UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
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`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING
`SYSTEMS, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Case No. 13-cv-13957
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`HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
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`
`
`
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`
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`CHRYSLER GROUP LLC,
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`Defendant.
`__________________________________/
`
`
`OPINION AND ORDER
`CONSTRUING DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
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`
`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
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`This is a patent infringement case in which Plaintiff Joao Control & Monitoring Systems,
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`LLC (“JCMS”) alleges that Defendant Chrysler Group LLC has infringed upon four of its
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`patents.
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`Pursuant to this Court’s Scheduling Order (Dkt. 25), the parties have identified the
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`disputed claim terms within the four patents that they feel are material to the infringement and
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`validity issues in this case. The parties have submitted extensive written briefs explaining their
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`positions on how the disputed claim terms should be construed (Dkts. 36, 38, 40). On March 24,
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`2015, the Court held oral argument.
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`In this opinion and order, the Court will construe the disputed claim terms identified by
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`the parties, pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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`
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`II. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
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`Plaintiff JCMS has asserted four patents against Defendant Chrysler Group LLC: (i) U.S.
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`Patent No. 5,917,405 (‘405 Patent), entitled “Control Apparatus and Methods for Vehicles”; (ii)
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`1
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 1
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`U.S. Patent 6,549,130 (‘130 Patent), entitled “Control Apparatus and Method for Vehicles and/or
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`Premises”; (iii) U.S. Patent No. 6,542,076, entitled “Control, Monitoring and/or Security
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`Apparatus and Method”; and (iv) U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363, entitled “Control and/or Monitoring
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`Apparatus and Method.”
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`The four patents are all part of the same family of patents and are thus related. The
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`parties agree that that the written description sections of the asserted patents are largely the same
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`for purposes of construing the disputed claim terms. The parties also agree that the Court need
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`only refer and cite to the written description of the ‘405 Patent in construing the disputed claim
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`terms where the patents contain common claim terms. See Markman Hr’g Tr. at 13 (Dkt. 49).
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`The asserted patents relate inter alia to security systems that prevent theft of a motor
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`vehicle and facilitate recovery of the vehicle after the theft. In one example embodiment, the
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`asserted patents teach a system that allows an owner, after theft of his vehicle, to turn off the
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`vehicle or lock-out the thief from the vehicle by controlling vehicle systems via an online web
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`site or a central security office. The web site or central security office would then communicate
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`with the vehicle’s onboard computer thereby allowing the vehicle’s owner to control systems of
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`the vehicle.
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`More specifically, the patented system allows the vehicle’s owner to turn off or activate
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`various vehicle systems to thwart theft of the vehicle, such as turning off the fuel supply system,
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`the exhaust system, or the ignition system; locking the vehicle hood; turning on an interior or
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`exterior siren, alarm, or horn; activating an intercom system for providing communications
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`between vehicle owner and the vehicle occupants; and/or activating a video and/or audio
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`recording device within the vehicle. The patented system would only allow the vehicle owner to
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`2
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 2
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`turn off these vehicle systems when it safe to do so, such as when the thief turns the engine off or
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`the vehicle is stopped.
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`The patent also teaches that the patented system can have a vehicle position and locating
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`device that can be utilized to allow the vehicle’s owner to determine the position and/or location
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`of the vehicle after it is stolen.
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`Figure 11B of the ‘405 Patent illustrates the patented system, which has been reproduced
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`below. Reference number 150 shows a home and/or personal computer that communicates with
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`an online web site 954, a central security office 950, or directly with a receiver 3 on the vehicle.
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`III. LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`
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`Claims of a patent are short and concise statements, expressed with great formality, of the
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`
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`metes and bounds of the patented invention. Each claim is written in the form of a single
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`sentence. Claim construction is the manner in which courts determine the meaning of a disputed
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`3
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 3
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`term in a claim. “The construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse
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`claim language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claim.”
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`Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
`
`The construction of key terms in patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent
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`infringement case. Claim construction is central to both a determination of infringement and
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`validity of a patent. The judge, not a jury, is to determine the meaning of the disputed claim
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`terms as a matter of law. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 391.
