`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner,
`v.
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC
`Patent Owner
`________________
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`Case IPR2015-01585
`Patent 5,917,405
`________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
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`Case IPR2015-01585
`Patent 5,917,405
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
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`II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 2
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` A. Overview of the ‘405 Patent .......................................................................... 2
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` B. Prosecution History of the ‘405 Patent .......................................................... 3
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` C. Representative Claims .................................................................................... 4
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................... 5
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` A. Legal Standards .............................................................................................. 5
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` B. “control device” .............................................................................................. 8
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` C. “first signal,” “second signal” and “third signal” ........................................... 8
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` D. “positioning device” ..................................................................................... 10
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` E. “monitoring device” ..................................................................................... 12
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` F. “voice synthesizing device” .......................................................................... 13
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`IV. DAVID McNAMARA’S DECLARATION IS FUNDAMENTALLY
` FLAWED ......................................................................................................... 13
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` A. David McNamara did not Review the Materials Required to Properly Reach
` his Conclusions and Opinions ..................................................................... 13
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` B. David McNamara has an Erroneous Understanding of the Standards to Use
` In Construing Patent Claims ........................................................................ 14
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` C. David McNamara’s Testimony Should Be Given Little or No Weight ....... 16
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` A. Ground 1 is Deficient ................................................................................... 17
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`V. RESPONSE TO PROPOSED GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY ........................ 17
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` 1. Frossard fails to disclose the “A to B to C” control system/method of
` claims 1and 16 ........................................................................................ 17
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` B. Ground 2 is Deficient ................................................................................... 22
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` C. Ground 3 is Deficient ................................................................................... 23
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` D. Ground 4 is Deficient ................................................................................... 25
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` E. Ground 5 is Deficient ................................................................................... 27
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` F. Ground 6 is Deficient .................................................................................... 32
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` G. Ground 7 is Deficient .................................................................................. 35
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`VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................ 37
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` 1. Pagliaroli fails to disclose the “A to B to C” control system/method of
` claims 1and 16 ......................................................................................... 27
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`Case IPR2015-01585
`Patent 5,917,405
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`Exhibit
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`EX2001
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`Description
`“Preliminary Remarks” filed by Applicant on November 26, 2006
`during prosecution of the patent application that issued as related U.S.
`Patent No. 7,277,010
`“Supplement to the Remarks for the Amendment filed on October 24,
`2007” filed on November 23, 2007 during prosecution of the patent
`application that issued as related U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363
`EX2003 Excerpt from U.S. Patent No. 6,549,130
`August 26, 2015 Opinion and Order Construing Disputed Claim Terms
`in the matter of JCMS v. Chrysler Group LLC, Case No. 13-cv-13957
`(E.D. Mich.)
`EX2005 Transcript of March 15, 2006 Deposition of David McNamara
`EX2006 Transcript of March 16, 2006 Deposition of David McNamara
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`EX2002
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`EX2004
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION
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`In response to the Corrected Petition for Inter Partes Review (“Petition”)
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`filed by Petitioner, the Board has instituted inter partes review (Paper 11, the
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`“Decision”) of claims 1, 2, 3, 11, 16 and 17 (“Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent
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`No. 5,917,405 (“the ‘405 Patent”) based on the following grounds:
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`Ground
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
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`Proposed Rejections
`Claims
`anticipated by Frossard
`1 and 16
`obvious in view of Frossard and Pagliaroli
`2 and 17
`obvious in view of Frossard and Simms
`3
`obvious in view of Frossard and Shimizu
`11
`1, 2, 16 and 17 anticipated by Pagliaroli
`3
`obvious in view of Pagliaroli and Simms
`11
`obvious in view of Pagliaroli and Shimizu
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`The seven proposed grounds of rejection are substantively flawed, in that
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`none of the cited references teach important properly construed claim limitations.
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`For example, none of the cited references teach an “A to B to C” control
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`system/method, as required by the challenged claims and as will be explained in
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`more detail below.
