UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`______________
`
`
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`
`______________
`
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 to Severinsky et al.
`
`IPR Case No.: IPR2015-00792
`
`______________
`
`
`
`REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,214,097
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`
`
`Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
`
`Updated List of Exhibits .......................................................................................... iv
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`Claim construction ........................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`B.
`
`C.
`
`“Setpoint (SP)” ...................................................................................... 2
`Paice seeks to amend independent claims 1, 11 and 21 to
`include a “comparison” ......................................................................... 3
`“Abnormal and transient conditions” ................................................... 4
`
`III.
`
`Paice’s procedural arguments .......................................................................... 6
`
`A.
`B.
`
`Ford’s Petition is not conclusory ........................................................... 6
`Ford is not estopped from maintaining its challenges to claims
`7, 17, 27, 37 and 38 ............................................................................... 6
`
`IV.
`
`Issues raised for Grounds 1 and 2: Paice’s repeated arguments
`regarding “RL” and “SP,” and Paice’s new argument regarding
`“abnormal and transient conditions,” are not persuasive ............................... 7
`
`A. As the Board has previously found, Severinsky ’970 discloses
`“when” to operate the engine based on “RL”, i.e., the “torque
`required to propel the vehicle” .............................................................. 7
`As the Board has previously found, Severinsky ’970 discloses a
`“setpoint” ............................................................................................... 8
`Severinsky ’970 discloses the additional “abnormal and
`transient conditions” limitations of claims 7, 17, 27 and 37 ..............10
`Paice cannot avoid its admissions in the specification of the
`’097 Patent ...........................................................................................12
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`V.
`
`
`
`Issues raised for Grounds 1 and 2: Paice’s renewed arguments
`regarding “limit[ing] the rate of change of torque produced by the
`engine such that combustion of fuel within the engine occurs at a
`substantially stoichiometric ratio,” and the rationale to combine
`Severinsky ’970 and Takaoka, are not persuasive.........................................14
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`
`
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`A. As the Board has previously found, the combination of
`Severinsky ’970 and Takaoka teaches “limit[ing] the rate of
`change of torque produced by the engine such that combustion
`of fuel within the engine occurs at a substantially stoichiometric
`ratio”....................................................................................................14
`1.
`Takaoka teaches a control strategy for limiting engine
`torque - Paice’s “underpowered engine” argument lacks
`merit ..........................................................................................14
`Takaoka teaches limiting engine torque ...................................16
`Paice’s current analysis of Takaoka conflicts with its
`prior analysis of Takaoka ..........................................................17
`Rationale to combine Severinsky ’970 with Takaoka ........................18
`1.
`Severinsky ’970’s disclosure of a lean-burn engine
`control strategy is not a “teaching away” .................................20
`
`2.
`3.
`
`B.
`
`VI.
`
`Issues raised for only Ground 2 .....................................................................21
`
`VII. Conclusion .....................................................................................................22
`
`Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................23
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`
`
`
`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Cases
`
`Clearwater Systems Corp. v. Evapco, Inc.,
`
`394 Fed. Appx. 699 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................13
`
`Clearwater Systems Corp. v. Evapco, Inc.,
`
`596 F.Supp.2d 291 (D. Conn. 2009) .............................................................13
`
`Constant v. Advanced Micro–Devices, Inc.,
`
`848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) .....................................................................12
`
`In re Gurley,
`
`27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .................................................................. 20, 21
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................5, 11
`
`PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,
`
`491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .....................................................................12
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315 ....................................................................................................6, 21
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1201
`
`Updated List of Exhibits
`
`Description
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097
`
`1202
`
`Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`
`
`
`1203
`
`1204
`
`Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Company, Case No. 1:14-cv-
`00492, District of MD, Baltimore Div., Complaint (Feb.
`19, 2014)
`Ford’s letter to Paice dated September 22, 2014
`
`1205
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970
`
`Identifier
`
`’097
`Patent
`Stein
`Decl.
