Paper No.
`Filed: January 25, 2016
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
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`
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`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00871
`Patent 8,560,705
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Response
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`Table of Contents
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`“Interception of a Request . . . to Look up an Internet Protocol
`(IP) address” (Claims 1, 5, 9, 16, 19, and 23) ....................................... 4
`
`Secure Communication Link (Claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10-12, 16, 20,
`21, 24-27) .............................................................................................. 5
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Secure Communication Link”................................. 6
`
`A “Secure Communication Link” Must Be Direct ..................... 8
`
`A “Secure Communication Link” Requires Encryption ........... 13
`
`C. Virtual Private Network Link” (Claims 6 and 21) .............................. 15
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Link” Requires a Virtual
`Private Network ........................................................................ 16
`
`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Virtual Private Network Link”.............................. 17
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Link” Must Be Direct .................. 18
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Link” Requires a Network ........... 19
`
`A “Virtual Private Network Link” Requires Encryption .......... 21
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`“Secure Domain Name” (Claims 7 and 22) ........................................ 22
`
`Other Terms ......................................................................................... 25
`
`III. The Cited References Do Not Render Claims 1-30 Unpatentable ................ 27
`
`A.
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 Does Not Render
`Claims 1-23 and 25-30 Unpatentable .................................................. 27
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Aventail’s Disclosure ................................................................ 27
`
`Aventail Does Not Disclose the Claimed “Determination” ...... 29
`
`i
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`

`
`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`The Alleged “Determination” by Aventail Connect ...... 30
`
`The Alleged “Determination” by the SOCKS
`Server .............................................................................. 34
`
`The Cited References Do Not Disclose the Claimed
`“Secure Communication Link” ................................................. 36
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 Does Not
`Disclose the Features of Claims 4 and 20 ................................. 38
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 Does Not
`Disclose the Features of Claims 7 and 22 ................................. 39
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 Does Not
`Disclose the Features of Claims 2, 3, 5, 8-15, 17-19, and
`23-30 ......................................................................................... 42
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`B.
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401, RFC 2543, and Brand Does Not
`Render Claim 24 Unpatentable ........................................................... 42
`
`IV. Petitioner’s Expert Testimony Should be Accorded Little, If Any
`Weight ............................................................................................................ 43
`
`V.
`
`Each of the Instituted Grounds Is Based on At Least One Reference
`That Does Not Qualify As Prior Art .............................................................. 46
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Established that Aventail Qualifies As a
`Printed Publication .............................................................................. 47
`
`Petitioner Has Not Established that RFCs 2401 and 2543
`Qualify As Printed Publications .......................................................... 52
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Evidence Presented with the Petition Cannot
`Establish by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFCs
`2401 and 2543 Were Publicly Accessible ................................ 52
`
`The Board’s Findings Are Insufficient to Establish by a
`Preponderance of the Evidence that RFCs 2401 and 2543
`Were Publicly Accessible ......................................................... 55
`
`ii
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`

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`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`3.
`
`The Supplemental Information Is Also Insufficient to
`Establish by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFCs
`2401 and 2543 Were Publicly Accessible ................................ 58
`
`VI. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 60
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00871
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp.,
`715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 46
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369, Paper No. 9 (June 25, 2015) .................................................... 53
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 15 (May 14, 2014) .................................................... 4
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Concepts In Optics, Inc.,
`111 F. App’x 582 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................... 44, 45
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................ 10, 15, 19, 24
`
`Brand v. Miller,
`487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 44
`
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.,
`445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 47
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 43
`
`In re Cuozzo,
`793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`No. 15-446, 2016 WL 205946 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) ............................................. 3
`
`Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................... 19, 24
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLC,
`IPR2015-00499, Paper No. 7 (July 17, 2015) .................................................... 54
`
`Elec. Frontier Found. v. Pers. Audio, LLC,
`IPR2014-00070, Paper No. 21 (Apr. 18, 2014) ............................................ 49, 57
`
`iv
`
`

