UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Patent No. 6,549,130
`Issue Date: April 15, 2003
`Title: CONTROL APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR
`VEHICLES AND/OR FOR PREMISES
`
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY
`
`Case No. IPR2015-01611
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Patent No. 6,549,130
`Issue Date: April 15, 2003
`Title: CONTROL APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR
`VEHICLES AND/OR FOR PREMISES
`
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY
`
`Case No. IPR2015-01611
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
`
`II. CLAIMS 26, 31, 38, 42, 43, 48, 60, 63, 64, 73, 74, 85, 91, 92, 138, 139,
`AND 143 ARE INVALID .............................................................................. 2
`
`A. Claims 26, 38, 42, 43, 48, 63, 73, 74, 91, and 138 are Anticipated
`by Kniffin ............................................................................................. 2
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Kniffin describes a chain of three control devices for
`controlling a vehicle system/component ................................. 3
`
`Kniffin describes dependent claims 38, 43, 63, 73, and 74 .... 5
`
`Kniffin describes a signal for one of activating, deactivating,
`enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a
`vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem ..... 6
`
`B.
`
`Claims 64, 85, and 92 are Obvious in View of Kniffin ...................10
`
`1.
`
`Operation on or over the Internet or the World Wide Web
`would have been obvious ........................................................10
`
`C. Claim 31 is Obvious in View of Kniffin and Ryoichi .....................13
`
`D. Claims 60 and 139 are Obvious in View of Kniffin and Drori ......13
`
`E.
`
`Claim 143 is Obvious in View of Kniffin and Neeley .....................14
`
`III. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................14
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`LISTING OF EXHIBITS
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,549,130 to Joao
`
`Declaration of Scott Andrews
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,028,537 to Suman
`
`June 4, 2001 Notice of Allowability for U.S. Patent App.
`Ser. No. 09/277,935
`
`October 29, 1998 Notice of Allowability for U.S. Patent
`App. Ser. No. 08/683,828
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,072,402 to Kniffin
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,113,427 to Ryoichi
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,081,667 to Drori
`
`September 17, 2014 Order Granting Ex Parte
`Reexamination, Control No. 90/013,301
`
`January 20, 2015 Non-Final Office Action,
`Reexamination Control No. 90/013,301
`
`March 18, 2015 Response to Non-Final Office Action,
`Reexamination Control No. 90/013,301
`
`May 12, 2015 Supplemental Response to Non-Final
`Office Action, Reexamination Control No. 90/013,301
`
`May 22, 2015 Final Office Action, Reexamination
`Control No. 90/013,301
`
`May 22, 2015 Final Office Action, Reexamination
`Control No. 90/013,300
`
`ii
`
`Exhibit 1001
`
`Exhibit 1002
`
`Exhibit 1003
`
`Exhibit 1004
`
`
`Exhibit 1005
`
`
`Exhibit 1006
`
`Exhibit 1007
`
`Exhibit 1008
`
`Exhibit 1009
`
`
`Exhibit 1010
`
`
`Exhibit 1011
`
`
`Exhibit 1012
`
`
`Exhibit 1013
`
`
`Exhibit 1014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Exhibit 1015
`
`Exhibit 1016
`
`Exhibit 1017
`
`Exhibit 1018
`
`Exhibit 1019
`
`
`Exhibit 1020
`
`
`Exhibit 1021
`
`
`Exhibit 1022
`
`
`Exhibit 1023
`
`
`Exhibit 1024
`
`Exhibit 1025
`
`
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 4,602,127 to Neely
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,732,074 to Spaur
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,808,566 to Behr
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,726,984 to Kubler
`
`July 29, 2015 Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte
`Reexamination Certificate, Reexamination Control No.
`90/013,303
`
`June 1, 2015 Response to Office Action, Reexamination
`Control No. 90/013,303
`
`August 18, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order
`Regarding Claim Construction in Joao Control &
`Monitoring Systems, LLC v. Protect America, Inc., Case
`No. 1:14-cv-134 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`March 23, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order in
`Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC v. Telular
`Corp., Case No. 1:14-cv-09852 (N.D. Ill.)
`
`June 10, 2016 Opinion and Order (1) Granting In Part
`and Denying In Part Defendant FCA US LLC’S Motion
`for Summary Judgment on Invalidity and
`Noninfringement (Dkt. 59) and (2) Denying as Moot
`Plaintiff Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC’S
`Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement of U.S.
