Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`
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`Paper No.
`Filed: December 11, 2015
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case IPR2015-00810
`Patent 8,868,705
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`
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`
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`Patent Owner’s Response
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`I.
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`II.
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
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`Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`“Secure Domain Name” (Claims 3, 10, and 25) ................................... 3
`
`“Encrypted Communications Channel” Phrases (Claims 1, 2, 4-
`7, 9, 11-13, 18, 21, 22, and 26-29) ........................................................ 8
`
`“Intercept[ing] . . . A Request to Look up an Internet Protocol
`(IP) address” (Claims 1 and 21) .......................................................... 11
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`“Domain Name” (Claims 1, 3, 10, 21, and 25) ................................... 13
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`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 1, 2, 9, and 21) .......................... 13
`
`“Modulated Transmission Link/Unmodulated Transmission
`Link” (Claims 5, 6, 11, 12, 27 and 28) ................................................ 16
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`G.
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`“Phone” (Claims 8, 15, 30, and 32) .................................................... 17
`
` Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Obvious Claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-III.
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`26, and 28-34 ................................................................................................. 17
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`Beser’s Disclosure ............................................................................... 17
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`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Disclose “Intercepting From the
`Client Device a Request to Look Up an Internet Protocol (IP)
`Address Corresponding to a Domain Name Associated With the
`Target Device” .................................................................................... 21
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Alleged Request in Beser Is Not a “Request to Look
`Up an Internet Protocol (IP) Address” ...................................... 22
`
`The Alleged Request in Beser Is Not “Intercept[ed]” .............. 23
`
`Beser and RFC 2401 Would Not Have Been Combined as the
`Petition Suggests ................................................................................. 27
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`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Obvious Dependent
`Claims 3, 10, and 25 ............................................................................ 33
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`E.
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`F.
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`G.
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`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Obvious Dependent
`Claims 4 and 26 ................................................................................... 34
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`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Obvious Dependent
`Claims 14 and 31 ................................................................................. 35
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`Beser and RFC 2401 Do Not Render Obvious Dependent
`Claims 18-20 and 22-24 ...................................................................... 37
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`H. Dependent Claims 2, 6-9, 12, 13, 15-17, 28-30, and 32-34 ................ 38
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`IV.
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` Beser, RFC 2401, and Brand Do Not Render Obvious 5, 11, and 27 ........... 38
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`V.
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`
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`Petitioner Has Not Shown that RFC 2401 Is a Prior Art Printed
`Publication ..................................................................................................... 39
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`The Evidence Presented with the Petition Cannot Establish by a
`Preponderance of the Evidence that RFC 2401 Was Publicly
`Accessible ............................................................................................ 39
`
`The Board’s Findings Are Insufficient to Establish by a
`Preponderance of the Evidence that RFC 2401 Was Publicly
`Accessible ............................................................................................ 41
`
`The Supplemental Information Is Also Insufficient to Establish
`by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFC 2401 Was
`Publicly Accessible ............................................................................. 44
`
`VI.
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` Petitioner’s Expert Testimony Should be Accorded Little, If Any
`Weight ............................................................................................................ 47
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`
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` Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 51 VII.