`
`
`Eon–Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp.,
`653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ......................................................................... 13
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00871
`
`Finnigan Corp. v. ITC,
`180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................. 48, 50, 60
`
`Garmin Int’l inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Tech, LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 15 (Jan. 19, 2013) ................................................... 12
`
`Google Inc. v. Art+Com Innovationpool GMBH,
`IPR2015-00788, Paper No. 7 (September 2, 2015) ................................ 53, 54, 56
`
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................... 3
`
`Kinetic Technologies, Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00690, Paper No. 43 (October 19, 2015) ...................................... 46, 60
`
`In re Klopfenstein,
`380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 47
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 44
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 56
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................... 11, 15
`
`Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Mobile Scanning Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00093, Paper No. 28 (Apr. 29, 2013) .................................................. 12
`
`Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 43, 45
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2014-00514, Paper No. 18 (Sep. 9, 2014) .................................................... 57
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .................................................................... 44, 45
`
`v
`
`

`
`
`In re Skvorecz,
`580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 2
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00871
`
`Square Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLC,
`CBM2014-00156, Paper No. 22 (Feb. 26, 2015) ............................................... 53
`
`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.,
`No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL 7567492 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) .......................... 11
`
`Symantec Corp. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y.,
`IPR2015-00371, Paper No. 13 (July 17, 2015) ................................ 53, 55, 56, 57
`
`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .....................................................................passim
`
`Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................................. 48, 50, 60
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 10
`
`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2013-00112, Paper No. 14 (June 27, 2013) ................................................. 12
`
`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ............................................................................ 2
`
`ZTE Corp. & ZTE (USA) Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings Inc.,
`IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 (June 19, 2013) .................................................. 12
`
`
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) ................................................................................................... 46
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`Federal Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) ........................................................................................... 59, 60
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 2
`
`vi
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`

`
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) .......................................................................................... 54
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`
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`vii
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`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00871
`
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Response to the Board’s
`
`decision to institute inter partes review (Paper No. 8, the “Decision”) and to the
`
`petition for inter partes review (the “Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Apple Inc. The
`
`Board instituted review of U.S. Patent No. 8,560,705 (“the ’0705 patent”) on the
`
`following grounds: (1) obviousness of claims 1-23 and 25-30 over Aventail, RFC
`
`2401, and RFC 2543; and (2) obviousness of claim 24 over Aventail, RFC 2401,
`
`RFC 2543 and Brand. Petitioner has not carried its “burden of proving . . .
`
`unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence” (35 U.S.C. § 316(e)) because
`
`the asserted references fail to disclose each of the claimed features. In addition,
`
`Petitioner has failed to show that Aventail, RFC 2401, and RFC 2543 are prior art
`
`printed publications. Petitioner’s submitted expert testimony should also be given
`
`little to no weight because it fails to describe how any of the claim features are
`
`taught or suggested in the asserted references. Accordingly, the Board should
`
`enter judgment against Petitioner and terminate this proceeding.
`
`II. Claim Construction
`The Petition identified eight terms for construction. In its Preliminary
`
`Response, Patent Owner addressed Petitioner’s constructions. The Decision
`
`declined to provide constructions for any of these terms finding that “neither party
`
`has identified a term for construction that is dispositive on any of the challenges.”
`
` 1
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`
`
`