`Patent No. 7,397,363 by UConnect Access (Dkt. 57) in
`Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC v. Chrysler
`Group LLC, Case No. 4:13-cv-13957
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,404,361 to Casorso
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,875,486 to Toda
`
`iii
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`This Petitioner’s Reply is responsive to the Patent Owner’s Response to
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (the “Response”).
`
`As set forth in the Petition, the claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,549,130 (the
`
`“’130 patent”) are invalid in view of the prior art cited therein, including U.S.
`
`Patent No. 6,072,402 (Exhibit 1006, “Kniffin”), U.S. Patent No. 5,113,427
`
`(Exhibit 1007, “Ryoichi”), U.S. Patent No. 5,081,667 (Exhibit 1008, “Drori”), and
`
`U.S. Patent No. 4,602,127 (Exhibit 1015, “Neeley”). Despite the Patent Owner’s
`
`(“Joao”) assertions that the ’130 patent describes a “novel and unconventional
`
`system,” and claims a “specially assembled and programmed distributed control
`
`system for vehicles” (Response at 2), the ’130 patent merely claims a conventional
`
`chain of three control devices, passing along signals to allow for remote operation
`
`of vehicle systems. As set forth in the Petition, the claimed systems and methods
`
`are disclosed by the cited prior art and were well known before the earliest
`
`effective filing date of the ’130 patent, such that the challenged claims are invalid
`
`and should be canceled.
`
`In its Response, Joao argues that Kniffin fails to describe a chain of three
`
`control devices for controlling a vehicle component, device, system, or subsystem,
`
`even
`
`though Kniffin describes communicating
`
`from a
`
`telephone and
`
`communications link, to a clearinghouse, to an in-vehicle control device for storing
`
`1
`
`
`
`data in an in-vehicle memory. For the reasons set forth below, and in the Petition,
`
`Joao’s arguments do not address the express disclosure of the prior art, so that the
`
`challenged claims are unpatentable, and should be canceled.
`
`II. CLAIMS 26, 31, 38, 42, 43, 48, 60, 63, 64, 73, 74, 85, 91, 92, 138, 139,
`AND 143 ARE INVALID
`A. Claims 26, 38, 42, 43, 48, 63, 73, 74, 91, and 138 are Anticipated
`by Kniffin
`
`Joao states that it “disagrees with the Petitioner’s interpretation of ‘control
`
`device’ that would allow the ‘access control device 64’ of Kniffin to serve as the
`
`‘first control device’ of claims 26 and 48 and the ‘third control device’ of claims
`
`42 and 138.” Joao further states that “the ‘access control device 64’ is the vehicle
`
`system being controlled and not a ‘control device.’” Response at 15. Joao’s own
`
`proposed construction of “control device” belies these assertions.
`
`Joao contends that a “control device” is “a device or a computer, or that part
`
`of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, an action, or a function, or
`
`which performs a number of operations, actions, or functions.” Response at 14.
`
`This construction of “control device” does not exclude Kniffin’s access control
`
`device 64, which is, for example, a device, or part of a device, which performs an
`
`operation, action, or function (e.g., storing data in memory). Kniffin, 8:21–24.
`
`2
`
`
`
`1. Kniffin describes a chain of three control devices for
`controlling a vehicle system/component
`
`Joao’s Response contends that “Kniffin fails to disclose an ‘A to B to C’
`
`system for controlling a vehicle system/component in response to a signal from a
`
`control device located remote from the vehicle.” Response at 15-26. However, as
`
`explained in the Petition (see pp. 13–19), Kniffin describes the claimed chain of
`
`three control devices: access control device 64 (in-vehicle control device),
`
`clearinghouse 18 or 66 (middle device, located remote from the vehicle), and
`
`telephone 22 and communications link 16 (originating device, located remote from
`
`the other control device and remote from the vehicle). Kniffin describes sending
`
`control signals from one device to the next, culminating in the activation (or
`
`deactivation) of a vehicle system: storing schedule data in a memory. More
`
`specifically, Kniffin describes that a delivery company uses telephone 22 and
`
`communication link 16 to contact clearinghouse 66, and provide a schedule of
`
`deliveries for the truck. Once clearinghouse 66 verifies the schedule of deliveries,
`
`clearinghouse 66 transmits the schedule to the truck access control device 64 (the
`
`in-vehicle control device, i.e., at the truck 62 shown in Fig. 4), and the truck access
`
`control device 64 stores the schedule in memory 68 (storing of the schedule in the
`
`memory 68 constitutes activating a vehicle component, device, system, or
`
`subsystem). Kniffin, 8:15-24; Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 11-13.