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`Further, as will be discussed below, it became apparent during cross-
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`examination that Petitioner’s expert, David McNamara: (1) did not review the
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`materials required to properly reach his conclusions and opinions; and (2) has an
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`erroneous understanding of the proper standards to use in construing patent
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`claims. For at least these reasons, the Board should give Mr. McNamara’s
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`testimony little or no weight.
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`Accordingly, Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC (“JCMS” or
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`“Patent Owner”) submits this Response to Petitioner’s Petition and the Board’s
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`Decision.
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`A. Overview of the ‘405 Patent
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`The ‘405 Patent is directed to a novel and unconventional system for, inter
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`alia, remotely-controlling and/or monitoring systems located at vehicles and
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`premises. EX1001 at 23. The Challenged Claims are directed to a specially
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`assembled and programmed distributed control system/method for vehicles,
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`wherein control functions for a vehicle or for a vehicle component, vehicle
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`device, vehicle system, or vehicle subsystem, of a vehicle, can be distributed
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`among three separate and distinct control devices, each of which can generate or
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`transmit a separate and distinct signal in order to control a separate fourth
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`device of or at the vehicle, which is the respective vehicle component, vehicle
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`device, vehicle system, or vehicle subsystem.
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`A separate
`interface device can be optionally used
`to facilitate
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`communications between one of the control devices and the separate fourth
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`device of or at the vehicle, which is the respective vehicle component, vehicle
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`device, vehicle system, or vehicle subsystem.
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`B.
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`Prosecution History of the ‘405 Patent
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`The patent application that issued as the ‘405 Patent was filed on July 18,
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`1996. EX1001. The ‘405 patent issued on June 29, 1999. Id. The ‘405 patent is an
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`expired patent.
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`During prosecution of the related U.S. Patent Applications which issued as
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`U.S. Patent Nos. 7,397,363 and 7,277,010 (hereinafter “the ‘363 Patent” and “the
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`‘010 Patent,” respectively), the Applicant chose to be his own lexicographer and
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`provided explicit definitions for, inter alia, the terms “control device,” “remote,”
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`and “located at” in “Preliminary Remarks” filed by Applicant on November 26,
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`2006 during prosecution of the patent application that issued as the ‘010 patent
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`(see EX2001, hereinafter “Preliminary Remarks”) and in “Supplement to the
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`Remarks for the Amendment filed on October 24, 2007” filed on November 23,
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`2007 during prosecution of the patent application that issued as the ‘363 Patent
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`(see EX2002, hereinafter “First Remarks”).
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`C. Representative Claims
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`Claims 1 and 16 are the only independent claims being challenged. They
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`are reproduced below:
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`1.
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`A control apparatus for a vehicle, which comprises:
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`a first control device, wherein said first control device one of
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`generates and transmits a first signal for one of activating, deactivating, enabling,
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`and disabling, one of a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system,
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`and a vehicle subsystem, wherein said first control device is located at the
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`vehicle;
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`wherein said first control device is responsive to a second signal,
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`wherein the second signal is one of generated by and transmitted from a second
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`control device, wherein the second control device is located at a location which is
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`remote from the vehicle, and further wherein the second control device is
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`responsive to a third signal, wherein the third signal is one of generated by and
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`transmitted from a third control device, wherein the third control device is
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`located at a location which is remote from the vehicle and remote from the
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`second control device.
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`16. A method for control for a vehicle, which comprises:
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`transmitting a first signal from a first control device to a second
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`control device, wherein the first control device is located at a location remote
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`from the vehicle and remote from the second control device;
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`transmitting a second signal from the second control device to a
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`third control device, wherein the third control device is located at the vehicle, and
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`further wherein the second control device is located at a location remote from the
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`vehicle;
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`generating a third signal at the third control device in response to
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`said second signal,
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`one of activating, deactivating, enabling, and disabling, one of a
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`vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle system, and a vehicle subsystem,
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`in response to said third signal.
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Legal Standards
`A.
