UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Palo Alto Networks, Inc. and
`Blue Coat Systems, Inc.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`Finjan, Inc.
`Patent Owner
`
`Inter Partes Review No. 2015-019741
`U.S. Patent No. 7,647,633
`
`PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Case IPR2016-00480 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`

`
`Table of Contents
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`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`THERE IS NO BASIS TO EXCLUDE DR. RUBIN’S CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION OPINIONS (EX. 1002, ¶¶ 79-93) .................................. 1
`III. THE GRENIER DECLARATION (EX. 1005) IS ADMISSIBLE ................ 2
`IV. EXHIBITS 1006 (AUTHOR’S WEBPAGE), 1007 (FILEWATCHER
`WEBPAGE), AND 1008 (KAVA PAPER) ARE ADMISSIBLE ................. 3
`A.
`Exhibits 1006-1008 are Authentic ....................................................... 4
`B.
`Exhibits 1006-1007 are Not Hearsay ................................................... 4
`C.
`Exhibits 1006-1008 are Relevant ......................................................... 6
`THE KENT DECLARATION (EX. 1082) IS ADMISSIBLE ...................... 6
`V.
`VI. THE SHERFESEE AFFIDAVIT (EX. 1093) IS ADMISSIBLE .................. 7
`VII. THE BUTLER AFFIDAVITS (EXS. 1092, 1095) ARE
`ADMISSIBLE ................................................................................................ 8
`VIII. PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS 1099, 1101, 1035, 2022, AND
`RELATED ARGUMENTS REBUT ARGUMENTS RAISED IN
`FINJAN’S RESPONSE .................................................................................. 9
`A.
`PAN’s Claim Construction Arguments Properly Respond to
`Finjan’s New Claim Construction Position.......................................... 9
`Reply Arguments Regarding Shin Should Not Be Excluded ............ 11
`PAN’s Arguments Regarding a Poison Java + Brown
`Combination Properly Rebut Finjan’s Response ............................... 11
`Testimony and Reply Arguments Regarding Shin and Poison
`Java’s Public Availability ................................................................... 12
`IX. SHIN (EX. 1009), POISON JAVA (EX. 1004), AND BROWN (EX.
`1041) ARE ADMISSIBLE ........................................................................... 12
`A.
`Shin (Ex. 1009) is Admissible............................................................ 13
`B.
`Poison Java (Ex. 1004) is Admissible ................................................ 14
`C.
`Brown (Ex. 1041) is Admissible ........................................................ 15
`
`B.
`C.
`
`D.
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`-i-
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`

`
`Table of Authorities
`(cont’d)
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`Actifio, Inc. v. Delphix Corp.,
`IPR2015-00025, Paper 69 (PTAB Apr. 12, 2016) ................................. 13, 14, 15
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369, Paper 40 (PTAB June 17, 2016) ............................................... 3
`Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.,
`848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 988 U.S. 892 (1988) ......................... 3, 8
`Crestron Elecs., Inc. v. Intuitive Building Controls, Inc.,
`IPR2015-01460, Paper 14 (PTAB Jan. 14, 2016) ................................................ 8
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs.,
`IPR2013-00085, Paper 73 (PTAB May 15, 2014) ....................................... 13, 15
`Ericsson, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2014-000527, Paper 41 (PTAB May 18, 2015) ........................................... 14
`Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2014-01149, Paper 68 (PTAB Dec. 9, 2015) ................................... 13, 14, 15
`In re Hall,
`781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) .......................................................................... 3, 8
`Hughes Network Sys., LLC v. California Institute of Tech.,
`IPR2015-00059, Paper 42 (PTAB Apr. 21, 2016) ....................................... 10, 11
`Int’l Business Machines Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`IPR2015-00089, Paper 44 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2016) ................................... 5, 13, 15
`L-3 Comms. Holdings, Inc. v. Power Survey, LLC,
`IPR2014-00834, Paper 68 (PTAB Nov. 23, 2015) ............................................... 9
`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00002, Paper 66 (PTAB Jan. 23, 2014) .............................................. 8
`Microsoft Corp. v. Bradium Techs., LLC,
`IPR2016-00448, Paper 9 (PTAB July 25, 2016) .......................................... 14, 15
`-ii-
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`

`
`Table of Authorities
`(cont’d)
`
`Page(s)
`
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`Nintendo of America Inc. v. Motion Games LLC,
`IPR2014-00164, Paper 51 (PTAB May 15, 2015) ......................................... 9, 10
`Nissan North America, Inc. v. Diamond Coating Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-01548, Paper 43 (PTAB Nov. 6, 2015) ................................................. 9