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`
`(Decision at 8.)
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`In inter partes review, claims are to be given their “broadest reasonable
`
`construction in light of the specification.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this
`
`standard, terms are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which
`
`is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill1 at the time of
`
`the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(en banc)). Although VirnetX’s constructions represent the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation (BRI) of the claims in light of the specification and prosecution
`
`history, the Board should apply the claim construction standard applied by the
`
`courts, especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of the patents in
`
`the same family as the ’0705 patent. The BRI standard “is solely an examination
`
`expedient, not a rule of claim construction.” In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267-
`
`68 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It is certainly justified during the examination process
`
`because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution. In
`
`re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But, as the Board has noted,
`
`1 A person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have had a
`
`master’s degree in computer science or computer engineering and approximately
`
`two years of experience in computer networking and computer security. (Ex. 2018
`
`at ¶¶ 13-14.)
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`inter partes review is not an examination and is “more adjudicatory than
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`examinational, in nature.” Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027,
`
`Paper No. 26 at 6 (June 11, 2013).
`
`The ability to amend claims during inter partes review is so severely
`
`restricted that the rationale underpinning the BRI—the ability to freely amend
`
`claims—does not apply especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of
`
`patents in the same family as the ’0705 patent. As a result, to the extent the Board
`
`would have adopted a narrower construction under the courts’ claim construction
`
`standard than it has adopted here, it should adopt the narrower construction
`
`because the BRI standard should not apply to this proceeding.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to reconsider en banc
`
`the application of the BRI standard in Board proceedings, but the Supreme Court
`
`recently granted certiorari. In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Cuozzo
`
`Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446, 2016 WL 205946, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 15,
`
`2016). VirnetX respectfully submits that, given “the adjudicative nature and the
`
`limited amendment process of IPRs,” claims in IPR proceedings should be given
`
`their “actual meaning.” In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1299, 1301-02 (Prost, C.J.,
`
`dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing). VirnetX preserves this argument in
`
`the event the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cuozzo and
`
`instructs that a different standard should be applied.
`
`3
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`

`
`
`
`A.
`
`“Interception of a Request . . . to Look up an Internet Protocol
`(IP) address” (Claims 1, 5, 9, 16, 19, and 23)2
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Receiving a request
`pertaining to a first entity
`at another entity
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction
`necessary; alternatively,
`receiving a request to
`look up an internet
`protocol address and,
`apart from resolving it
`into an address,
`performing an evaluation
`on it related to
`establishing a secure
`communication link
`
`
`Petitioner proposes that “interception of a request” be construed similarly to
`
`an interpretation that the Board adopted in a related proceeding. (Pet. at 9-10,
`
`citing Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 15 at 12-13.) Though
`
`the Board declined to preliminarily construe this term in this proceeding, if the
`
`Board later deems construction necessary, it should construe the term in its entirety
`
`as proposed by Patent Owner’s alternative construction. As explained in Patent
`
`Owner’s Preliminary Response, in contrast to Petitioner’s proposal, Patent
`
`Owner’s alternative construction appropriately captures the notion of performing
`
`
`2 Patent Owner identifies only the challenged claims that expressly recite the terms
`
`at issue. Claims that depend from the identified claims may also implicitly contain
`
`the terms.
`
`4
`
`

`
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`an additional evaluation on a request to look up an IP address related to
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`establishing an encrypted communications channel, beyond conventionally
`
`resolving it and returning the address. (Prelim. Resp. at 27-30.) The independent
`
`claims support this construction, for example, by reciting that a determination is
`
`made as a result of the request [to look up an IP address] that the target device is a
`
`device with which a secure communication link can be established. (Ex. 1050,
`
`claims 1 and 16.) Additionally, dependent claims 5 and 19 expressly specify the
`
`evaluation, reciting that the “interception” involves “receiving the DNS request to
`
`determine that the target device is available for the secure communications
`
`service.” (Ex. 1050, claims 5 and 19.)
`
`B.
`
`Secure Communication Link (Claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10-12, 16, 20, 21,
`24-27)
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`A direct communication link
`that provides data security
`through encryption
`
`Decision’s
`Construction
`No construction
`proposed
`
`Petitioner’s Proposed
`Construction
`A transmission path that
`restricts access to data,
`addresses, or other
`information on the path,
`generally using obfuscation
`methods to hide information
`on the path, including, but
`not limited to, one or more
`of authentication,
`encryption, or address
`hopping
`
`
`As discussed in the preliminary response, a “secure communication link” in
`
`view of the specification is “a direct communication link that provides data
`
`5
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`