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`
`
`A judge has two primary goals in construing the disputed claim terms. The first goal is to
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`determine the scope of the invention by interpreting the disputed claim terms to the extent
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`needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. The second goal is to provide a construction
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`that will be understood by the jury, who might otherwise misunderstand a claim term in the
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`context of the patent specification and prosecution history of the patent. See, e.g., Power-One,
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`Inc. v. Artesyn Techns., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The terms, as construed by
`
`the court, must ensure that the jury fully understands the court’s claim construction rulings and
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`what the patentee covered by the claims.”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554,
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`1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
`
`technical scope, to clarify and when necessary, to explain what the patentee covered by the
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`claims, for use in the determination of infringement.”). The Court’s claim construction ruling
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`forms the basis for the ultimate jury instructions, although that is not to say that the Court cannot
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`modify its wording for the jury instructions after ruling on claim construction. See IPPV Enters.,
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`LLC v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D. Del. 2000).
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`The seminal case setting forth the principles for construing disputed claim terms is
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). According to Phillips, the
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`4
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 4
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`words of the claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary” meaning, i.e., “the
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`meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
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`the invention.” Id. at 1312-1313. The person of ordinary skill in the art views the claim term in
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`light of the entire intrinsic record, which is the entire claim, the other parts of the patent, and, if
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`in evidence, the prosecution history of the patent before the United States Patent and Trademark
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`Office. Id. at 1313-1314. Although a claim must be construed in view of the entire patent, the
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`court should normally not read limitations or features of the exemplary embodiments discussed
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`in the patent specification into the claims. Id. at 1323-1324.
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`The prosecution history of the patent can often inform the meaning of the claim language
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`by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
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`invention during the course of prosecution by his statements, making the claim scope narrower
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`than it would otherwise be. However, because the prosecution history is an ongoing negotiation
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`between the patent office and the patent owner, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it
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`often lacks the clarity of the patent itself and is generally less useful for claim construction
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`purposes. Id. at 1317.
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`In discerning the meaning of claim terms, resorting to dictionaries and treatises also may
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`be helpful. Id. at 1320-1323. However, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that
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`it will be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the indisputable public records
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`consisting of the claims, the specification of the patent and the prosecution history, thereby
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`undermining the public notice function of patents. Id. In the end, the construction that stays true
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`to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will
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`be the correct construction. Id. at 1316.
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`
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`5
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 5
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`It is proper for the Court to construe the disputed claim terms in the context of the
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`infringement or invalidity dispute by viewing the accused device or prior art. Viewing the
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`accused device or prior art allows the Court to construe the claims in the context of the dispute
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`between the parties, not in the abstract. “While a trial court should certainly not prejudge the
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`ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to include or exclude an accused
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`product or process, knowledge of that product or process provides meaningful context for the
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`first step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.” Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
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`Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit has
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`held that without “the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products,” a court’s claim
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`construction decision “takes on the attributes of something akin to an advisory opinion.” Lava
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`Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt, LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`
`
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS FOR DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
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`The parties have requested that the Court construe a number of claim terms. The Court will
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`address each disputed claim term in the following sections.
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`A. “Control Device”
`
`Defendant’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`A device that directs
`the activity of another
`device
`
`Court’s
`Construction
`
`A device that directs
`the activity of another
`device
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`A device or a
`computer, or that part
`of a device or
`computer, which
`performs an
`operation, an action,
`or a function, or
`which performs a
`number of operations,
`actions, or functions
`
`6
`
`
`
`Disputed Term
`
`“control device”
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`
`
`
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`
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 6
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`

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`The parties request that the Court construe the term “control device” in Claims 15, 17,
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`and 20 in the ‘405 Patent; Claims 64, 85, 92, and 144 in the ‘130 Patent; and Claims 13, 17, 18,
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`28, 65, and 68 in the ‘076 Patent.