`QSC Audio Products, LLC v. Crest Audio, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00127, Paper 43 (PTAB Apr. 29, 2015) ........................................... 5, 6
`SAP America, Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam,
`IPR2013-00195, Paper 60 (PTAB Sept. 18, 2014)............................................... 4
`SDI Techs., Inc. v. Bose Corp.,
`IPR2013-00350, Paper 36 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2014) ................................................. 4
`TRW Automotive v. Magna Elecs. Inc.,
`IPR2014-01347, Paper 25 (PTAB Jan. 6, 2016) ................................................ 14
`United States v. Turner,
`718 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2013) ................................................................................. 4
`Valeo North America, Inc. v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-01204, Paper 51 (PTAB Jan. 25, 2016) .............................................. 13
`Vibrant Media, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,
`IPR2013-00172, Paper 50 (PTAB July 28, 2014) ................................................ 9
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R.
`§§ 42.51(b)(2), 42.52(a) ........................................................................................ 2
`§§ 42.53(f)(8), 42.64(a), (c) .................................................................................. 2
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`-iii-
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`Table of Authorities
`(cont’d)
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`Page(s)
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`F.R.E.
`401 ............................................................................................................. 3, 6, 7, 8
`602 ..................................................................................................................... 3, 8
`801 ......................................................................................................................... 4
`807 ....................................................................................................... 5, 13, 14, 15
`807(a)(1) ............................................................................................................... 6
`807(a)(2) ............................................................................................................... 6
`807(a)(2)-(4) ................................................................................................. 14, 15
`807(a)(3) ............................................................................................................... 6
`807(a)(4) ............................................................................................................... 6
`901 ......................................................................................................................... 4
`901, 602 ................................................................................................................. 8
`901(b)(1), (b)(4) ...................................................................................... 13, 14, 15
`901(b)(4) ............................................................................................................... 4
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`-iv-
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner Finjan, Inc.’s Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 36) should
`
`be denied for the reasons below.
`
`II. THERE IS NO BASIS TO EXCLUDE DR. RUBIN’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`OPINIONS (EX. 1002, ¶¶ 79-93)
`Finjan’s motion to exclude paragraphs 79-932 of Dr. Rubin’s declaration
`
`(Ex. 1002) rests on a mischaracterization of Dr. Rubin’s deposition and the
`
`baseless suggestion that deposition objections render all related testimony
`
`inadmissible. Finjan’s arguments do not withstand scrutiny. As PAN explained in
`
`its Reply (Paper 31 at 7-8), Finjan’s suggestion that Dr. Rubin refused to answer
`
`questions is misleading. Dr. Rubin answered all questions asked about instituted
`
`claims 14 and 19. When Finjan’s counsel asked about non-instituted claim 13,
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`PAN’s counsel asked Finjan’s counsel to explain its relevance. (Ex. 2022, Rubin
`
`Dep. at 89:6-94:12.) After resolving the issue off the record, Finjan’s counsel
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`proceeded with questions concerning claim 13, which Dr. Rubin answered. (Id.)
`
`Finjan provides no support for its nonsensical argument that an objection
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`made during a deposition amounts to an admission that all related testimony is
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`irrelevant. (See Paper 36 at 2-3). To the contrary, objections are made on the record
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`to avoid waiver, and are ineffective unless preserved in a subsequent motion to
`
`
`2 Finjan identifies no basis for excluding the entirety of Dr. Rubin’s testimony.