`
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`security through encryption.” (Prelim. Resp. at 43-48; see also Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 15-
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`26.) Petitioner’s proposed construction contradicts the plain language of the
`
`claims, is internally inconsistent, is inconsistent with the ’0705 patent specification
`
`and prosecution history, and is inconsistent with its own prior statements.
`
`1.
`
`“Authentication” and “Address Hopping” Alone Do Not
`Result in a “Secure Communication Link”
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction (Pet. at 11-12) is internally inconsistent
`
`and
`
`technically flawed.
`
` Of
`
`the obfuscation methods
`
`in
`
`the proposed
`
`construction—authentication, encryption, and address hopping—only encryption
`
`restricts access to “data, addresses, or other information on the path,” as required
`
`by the first portion of the construction. (Ex. 2018 at ¶ 17.) The other techniques
`
`alone do not “hide information on the path,” as Petitioner’s construction requires.
`
`(Id.)
`
`Authentication merely “[e]nsur[es] that a message originated from the
`
`expected sender and has not been altered on route.” (Ex. 2008 at 3, Glossary for
`
`the Linux FreeS/WAN Project.) It does not prevent an eavesdropper from
`
`accessing data transmitted over an unsecure communication link. (Ex. 2018 at
`
`¶ 18.) The specification supports this fact by describing at least one scenario
`
`where an authenticated transmission occurs “in the clear”—i.e., over an unsecured
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`communication link:
`
`SDNS [secure domain name service] 3313 can be accessed
`
`6
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`through secure portal 3310 “in the clear”, that is, without using
`an administrative VPN communication link. In this situation,
`secure portal 3310 preferably authenticates the query using any
`well-known technique, such as a cryptographic technique,
`before allowing the query to proceed to SDNS [3313].
`
`(Ex. 1050 at 51:52-57.)
`
`Address hopping alone also does not provide the claimed security, as there is
`
`nothing inherent in moving from address to address that hides information on the
`
`path or precludes an eavesdropper from reading the details of a communication.
`
`(Ex. 2018 at ¶ 20.) This is why the ’0705 patent discloses embodiments that use
`
`encryption in conjunction with address hopping to protect, for example, the next
`
`address in a routing scheme from being viewed by eavesdroppers. (See, e.g., Ex.
`
`1050 at 3:36-50, stating in part that “[e]ach TARP packet’s true destination is
`
`concealed behind a layer of encryption generated using a link key.”) It is the
`
`encryption that hides information on the path while moving from address to
`
`address. (See, e.g., Ex. 1050 at 3:16-4:40; Ex. 2018 at ¶ 20.)
`
`While authentication and address hopping may be used in conjunction with
`
`encryption as an “obfuscation method,” this fact does not make them sufficient by
`
`themselves to “hide information on the path,” as Petitioner’s construction requires.
`
`(Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 20-21.) Because Petitioner’s construction presents them as
`
`alternatives, allowing each to be sufficient, Petitioner’s construction must be
`
`7
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`

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`rejected.
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`Petitioner asserts, however, that Patent Owner’s expert agrees that address
`
`hopping hides information on the path. (Pet. at 11, citing Ex. 1055 at 113:16-
`
`114:12.) But, as Patent Owner’s expert explained, address hopping simply makes
`
`it such that “[y]ou may not be able to determine in isolation who is speaking to
`
`whom.” (Ex. 1055 at 114:1-6.) In other words, address hopping may make it more
`
`difficult to determine the originating and terminating devices, but it alone does not
`
`“hide” the addresses. (Ex. 2018 at ¶ 20.) Thus, Petitioner’s proposed construction
`
`of “secure communication link” should be rejected.
`
`A “Secure Communication Link” Must Be Direct
`
`2.
`Petitioner’s construction incorrectly encompasses links that are not direct.
`
`The ’0705 patent specification describes a secure communication link as “direct”
`
`between a client and target device and the prosecution history of related VirnetX
`
`patents supports this understanding.
`
`For instance, in one embodiment, the ’0705 patent describes the link
`
`between an originating TARP terminal and a destination TARP terminal as direct.
`
`(See, e.g., Ex. 1050, 9:41-50, Fig. 2; see also id. at 33:51-57 (describing a variation
`
`of the TARP embodiments as including a direct communication link); 38:11-14
`
`(describing the embodiment of Figure 24 in which a first computer and second
`
`computer are connected directly).) The ’0705 patent similarly describes direct
`
`8
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`