`
`Claim 1 of the ‘405 Patent is reproduced below to illustrate the use of “control device”:
`
`1. A control apparatus
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`for a vehicle, which comprises:
`
` a
`
` first control device, wherein said first control device one of
`generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
`deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component,
`a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem,
`wherein said first control device is located at the vehicle;
`
`wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
`wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
`from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
`located at a location which is remote from the vehicle, and further
`wherein the second control device is responsive to a third signal,
`wherein the third signal is one of generated by and transmitted
`from a third control device, therein the third control device is
`located at a location which is remote from the vehicle and remote
`from
`the
`second
`control device.
`
`(Emphasis
`added).
`
`Plaintiff argues that “control device” should be construed to mean “a device or computer,
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`or that part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, or a function, or which
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`performs a number of operations, actions, or functions.”
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`Defendant argues that “control device” should be construed to mean “a device that directs
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`the activity of another device.”
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`The Court agrees with Defendant and construes “control device” to mean “a device that
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`directs the activity of another device.” This construction most naturally aligns with the intrinsic
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`evidence of claim language and written description of the patent.
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`
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`7
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 7
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`Starting with the claim language itself, the Court notes that “control device” uses the
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`adjective “control” to modify “device.” Thus, the claim language means that a device that
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`controls or directs the activity of another device.
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`The Court’s construction is supported by how the claim term “control device” is used in
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`the context of the claims. The claim language itself clearly states that the first, second, and third
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`control devices generate and transmit signals for directly or indirectly controlling a vehicle
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`component or system. In the typical embodiment, when the vehicle is stolen, the vehicle’s owner
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`through his personal computer (i.e., the third control device) accesses and sends commands to a
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`remote web site or central security office (i.e., the second control device) in order to control
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`vehicle functions. The web site or central security office system then sends commands to the
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`vehicle’s computer (i.e., the first control device), which in turn sends commands to the vehicle
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`systems, such as the ignition system or fuel system, to disable the vehicle. This claim language
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`makes clear that the “control device” sends control commands or directs the activities of another
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`device.
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`
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`The Courts finds that Plaintiff’s proposed construction for “control device” is too broad.
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`Plaintiff argues that “control device” should be construed to mean “a device or computer, or that
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`part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, or a function, or which performs a
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`number of operations, actions, or functions.” Plaintiff’s proposed construction would encompass
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`any device that performs a function.
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`
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`Plaintiff argues that, by implication, Claim 2 supports its proposed construction for
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`“control device.” Claim 2 states:
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`2. The apparatus of claim 1, which
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`further comprises:
`
` a
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` monitoring device for monitoring at least one of the vehicle,
`vehicle operational status, vehicle operation, said one of a vehicle
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`
`
`8
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 8
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`component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle
`subsystem, a vehicle one of fuel supply, water supply, and coolant
`supply, one of electrical generator and alternator operation, battery
`charge level, engine temperature level, one of an electrical circuit
`and an electrical device, activity inside the vehicle, and activity
`outside the vehicle.
`
`
`Plaintiff argues that Claim 2 states that the control device also monitors and, therefore, is
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`simply performing a function, not directing the activity of another device. The Court finds that
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`Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. Claim 2 does not further define “control device,” but rather
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`introduces a new device into the system, a “monitoring device.” According to the claim
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`language, the monitoring device is a separate device.
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`
`
`Plaintiff also argues that the Court should adopt its definition of “control device,”
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`because the Plaintiff explicitly submitted its definition in the prosecution history of different,
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`although related, patent applications. Specifically, Plaintiff submitted its explicit definition in
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`2006 and 2007 in the prosecution histories of different patent applications. The Court does not
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`find Plaintiff’s arguments persuasive in this case. While statements made in related patent
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`applications can be used in construction of claim terms, a court must be careful to consider
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`whether or not the patent owner is trying to broaden or even redefine the construction of the
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`claim term after the issuance of the patent. The ‘405 Patent issued in 1999, and the ‘130 and
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`‘076 Patents issued in 2003. Plaintiff did not submit its proposed definition of “control device”
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`until after the issuance of the ‘405, ‘130, and ‘076 Patents, specifically in 2006 and 2007 in the
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`prosecution histories of different, though related, patent applications. Therefore, The United
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`States Patent and Trademark Office did not have the benefit of Plaintiff’s definitions before it
`
`granted the ‘405, ‘130, and 076 Patents.