`Paice
`Complaint
`
`Ford
`Letter
`Severinsk
`y ’970
`Takaoka
`
`IPR2014-
`01415 PO
`Preliminar
`y
`Response
`Librarian
`Decl.
`
`Toshifumi Takaoka et al., A High-Expansion Ratio
`Gasoline Engine for the Toyota Hybrid System, Toyota
`Technical Review Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 1998) (available
`at: https://www.worldcat.org/title/a-high-expansion-ratio-
`gasoline-engine-for-the-toyota-hybrid-
`system/oclc/205516653&referer=brief_results.)
`Ford Motor co. v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-01415,
`Paper 9, Patent Owner Preliminary Response (P.T.A.B.
`Dec. 16, 2014)
`
`Declaration of Walt Johnson, Librarian at Patent and
`Trademark Resource Center
`(PTRC), Minneapolis
`Central Library
`U.S. Patent No. 5,865,263
`
`1206
`
`1207
`
`1208
`
`1209
`
`1210
`
`1211
`
`1212
`
`1213
`
`Yamaguch
`i
`’097 File
`History
`’347
`Patent
`’347 File
`History
`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. et al., Case No. 2:04- Toyota
`
`File History of U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347
`
`File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347
`
`iv
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`Identifier
`
`Litigation
`
`Hyundai
`Litigation
`
`IPR2014-
`00571
`Decision
`’634
`Patent
`IPR2014-
`0571 PO
`Response
`Kawakats
`u
`Anderson
`
`Dr. Stein
`CV
`Heywood
`
`Pulkrabek
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`
`1214
`
`1215
`
`Description
`
`cv-211, E.D. Texas, Claim Construction Order (Dec. 5,
`2008)
`Paice, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Corp. et a., Case No. 2:12-
`cv-0499, District of MD, Baltimore Div., Claim
`Construction Order (July 24, 2014)
`Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, LLC, Case IPR2014-00571,
`Paper 12, Decision (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2014)
`
`1216
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`
`Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, LLC, Case IPR2014-00571,
`Paper 20, Patent Owner Response (P.T.A.B. Jan. 21,
`2015)
`U.S. Patent No. 4,335,429
`
`Catherine Anderson & Erin Pettit, The Effects of APU
`Characteristics on
`the Design of Hybrid Control
`Strategies for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE Technical
`Paper
`950493
`(February,
`1995)
`(available
`at
`http://papers.sae.org/950493/.)
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Jeffery L. Stein
`
`1217
`
`1218
`
`1219
`
`1220
`
`1221
`
`1222
`
`1223
`
`1224
`1225
`
`Internal Combustion Engine
`John B. Heywood,
`Fundamentals
`(McGraw-Hill 1988)
`(available
`at
`http://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=2094
`6&recCount=25&recPointer=4&bibId=2421798.)
`Willard W. Pulkrabek, Engineering Fundamentals of the
`Internal Combustion Engine (Prentice Hall, 1997)
`(available
`at
`http://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=1000
`3&recCount=25&recPointer=1&bibId=2109503.)
`Hawley, G.G., The Condensed Chemical Dictionary, Van
`Nostrand Reinhold Co., 9th ed. (1977) (available at
`http://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=2154
`1&recCount=25&recPointer=14&bibId=1289584.)
`Pieper
`U.S. Patent No. 913,846
`Michael Duoba, Ctr. for Transp. Research, Argonne Duoba
`
`Hawley
`
`v
`
`

`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`
`1226
`
`1227
`
`1228
`1229
`
`1230
`
`1231
`
`1232
`
`1233
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`Description
`
`Identifier
`
`in
`the Vehicle Tester
`for
`Nat’l Lab., Challenges
`Characterizing Hybrid Electric Vehicles, 7th CRC on
`Road Vehicle Emissions Workshop
`(April 1997)
`(available at http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/516019.)