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp.,
`715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 50
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369, Paper No. 9 (June 25, 2015) .............................................. 39, 40
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 15 (May 14, 2014) ........................................ 4, 12, 25
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 41 (May 11, 2015) .................................................. 14
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2015-00811, Paper No. 8 (Sept. 11, 2015) ....................................... 13, 14, 15
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Concepts In Optics, Inc.,
`111 F. App’x 582 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................... 47, 50
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Brand v. Miller,
`487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 48
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 47
`
`In re Cuozzo,
`793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`No. 15-446, 2015 WL 5895939 (Oct. 6, 2015) .................................................... 3
`
`Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLC,
`IPR2015-00499, Paper No. 7 (July 17, 2015) .............................................. 41, 42
`
`iii
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`

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`
`Elec. Frontier Found. v. Pers. Audio, LLC,
`IPR2014-00070, Paper No. 21 (Apr. 18, 2014) .................................................. 44
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`Finnigan Corp. v. ITC,
`180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 47
`
`In re Fulton,
`391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 32
`
`Google Inc. v. Art+Com Innovationpool GMBH,
`IPR2015-00788, Paper No. 7 (September 2, 2015) ...................................... 40, 41
`
`In re Gurley,
`27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .............................................................................. 32
`
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................... 2
`
`Kinetic Technologies, Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00690, Paper No. 43 (Oct. 19, 2015) .................................................. 46
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 48
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 43
`
`Medichem, SA v. Rolabo, SL,
`437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 32
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................... 7, 15
`
`Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 47, 50
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2014-00514, Paper No. 18 (Sep. 9, 2014) .................................................... 43
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .................................................................... 48, 49
`
`iv
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`

`
`
`In re Skvorecz,
`580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 2
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`Square Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLC,
`CBM2014-00156, Paper No. 22 (Feb. 26, 2015) ............................................... 40
`
`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.,
`No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL 7567492 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) ............................ 7
`
`Symantec Corp. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y.,
`IPR2015-00371, Paper No. 13 (July 17, 2015) .................................................. 40
`
`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 6, 7, 8
`
`Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 47
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 10
`
`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ............................................................................ 2
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ..................................................................................................... 1
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`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R.
`§ 41.65(a) ............................................................................................................ 35
`§ 42.65(a) ...................................................................................................... 36, 46
`§ 42.100(b) ............................................................................................................ 2
`§ 42.104(b)(5) ..................................................................................................... 41
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`v
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Response to the Board’s
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`decision to institute inter partes review (Paper No. 8, the “Decision”) and to the
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`petition for inter partes review (the “Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Petitioner Apple
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`Inc. The Board instituted review of U.S. Patent No. 8,868,705 (“the ’705 patent”)
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`on two grounds: (1) obviousness of claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-26, and 28-34 over Beser
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`and RFC 2401; and (2) obviousness of claims 5, 11, and 27 over Beser, RFC 2401,
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`and Brand. Apple has not carried its “burden of proving . . . unpatentability by a
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`preponderance of the evidence” (35 U.S.C. § 316(e)) because the asserted
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`references fail to disclose each of the claimed features. In addition, Apple has
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`failed to show that RFC 2401 is a prior art printed publication. Apple’s submitted
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`expert testimony should also be given little to no weight because it fails to describe
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`how any of the claim features are taught or suggested in the asserted references.
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`Accordingly, the Board should enter judgment against Apple and terminate this
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`proceeding.
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`II.
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` Claim Construction
`The Petition identified six terms for construction. In its Preliminary
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`Response, Patent Owner addressed Petitioner’s constructions and also addressed an
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`additional term. The Decision did not provide a construction for any of the terms,
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`finding that “neither party has identified a term for construction that is dispositive
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`on any of the challenges.” (Decision at 8.) Patent Owner respectfully disagrees
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`and addresses the terms below under the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI)
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`standard.
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`In inter partes review, claims are to be given their “broadest reasonable
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`construction in light of the specification.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Although
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`VirnetX’s constructions represent the BRI of the claims in light of the specification
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`and prosecution history, the Board should apply the claim construction standard
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`applied by the courts, especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of
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`the patents in the same family as the ’705 patent. The BRI standard “is solely an
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`examination expedient, not a rule of claim construction.” In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d
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`1262, 1267-68 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It is certainly justified during the examination
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`process because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims during
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`prosecution. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But, as the
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`Board has noted, inter partes review is not an examination and is “more
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`adjudicatory than examinational, in nature.” Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
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`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 at 6 (June 11, 2013).
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`The ability to amend claims during inter partes review is so severely
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`restricted that the rationale underpinning the BRI—the ability to freely amend
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`claims—does not apply especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of
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`patents in the same family as the ’705 patent. As a result, to the extent the Board
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`would have adopted a narrower construction under the courts’ claim construction
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`standard than it has adopted here,
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`it should adopt
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`the narrower construction
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`because the BRI standard should not apply to this proceeding.