`
` Broadening of a patent is to take place through a reissue patent application which is to be
`
`filed within two years after the issuance of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251; See ArcelorMittal
`
`
`
`9
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 9
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`

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`France v. AK Steel Corp., 786 F.3d 885 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that a claim that is broadened
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`through claim construction after the two year period to file a broadening reissue application is
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`invalid). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has repeatedly instructed that it is
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`important to remember that there is a “public notice” function in patent law. Allowing a patent
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`owner to broaden claim language years after the issuance of the patent would be contrary to the
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`public notice principle in patent law and allow a patent owner to broaden the meaning of claim
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`terms without filing a reissue patent application within two years of the issuance of the patent
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`contrary to the statutory scheme.
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`
`
`In this case, the Court finds that the definitions submitted in the related patent
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`applications years after issuance of the ‘405, ‘130, and ‘076 patents would broaden the claims
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`and, therefore, be improper.
`
`B. “Processing Device”
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`“A device or a
`computer, or that part
`of a device or a
`computer, which
`performs an
`operation, an action,
`or a function, or
`which performs a
`number of operations,
`actions or functions.”
`
`Defendant’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning applies.
`
`OR
`
`“a device that
`performs operations
`on data”
`
`Court’s
`Construction
`
`“A device or a
`computer, or that part
`of a device or a
`computer, which
`performs an
`operation, an action,
`or a function, or
`which performs a
`number of operations,
`actions or functions.”
`
`
`
`Disputed Term
`
`processing device
`
`
`
`The parties request that the Court construe the claim language “processing device” in
`
`Claims 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, and 36 of the ‘363 Patent.
`
`The parties agree that the term “processing device” in the ‘363 Patent is the same element
`
`as “control device” in the ‘405, 076, and ‘130 Patents and does the same thing in the invention.
`
`
`
`10
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 10
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`

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`In the ‘363 Patent, the patent owner chose to use a different term “processing device,” instead of
`
`“control device,” to describe the element of the invention. Markman Hr’g Tr. at 50, 53.
`
`Claim 21 of the ‘363 Patent is reproduced below with examples of the disputed claim
`
`terms underlined:
`
`21. An apparatus, comprising:
`
` a
`
` first processing device, wherein the first processing device at
`least one of generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for
`at least one of activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and
`controlling an operation of, at least one of a vehicle system, a
`vehicle equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device,
`a vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, of or located at a
`vehicle, wherein the first processing device is associated with a
`web site, and further wherein the first processing device is located
`at a location remote from the vehicle,
`
`wherein the first processing device at least one of generates the
`first signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
`signal, wherein the second signal is a at least one of generated by a
`second processing device and
`transmitted from a second
`processing device, wherein the second processing device is located
`at a location which is remote from the first processing device and
`remote from the vehicle, wherein the first processing device
`determines whether an action or an operation associated with
`information contained in the second signal, to at least one of
`activate, de-activate, disable re-enable, and control an operation of,
`the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment system, a
`vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a
`vehicle appliance, is an authorized or an allowed action or an
`authorized or an allowed operation, and further wherein the first
`processing device at least one of generates the first signal and
`transmits the first signal to a third processing device if the action or
`the operation is determined to be an authorized or an allowed
`action or an authorized or an allowed operation, wherein the third
`processing device is located at the vehicle,
`
`wherein the second signal is transmitted to the first processing
`device via, on, or over, at least one of the Internet and the World
`Wide Web, and further wherein the second signal is automatically
`received by the first processing device, wherein the first signal is
`transmitted to and automatically received by the third processing
`device, wherein the third processing device at least one of
`
`
`
`11
`
`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 11
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`

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`generates a third signal and transmits a third signal for at least one
`of activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling
`an operation of, the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle
`equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a
`vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, in response to the first
`signal. (Emphasis added.)
`
`Plaintiff argues that the claim term “processing device” should be construed to mean “a
`
`device or a computer, or that part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, an
`
`action, or a function, or which performs a number of operations, actions or functions.”