`Society of Automotive Engineers Special Publication,
`Technology for Electric and Hybrid Vehicles, SAE SP-
`1331
`(February
`1998)
`(available
`at
`http://www.worldcat.org/title/technology-for-electric-and-
`hybrid-vehicles/oclc/39802642.)
`Kozo Yamaguchi et al., Development of a New Hybrid
`System — Dual System, SAE Technical Paper 960231
`(February 1996)
`(available at http://papers.sae.org/960231/.)
`U.S. Patent No. 3,888,325
`L. E. Unnewehr et al., Hybrid Vehicle for Fuel Economy,
`SAE Technical Paper 760121 (1976) (available at
`http://papers.sae.org/760121/.)
`Brown, T.L. et al., Chemistry, The Central Science, Third
`Edition
`(Prentice-Hall
`1985)
`(available
`at
`http://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=2182
`9&recCount=25&recPointer=13&bibId=4259071.)
`Grunde T. Engh & Stephen Wallman, Development of the
`Volvo Lambda-Sond System, SAE Technical Paper
`770295
`(1977)
`(available
`at
`http://papers.sae.org/770295/.)
`A. G. Stefanopoulou et al., Engine Air-Fuel Ratio and
`Torque Control using Secondary Throttles, Proceedings
`of the 33rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
`(December
`1994)
`(available
`at
`http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnu
`mber=411385&queryText%3DA.+G.+Stefanopoulou+et+
`al.%2C+Engine+Air-
`Fuel+Ratio+and+Torque+Control+using+Secondary+Thr
`ottles%2C+Proceedings+of+the+33rd+IEEE+Conference
`+on+Decision+and+Control+.LB.December+1994.RB.)
`Oreste Vittone et al., FIAT Research Centre, Fiat
`Conceptual Approach to Hybrid Car Design, 12th
`
`SAE SP-
`1331
`
`Yamaguch
`i Paper
`
`Reinbeck
`Unnewehr
`
`Brown
`
`Engh
`
`Stefanopo
`ulou
`
`Vittone
`
`vi
`
`

`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`
`1234
`
`1235
`
`1236
`1237
`
`1238
`
`1239
`
`1240
`
`1241
`
`1242
`
`1243
`
`1244
`
`1245
`
`1246
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`Description
`
`Identifier
`
`International Electric Vehicle Symposium, Volume 2
`(1994),
`(available
`at
`https://www.worldcat.org/title/symposium-proceedings-
`12th-international-electric-vehicle-symposium-december-
`5-7-1994-disneyland-hotel-and-convention-center-
`anaheim-
`california/oclc/32209857&referer=brief_results.)
`General Electric Company, Corp. Research & Dev.,
`Near-Term Hybrid Vehicle Program, Final Report -
`Phase
`1
`(October
`1979)
`(available
`at
`http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19800017707.)
`U.S. Application No. 13/065,704
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,479,898
`Reply Decl. of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`
`Final Decision, IPR2015-01415, Paper 30 (March 10,
`2016)
`
`Final Decision, IPR2014-01416, Paper 26 (March 10,
`2016)
`
`Mr. Hannemann Deposition Transcript (IPR2015-00571,
`April 7, 2015)
`Final Decision, IPR2014-00570, Paper 44 (September 28,
`2015)
`Final Decision, IPR2014-00904, Paper 41 (December 10,
`2015)
`Mr. Hannemann Deposition Transcript (IPR2015-01415,
`September 4, 2015)
`Mr. Hannemann Deposition Transcript (IPR2015-00570,
`April 8, 2015)
`Dr. Stein Deposition Transcript (IPR2015-01415, May
`29, 2015)
`Bosch Automotive Handbook (Oct. 1996)
`
`GE Final
`Report
`
`’704
`Applicatio
`n
`Cullen
`Reply
`Decl.