`The ‘405 Patent is expired. Claim terms in an expired patent are generally
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`given their “ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH
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`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, it is important to note that
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`the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) and controlling case law
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`make it clear that the determination of the ordinary and customary meaning of a
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`term or phrase does not occur in a vacuum, but instead it must be made in light of
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`the patent’s specification and the intrinsic evidence. MPEP §2111.01 is clear and
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`unequivocal on this point. The pertinent portion of the MPEP §2111.01 recites:
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`The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be
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`evidenced by a variety of sources, including “the words
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`of
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`the claims
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`themselves,
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`the remainder of
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`the
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`specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic
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`evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the
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`meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.”
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 USPQ2d
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`at 1327. If extrinsic reference sources, such as
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`dictionaries, evidence more than one definition for the
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`term, the intrinsic record must be consulted to identify
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`which of the different possible definitions is most
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`consistent with Applicant’s use of the terms. Brookhill-
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`Wilk 1, 334 F.3d at 1300, 67 USPQ2d at 1137; see also
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`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158
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`F.3d 1243, 1250, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
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`1998) (“Where there are several common meanings for
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`a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away
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`from the improper meanings and toward the proper
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`meanings.”) and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc.,
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`90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
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`1996) (construing the term “solder reflow temperature”
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`to mean “peak reflow temperature” of solder rather than
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`the “liquidus temperature” of solder in order to remain
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`consistent with the specification.). (Emphasis added).
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`“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer” and assign special
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`definitions to the words in the claim, as long as those definitions are clearly
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`stated in the patent specification or file history. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
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`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP
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`Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Therefore, “it is always
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`necessary to review the specification to determine whether the inventor has used
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`any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. The
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`specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the
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`claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Id. Because the specification
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`must contain a description sufficient to those of ordinary skill in the art to make
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`and use the invention, the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of
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`a disputed claim term.” Id.
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`B.
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`“control device”
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`For purposes of its Decision, the Board adopted the express definition of
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`“control device” provided during prosecution of the patent application that issued
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`as related U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363, which is “a device or a computer, or that
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`part of a device or a computer, which performs an operation, an action, or a
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`function, or which performs a number of operations, actions, or functions.”
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`Decision at 14.
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`JCMS respectfully submits that this construction should be adopted for the
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`remainder of this IPR.
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`C.
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`“first signal,” “second signal” and “third signal”
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`JCMS respectfully submits that construction of these terms is necessary at
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`this time, as will become apparent below.
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`In litigation involving the ‘405 Patent, the U.S. District Court for the
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`Eastern District of Michigan issued an Opinion and Order Construing Disputed
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`Claim Terms in which they construed the terms “first signal,” “second signal”
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`and “third signal” as follows:
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`“The Court does, however, find that Defendant’s
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`proposed alternative constructions are consistent with
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`the normal understanding of the claim terms. In fact,
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`the parties agree that the “first signal” is a signal sent
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`by the first device, the “second signal” is sent by the
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`second device, and the “third signal” is sent by the
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`third device.” EX2004 at 23. (emphasis added).
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`JCMS respectfully submits that, for purposes of this proceeding, these
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`constructions should be adopted, as they are required to evaluate the merits of
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`Petitioner’s arguments, namely:
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`• “first signal” is “a signal sent by a first device”
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` “second signal” is “a signal sent by a second
` device”
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` “third signal” is “a signal sent by a third
` device”
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`D.
` “positioning device”
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`For purposes of the Decision, the Board agreed with Petitioner assertion
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`that the term “positioning device,” which appears in dependent claim 3, should be
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`construed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). The Board then adopted Petitioner’s
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`proposed construction for this term for purposes of the Decision. Specifically, the
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`Board identified the function of this term to be “determining location of the
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`vehicle, wherein said positioning device is located at the vehicle,” and identified
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`the structure to be a “satellite-based global positioning device.”
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`Patent Owner disagrees that this should be construed pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 112(f). The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) states:
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`“35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112,
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`paragraph 6 will not apply if persons of ordinary skill in
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`the art reading the specification understand the term to
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`be the name for the structure that performs the function,
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`even when the term covers a broad class of structures or
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`identifies the structures by their function (e.g., ‘filters,’
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`‘brakes,’ ‘clamp,’ ‘screwdriver,’ and ‘locks’)” MPEP
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`2181(I)(A). (emphasis added).