`
`3
`
`
`
`Joao argues that Kniffin describes the lock mechanism as the controlled
`
`vehicle component, and that the lock mechanism is controlled by access control
`
`device 64 in response to a signal from sensor 36, and not from clearinghouse 66.
`
`Response, at 20–26. While Kniffin describes controlling the in-vehicle lock
`
`mechanism, as set forth in the Petition, Kniffin also describes storing data in an in-
`
`vehicle memory, in response to data received by the access control device from a
`
`clearinghouse. See Petition at 13–14 (“Kniffin describes . . . sending control
`
`signals from one device to the next, culminating in the activation (or deactivation)
`
`of a vehicle system, e.g., storing an authorized schedule of deliveries in a
`
`memory.”), and 15 (“Once clearinghouse 66 has verified the schedule of deliveries,
`
`clearinghouse 66 transmits the schedule to the truck access control device 64 (the
`
`in-vehicle control device), where the schedule is stored in memory 68 (activating a
`
`vehicle component).”). The memory 68 is a device, located in the vehicle, that is
`
`activated by a signal received from the in-vehicle access control device 64, which
`
`receives a signal from the remote clearinghouse 66, which in turn receives a signal
`
`from the telephone 22 and communication link 16. Kniffin, 8:15-24. Thus, while
`
`Kniffin describes controlling a lock mechanism, Kniffin also expressly describes
`
`activating the memory 68, which is a vehicle device, system, or subsystem. The
`
`disclosure of the former (controlling a lock mechanism) does not negate the
`
`disclosure of the latter (activating the memory). Joao’s arguments relating to the
`
`4
`
`
`
`control of lock mechanism 32 do not address the arguments presented in the
`
`Petition.
`
`2. Kniffin describes dependent claims 38, 43, 63, 73, and 74
`The only argument made by Joao relating to claims 38, 43, 63, and 73 is that
`
`claim 38 is patentable based on its dependency from claim 26, that claim 43 is
`
`patentable based on its dependency from claim 42, and that claims 63 and 73 are
`
`patentable based on their dependency from claim 48. Response at 27. As set forth
`
`in the Petition (see pp. 19, 23–24), the additional limitations of claims 38, 43, 63,
`
`and 74 are disclosed by Kniffin, so that claims 38, 63, 73, and 74 are anticipated by
`
`Kniffin.
`
`Additionally, as to claim 74, Kniffin describes a voice synthesizer reporting
`
`status information regarding the lock (status of a vehicle device) to the user,
`
`including whether access permission has been granted and time windows for
`
`access. Kniffin, 2:54–61; Ex. 1002, ¶ 19. Kniffin therefore discloses the additional
`
`limitations of, and, consequently anticipates, claim 74. Joao argues that Kniffin’s
`
`voice synthesizer is located at the clearinghouse 66, not at the vehicle, and
`
`therefore is not “connected to” the first control device. Response, at 27–29. Claim
`
`74, however, does not require that the voice synthesizer be located in the vehicle.
`
`Claim 74 merely requires that “the voice synthesizer is connected to the first
`
`control device,” and Joao provides no basis for requiring that a connected devices
`
`5
`
`
`
`be co-located. The ’130 patent even describes two devices as “connected,” though
`
`they are only connected wirelessly, so that Kniffin’s description of synthesizing a
`
`voice at the clearinghouse and relaying that voice to the user (see Kniffin, 2:54–61)
`
`constitutes a connected device. Ex. 1001, 43:21–24 (“The activation device 16 is
`
`connected directly to the CPU 4 as shown in FIG. 9 or it may be connected to the
`
`CPU 4 via a wireless communication link or medium.”).
`
`As Scott Andrews testified (see Ex. 2004, p. 226, lines 8-21):
`
`Q. Claim 74, does claim 74 specify -- if you read it carefully,
`does claim 74 specify the location of the voice synthesizer?