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`The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to reconsider en banc
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`the application of the BRI standard in Board proceedings. In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d
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`1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015). VimetX nevertheless respectfully submits that, given “the
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`adjudicative nature and the limited amendment process of IPRS,” claims in [PR
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`proceedings should be given their “actual meaning.” Id. at 1299, 1301-02 (Prost,
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`C .J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing)- VirnetX preserves this
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`argument in the event the Supreme Court grants review of the Federal Circuit’s
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`decision in Cuozzo and instructs that a different standard should be applied. See
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`Pet’n for a Writ of Certiorari, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No- 15-446, 2015
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`WL 5895939 (Oct. 6, 2015).
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`A.
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`“Secure Domain Name” (Claims 3, 10, and 25)‘
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`Decision’s Construction
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`No construction proposed
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`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Construction
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`A non-standard domain
`name that corresponds to
`a secure comuter
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`A name that corresponds
`to a secure computer
`network address
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`1 Patent Owner identifies only the challenged claims that expressly recite the
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`terms at issue. Claims that depend from the identified claims may also implicitly
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`contain the terms.
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`network address and
`cannot be resolved by a
`conventional domain
`name service (DNS)
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`Petitioner construed the phrase to mean “a name that corresponds to a secure
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`computer network address” (Pet. at 11-12), which is the same construction the
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`Board adopted in a related proceeding. Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237,
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`Paper No. 15 at 12-13 (May 14, 2014). As detailed in Patent Owner’s Preliminary
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`Response and below, Patent Owner respectfully disagrees with this construction.
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`(Prelim. Resp. at 34-37.)
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`Patent Owner’s construction was agreed to by the parties—including
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`Petitioner—in the ’417 litigation. (Ex. 2002, Joint Claim Construction Chart
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`Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(d) in the ’417 litigation (E.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2011) at 19-20.)
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`In addition to this confirmation from multiple parties that the proposed
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`construction here is correct, the specification supports the construction.
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`The specification teaches that a “secure domain name” is “a nonstandard
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`domain name.” (Ex. 1001 at 7:29-31; 50:22-31.) Examples of “a nonstandard
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`domain name” are provided in the specification: .scom, .snet, .sorg, .sedu, .smil,
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`and .sgov. (Id. at 7:39-42.) The specification also explains that a “secure domain
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`name” “corresponds to a secure computer network address,” stating that “SDNS
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`3313 contains a cross-reference database of secure domain names and
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`corresponding secure network addresses.” (Id. at 51:6-10; Ex. 2016 at ¶¶ 15-16.)
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`Because a “secure domain name” is “a non-standard domain name,” the
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`specification explains that “a query to a standard domain name service (DNS) will
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`return a message indicating that the universal resource locator (URL) is unknown.”
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`(Ex. 1001 at 50:32-35; Figs. 33, 34.) To obtain the URL for a “secure domain
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`name,” “a secure domain name service (SDNS)” must be queried. (Id. at 51:35-38;
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`Figs. 33, 34; Ex. 2016 at ¶ 17.)
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`Patent Owner also expressly disclaimed Petitioner’s proposed construction
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`during a now-completed inter partes reexamination of a related patent. There,
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`Patent Owner stated that the patent “takes pains to explain that a secure domain
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`name is different from a domain name that just happens to be associated with a
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`secure computer or just happens to be associated with an address requiring
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`authorization.” (Ex. 2008 at 5, Response to Office Action in Control No.
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`95/001,270 (Apr. 19, 2010).) Unlike a domain name that just happens to be
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`associated with a secure computer or just happens to be associated with an address
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`requiring authorization, Patent Owner explained that “a secure domain name
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`cannot be resolved by a conventional domain name service.” (Id. at 6.) Explicitly
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`relying on and agreeing with Patent Owner’s statements, the examiner allowed the
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`claims of the patent:
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`Patent Owner argues that the ’180 patent clearly
`distinguishes the claimed ‘secure domain name; from a
`domain name that happens to correspond to a secure
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`computer. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The
`Examiner agrees that the ’180 patent distinguishes the
`claimed ‘secure domain name.’ For example, the ’180
`patent explains that a secure domain name is a non-
`standard domain name and that querying a convention[al]
`domain name server using a secure domain name will
`result in a return message indicating that the URL is
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`unknown . . . .
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`(Ex. 2006 at 4, Right of Appeal Notice in Control No. 95/001,270 (Dec. 3, 2010).)