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`Patent Owner respectfully submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`reading the specification would understand the term “positioning device” to be
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`the name for the structure that performs the corresponding functions, even though
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`the term covers a broad class of structures and/or identifies the structures by their
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`function.
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`The MPEP also lists the following examples of structural terms that have
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`been found not to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f): “circuit,” “detent mechanism,”
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`“digital detector,” “reciprocating member,” “connector assembly,” “perforation,”
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`“sealingly connected joints,” and “eyeglass hanger assembly.” MPEP 2181(I)(A).
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`Patent Owner respectfully submits that the term “positioning device” is
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`sufficiently similar to some of the examples listed above so as to not invoke 35
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`U.S.C. § 112(f).
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`Interestingly, although Petitioner argues that the term “positioning device”
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`does not connote sufficiently definite structure to avoid invoking 35 U.S.C. §
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`112(f), they then proceed to use the exact same term (positioning device) in the
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`definition they proposed for the structure disclosed in the specification of the
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`‘405 Patent. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the structure disclosed in the
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`specification of the ‘405 Patent is a “satellite-based global positioning device.”
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`Paper 6 at 13-14. (emphasis added). This is further evidence that a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art reading the specification would understand the term
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`“positioning device” to be the name for the structure that performs the
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`corresponding functions, even though the term covers a broad class of structures
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`and/or identifies the structures by their function.
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`For at least these reasons, Patent Owner respectfully submits that the term
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`“positioning device” should not be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but rather
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`this term should be given its ordinary and customary meaning, which is “a device
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`that determines the location of the vehicle.”
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`E.
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` “monitoring device”
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`For purposes of the Decision, the Board agreed with Petitioner’s assertion
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`that the term “monitoring device,” which appears in dependent claim 2, should be
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`construed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). However, the Board did not adopt
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction because the Board felt that it did not account
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`“for all of the structure provided by the specification.” Decision at 6. Instead, the
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`Board identified the function of this term to be “monitoring at least one of the
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`vehicle, vehicle operational status, vehicle operation,” and identified the structure
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`to be a “[h]ardware such as home fire detectors, video recording devices,
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`cameras, audio recording devices, gas meters, electricity meters, personal
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`communication devices, personal digital assistants, cellular
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`telephones,
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`electronically equipped watches, computer servers, and CPU 4 or software that
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`monitors an occurrence and/or a situation associated with a vehicle and which
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`may warrant providing notice, that is located at the vehicle.”
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`Patent Owner submits that the construction proposed by the Board should
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`be adopted for the remainder of the present IPR.
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`F.
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` “voice synthesizing device”
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`The Board disagreed with Petitioner’s assertion that this term should be
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`construed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Decision at 8-9. Instead, the Board
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`adopted the following construction for purposes of the Decision: “an electronic
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`instrument that combines simple wave forms to produce more complex sounds,
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`such as those of various other instruments.” Id. At 8. (quoting The American
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`Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1994)).
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`Patent Owner submits that the construction proposed by the Board should
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`be adopted for the remainder of the present IPR.
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`IV. DAVID McNAMARA’S DECLARATION IS FUNDAMENTALLY
` FLAWED
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`A. Mr. McNamara did not Review the Materials Required to
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` Properly Reach his Conclusions and Opinions
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`During David McNamara’s cross-examination, it became apparent that Mr.
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`McNamara had not reviewed the materials required for him to properly reach his
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`conclusions and opinions. In his Declaration, Mr. McNamara indicated that he
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`“read” the prosecution history of the ‘405 Patent, as is required in order to
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`properly construe the claims. EX1003 at ¶ 16. Yet, during cross-examination, Mr.
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`McNamara testified that, in fact, he did not review the prosecution history of the
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`‘405 Patent, as evidenced by the following exchange:
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`EX2005 at 153
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`Q: You have testified previously, I think, that you did
` not review the prosecution histories for the four
` JCMS patents at issue correct?
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`A: That’s correct.
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`Q: Is it necessarily true, then, that you, in reaching the
` conclusions or opinions expressed in Exhibits 1
` through 4, you did not apply the, any definitions that
` may have been provided by Mr. Joao during
` prosecution of those patents, correct?