`A. It -- I'll read it and then I'll explain. “The apparatus of claim
`48, further comprising: A voice synthesizer for providing voice
`information regarding at least of one of apparatus status, vehicle
`operation status, and status of at least one of a vehicle system,” et
`cetera, et cetera. And it ends with “wherein the voice synthesizer is
`connected to the first control device.”
`So it does not explicitly say that it is located at the first control
`device. It says it’s merely connected to the first control device.
`
`3. Kniffin describes a signal for one of activating, deactivating,
`enabling, and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a
`vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem
`
`Joao’s Response contends that “[s]toring a delivery schedule in a memory
`
`does not constitute ‘activating’ or ‘enabling’ a vehicle system/component.”
`
`Response at 29-31. However, as explained in the Petition (see pp. 13–19), Kniffin
`
`6
`
`
`
`describes the claimed chain of three control devices: access control device 64 (in-
`
`vehicle control device), clearinghouse 18 or 66 (middle device, located remote
`
`from the vehicle), and telephone 22 and communications link 16 (originating
`
`device, located remote from the other control device and remote from the vehicle).
`
`Kniffin describes sending control signals from one device to the next, culminating
`
`in the activation (or deactivation) of a vehicle system: storing schedule data in a
`
`memory. More specifically, Kniffin describes that a delivery company uses
`
`telephone 22 and communication link 16 to contact clearinghouse 66, and provide
`
`a schedule of deliveries for the truck. Once clearinghouse 66 verifies the schedule
`
`of deliveries, clearinghouse 66 transmits the schedule to the truck access control
`
`device 64 (the in-vehicle control device, i.e., at the truck 62 shown in Fig. 4), and
`
`stores the schedule in memory 68 (storing of the schedule constitutes activating a
`
`vehicle component). Kniffin, 8:15-24; Ex. 1006, ¶¶ 11-13.
`
`Joao, in its Response, refers to Kniffin’s description of access control device
`
`64 controlling the lock mechanism in response to a signal from the CPU 30 in
`
`response to a sensor 36 detecting an identification device 70. Response, at 31.
`
`Kniffin, however, expressly describes that the clearinghouse transmits a schedule
`
`of stops to the truck access control device, and that schedule is then stored in a
`
`memory located in the vehicle. Kniffin, 8:21-24 (“After suitable verification
`
`checks, the clearinghouse transmits to the targeted truck access control device 64
`
`7
`
`
`
`the authorized schedule of stops, which data is received and stored in a memory
`
`68.”). Kniffin’s memory 68 is located in the vehicle and constitutes a vehicle
`
`component, device, system, or subsystem; and, like any computer memory,
`
`Kniffin’s memory, for example, receives data, stores data, maintains stored data,
`
`etc. Storing data in the memory entails activation of the memory’s storage
`
`functionality, to store data not previously stored thereon. That is, upon receipt of
`
`data (in this case, the authorized schedule of stops), the memory is “activated” or
`
`“enabled” to store that data. Kniffin’s express disclosure of storing data in an in-
`
`vehicle memory therefore discloses that the memory is activated to receive and
`
`store the data. Thus, Kniffin’s description of storing data in memory constitutes a
`
`disclosure of activating a vehicle component, device, system, or subsystem.1
`
`1
`It is common in the computer field to refer to storing data in memory as,
`
`e.g., “activating” memory. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,404,361 (Ex. 1024), at
`
`12:38–42 (“Concurrently, memory control circuit 442 generates read/write control
`
`signals that are applied to the control leads 423 of cache memory bus 420 to select
`
`and activate memory device 411.”) and 14:53–58 (“A read control signal is
`
`concurrently applied by memory control circuit 442 to the control leads 423 of the
`
`cache memory bus 420 to activate the selected memory device 411 to retrieve the
`
`requested data record and apply this data record to the data leads 421 of the cache
`
`memory bus 420.”); U.S. Patent No. 5,875,486 (Ex. 1025), at Abstract (“a
`
`8
`
`
`
`Joao contends that the lock mechanism described by Kniffin is the controlled
`
`vehicle component. Response, at 31. However, Kniffin also describes storing data
`
`in an in-vehicle memory, in response to data received by the truck access control
`
`device 64 from a clearinghouse 66. The memory 68 is a device, located in the
`
`vehicle, that is activated by a signal received from the in-vehicle access control
`
`device 64, which receives a signal from the remote clearinghouse 66, which in turn
`
`receives a signal from the telephone 22 and communication link 16. Kniffin, 8:15-
`
`24. Thus, while Kniffin describes controlling a lock mechanism, Kniffin also
`
`expressly describes activating the memory. The disclosure of the formed
`
`(controlling a lock mechanism) does not negate the disclosure of the latter
`
`(activating the memory).