`
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`communications in later embodiments as well. (See, e.g., id. at 40:13-16, 41:5-8
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`(describing a virtual private network as being direct between a user’s computer and
`
`target), 42:12-16, 43:5-9 (describing a load balancing example in which a virtual
`
`private network is direct between a first host and a second host), 49:8-10, 49:16-31
`
`(describing a secure communication link that is direct between a first computer and
`
`a second computer), Figs. 24, 26, 28, 29, 33; Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 21-24.) In each of
`
`these embodiments, the ’0705 patent specification discloses that the link traverses
`
`a network (or networks) through which it is simply passed or routed via various
`
`network devices such as Internet Service Providers, firewalls, and routers. (See,
`
`e.g., Ex. 1050 at Figs. 2, 24, 28, 29, 33; Ex. 2018 at ¶¶ 21-24.)
`
`Moreover, Patent Owner also clearly and unambiguously disclaimed a
`
`secure communication link that is not direct in connection with the prosecution of a
`
`related VirnetX patent. (Ex. 2012 at 8.) In particular, Patent Owner explained that
`
`“Aventail has not been shown to disclose a secure communication link because
`
`computers connected according to Aventail do not communicate directly with each
`
`other.” (Id.)
`
`Given the specification’s disclosure and the prosecution history, during
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`litigation Petitioner contended that a “secure communication link” requires direct
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`communication. (Ex. 2002 at 5-7, 10 (contending that a “secure communication
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`link” should be construed consistently with a “virtual private network
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`communication link”, which requires direct communication).)
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`Indeed, both a district court and the Federal Circuit agreed with Petitioner
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`and concluded that a secure communication link requires “direct communication.”
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`The Federal Circuit stated that the district court’s construction of VPN is “a
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`network of computers which privately and directly communicate with each other
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`by encrypting traffic on insecure paths between the computers where the
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`communication is both secure and anonymous.” VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems,
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`Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1317 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Based on that construction, the
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`Federal Circuit held that a secure communication link similarly requires “a direct
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`communication link . . . .” Id. at 1319.
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`When a patentee has “unequivocally and unambigously disavow[ed] a
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`certain meaning,” as the Patent Owner did here, the doctrine of prosecution history
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`disclaimer overcomes any ordinary meaning of the term and the term must be
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`construed “consistent with the scope of the claim being surrendered.” Biogen Idec,
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`Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2013.) The district court
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`recognized this to be the case, construing a “secure communication link” as “a
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`direct communication link . . . .” (Ex. 2004 at 10-13.) The Federal Circuit
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`likewise affirmed that a “secure communication link” is “a direct communication
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`link . . . .” VirnetX, Inc., 767 F.3d at 1319.
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`In the institution decision, the Board relies on Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli,
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`LLC, 742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014), to dismiss Patent Owner’s prosecution history
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`arguments. (Decision at 19, n. 6.) Specifically, the Board has highlighted the
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`Federal Circuit’s dicta in Tempo Lighting that the PTO is not automatically
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`required “to accept a claim construction proffered as a prosecution history
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`disclaimer,” since the disclaimer “generally only binds the patent owner.” 742
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`F.3d at 978. But while a patent examiner is not bound by a patent owner’s
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`disclaimer when construing claim
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`terms, an unambiguous disclaimer
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`is
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`nevertheless informative with respect to the patent’s scope and should be given
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`effect in subsequent IPR proceedings. Where a “patent has been brought back to
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`the agency for a second review,” the Board should consult the patent’s prosecution
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`history. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
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`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O., No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL
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`7567492, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) (prosecution history “is to be consulted
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`even in determining a claim’s broadest reasonable interpretation”).
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`Despite its statement in Tempo Lighting, the Federal Circuit there applied
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`prosecution history disclaimer where an examiner requested the patent applicant to
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`rewrite its claims to clarify a specific claim term, resulting in an applicant’s
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`disclaiming remarks. 742 F.3d at 977-78. Here too, in the related reexamination
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`proceeding, the examiner construed “virtual private network communication link”