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`A: That’s correct.
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` B. David McNamara has an Erroneous Understanding of the
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` Standards to Use in Construing Patent Claims
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`Case IPR2015-01585
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
`Patent 5,917,405
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`Mr. McNamara is not at all versed in the proper standards to use when
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`construing patent claims. For example, Mr. McNamara admitted during cross-
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`examination that he used the wrong standard when construing the challenged
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`claims in a related inter partes review brought by the same Petitioner (IPR2015-
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`01645), as evidenced by the following exchange:
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`EX2005 at 151-152
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`Q: . . . With respect to the '363 patent, if you turn
` to that declaration which should be Exhibit 4,
` you have Paragraph 9 that the, you identify
` the claim construction, or the, it states the
` following, "The claim of an unexpired patent
` is to be given the broadest reasonable
` construction in light of the specification of the
` patent in which it appears, which is what I
` have done when performing my analysis in
` this declaration." Do you see that?
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`A: Which paragraph are we reading?
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`Q: I am at paragraph 9 of Exhibit 4?
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` . .
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`Q: Okay. Are you aware that the PTAB has indicated or
` stated that that is, in fact, the wrong standard for the
` ‘363 patent and that, in fact, the standard is the
` standard that you articulated in the, for example, in
` Exhibit 1?
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`A: I’m recently aware of that, yes.
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`Case IPR2015-01585
`Patent 5,917,405
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
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`Q: Okay. How does the use of the wrong claim
` construction standard affect your opinions in this
` case?
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`A: I don't think I used the wrong standard because I used
` the same standard through all of the four patents. I
` used the one of ordinary and customary
` understanding. (emphasis added)
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`Q: Is that notwithstanding the fact that you say in
` Paragraph 9 that you used a different standard? Is that
` incorrect?
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`A: Well, I think that the, put it this way, I can’t
` personally differentiate between broadest and
` ordinary and customary. I guess that is the simple
` answer. (emphasis added).
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`Thus, by Mr. McNamara’s own testimony, he admitted that he cannot tell
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`the difference between the standards used to construe claims in expired and
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`unexpired patents, and so he simply uses the same standard regardless of whether
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`the patent is expired or not. Specifically, Mr. McNamara testified that he uses the
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`“plain and ordinary meaning” standard for all patents, although, given his
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`testimony, it is not clear that he even knows what this standard is or should be.
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`C. David McNamara’s Testimony Should Be Given Little or No
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` Weight
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`Case IPR2015-01585
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
`Patent 5,917,405
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`The Board should give Mr. McNamara’s testimony little or no weight
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`because, as discussed in detail above: (1) despite his statements in his sworn
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`Declaration to the contrary, he did not even review the materials required to
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`properly reach his conclusions and opinions; and (2) he has an erroneous
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`understanding of the proper standards to use in construing patent claims.
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`V. RESPONSE TO PROPOSED GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY
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`A. Ground 1 is Deficient
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`Ground 1 alleges that claims 1 and 16 are anticipated by Frossard.
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`However, Patent Owner respectfully submits that Frossard fails to disclose, teach
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`or suggest every claimed element, as required under § 102, when the claim
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`elements are properly construed.
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`Frossard fails to disclose the “A to B to C” control
`1.
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` system/method of claims 1 and 16
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`As discussed supra in Section III.C, the “first signal,” “second signal” and
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`“third signal” recited in claims 1 and 16, are properly construed as:
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`• “first signal” is “a signal sent by a first device”
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`• “second signal” is “a signal sent by a second device”
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`• “third signal” is “a signal sent by a third device”
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`Case IPR2015-01585
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
`Patent 5,917,405
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`Petitioner alleges that the claimed first control device (claim 1) or third
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`control device (claim 16) at the vehicle is satisfied by Frossard’s “receiver-
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`decoder circuits 4.” See Paper 6 at 17 and 23. Petitioner further alleges that the
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`claimed intermediate second control device of each of claim 1 and 16 is satisfied
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`by the “resource 2” and “server 1” of Frossard. Id. at 19-20 and 22-25. Finally,
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`Petitioner asserts that the claimed remote third control device (claim 1) or first
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`control device (claim 16) is satisfied by the “telephone” or “minitel” shown in
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`Fig. 1 of Frossard. Id. at 20 and 22. See also EX1005 at Fig. 1.