`
`
`specification circuit for specifying sequentially memory cells … and for entering
`
`them in an active state.”), 5:64–65 (“A signal CE is a signal which indicates the
`
`active period of the memory device 1.”), and 6:14–17 (“When the CE signal is
`
`switched to the ‘H’ level, … the memory enters the inactive state.”) (all
`
`emphasis added).
`
`9
`
`
`
`B. Claims 64, 85, and 92 are Obvious in View of Kniffin
`
`1. Operation on or over the Internet or the World Wide Web
`would have been obvious
`
`Joao’s Response contends that “[t]here is absolutely no disclosure, teaching
`
`or suggestion, nor any motivation given in Kniffin to use the Internet or the World
`
`Wide Web,” and that “conventional wisdom at the time of the invention of the
`
`subject matter of the ’130 Patent would have actually taught away from the use of
`
`the Internet or World Wide Web.” Response at 32-35. However, as explained in
`
`the Petition (see pp. 40–48), operating Kniffin’s system over the Internet would
`
`have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the ’130 patent
`
`was filed.2 Use of the Internet or World Wide Web in vehicle control systems was
`
`well-known when the ’130 patent was filed on March 29, 1999. See, e.g., Ex. 1016,
`
`2:42-48, 3:13-20, 7:40-47, 11:27-57, 12:51-54; Ex. 1017, Abstract, 1:19-26; Ex.
`
`1018, Abstract, 8:25-59; Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 21–28. Further, Joao admitted that, in March
`
`
`2
`As explained in the Petition (at 42–43, n.5), it is Joao’s burden to establish
`
`that it is entitled to an earlier filing date, on a claim-by-claim basis, and the claims
`
`of the ’130 patent cannot be entitled to any filing date earlier than March 27, 1996,
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Joao’s Response does not establish that any challenged
`
`claim of the ’130 patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than its March 29, 1999
`
`filing date.
`
`10
`
`
`
`of 1996, a person of ordinary skill in the art as would have appreciated the Internet
`
`as an improved transmission system as compared to the radio frequency system
`
`described by Kniffin. Petition, at 43–44 (“One having ordinary skill in the art at the
`
`time of the invention of Claim 21 [of U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363, which is a
`
`continuation-in-part of, for example, the ’130 patent] would appreciate the
`
`infrastructure of the Internet and its improved signal transmission capabilities, as
`
`compared to the rf system used in Kniffin, as being a superior system for
`
`transmitting a signal or message from one location to another.”); Ex. 1020, at 11.
`
`Further still, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that adapting existing
`
`processes to incorporate Internet technology would have been obvious. See
`
`Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
`
`(finding “the use of hypertext to communicate … was a routine incorporation of
`
`Internet technology into existing processes”), amended on reh’g on other grounds,
`
`728 F.3d 1332, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532
`
`F.3d 1318, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding it obvious to “adapt[] existing
`
`electronic processes to incorporate modern internet and web browser technology”);
`
`Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Systems, Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1369–
`
`71 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`11
`
`
`
`Despite this evidence that use of the Internet would have been obvious, Joao
`
`asserts that, at the time of the effective filing date of the ’130 patent,3
`
`“conventional wisdom” was that the Internet was not secure, and that there were
`
`too many impediments to use, so that conventional wisdom would teach away from
`
`using the Internet or World Wide Web. Response, at 26–29. Joao relies on the
`
`“The Internet Report” from Morgan Stanley (Ex. 2005) as evidence of the
`
`“conventional wisdom” regarding the Internet, and does not address any of the
`
`evidence presented in the Petition, including Joao’s during the reexamination of
`
`related U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363.