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`Given Patent Owner’s statements and the examiner’s reliance on them,
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`Apple and its co-defendants explained in district court that the patent issued as a
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`result of Patent Owner’s statements, thus disallowing Patent Owner from taking a
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`different position with respect to those terms. (See Ex. 2003 at 8:13-10:2,
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`Markman Hearing Tr. From ’417 Litigation (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2012).) A
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`disclaiming statement is unambiguous when “a competitor would reasonably
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`believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.” Cyber
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`Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Here, VirnetX’s
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`disclaimer “show[s] reasonable clarity and deliberateness.” Biogen Idec, Inc. v.
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`GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
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`In related IPR proceedings, the Board has relied on Tempo Lighting, Inc. v.
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`Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014), to dismiss Patent Owner’s prosecution
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`history arguments. Specifically, the Board has highlighted the Federal Circuit’s
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`dicta in Tempo Lighting that the Office is not automatically required “to accept a
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`claim construction proffered as a prosecution history disclaimer,” since the
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`disclaimer “generally only binds the patent owner.” 742 F.3d at 978. But while a
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`patent examiner is not bound by a patent owner’s disclaimer when construing
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`claim terms, an unambiguous disclaimer is nevertheless informative with respect to
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`the patent’s scope and should be given effect in subsequent IPR proceedings.
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`Where a “patent has been brought back to the agency for a second review,” the
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`Board should consult the patent’s prosecution history. Microsoft Corp. v.
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`Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Straight Path IP Grp., Inc.
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`v. Sipnet EU S.R.O., No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL 7567492, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25,
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`2015) (prosecution history “is to be consulted even in determining a claim’s
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`broadest reasonable interpretation”).
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`Despite its statement in Tempo Lighting, the Federal Circuit there applied
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`prosecution history disclaimer where an examiner requested the patent applicant to
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`rewrite its claims to clarify a specific claim term, resulting in an applicant’s
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`disclaiming remarks. 742 F.3d at 977-78. Here too, in the related reexamination
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`proceeding, the examiner construed “secure domain name” more broadly than the
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`specification, and VirnetX disclaimed embodiments that included standard domain
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`names in response to the examiner’s broadening of the claim. (Ex. 2008 at 5.) Just
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`as in Tempo Lighting, this disclaimer was a “clarification” of the meaning of the
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`term “secure domain name.” 742 F.3d at 978. The Board should consider and
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`apply Patent Owner’s prosecution history disclaimer here.
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`Because each aspect of Patent Owner’s construction of “secure domain
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`name” is supported by intrinsic and extrinsic evidence and because Patent Owner
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`expressly disclaimed Petitioner’s proposed construction, precluding it from arguing
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`for a broader construction, the Board should construe “secure domain name” to be
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`“a non-standard domain name that corresponds to a secure computer network
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`address and cannot be resolved by a conventional domain name service (DNS).”
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`B.
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`“Encrypted Communications Channel” Phrases (Claims 1, 2, 4-7,
`9, 11-13, 18, 21, 22, and 26-29)
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`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
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`Decision’s Construction
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`Construction A direct communications No construction proposed No construction proposed
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`channel that is enc ‘O ted
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`Independent claims 1 and 21 of the ’705 patent recite an “encrypted
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`communications
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`channel”
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`and more
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`specifically
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`recite
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`“an
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`encrypted
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`communications channel between a client device and a target device.” (Ex. 1001,
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`claims 1 and 21.) Thus, in the context of the ’705 patent claims, the encrypted
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`communications channel between a client device and a target device is a direct
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`communications charmel that is encrypted.
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`The ’705 patent describes encrypted communications that are direct between
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`a client device and a target device. For instance, in one embodiment, the ’705
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`patent describes the communication between an originating TARP terminal and a
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`destination TARP terminal as direct. (See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 9:41-50, Fig. 2; see also
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`id. at 33:43-51 (describing a variation of the TARP embodiments as including a
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`direct communication link); 38:6-9 (describing the embodiment of Figure 24 in
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`which a first computer and second computer are connected directly).) The ’705
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`patent similarly describes direct encrypted communications in later embodiments
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`as well. (See, e.g., id. at 40:7-10, 40:66-41:2 (describing a virtual private network
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`as being direct between a user’s computer and target), 42:6-10, 42:66-43:3
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`(describing a load balancing example in which a virtual private network is direct
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`between a first host and a second host), 48:66-49:1, 49:10-22 (describing a secure
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`communication link that is direct between a first computer and a second computer),
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`Figs. 24, 26, 28, 29, 33; Ex. 2016 at ¶¶ 18-19.)