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`Even though Petitioner asserts that the claimed second control device of
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`each of claim 1 and claim 16 is satisfied by the “resource 2” and “server 1” of
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`Frossard, the “resource 2” and “server 1” are actually at least two separate
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`devices. Claim 1 requires that the second control device receive a third signal
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`from the claimed third control device. Claim 16 requires that the second control
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`device receives a first signal from the claimed first control device.
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`The device in Frossard that receives a signal from the “telephone” or
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`“minitel,” which Petitioner asserts is the claimed first control device of claim 1
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`and the claimed third control device of claim 16, is actually the server 1 of
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`Frossard. Thus, based on Petitioner’s anticipation arguments, the server 1 of
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`Case IPR2015-01585
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
`Patent 5,917,405
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`Frossard must be the component that corresponds to the claimed second control
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`device of claim 1 and claim 16 because it receives a third signal from the claimed
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`third control device (in the case of claim 1) and a first signal from the claimed
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`first control device (in the case of claim 16).
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`As noted above, claim 1 requires that the second control device receive a
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`third signal from the claimed third control device and Claim 16 requires that
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`the second control device receives a first signal from a first control device.
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`In Frossard, the telephone/minitel transmits a signal (a first generated
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`signal) to the server 1 which, in turn, transmits a new signal (a second generated
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`signal) to the resource 2 which, in turn, transmits yet another new signal (a third
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`generated signal) to the receiver/decoder 4. The receiver/decoder circuits 4 of
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`Frossard, which is located at the vehicle, receives that third sent signal.
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`With regards to claim 1, and using the proper construction of “first signal,”
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`second signal” and “third signal,” the telephone/minitel (a third control device)
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`transmits a third signal to the server 1 (a second control device) which, in turn,
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`transmits a second signal to the resource 2 (a first control device). However, the
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`resource 2 is not located at the vehicle and, therefore, the resource 2 cannot be
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`the “first control device” of claim 1. Thus, by virtue of the definition of “first
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`Case IPR2015-01585
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
`Patent 5,917,405
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`signal”, “second signal” and “third signal”, Frossard fails to disclose the “first
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`control device” of claim 1, which must be located at the vehicle and which must
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`also generate or transmit yet another signal at the vehicle.
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`To be sure, with regards to claim 1, the first control device, which is
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`located at the vehicle (and which Petitioner asserts is the receiver-decoder
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`circuits 4 of Frossard), must receive and be responsive to the second signal from
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`the second control device which, as discussed above, must necessarily be a signal
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`from server 1. However, based on the proper construction of “first signal,”
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`“second signal” and “third signal,” there is an intermediate device, which is the
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`resource 2 of Frossard, located between the server 1 of Frossard and the
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`receiver-decoder circuits 4 of Frossard that receives the “second signal” from
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`the server 1 of Frossard and generates a separate third signal.
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`After receiving the “second signal” from the server 1, the resource 2 of
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`Frossard, in turn, generates a “third signal.” Thus, the receiver-decoder circuits 4
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`is not receiving a “second signal” from the intermediate second control device
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`(server 1), but rather, the receiver/decoder 4 of Frossard is receiving a “third
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`signal” from a device positioned between the server 1 and the receiver-decoder
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`circuits 4.
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`Case IPR2015-01585
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
`Patent 5,917,405
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`Thus, Frossard teaches a first control device remote from the vehicle
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`(telephone/minitel), that sends a first signal to a second control device remote
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`from the vehicle (server 1), which in turn sends a second signal to a third control
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`device remote from the vehicle (resource 2), which in turn sends a third signal to
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`a fourth control device at the vehicle (receiver-decoder circuits 4), which in turn
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`sends a fifth signal to a device in the vehicle that is being controlled. This is an
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`“A to B to C to D” system in