`
`Joao does not explain why Morgan Stanley’s report should be considered by
`
`the Board to represent conventional wisdom relating to the obviousness of using
`
`the Internet to transmit information. The report was prepared to help investors
`
`“identify risks, rewards, market opportunities, investment ideas, company
`
`competitive strategies, products, and how the Internet works.” Ex. 2005, at 4. The
`
`report does not address whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`
`considered the report, or the information therein, when looking for technical
`
`solutions for transmitting information. To show teaching away, Joao only cites to
`
`security concerns, and limits on the growth of the number of Internet users
`
`(Response, at 32–35), neither of which addresses the technical question of how to
`
`3
`Joao does not identify an effective filing date of the ’130 patent.
`
`12
`
`
`
`transmit information, so that the report has little, if any, relevance to the
`
`obviousness analysis. If the report is relevant to the obviousness analysis, it is to
`
`show that using the Internet to transmit information was a well-known technical
`
`solution at that time, even if Morgan Stanley felt that certain risks exist in Internet-
`
`related stocks. See, e.g., Ex. 2005, at 33–35 (detailing the history of the Internet
`
`since 1968), 40 (estimating 9 million World Wide Web users in 1995, including
`
`3% of the U.S. population, and concluding that “we believe that the Internet
`
`market growth has just begun, and that it will prove to be big.”).
`
`C. Claim 31 is Obvious in View of Kniffin and Ryoichi
`
`The only argument made by Joao relating to claim 31 is that claim 31 is
`
`patentable based on its dependency from claim 26. Response, at 36. As set forth in
`
`the Petition (see pp. 48–51), claim 31 is obvious in view of Kniffin and Ryoichi.
`
`D. Claims 60 and 139 are Obvious in View of Kniffin and Drori
`
`The only argument made by Joao relating to claims 60 and 139 is that claim
`
`60 is patentable based on its dependency from claim 48, and claim 139 is
`
`patentable based on its dependency from claim 138. Response, at 36. As set forth
`
`in the Petition (see pp. 51–56), claims 60 and 139 are obvious in view of Kniffin
`
`and Drori.
`
`13
`
`
`
`E. Claim 143 is Obvious in View of Kniffin and Neeley
`
`The only argument made by Joao relating to claim 143 is that claim 143 is
`
`patentable based on its dependency from claim 138. Response, at 36. As set forth
`
`in the Petition (see pp. 56–60), claim 143 is obvious in view of Kniffin and Neeley.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`As set forth in the Petition, claims 26, 31, 38, 42, 43, 48, 60, 63, 64, 73, 74,
`
`85, 91, 92, 138, 139, and 143 of the ’130 patent are invalid in view of the prior art.
`
`For the reasons set forth in the Petition, and herein, Petitioner, Volkswagen Group
`
`of America, Inc., respectfully requests the cancellation of claims 26, 31, 38, 42, 43,
`
`48, 60, 63, 64, 73, 74, 85, 91, 92, 138, 139, and 143 of the ’130 patent.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Clifford A. Ulrich/
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Reg. No. 42,194)
`
`Dated: August 4, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Michael J. Lennon (Reg. No. 26,562) Lead Counsel
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Reg. No. 42,194) Backup Counsel
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York, NY 10004
`
`
`
`
`14
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`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
`
`The foregoing Petitioner’s Reply complies with the type-volume limitations
`
`of 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(c)(1). Excluding the items listed in 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(c) as
`
`not included in the word count, and using the word count of the word-processing
`
`system used to prepare the paper (Microsoft Word), the petition contains 3,559
`
`words.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Michael J. Lennon (Reg. No. 26,562) Lead Counsel
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Reg. No. 42,194) Backup Counsel
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York, NY 10004
`Tel:
`
`212.425.7200
`Fax:
`
`212.425.5288
`Email:
`mlennon@kenyon.com
`culrich@kenyon.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Clifford A. Ulrich/
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Reg. No. 42,194)
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The foregoing Petitioner’s Reply and associated Exhibits 1024 and 1025
`
`
`
`were served on August 4, 2016, via email upon the following:
`
`Raymond A. Joao, Reg. No. 35,907
`rayjoao@optonline.net
`René A. Vazquez, Reg. No. 38,647
`rvazquez@sinergialaw.com
`
`
`
`Michael J. Lennon (Reg. No. 26,562) Lead Counsel
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Reg. No. 42,194) Backup Counsel
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York, NY 10004
`Tel:
`
`212.425.7200
`Fax:
`
`212.425.5288
`Email:
`mlennon@kenyon.com
`culrich@kenyon.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Clifford A. Ulrich/
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Reg. No. 42,194)
`
`
`
`16
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