`’1415
`Final
`Decision
`’1416
`Final
`Decision
`Hn Tr. 1
`
`’570 Final
`Decision
`’904 Final
`Decision
`Hn Tr. 2
`
`Hn Tr. 3
`
`Stein Tr. 1
`
`Bosch
`Handbook
`
`vii
`
`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`The Board instituted an inter partes review on two Grounds challenging
`
`claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 37, and 38 of
`
`the ’097 Patent. (“Decision,” Paper 13 at 2.)
`
`Paice’s Patent Owner Response (“POR,” Paper 16) focuses on four principal
`
`arguments, all of which have been: (a) raised in prior responses by Paice; (b)
`
`addressed in prior replies by Ford; and (c) rejected by this Board. These arguments
`
`are: (1) that “setpoint” should be construed as a definite, but potentially variable
`
`value “at which a transition between operating modes may occur,” (see e.g.,’1415
`
`Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 7-10; addressed below at 2-3); (2) that Severinsky ’970
`
`allegedly does not teach using “road load” and “setpoint” to determine when to
`
`operate the engine (see e.g.,’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 19-26; addressed
`
`below at 7-12); (3) that Takaoka allegedly does not teach limiting a rate of change
`
`of engine torque output to achieve stoichiometry (see e.g.,’1415 Final Decision,
`
`Ex. 1238 at 33-35; addressed below at 13-18); (4) that Takaoka and Severinsky
`
`’970 teach away from their combination (see e.g., ’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238
`
`at 33-36; addressed below at 18-19).
`
`Paice’s POR also addresses the new issue raised in this IPR, i.e., limitations
`
`concerning “abnormal and transient conditions.” Paice attempts to distinguish the
`
`Challenged Claims over the prior art by construing claims requiring “abnormal
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`and transient conditions” unreasonably narrowly (addressed below at 4-5, 10-12).
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
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`(POR at 12-13, 40-42.)
`
`II. Claim construction
`
`A.
`
`“Setpoint (SP)”
`
`The Board construed “setpoint (SP)” as “a predetermined torque value that
`
`may or may not be reset.” (Decision at 8.) Paice seeks a construction as “a definite,
`
`but potentially variable value at which a transition between operating modes may
`
`occur” and argues that the Board’s construction “is unreasonably broad and does
`
`not reasonably reflect the disclosure of the ’097 patent.” (POR at 6.)
`
`The Board explained its “SP” construction in multiple final determinations.
`
`(See e.g., ’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 7-10; ’1416 Final Decision, Ex. 1239
`
`at 8-11.) As the Board stated, “claims 1 and 11 speak of the ‘setpoint’ or ‘SP’ as
`
`being the lower limit at which the engine can produce torque efficiently,” and
`
`“[t]hese express recitations suggest that ‘setpoint’ is not just any value, but a value
`
`that—per the surrounding claim language—equates to a measure of ‘torque.’”
`
`(’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 7-8.) The Board further referenced Paice’s
`
`expert’s testimony that “under the ‘most straightforward’ approach for the claimed
`
`‘comparison,’ the ‘setpoint is a torque value.’” (’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 n.7
`
`at 7, citing Hn Tr 1, Ex. 1240 at 79:16-80:25.)
`
`The Board rejected Paice’s proposed “setpoint” construction, stating that
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`although “sometimes the specification describes the setpoint in terms of a
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`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
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`‘transition point’ . . . the claim language itself makes clear that setpoint relates
`
`simply to a torque value, without requiring that it be a transition point.” (’1415
`
`Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 8.) The Board also stated that “the specification
`
`acknowledges that the mode of operation does not always transition, or switch, at
`
`the setpoint, but instead depends on a number of parameters.” (Id.)
`
`Ford agrees with the Board’s construction, as supported by the Board’s prior
`
`final determinations. (See also Pet. at 13-15.)
`
`B.