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`1
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`exclude. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.53(f)(8), 42.64(a), (c). The court reporter merely notes
`
`objections, and the witness answers subject to the objections. Pat. Tr. Practice
`
`Guide, Appx. D at ¶ 2. Here, PAN’s counsel properly objected on the record to
`
`preserve objections, Dr. Rubin answered those questions, and PAN later waived its
`
`objections to Finjan’s questions by not pressing those objections in a motion to
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`exclude. Finjan’s counsel questioned Dr. Rubin regarding claims 13 and 14 in view
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`of the Blue Coat construction of non-instituted claim 13. (Ex. 2022 at 93:7-94:12,
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`105:2-107:11.) PAN’s counsel objected to those questions as irrelevant to the
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`extent they called for testimony regarding claim 13.3 (Id.)
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`Finally, to the extent Finjan seeks exclusion based on allegations that
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`Dr. Rubin did not answer Finjan’s questions, Finjan has waived its complaint,
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`because it never sought additional discovery under 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.51(b)(2),
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`42.52(a).
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`III. THE GRENIER DECLARATION (EX. 1005) IS ADMISSIBLE
`Mr. Grenier’s declaration is probative of Poison Java’s public availability
`
`because Mr. Grenier testified that Poison Java was printed, published, and
`
`
`3 The Board’s rules do not allow objecting counsel to explain the basis for an
`
`objection unless counsel taking the deposition so requests. Pat. Tr. Practice Guide,
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`Appx. D at ¶ 3. Finjan’s counsel did not ask for an explanation in this instance.
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`2
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`distributed in the IEEE Spectrum magazine in August 1999. (Ex. 1005 at ¶¶ 8-11;
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`F.R.E. 401.) During his deposition, Mr. Grenier authenticated his declaration and
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`explained that the Abstract for the later-published electronic version of Poison Java
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`(Exhibit A) corroborates an August 1999 printed publication date, because this
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`date was entered by IEEE in the normal course of business based on the printed
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`publication. (Ex. 1005 at ¶¶ 8-11; Ex. 2023, Grenier Dep. at 30:16-38:21.) As
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`explained in PAN’s Reply, later electronic publication, which Finjan cites (Paper
`
`36 at 3-4), does not change the original August 1999 printed publication date.
`
`Finjan also complains that Mr. Grenier’s declaration lacks foundation. But
`
`Mr. Grenier’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge of exhibits attached
`
`to his declaration and IEEE’s regular business practices. (Ex. 1005; Ex. 2023,
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`Grenier Dep. at 30:16-33:11, 37:21-38:21.) Such testimony is admissible. F.R.E.
`
`602; In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Constant v. Advanced Micro-
`
`Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 988 U.S. 892 (1988).
`
`IV. EXHIBITS 1006 (AUTHOR’S WEBPAGE), 1007 (FILEWATCHER WEBPAGE),
`AND 1008 (KAVA PAPER) ARE ADMISSIBLE
`Finjan argues that Exhibits 1006-1008 should be excluded primarily because
`
`they are allegedly insufficient to prove Shin’s public availability. (Paper 36 at 4-6.)
`
`As explained below, these arguments go to weight, rather than admissibility, and
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`should be rejected. See Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper
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`3
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`40 at 36-37 (PTAB June 17, 2016).
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`
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`A. Exhibits 1006-1008 are Authentic
`Exhibits 1006-1008 have distinctive characteristics
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`that sufficiently
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`authenticate the webpages. F.R.E. 901(b)(4). The standard for admissibility under
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`F.R.E. 901 is “slight.” United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2013).
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`Distinctive characteristics include “dates, websites, trademarks, copyright notices,
`
`and URL links” indicating the document is what it purports to be. SAP America,
`
`Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam, IPR2013-00195, Paper 60 at 22 (PTAB Sept. 18,
`
`2014). Exhibit 1006 bears the CPS Labs URL and logo, and the retrieval date. (Ex.
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`1006.) Exhibit 1007 includes the URL www.filewatcher.com, with a footer link to
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`its source and a time/date stamp of its retrieval. (Ex. 1007 at 1.) Exhibit 1008 has a
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`URL link to its source and includes an abstract identifying authors and dates on the
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`copy itself. (Ex. 1008 at 1, 3-4.) Finjan provides no showing these characteristics
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`are untrustworthy. See SAP, IPR2013-00195, Paper 60 at 22; SDI Techs., Inc. v.
