.e., the claimed
`‘alert signal’).” Id. (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 60). Petitioner further asserts that at
`Tsou’s tracking time intervals, the claim 1 limitation “determining whether
`the alert signal was active” occurs. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 61–62).
`Regarding the third limitation, Petitioner maps the first tracking
`interval of Tsou immediately after entering tracking mode to the claimed
`threshold time. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 61–62).
`Based on the above, Petitioner concludes that:
`[B]ecause Tsou does not begin to increment its tracking counter
`(which results in the sustaining of an alert until the counter
`reaches zero) unless at least one tracking time interval has
`passed, it “determin[es] whether the alert signal was active for a
`threshold time.”
`
`Id. at 24 (second alteration in original); see also Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 61–62.
`We disagree with Petitioner that Tsou teaches determining whether
`the alert signal was active for a threshold time. Tsou teaches that at each
`tracking time interval, the tracking counter is incremented or decremented
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`based on the presence or absence of an alert command and is monitored to
`determine whether the tracking counter is above zero, or has fallen to zero.
`Ex. 1006, 17:63–18:8. If the tracking counter is at zero, the target decision
`device returns to the acquisition mode, and the alert signal ends. Id. at 18:3–
`5; Pet. 24. However, Petitioner acknowledges that during the tracking time
`interval, the alert signal is active because the system is in the tracking mode.
`Pet. 23. That is, regardless whether the alert command ended during the
`first tracking time interval of Tsou immediately after entering tracking
`mode, the alert signal will remain active until the end of the first tracking
`time interval. Pet. 23.
`Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish that in Tsou a determination is
`made whether the alert signal was active. Rather, the cited portions of Tsou
`address a scenario where the alert signal will have been active during the
`entire tracking time interval. Pet. 23; Ex. 1006, 17:54–18:8. Petitioner has
`not identified any scenarios where the alert signal would not have been
`active for the duration of the first tracking time interval, because, as
`Petitioner acknowledges, when the system of Tsou is in the tracking mode,
`the alert signal is active (Pet. 23), and the system of Tsou is in the tracking
`mode at least for the duration of the first tracking time interval. Ex. 1006,
`17:54–18:8.
`Instead, the only determination taught in Tsou is a determination
`whether the tracking counter is above zero or has fallen to zero. Id. at 18:1–
`5. Dr. Papanikolopoulos explains:
`Thus, if an object is detected once, but not detected again after
`tracking mode is entered, the tracking counter will never be
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`incremented, and the system will immediately reenter acquisition
`mode, and the alert signal will be deactivated. In other words,
`the alert signal will not be sustained. If, on the other hand, the
`target is tracked (and the alert signal is active) for at least one
`tracking interval, then the alert signal will be sustained according
`to the incremented tracking counter, as required by claim 1.
`
`Ex. 1010 ¶ 62.
`However, what Dr. Papanikolopoulos describes is Tsou determining
`whether the alert command was active at the end of the first tracking time
`interval, not whether the alert signal was active for the threshold time,
`because the decision whether to sustain the alert signal is based on whether
`the alert command is active at the end of the first tracking time interval. Dr.
`Papanikolopoulos and Petitioner fail to explain how determining whether the
`alert command is active at the end of the first tracking time interval teaches
`“determining whether the alert signal was active for a threshold time”
`(emphasis added), as recited in claim 1.
`Although Tsou’s determination of the status of the tracking counter
`may be related to the alert signal because the alert signal is active while the
`tracking counter remains above zero (Pet. 23–24), Tsou’s determination
`whether the tracking counter is at or above zero is not the same as
`“determining whether the alert signal was active for a threshold time.”
`Thus, we are not persuaded that Tsou teaches or suggests “at the end of the
`alert command, determining whether the alert signal was active for a
`threshold time,” as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added).