`
`Paice seeks to amend independent claims 1, 11 and 21 to
`include a “comparison”
`
`Paice proposes a “construction” that adds a “comparison” limitation to
`
`independent claims 1, 11 and 21. (POR at 10-11 (e.g., “operating the at least one
`
`electric motor to provide torque to the hybrid vehicle when a comparison of torque
`
`required to operate the hybrid vehicle to a setpoint (SP) results in a determination
`
`that the torque required to operate the hybrid vehicle is less than SP.”))
`
`Impermissibly adding limitations does not comport with the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation standard. In any event, a POSA would have understood that
`
`Severinsky ’970’s disclosure of running the engine only between 60-90% of MTO
`
`teaches that the engine is started and operated when the “RL” > “SP” and shut off
`
`when “RL” < SP. (Reply Decl., Ex. 1237, ¶¶10-16; see also Pet. at 22; Severinsky
`
`’970, Ex. 1205, at 17:44-55; 20:63-67.) Since Ford’s analysis shows that
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`Severinsky ’970 teaches a “comparison” of the torque required/RL to a setpoint
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`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
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`(SP), Paice’s proposed construction does not affect the obviousness analysis.
`
`C.
`
`“Abnormal and transient conditions”
`
`In its Institution Decision, the Board stated that “it is not necessary to
`
`expressly construe ‘abnormal and transient conditions’ beyond determining that
`
`such conditions encompass starting and stopping the engine, in comparison to
`
`other disclosed conditions of operating the engine.” (Decision at 9.)
`
`Paice argues that “abnormal and transient conditions” be construed as
`
`“‘starting and stopping of the engine and provision of torque to satisfy drivability
`
`or safety considerations,’ to make clear that it does not include ‘city traffic and
`
`reverse operation.’” (POR at 12-13, citing ’097 FH, Ex. 1210 at 238.) But Paice’s
`
`proposed claim construction does not make it clear that “abnormal and transient
`
`conditions” excludes “city traffic and reverse operation.” (Reply Decl., Ex. 1237,
`
`¶23.) Paice’s proposed claim construction merely adopts the Board’s construction,
`
`adds “and provision of torque” and then adds the later claim language “to satisfy
`
`drivability or safety considerations.” (POR at 12.)
`
`To argue for excluding “city traffic and reverse operation,” Paice argues for
`
`a prosecution disclaimer based on the prosecution history of the ’097 Patent. (POR
`
`at 12, 42.) However, for a prosecution disclaimer to arise, “the alleged disavowing
`
`actions or statements made during prosecution [must] be both clear and
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`unmistakable.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed.
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`Cir. 2003). But, the Board declined Paice’s proposed construction, stating: “We
`
`decline Paice’s invitation for the simple reason that abnormal and transient
`
`conditions, such as starting the engine, may very well occur in city traffic and
`
`reverse operation.” (Decision at 9; see also Reply Decl., Ex. 1237, ¶¶25-26.)
`
`Indeed, the prosecution history excerpt Paice cites supports the Board’s conclusion
`
`“that such [abnormal and transient] conditions encompass starting and stopping the
`
`engine, in comparison to other disclosed conditions of operating the engine.”
`
`(Decision at 9.)
`
`The “abnormal and transient conditions” referred to are such
`
`conditions as starting the engine, during which operation it must
`
`necessarily be operated at less than SP for a short time.
`
`(POR at 12, citing ’097 File History, Ex. 1210 at 238, emphasis added.)
`
`As explained below, Ford relies on Severinsky ’970’s disclosure of
`
`operating the engine “outside its most fuel efficient operating range”, i.e., when RL
`
`< SP, to meet the “abnormal and transient conditions” limitations. (Pet. at 49;
`
`Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205, 18:23-33: Stein Decl., Ex. 1202, ¶¶427-436.) This is
`
`consistent with the Board’s conclusion that “abnormal and transient conditions”
`
`encompass starting the engine. (See Decision at 9.)
`
`5
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
`
`
`III. Paice’s procedural arguments
`
`A.