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`In each of these embodiments, the ’705 patent specification discloses that
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`the communication traverses a network (or networks) through which it is simply
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`passed or routed via various network devices such as Internet Service Providers,
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`firewalls, and routers. (See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at Figs. 2, 24, 28, 29, 33; Ex. 2016 at ¶
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`20.) In litigation, Petitioner and its co-defendants recognized that this type of
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`network traversal is a “direct” communication. (See Ex. 2003 at 2:16-21, 4:17-
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`5:12, Markman Hearing Transcript in the ’417 litigation (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2012);
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`see also id. at 44:13-45:12 (Petitioner explaining that the claims should be limited
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`to “direct” communication because the specification teaches direct communication
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
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`between the client and target).)
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`
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`In view of Petitioner’s arguments and the specification, both a district court,
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`(Ex. 2004 at 8, 13, Memorandum Opinion and Order in the ’417 litigation), and the
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`Federal Circuit construed the related terms “secure communication link” and
`
`“virtual private network” to include “direct” communication. VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco
`
`Sys. Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1317 n.1, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Accordingly, under the
`
`applicable BRI standard, and in light of the language of the ’705 patent claims,
`
`which recite “an encrypted communications channel between a client device and a
`
`target device,” the Board should construe “encrypted communications channel” as
`
`a “direct communications channel that is encrypted.”
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`10
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`

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`C.
`
`“Intercept[ing] . . . A Request to Look up an Internet Protocol
`(IP) address” (Claims 1 and 21)2
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00810
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Construction
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`
`
`Receiving a request
`pertaining to a first entity
`at another entity
`
`No construction
`necessary; alternatively,
`receiving a request to
`look up an intemet
`protocol address and,
`apart from resolving it
`into an address,
`performing an evaluation
`on it related to
`
`establishing an encrypted
`communications channel
`
`2 Step 2 of claims 1 and 21 recites “the request to look up the IP address
`
`transmitted in step (I)’’ instead of “intercepted in step (I)’’ due to a clerical error at
`
`the Office.
`
`(Ex. 1001 at 55:53-54, 57:1-2; see Ex. 1002 at 638, 639, 641, 655-56.)
`
`Per the Board’s Order dated December 9, 2015, Patent Owner filed a Request for a
`
`Certificate of Correction.
`
`(See Ex. 2017.) Patent Owner notes that this correction
`
`does not change the scope of the claims and is not of “patentable significance” as
`
`the file history made explicit
`
`that
`
`the proper understanding of “IP address
`
`transmitted in step (I)’’ could only be the “IP address intercepted in step (1)_” All
`
`of Patent Owner’s arguments
`
`in this Response are consistent with this
`
`understanding.
`
`ll
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`

`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00810
`
`Though the Board declined to preliminarily construe this term, if the Board
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`later deems construction necessary, it should adopt Patent Owner’s construction
`
`because Petitioner’s proposed construction does not reflect the appropriate
`
`construction in view of the specification. Petitioner’s proposed construction for
`
`the “intercept[ing]” phrase (Pet. at 11) is similar to a construction that the Board
`
`adopted in a related proceeding. Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237, Paper
`
`No. 15 at 12-13.
`
`As explained in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, Patent Owner’s
`
`alternative construction appropriately captures the notion of performing an
`
`additional evaluation on a request to look up an IP address related to establishing
`
`an encrypted communications channel, beyond conventionally resolving it and
`
`returning the address. (Prelim. Resp. at 29-32; see also Ex. 2016 ¶ 24.) The
`
`independent claims support this construction, for example, by reciting that a
`
`determination is made whether the request to look up the IP address corresponds to
`
`a device that accepts an encrypted channel connection with the client device, and
`
`that “in response to” this determination, provisioning information required to
`
`initiate the encrypted communications channel is provided. (Ex. 1001, claims 1
`
`and 21.) Additionally, dependent claims 16 and 33 expressly specify the
`
`evaluation, reciting that “intercepting” involves “receiving the request to determine
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`12
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`

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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
`
`whether the target device accepts an encrypted channel connection with the client
`
`device.” (Ex. 1001, claims 16 and 33.)