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`Bose Corp., IPR2013-00350, Paper 36, at 16-18 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2014).
`
`Exhibits 1006-1007 are Not Hearsay
`B.
`First, Exhibits 1006-1007 are not hearsay because they are not offered for
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`the truth of the matter asserted. Petitioner relies on Exhibits 1006-1007 to
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`demonstrate consistency among various references confirming Shin’s publication
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`date. (Paper 1 at 4-5; F.R.E. 801.)
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`4
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`Second, even if Exhibits 1006-1007 are hearsay, they are admissible under
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`the residual hearsay exception. F.R.E. 807; QSC Audio Products, LLC v. Crest
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`Audio, Inc., IPR2014-00127, Paper 43 at 14-15 (PTAB Apr. 29, 2015). The Board
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`has repeatedly found evidence of public availability admissible under the residual
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`hearsay exception. Id.; Int’l Business Machines Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II
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`LLC, IPR2015-00089, Paper 44 at 52-56 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2016) (hereinafter IBM)
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`(finding exhibits indicating dates in close “proximity” “corroborate[d] each other”
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`and offered “circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness”). Petitioner offers
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`extensive circumstantial evidence corroborating the dates:
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`• Ex. 1006: Insik Shin’s publications, including “Java Bytecode Modification and
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`Applet Security” (Ex. 1006 at 2);
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`• Ex. 1007: a filewatcher.com webpage listing three July 1998 files titled “java-
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`bytecode-mod” that were collected from Stanford servers (“ftp.cs.stanford.edu”,
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`“cs.stanford.edu”, and “mirror.stanford.edu”) (Ex. 1007 at 1);
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`• Ex. 1008: a January 1999 paper citing “Shin, I. & Mitchel, J.C.: Java Bytecode
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`Modification and Applet Security. Stanford CS Tech Report, (1998)” (Ex. 1008
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`at 1, 3, 14);
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`• Ex. 1009 (Shin): a paper titled “Java Bytecode Modification and Applet
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`Security,” listing Stanford’s computer science department and noting it was
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`submitted to OOPLSA in ’98 (Ex. 1009 at 1);
`5
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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`• Ex. 1095 (Butler Affidavit) and Ex. 1093 (Sherfesee Affidavit), indicating
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`Internet Archive’s records show Shin (Ex. 1009) as being publicly available by
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`April 18, 1998, through Stanford’s computer science department, “www-cs-
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`students.stanford.edu/~ishin/paper.ps” (Ex. 1095).
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`See F.R.E. 807(a)(1). The dates in Exhibits 1006-1007 are evidence of the public
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`availability of Shin (F.R.E. 807(a)(2)) and more probative than other evidence
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`obtained by Petitioner and not submitted with its Petition. See QSC Audio,
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`IPR2014-00127, Paper 42 at 15; F.R.E. 807(a)(3). Finally, admitting the dates for
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`consideration will serve the interest of justice. (See id.; F.R.E. 807(a)(4).)
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`Accordingly, Exhibits 1006-1007 fall within the residual hearsay exception.
`
`C. Exhibits 1006-1008 are Relevant
`Finjan argues that Exhibits 1006-1008 are not relevant based on its other
`
`objections and their insufficiency to prove Shin’s public accessibility. (Paper 36 at
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`4-6.) But this is not the proper test for relevance. F.R.E. 401. Exhibits 1006-1008
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`are probative of Shin’s public availability because they tend to show that Shin was
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`publicly accessible as of July 1998 via the Stanford Computer Science department.
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`V. THE KENT DECLARATION (EX. 1082) IS ADMISSIBLE
`Finjan’s foundation and relevance arguments (Paper 36 at 6-7) are baseless.
`
`Mr. Kent testified, based on his own knowledge, that: (1) the chapter of Brown
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`attached to his declaration was identical to the same chapter in the edition he
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`6
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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`received at the time of its first publication (Ex. 2024, Kent Dep. at 31:23-33:6);
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`(2) he received the earlier edition of Brown in September 1996 (id., 20:20-22:22,
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`25:21-26:21); (3) the earlier edition of Brown was indexed by ISBN number and
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`received a Library of Congress catalogue number (id., 17:7-18:7); (4) the edition
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`attached to his declaration was published in December 1996 (id., 25:14-26:2); and
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`(5) he received periodic updates in 1996 concerning sales of Brown (id., 23:6-
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`25:7). Thus, Mr. Kent’s declaration is based on personal knowledge and is relevant
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`to the public availability of the same disclosure in Brown cited in the Petition.