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`more broadly than the specification, and VirnetX disclaimed embodiments that did
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`not involve direct communication in response to the examiner’s broadening of the
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`claim. (Ex. 2006 at 8; Ex. 2011 at 7.) Just as in Tempo Lighting, this disclaimer
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`was a “clarification” of the meaning of the term “virtual private network
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`communication link.” 742 F.3d at 978. The Board should consider and apply
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`Patent Owner’s prosecution history disclaimer here.
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`There is no reason the Board should find any differently here. Indeed, the
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`Board has relied on prosecution history statements in construing claims in
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`numerous other inter partes reviews. See, e.g., Garmin Int’l inc. v. Cuozzo Speed
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`Tech, LLC, IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 15 at 8 (Jan. 9, 2013); Motorola Solutions,
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`Inc. v. Mobile Scanning Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00093, Paper No. 28 at 10 (Apr. 29,
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`2013); ZTE Corp. & ZTE (USA) Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings Inc., IPR2013-
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`00134, Paper No. 12 at 16 (June 19, 2013); Xilinx, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I
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`LLC, IPR2013-00112, Paper No. 14 at 6 (June 27, 2013).
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`Here, the language of the claims further compels a construction that includes
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`direct communication. Specifically, both claims 1 and 16 recite in some variation
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`“a connection of the client device with a target device over a secure
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`communication link,” indicating that the secure communication link is direct. (Ex.
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`1050, claims 1 and 16.) Thus, like the district court and the Federal Circuit, the
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`Board should find
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`that a secure communication
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`link requires “direct”
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`communication. Petitioner’s construction of “secure communication link,” which
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`does not require direct communication, should be rejected.
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`A “Secure Communication Link” Requires Encryption
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`3.
`While the Petitioner notes that the Federal Circuit appears to agree that a
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`“secure communication link” requires encryption (Pet. at 31), its construction fails
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`to require encryption. Petitioner’s proposed construction is contrary to the
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`specification, which “repeatedly and consistently” explains
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`that a secure
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`communication link requires encryption. See Eon–Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp.,
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`653 F.3d 1314, 1321–23 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For instance, the ’0705 patent
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`specification teaches that “data security is usually tackled using some form of data
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`encryption,” and it repeatedly discusses using encryption. (Ex. 1050 at 1:57-58;
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`see also id. at 3:17-19 (“TARP” embodiments described as using a “unique two-
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`layer encryption format”), 3:36-37 (“[e]ach TARP packet’s true destination
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`address is concealed behind a layer of encryption”), 4:7-9 (“[t]he message payload
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`is hidden behind an inner layer of encryption”), 9:60-61, 11:10-17, 34:15-16; Ex.
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`2018 at ¶ 25.)
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`In support of its construction’s vague security requirements, Petitioner
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`falsely contends that Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Fabian Monrose, agreed that the
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`specification has “opposing views” as to the meaning of secure communication.
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`(Pet. at 11, citing Ex. 1055 at 113:16-114:12, 74:12-14.) First, neither of the
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`sections to which Petitioner cites discusses any “opposing views” of secure
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`communication. (See Ex. 1055 at 113:16-114:12, 74:12-14.) And second, where
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`Case No. IPR2015-00871
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`Dr. Monrose does use the phrase, it is in response to a question as to whether the
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`specification includes an explicit definition for “secure communication link.” (Id.
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`at 66:11-17.) In reply, Dr. Monrose stated, rather unremarkably, that he believed
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`the parties had “opposing views” on the term. (Id.) Petitioner’s characterizations
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`of Dr. Monrose’s testimony are false and his testimony does not support
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`Petitioner’s constructions. (Ex. 2018 at ¶ 26.)
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`During litigation, Petitioner agreed that secure communication links in the
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`context of Patent Owner’s patents shared the encryption requirement of VPNs.
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`Petitioner and other defendants asked the district court to adopt an encryption
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`requirement based on Patent Owner’s statements during reexamination that
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`contrasted the “secure communication link” recited