`
`D.
`
`“Domain Name” (Claims 1, 3, 10, 21, and 25)
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`a network address
`
`an IP address
`
`Construction A name corresponding to A name corresponding to
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`The BRI of “domain name” is “a name corresponding to a network address.”
`
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with Petitioner’s, but, as
`
`discussed in more detail in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, recognizes that a
`
`name may correspond to types of network addresses other than an “IP” address.
`
`(Pet. at 1 1; see Prelim. Resp. at 33-34; see also Ex. 2016 at 1] 24.)
`
`E.
`
`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 1, 2, 9, and 21)
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Construction
`
`Information that is used
`to establish an encrypted
`communications channel
`
`Information that enables
`communication in a
`virtual private network,
`where the virtual private
`
`network uses enc tion
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`No construction proposed
`
`In a related proceeding involving the ’705 patent, IPR20l5—008l] (“the ’81l
`
`proceeding”), the Board preliminarily construed “provisioning information” to be
`
`“information that
`
`is provided to enable or aid in establishing a secure
`
`communications charmel.” Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR20l5—008l 1, Paper No.
`
`8 at 9 (Sept. 11, 2015). In doing so, it recognized that “[t]he claims do not recite or
`
`13
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`

`
`
`implicate in any way explicitly a VPN,” contrary to Petitioner’s proposed
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`Case No. IPR2015-00810
`
`construction. Id. However, the Board overlooked that the claims also do not recite
`
`a “secure communications channel,” as its construction states. Rather, the claims
`
`repeatedly refer to an “encrypted communications channel.”3 (Ex. 1001, claims 1
`
`and 21 (reciting that the provisioning information is “required to initiate the
`
`creation of the encrypted communications channel”).)
`
`The Board’s construction in the ’811 proceeding is also overly broad in that
`
`it encompasses any information that “enables or aid[s] in” communication using a
`
`secure communications channel, even if that information has nothing to do with
`
`provisioning.
`
` For example, it would encompass source and destination
`
`information for individual packets of data that are traveling over a pre-existing
`
`channel. While this type of information may “enable or aid in” communication
`
`using an encrypted communications channel, it has no relationship to the
`
`traditional notions as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. (Ex.
`
`2016 at ¶¶ 21-22.)
`
`As discussed in the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner’s construction is
`
`more consistent with the general notion that provisioning refers to setting up or
`
`3 This is distinction is significant given the Board’s previous findings in related
`
`proceedings that security does not require encryption. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v.
`
`VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 41 at 5-8 (May 11, 2015).
`
`14
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`

`
`
`establishing a connection or service. As the Board noted, one dictionary explains
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00810
`
`that provisioning is “[s]etting up a telecommunications service for a particular
`
`customer,” and that “[c]ommon carriers provision circuits by programming their
`
`computers to switch customer lines into the appropriate networks.” Apple,
`
`IPR2015-00811, Paper No. 8 at 9 (citing Ex. 2007 at 6, McGraw-Hill Computer
`
`Desktop Encyclopedia (9th ed. 2001).). Applying these principles to provisioning
`
`in the context of the ’705 patent, encrypted communications channel provisioning
`
`refers to setting up or establishing an encrypted communication channel—not
`
`merely the sending of any and all information that may “enable or aid in”
`
`communication. Indeed, one of ordinary skill in the art4 would not have
`
`understood a channel to be provisioned every time a data packet is sent across it,
`
`but the Decision’s construction inaccurately encompasses this scenario. (Ex. 2016
`
`at ¶ 23); see Microsoft, 789 F.3d at 1298 (explaining that a construction is
`
`“unreasonably broad” where it is not “consistent with the one that those skilled in
`
`the art would reach”)