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`VI. THE SHERFESEE AFFIDAVIT (EX. 1093) IS ADMISSIBLE
`Mr. Sherfesee’s testimony is probative of and corroborates the dates
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`recorded by Alexa Internet and used in Internet Archive’s records. (Petition at 4-5;
`
`Ex. 1093.) Therefore, it is relevant to the issue of public availability. F.R.E. 401.
`
`Finjan complains that Mr. Sherfesee’s declaration lacks foundation and is
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`hearsay. But Mr. Sherfesee’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge of
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`Alexa Internet’s regularly conducted business practices. (Ex. 1093.) As Manager
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`and Director of the “Crawl Engineering Group,” which was responsible for
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`“developing, maintaining, and improving [the] web crawling technology,”
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`Mr. Sherfesee gained personal knowledge of the web crawling technology. (Ex.
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`2049, Sherfesee Dep. at 6:12-7:4, 23:4-10, 27:12-30:3, 24:6-27:14.) Mr. Sherfesee
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`testified, based on his knowledge of Alexa’s business practices, that since early
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`7
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`1996, Alexa Internet has regularly used crawler programs to capture information at
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`unique URLs and apply a date/time stamp to each URL archived. (Id.; Ex. 1093 at
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`¶¶ 4-9.) Such testimony is admissible. F.R.E. 602; In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 899;
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`Constant, 848 F.2d at 1560, cert. denied, 988 U.S. 892 (1988).
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`VII. THE BUTLER AFFIDAVITS (EXS. 1092, 1095) ARE ADMISSIBLE
`Exhibits 1092 and 1095 are relevant because they confirm that Brown and
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`Shin, respectively, were publicly available on a website before the relevant date.
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`F.R.E. 401; Ex. 1092; Ex. 1095.
`
`The Board has repeatedly accepted Mr. Butler’s affidavits as sufficient to
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`authenticate Internet Archive records. See, e.g., Crestron Elecs., Inc. v. Intuitive
`
`Building Controls, Inc., IPR2015-01460, Paper 14 (PTAB Jan. 14, 2016)
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`(collecting case law in which Wayback Machine evidence was admissible and
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`determining that Mr. Butler’s affidavit was sufficient to authenticate archived web
`
`pages). Here, Mr. Butler even authenticated his declarations and their attachments
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`during a deposition. (Ex. 2025, Butler Dep. at 10:18-15:19, 23:25-24:17, 29:21-
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`24.) Mr. Butler testified based on his personal procurement of archived web pages
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`(id. at 10:18-11:3) and his own knowledge of Internet Archive’s business practices
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`(Exs. 1092, 1095). Finjan’s arguments are directed at the sufficiency of the
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`affidavits, rather than their admissibility. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
`
`Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper 66 at 62 (PTAB Jan. 23,
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`8
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`2014). Thus, the Butler affidavits are admissible. F.R.E. 901, 602.
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`
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`VIII. PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS 1099, 1101, 1035, 2022, AND RELATED
`ARGUMENTS REBUT ARGUMENTS RAISED IN FINJAN’S RESPONSE
`A motion to exclude is not the proper vehicle to object to new evidence
`
`raised in a reply. Nintendo of America Inc. v. Motion Games LLC, IPR2014-00164,
`
`Paper 51 at 24 (PTAB May 15, 2015); Vibrant Media, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,
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`IPR2013-00172, Paper 50, at 41 (PTAB July 28, 2014). Even if it were proper,
`
`Finjan fails to “identify the corresponding objection in the record.” Nissan North
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`America, Inc. v. Diamond Coating Techs., LLC, IPR2014-01548, Paper 43 at 3
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`(PTAB Nov. 6, 2015). Finjan’s motion to exclude Exhibits 1099, 1101, 1035,4
`
`2022, and related arguments should be ignored. (Paper 36 at 9-11.) And as
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`explained below, each of Finjan’s “new evidence” arguments lack merit.