`
`Defendant argues that this claim term does not need to be construed because a jury would
`
`understand the term or, in the alternative, Defendant argues that “processing device” should be
`
`construed to mean “a device that performs operations on data.”
`
`
`
`During prosecution of the ‘363 Patent, before the United States Patent and Trademark
`
`Office took any action on the patent application that resulted in the ‘363 Patent, the patent owner
`
`submitted an explicit definition to the United States Patent and Trademark Office for the term
`
`“processing device.” Specifically, the patent owner submitted the exact definition it is proposing
`
`now. See 11/23/2007 Supp. to the Remarks for the Am. Filed on October 24, 2007, Ex. A to
`
`Pl.’s Markman Br. (Dkt. 36-2).
`
`
`
`The Court finds that the term processing device” should be construed to be consistent
`
`with the definition set forth in the prosecution history of the ‘363 Patent. By submitting the
`
`definition early in the prosecution history of the ‘363 Patent, the patent owner acted as his own
`
`“lexicographer.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
`
`(holding that to be a lexicographer a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed
`
`claim term” other than its plain and ordinary meaning). The Court also finds that this
`
`construction is consistent with the written description section of the patent because embodiments
`
`disclosed in the written description section of the patent are computers. For example, the
`
`
`
`12
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 12
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`

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`embodiment of Figure 11B, reproduced below, shows computers at reference numbers 150, 952,
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`970, and 4. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s definition may be more understandable for
`
`a jury than Defendant’s alternative construction because it explicitly makes clear that a
`
`“processing device” may be a computer.1
`
`
`
`
`
`C. “Remote”
`
`Disputed Term
`
`“remote”
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`“separate and apart
`from”
`
`Defendant’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`No construction
`necessary. Plain
`meaning applies.
`
`Alternatively:
`
`Court’s
`Construction
`
`No construction
`necessary at this time.
`If this terms needs
`construction, the
`Court will construe
`
`
`1 In their briefs, the parties did not explain why this claim term needs to be construed in light of
`the infringement or invalidity issues in the case. The Federal Circuit has cautioned that, without
`“the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products” or invalidity issues in the case, a
`court’s claim construction decision “takes on the attributes of something akin to an advisory
`opinion.” Lava Trading, Inc., 445 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, the Court reserves the right to
`modify its construction.
`
`
`
`13
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`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 13
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`

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`“distant in space”
`
`the term at summary
`judgment or before
`trial.
`
`The parties request that the Court construe the term “remote” in Claims 15, 17, and 20 of
`
`
`
`the ‘405 Patent; Claims 64, 85, 92, and 144 of the ‘130 Patent; Claims 13, 17, 18, 28, 65, and 68
`
`of the ‘076 Patent; and Claims 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, and 36 of the ‘363 Patent.
`
`Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe “remote” to mean “separate and apart
`
`from.”
`
`Defendant on the other hand argues that the term “remote” is clear and does not need to
`
`be construed. Alternatively, Defendant argues that “remote” should be construed to mean
`
`“distant in space.”
`
`The parties point to Claim 12 of the ‘405 Patent as an example of a claim using the term
`
`“remote”. Claim 12 states:
`
`12. A control apparatus
`
`for a vehicle, which comprises:
`
` a
`
` first control device, wherein said first control device one of
`generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
`deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a
`vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem, [w]herein
`said first control device is located at a location remote from the
`vehicle;
`
`wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
`wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
`from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
`located at a location which is remote from said first control device
`and remote from the vehicle,
`
`wherein said first signal controls a third control device, wherein the
`third control device is located at the vehicle, and further wherein the
`third control device one of generates and transmits a third signal for
`one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and disabling, said one of a
`vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle
`subsystem, in response to said first signal. (Emphasis added).