`Further, even if we accepted Petitioner’s interpretation of Tsou as
`teaching the claimed “determining whether the alert signal was active for a
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`threshold time,” which we do not, we are not persuaded that the cited
`portions of Tsou teach or suggest the subsequent limitation in claim 1, “if
`the alert signal was active for the threshold time, sustaining the alert signal
`for the variable sustain time.”4
`Specifically, at the end of the first tracking time interval, the alert
`signal would have been active during the entire first tracking time interval
`even if the alert command is no longer active. Therefore, the determination
`will be an affirmative (that the alert signal was active for the threshold time),
`and, according to the claim, the alert signal should be sustained for the
`variable sustain time. But, as Dr. Papanikolopoulos acknowledges, “if an
`object is detected once, but not detected again after tracking mode is entered
`. . . the alert signal will not be sustained.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 62. Stated differently,
`Dr. Papanikolopoulos acknowledges if the alert command is inactive after
`the first tracking time interval (i.e., the claimed “threshold time” as mapped
`by Dr. Papanikolopoulos) because an object is no longer detected, the alert
`signal of Tsou will not be sustained, which fails to teach or suggest “if the
`alert signal was active for the threshold time, sustaining the alert signal for
`the variable sustain time” (emphasis added) as recited in claim 1. Id.
`In summary, even if we accepted Petitioner’s interpretation of Tsou as
`teaching the claimed “determining whether the alert signal was active for a
`threshold time,” which we do not, the cited portions of Tsou still fail to teach
`or suggest the claimed sustaining the alert signal for the variable sustain time
`
`
`4 Petitioner acknowledges that Agravante also does not teach these
`limitations, and instead relies on Tsou as allegedly teaching these
`limitations. Pet. 23.
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`if the alert signal was active for the threshold time. Accordingly, we are not
`persuaded that the information presented in the Petition establishes a
`reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing
`unpatentability of claims 1, 2, and 6 as obvious over Agravante and Tsou.
`
`D. Challenge of Claims 1, 2, and 6 Based on Pakett and Kawai
`
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 2, and 6 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Pakett and Kawai.
`Pet. 35. To support its contentions, Petitioner provides explanations as to
`how the prior art allegedly meets each claim limitation. Id. at 35–60.
`Petitioner also relies upon the Declaration of Dr. Papanikolopoulos.
`Ex. 1010.
`
`1. Pakett (Ex. 1002)
`Pakett, titled “Smart Blind Spot Sensor,” describes sensing the
`presence of obstacles in a vehicle’s blind spots and generating an indicator
`signal notifying the vehicle operator of the presence of the obstacle.
`Ex. 1002, Abstract. The indicator may be an illuminated indicator or an
`audible indicator. Id. Rather than immediately providing an alarm or
`warning when an obstacle is detected, the system of Pakett waits until the
`end of a persistence period. Id. at 6:46–51, 7:53–63. Pakett describes the
`“persistence period” as the amount of time it takes the vehicle with the
`mounted radar system to travel 15 feet. Id. at 6:43–46. During the
`persistence period, no warnings are sent to the driver indicators. Id. at 6:46–
`51. After the persistence period, a warning is sent to the driver indicators if
`an obstacle is detected within one second after the end of the persistence
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`period, or two seconds after a prior warning was sent. Id. at 6:51–55. Pakett
`also describes “determin[ing] how long it has been since the warning was
`last activated” when a warning is presently being displayed. Id. at 7:64–
`8:10. If the warning has been displayed for more than one second without
`being reactivated, the system of Pakett ends the warning display. Id.
`
`2. Kawai (Exs. 1003 and 1004)
`Kawai, titled “Onboard Radar Device,” describes a signal processing
`filter for smoothing a radar signal subject to noise on an onboard radar
`device. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1, 8. Kawai describes a problem of detection loss in a
`radar detection signal, illustrated in Figure 2, reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2 of Kawai illustrates a radar detection signal with signal
`
`dropout.