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`A.
`
`PAN’s Claim Construction Arguments Properly Respond to
`Finjan’s New Claim Construction Position
`Finjan asserts
`that Petitioner’s “new arguments
`
`regarding claim
`
`construction” should be excluded without identifying what those new arguments
`
`actually are. (Paper 36 at 9-10.) PAN’s reply arguments merely respond to
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`arguments and evidence raised in Finjan’s Response. See L-3 Comms. Holdings,
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`4 Since Finjan does not identify a basis to exclude Exhibit 1035, its motion should
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`be denied outright as to that exhibit. Nissan, IPR2014-01548, Paper 43 at 3.
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`9
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`

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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
`
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`Inc. v. Power Survey, LLC, IPR2014-00834, Paper 68 at 23 (PTAB Nov. 23, 2015)
`
`(citing Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, No. 2014-1575, 2015 WL 6756451, at 10-15
`
`(Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2015)); Nintendo, IPR2014-00164, Paper 51 at 23-24.
`
`Finjan essentially argues that, when PAN filed its Petition, it should have
`
`anticipated that Finjan would abandon the claim construction position it took in
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`Blue Coat and argue the opposite construction in this proceeding. Here, Finjan
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`proposed a construction of claim 14 wherein mobile protection code must be
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`communicated to the destination “without modifying the executable code.” (Paper
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`22 at 12-19.) Claim 14 is silent as to modification, and Finjan argued against this
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`same construction in Blue Coat. (Ex. 1039 at 19; Ex. 1035 at 8.) Petitioner
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`responds, in part, by citing Exhibit 1099, declaration testimony from Finjan’s
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`expert, Dr. Medvidovic. (Paper 31 at 4-6.) Finjan and Dr. Medvidovic’s previous
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`opinions directly contradict Finjan’s current claim construction position. (Id. at 6.)
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`Petitioner also cites Dr. Rubin’s testimony to show that his understanding
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`contradicts Finjan’s proposed construction, as well. (Id. at 4-5.) Exhibits 1099 and
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`2022 and Petitioner’s related arguments are not offered to support its prima facie
`
`case of unpatentability but rather to rebut an unsupported claim construction raised
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`by Finjan in its Response. (Id. at 4-6, 16-17; Paper 22 at 12-19; Hughes, IPR2015-
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`00059, Paper 42 at 38.)
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`10
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`Petitioner’s Response
`IPR2015-01974
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`B. Reply Arguments Regarding Shin Should Not Be Excluded
`Petitioner’s arguments regarding Shin directly respond to Finjan’s proposed
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`
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`construction and Finjan’s assertions that Shin does not teach the claimed invention
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`under that construction. (Paper 31 at 16-17; Paper 22 at 27-29.) Finjan is not
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`prejudiced because Finjan raised and argued this issue in its Response. (Id.)
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`Finjan also asserts that Petitioner argues that a web browser is a mobile code
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`executor “for the first time.” (Paper 36 at 10.) In its Reply, Petitioner states that
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`“the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) incorporated in 2000-era web browsers is a
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`‘mobile code executor’.” (Paper 31 at 13-15.) Petitioner did not alter its original
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`theory that the JVM constitutes a mobile code executor (Paper 1 at 42-44), and
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`Petitioner’s mere mention of the web browser implementing the JVM does not
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`constitute a new theory. (Paper 31 at 13-15.)
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`C.
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`PAN’s Arguments Regarding a Poison Java + Brown
`Combination Properly Rebut Finjan’s Response
`Petitioner properly introduces Exhibit 1101 as rebuttal evidence to contradict
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`Finjan’s characterizations of a POSA’s knowledge. (Paper 31 at 20.) In its
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`Response, Finjan asserts that a POSA would not have been motivated to combine
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`Brown and Poison Java, because Brown mentions that Java code is safe. (Paper 22
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`at 39-41.) Petitioner relies on Exhibit 1101 to rebut Finjan’s characterization of a
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`POSA because, as of 1999, a POSA would have known Java had become unsafe.