`
`
`
`14
`
`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 14
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`

`
`
`The Court finds that the term “remote” is clear and does not need to be construed at this
`
`time, because the claim term is clear when read in the context of the claim and the patent. The
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`claim states that a second control device (e.g., a person using his personal computer or
`
`telephone) sends a command to a first control device (e.g., a web site or central security location)
`
`to control a vehicle system. The claim states that the first control device and second control
`
`device are “remote” from each other and the vehicle. The second control device then sends a
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`command signal to a third control device (e.g., the vehicle’s on-board computer), which is
`
`located at the vehicle. The third control device then sends a command signal to one or more
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`vehicle components or systems such as to turn-off the vehicle’s fuel supply or ignition system if
`
`the vehicle is stolen. The claim states that while the first and second control devices are
`
`“remote”, the third control device is located at the vehicle. Thus, in the context of the claim
`
`language and in context of the patent in general, the term “remote” means remote from the
`
`vehicle as opposed to being located at the vehicle.
`
`The Court’s understanding is supported by the written description sections of the asserted
`
`patents. The written description section of the patent supports the notion that term “remote”
`
`means remote from the vehicle. For example, the following two sections of the written
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`description support the Court’s understanding that “remote” simply means the first and second
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`control devices are remote from the location of the vehicle, as opposed to being located at the
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`vehicle.
`
`“The present invention enables an owner . . . to exercise and/or
`perform
`convenient
`control, monitoring
`and/or
`security
`functions . . . over . . . vehicles . . . from a remote location. For
`example, an individual may conveniently provide control over and
`monitor, the state and/or status of a vehicle parked at a location
`distant from his present location.” ‘405 Pat. col. 74 ll. 33-44
`(emphasis added).
`
`
`
`15
`
`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 15
`
`

`
`
`“The transmitter system 2 is a remote system, which is not
`physically connected to the remainder of the apparatus 1. Further,
`the transmitter system 2, in the preferred embodiment, is not
`located in the motor vehicle, but rather, is located external from,
`and separate and apart from, the motor vehicle. In the preferred
`embodiment, the transmitter system 2 or transceiver, is designed to
`be capable of transmitting signals over long distances, i.e. tens,
`hundreds, and/or thousands of miles or farther.” ‘405 Pat. col. 18
`ll. 58-66 (emphasis added).
`
`
`Defendant states that the ultimate issue in the case is whether a device located in the
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`vehicle (e.g., a cell-phone) is “remote” from the vehicle. Based on the claim language and the
`
`portions of the written description, “remote” from the vehicle would not encompass within the
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`vehicle or at the vehicle. However, the Court will address this particular claim construction issue
`
`further at the summary judgment stage of this case or at trial, in the context of any infringement
`
`or invalidity issues.
`
`D. “Located At”
`
`
`Disputed Term
`
`Court’s
`Construction
`
`No construction
`needed.
`
`Defendant’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`No construction
`needed. Plain and
`ordinary meaning.
`
`Alternatively:
`“situated at.”
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`“situated at, or situated
`in, or situated on”
`
`
`
`“located at”
`
`
`
`The parties request that the Court construe the term “located in” in Claims 15, 17, 20 of
`
`the ‘405 Patent; Claims 13, 17, 18, 28, 65, and 68 of the ‘076 Patent; and Claims 21, 22, 24, 25,
`
`33, and 36 of the ‘363 Patent.
`
`In the claims, the term “located at” is used simply to describe the location of the control
`
`devices in relation to the vehicle and other control devices. For example, in the typical
`
`
`
`16
`
`Petitioner CoxCom, LLC - Exhibit 1012 Page 16
`
`

`
`embodiment discussed in the patent, when the vehicle is stolen, the vehicle owner uses his
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`personal computer (i.e., the second control device), which the claim states is “located at a
`
`location remote from the vehicle. . . .” As an example of the disputed claim language, Claim 12
`
`is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:
`
`12. A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
`
` a
`
` first control device, wherein said first control device one of
`generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating,
`deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component,
`a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem,
`[w]herein said first control device is located at a location remote
`from the vehicle;
`
`wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
`wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted
`from a second control device, wherein the second control device is
`located at a location which is remote from said first control device
`and remote from the vehicle,
`
`wherein said first signal controls a third control device, wherein
`the third control device is located at the vehicle, and further
`wherein the third control device one of generates and transmits a
`third signal for one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and
`disabling, said one of a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a
`vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem, in response to said first
`signal. (Emphasis added).
`
`Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe “located at” to mean “situated at, sit