`Labels A, B, C, and D in Figure 2 of Kawai represent detection loss
`and misdetection periods. Ex. 1004 ¶ 6. In order to handle detection loss
`periods, Kawai describes means for “continuously hold[ing] the value of the
`detection signal from immediately before, limited to a prescribed time span,
`when the radar detection signal changes in excess of a preset threshold
`value.” Id. ¶ 20. The “prescribed time span” may be set variably based on
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`the amount of change in the radar detection signal. Id. ¶ 25. Figure 4 of
`Kawai, reproduced below, illustrates the result of holding the value of the
`detection signal when the radar detection signal changes excessively.
`
`
`Figure 4 of Kawai illustrates the radar detection signal with smoothed
`portions over the dropout periods.
`Kawai describes that by holding the value of the detection signal,
`almost none of the effect of the detection loss periods remains. Id. ¶ 22.
`Kawai further describes that additional filtering may be carried out to further
`smooth out the portions A2, B2, C2, and D2 illustrated in Figure 4 above.
`Id. ¶ 24.
`
`3. Analysis of Claim 1 – “Determining Whether the Alert Signal
`was Active for a Threshold Time”
`
`Claim 1 recites, in part, “at the end of the alert command, determining
`whether the alert signal was active for a threshold time.” Ex. 1001, 5:41–42.
`Petitioner asserts that “[t]here are only a few, insubstantial differences
`between [the teachings of Pakett] and [this] limitation of claim 1.” Pet. 46–
`47. Petitioner first identifies as a difference that by waiting for a variable
`persistence period before activating a warning, Pakett’s system determines
`whether an alert command has been active for a threshold time before it
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`activates the warning and applies a warning sustain time, rather than
`“determining whether the alert signal was active for a threshold time.” Id. at
`47 (emphasis added). Petitioner asserts that the combination of Pakett and
`Kawai and the knowledge and skill of one of ordinary skill in the art
`overcomes these deficiencies of Pakett. Id. at 46. We disagree with
`Petitioner and are not persuaded that the combination of Pakett and Kawai,
`with the knowledge and skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, overcomes
`the first “insubstantial” difference identified by Petitioner.
`Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious “to modify Pakett’s
`system such that it determines whether the ‘alert signal,’ as opposed to the
`‘alert command,’ was active for a ‘threshold time’ as the claim requires.”
`Pet. 47. Petitioner asserts that this could be accomplished by activating a
`warning (alert signal) as soon as Pakett recognizes that an obstacle is
`present, and then applying the processing method previously applied to the
`persistence period instead to determine whether to sustain the warning. Id.
`at 47–48 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 101–04). Petitioner asserts that “one of
`ordinary skill in the art would consider Pakett’s delay of a warning until
`after the end of the persistence period to be nothing more than an optional
`redundancy,” and, thus, that this modification would have been obvious as
`“nothing more than a routine, obvious design choice.” Id. at 48 (citing
`Ex. 1010 ¶ 104). We disagree with Petitioner that the cited portions of
`Pakett’s teaching to delay the warning until after the persistence period is
`“nothing more than an optional redundancy,” at least because the cited
`portions of Packett do not indicate, either explicitly or implicitly, the
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`function of waiting for the persistence period before sending a warning to
`the driver indicators as optional or redundant. See id.
`Pakett clearly states that during the persistence period, “no warnings
`are sent to the driver indicators.” Ex. 1002, 6:50–51 (emphasis added).
`Pakett explains that waiting through the persistence period before sending
`warnings to the driver indicators prevents the system from incorrectly
`identifying stationary obstacles that were identified by the square wave
`generator 29 as valid obstacles in the blind spot. Id. at 7:56–63. Pakett thus
`explains that waiting through the persistence period before sending warnings
`to the driver indicators filters out false positives of objects in the blind spot
`of the vehicle. Id.
`Although Petitioner alleges that Pakett teaches “numerous other
`methods to filter out and ignore stationary objects” (Pet. 48), only one is
`taught in Pakett to “eliminate signals which represent . . . stationary
`objects.” Ex. 1002, 5:19–21 (emphasis added). The other alleged
`“redundant” detection methods cited by Petitioner are related to limiting a
`detection distance so that only obstacles within a specified range are
`identified. Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1002, 3:64–4:5, 4:16–26, 5:40–44). Limiting
`a detection distance of the system is not the same as eliminating signals
`which represent stationary objects.