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`(Paper 31 at 20.) Thus, Petitioner does not improperly try to bolster its prima facie
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`case for unpatentability—rather, it rebuts Finjan’s arguments regarding a POSA.
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`Finjan also asserts that Petitioner raises new argument regarding whether
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`Poison Java and Brown modify executable code. (Paper 36 at 10.) As discussed
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`above, Finjan raised this construction in its Response, which directly contradicted
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`its earlier construction positions. (See Section VIII.A, supra.) Petitioner’s
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`discussion of Poison Java and Brown, as well as its citations to Dr. Rubin’s
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`testimony, directly rebut Finjan’s arguments in its Response. (Paper 31 at 21-22.)
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`D. Testimony and Reply Arguments Regarding Shin and Poison
`Java’s Public Availability
`Petitioner’s citation of Dr. Rubin’s deposition does not raise new arguments.
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`(Paper 31 at 9-11.) Finjan asserts that Petitioner “attempts to shoehorn new public
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`availability arguments” by citing Dr. Rubin, but fails to identify what these
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`supposed new arguments are. (Paper 36 at 11.) The cited portions of Dr. Rubin’s
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`deposition correspond directly to testimony he previously made in his declaration.
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`(Compare Ex. 2022, Rubin Dep. at 75:10-21, 70:21-71:11 with Ex. 1002 at ¶¶ 100,
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`102.) Accordingly, Exhibit 2022 and related arguments should not be excluded.
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`IX. SHIN (EX. 1009), POISON JAVA (EX. 1004), AND BROWN (EX. 1041) ARE
`ADMISSIBLE
`Finjan’s arguments that the prior art is irrelevant are directed at whether
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`these references qualify as “printed publication[s]” rather than any evidentiary
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`objection. (Paper 36 at 12-14.) This is an improper attempt at a sur-reply, with no
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`bearing on admissibility. Valeo North America, Inc. v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
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`IPR2014-01204, Paper 51 at 14 (PTAB Jan. 25, 2016).
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`Shin (Ex. 1009) is Admissible
`A.
`Shin was authenticated by witness
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`testimony and
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`its distinctive
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`characteristics. See Actifio, Inc. v. Delphix Corp., IPR2015-00025, Paper 69 at 12
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`(PTAB Apr. 12, 2016) (prior art authenticated by its distinctive characteristics and
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`authenticating testimony). Shin identifies its title, authors, and the Stanford
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`Computer Science Department. (Ex. 1009 at 1.) Petitioner cites numerous sources
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`which corroborate the same or similar title, authors, and source. (See Section IV.B,
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`supra.) Furthermore, the testimony of Mr. Butler (Ex. 1095) and Dr. Rubin (Ex.
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`1002 at ¶ 102) confirms the Shin paper is what it purports to be. Accordingly, Shin
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`is sufficiently authenticated. F.R.E. 901(b)(1), (b)(4); Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual
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`Ventures I LLC, IPR2014-01149, Paper 68 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 9, 2015).
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`Shin’s date is also admissible based on the same corroborating evidence—
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`Mr. Butler’s Internet Archive declaration. F.R.E. 807; Ex. 1095. The Board
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`consistently upholds admissibility of prior art dates under the residual hearsay
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`exception where there is corroborating evidence, e.g., an Internet Archive affidavit.
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`See IBM, IPR2015-00089, Paper 44 at 52-56; EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs.,
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`IPR2013-00085, Paper 73 at 66 (PTAB May 15, 2014). Shin is offered as evidence
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`of patentability, is more probative on this point than other prior art references not
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`relied on by Petitioner, and its admittance under the residual hearsay exception will
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`best serve the interests of justice. (Paper 1 at 4-5, 28-44; F.R.E. 807(a)(2)-(4).)
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`Poison Java (Ex. 1004) is Admissible
`B.
`Poison Java is a self-authenticating article from a type of publication—the
`
`IEEE Spectrum magazine—routinely admitted by the Board. (Ex. 1004 at 1;
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`Microsoft, IPR2016-00448, Paper 9 at 13-14; Ericsson, Inc. v. Intellectual
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`Ventures I LLC, IPR2014-000527, Paper 41 at 12 (PTAB May 18, 2015; F.R.E.
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`902(6).) Poison Java is also authenticated by its distinctive characteristics and
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`witness testimony. See Actifio, IPR2015-00025, Paper 69 at 12. Unlike the case
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`Finjan cites, Poison Java identifies its title, author, publication, and publication
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`date—Aug. 1999. (Ex. 1004 at 1; TRW Automotive v. Magna Elecs. Inc., IPR2014-
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`01347, Paper 25 at 5-12 (PTAB Jan. 6, 2016).) Mr. Grenier testified that Poison
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`Java was published in Volume 36, Issue 8 of IEEE Spectrum in August 1999. (Ex.
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`1005 at 1-2.) Furthermore, Dr. Rubin testified that he remembered reading a copy
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`of Poison Java in 1999. (Ex. 1002 at ¶100.) Accordingly, Poison Java was
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`authenticated. F.R.E. 901(b)(1), (b)(4); Ericsson, IPR2014-01149, Paper 68 at 13.
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`The date on Poison Java is also admissible based on the same corroborating
`
`evidence—Mr. Grenier’s testimony—discussed above. F.R.E. 807. The Board has
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`consistently upheld admissibility of a prior art date, particularly IEEE articles. See
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`Microsoft, IPR2016-00448, Paper 9 at 13-14. Furthermore, Poison Java is
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`probative of patentability, is more probative on this point than other prior art not
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`relied on by Petitioner, and its admittance under the residual hearsay exception will
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`best serve the interests of justice. (Paper 1 at 4, 51-55; F.R.E. 807(a)(2)-(4).)
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`C. Brown (Ex. 1041) is Admissible
`Brown was authenticated by its distinctive characteristics and witness
`
`testimony. See Actifio, IPR2015-00025, Paper 69 at 12. Brown has many
`
`distinctive characteristics, including its title, authors, publisher QUE, a 1996
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`copyright date, and ISBN and Library of Congress Catalog numbers. (Ex. 1041 at
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`1-2.) These are corroborated by Mr. Kent’s and Mr. Butler’s testimony. (Ex. 1082;
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`Ex. 2024, Kent Dep. at 31:23-33:6, 17:7-18:7, 20:22-26:21; Ex. 1092; Ex. 1093.)
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`Finjan offers no showing that Brown’s characteristics are untrustworthy. F.R.E.
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`901(b)(1), (b)(4); Ericsson, IPR2014-01149, Paper 68 at 13.
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`The date on Brown is also admissible based on the same corroborating
`
`evidence—Mr. Kent’s and Mr. Butler’s testimony—discussed immediately above.
`
`F.R.E. 807; see IBM, IPR2015-00089, Paper 44 at 52-56; EMC, IPR2013-00085,
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`Paper 73 at 66. Furthermore, Brown is offered as evidence of patentability, is more
`
`probative on this point than other prior art references not relied on by Petitioner,
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`and its admittance under the residual hearsay exception will best serve the interests
`
`of justice. (Paper 1 at 5, 28-44; F.R.E. 807(a)(2)-(4).)
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`Dated: December 6, 2016
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTN: Patent Group
`1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 700
`Washington, DC 20004
`Tel: (703) 456-8000
`Fax: (202) 842-7899
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`
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`By:
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`COOLEY LLP
`
`/Orion Armon/
`Orion Armon
`Reg. No. 65,421
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`Petitioner’s Response
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH PAGE LIMIT
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), I certify that this Response complies with
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`the type-volume limits of 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(b)(3) because it contains 15 pages,
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`excluding the parts of this Response that are exempted by 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a).
`
`
`Dated: December 6, 2016
`
`COOLEY LLP
`ATTN: Patent Group
`1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 700
`Washington, DC 20004
`Tel: (703) 456-8000
`Fax: (202) 842-7899
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`COOLEY LLP
`
`By:
`
`/Orion Armon/
`Orion Armon
`Reg. No. 65,421
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`Petitioner’s Response
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies that on
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`December 6, 2016, a complete and entire copy of this PETITIONER’S
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`RESPONSE TO PATENT OWNER’S