`The cited portion of Pakett teaches a low pass filter 27 that processes
`detection signals, and passes the processed signals to the square wave
`generator 29. Ex. 1002, 5:11–39. This low pass filter 27 is the other alleged
`“redundant” element that filters out and ignores stationary objects. Pet. 48.
`The signal from the square wave generator 29 is then output to a memory
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`register 37, which is used to establish the persistence period. Ex. 1002,
`6:40–43. Pakett teaches that the persistence period is used to facilitate
`ignoring transitions at the output of the square wave generator caused by
`stationary objects. Id. at 7:58–63. It stands to reason that the low pass filter
`27 does not filter out all signals stemming from stationary objects. If it did,
`there would be no need for the persistence period because no detection
`signals relating to stationary objects would make it through the low pass
`filter 27. Pakett explicitly states that the persistence period is used to
`eliminate identification signals that identify stationary objects, where the
`signals made it through the filter to the square wave generator 29. Id.
`Thus, we disagree with Petitioner that the persistence period of Pakett
`is merely optional or redundant, because no other features taught in the cited
`portions of Pakett achieve the same result of “effectively ignor[ing]
`transitions at the output of the square wave generator 29 caused by . . .
`stationary obstacles.” Id.
`The second “insubstantial” difference identified by Petitioner is that
`Pakett’s system employs a fixed 1-second sustain time, as opposed to the
`claimed “variable” sustain time. Pet. 49. Regarding this second difference,
`as discussed infra in Section II.D.4., Petitioner fails to establish that it would
`have been obvious to modify Pakett to arrive at the claimed “variable sustain
`time.”
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the information presented in
`the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail
`in establishing unpatentability of claims 1, 2, and 6 as obvious over Pakett
`and Kawai.
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`4. Analysis of Claim 1 – “Selecting a Variable Sustain Time”
`Claim 1 recites, in part, “selecting a variable sustain time as a function
`of relative vehicle speed.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–35. Petitioner acknowledges that
`“Pakett . . . uses a fixed sustain time of one second.” Pet. 43 (emphasis
`added). Petitioner cites to Kawai to overcome this deficiency of Pakett. Id.
`at 43–45. Petitioner asserts, referring to Kawai as an example, that “[i]t was
`known in the prior art, however, that a ‘variable’ sustain time could be
`employed to deal with misdetection, signal loss, and noise issues associated
`with a radar-based exterior object detection system.” Id. at 43. We are not
`persuaded that the combination of Pakett and Kawai would have rendered
`obvious these limitations.
`The fixed sustain time of Pakett cited by Petitioner refers to a
`minimum period of time that the alert signal of Pakett is sustained. Pet. 43
`(citing Ex. 1002, 7:64–8:10). In contrast, the variable sustain time of Kawai
`cited by Petitioner refers to a period of time when a radar detection signal is
`held at a previously detected level to smooth over a possible temporary
`detection loss or misdetection. Id. at 43–44 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 20–25). The
`radar detection signal of Kawai is not “a signal that provides a visual or
`audio alert to a driver,” and thus does not correspond to the claim 1
`limitation “alert signal.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 20–25. In fact, Kawai does not appear
`to teach any features that correspond to the claimed alert signal, and
`Petitioner does not identify any such features. Instead, the radar detection
`signal of Kawai appears more akin to “raw alert data that is used to generate
`an alert signal,” and thus corresponds more closely to the claim 1 limitation
`“alert command.” Id. ¶ 11; see also Section II.A., supra.
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`Petitioner asserts that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would also
`consider the use of a ‘variable sustain time’ like that set forth Kawai to be
`nothing more than a routine, obvious design choice.” Pet. 53. However, we
`are not convinced that the combination would have rendered obvious the
`features of claim 1, specifically “selecting a variable sustain time as a
`function of relative vehicle speed,” even if the alleged “variable sustain
`time” of Kawai we
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