`
`Ford’s Petition is not conclusory
`
`On pages 13-14, Paice makes a conclusory assertion that Ford did not
`
`provide adequate obviousness analysis. In particular, Paice asserts that Ford must
`
`“identify the differences between Severinsky [’970] and independent claim 21” to
`
`present an obviousness argument. (POR at 13.) Paice cites no case so holding. To
`
`the extent there are any differences between the prior art and the challenged claims,
`
`Ford ascertained them by providing limitation-by-limitation analysis of each
`
`challenged claim, including citations to the disclosure in the prior art reference that
`
`meets each limitation (see e.g., claims charts, Pet. at passim), and specific reasons
`
`of how and why to combine the references (Pet. at 52-55, 58-60) as appropriate, for
`
`all Grounds raised.
`
`B.
`
`Ford is not estopped from maintaining its challenges to
`claims 7, 17, 27, 37 and 38
`
`Paice argues that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), Ford’s petition should
`
`be dismissed with respect to claims previously challenged in IPR2014-00570 and
`
`IPR2014-01415. (POR at 15-16.) But, the present petition addresses the
`
`unpatentability of 5 additional instituted claims, 4 of which (i.e. claims 7, 17, 27
`
`and 37) were not challenged in IPR2014-00570 or IPR2014-01415. Claim 38 was
`
`challenged in IPR2014-00570, but it was denied institution. (See ’570 Final
`
`Decision, Ex. 1241 at 2.) Regardless, the Board may exercise its discretion in
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`maintaining this proceeding against the remaining claims. (See, e.g., ’1415 Final
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`Case No: IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0110IPR3
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`Decision, Ex. 1238 at 33, n.17.)
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`IV.
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`Issues raised for Grounds 1 and 2: Paice’s repeated arguments
`regarding “RL” and “SP,” and Paice’s new argument regarding
`“abnormal and transient conditions,” are not persuasive
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`A. As the Board has previously found, Severinsky ’970
`discloses “when” to operate the engine based on “RL”, i.e.,
`the “torque required to propel the vehicle”
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`Paice argues that “Severinsky [’970] determines when to use the internal
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`combustion engine based on the speed of the vehicle, in contrast to the ’097 patent,
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`which turns the engine on based on road load (claim 21) or the torque necessary to
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`operate the vehicle (claims 1 and 11).” (POR at 17.) Paice made this same
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`argument in IPR2014-01415 and the Board rejected it. (See ’1415 Final Decision,
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`Ex. 1238 at 20-24.)
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`As the Board found, “[a]lthough Severinsky describes the use of ‘speed’ as a
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`factor considered by the microprocessor, Severinsky makes clear that the
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`microprocessor also uses the vehicle’s ‘torque’ requirements in determining when
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`to run the engine.” (’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 20-21, citing Severinsky
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`’970, Ex. 1205, 17:11–15.) Severinsky ’970 does not use the term “road load”, but
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`describes HEV mode selection based on the “load imposed by the vehicle’s
`
`propulsion requirements” - which meets the Board’s construction of “road load” as
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`“the amount of instantaneous torque required for propulsion of the vehicle, be it
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`positive or negative.” (Pet. at 19, Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205, 17:11-15; Decision at
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`6.)
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`The record continues to support the Board’s decision in the related IPR. For
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`example Severinsky ’970 discloses that the “microprocessor 48” determines “the
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`load imposed by the vehicle’s propulsion requirements,” (i.e., “RL”) “at all times.”
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`(Pet. at 18-19; citing Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205, 17:11-15; Stein Decl., Ex. 1202,
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`¶¶142-153, 159.) Severinsky ’970 also discloses that the microprocessor uses the
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`vehicle’s torque requirements in determining when to run the engine:
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`[A]t all times the microprocessor 48 may determine the load (if
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`any) to be provided to the engine by the motor, responsive to
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`the load imposed by the vehicle’s propulsion requirements,
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`so that the engine 40 can be operated in its most fuel efficient
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`operating range.
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`(Pet. at 18 citing Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205, 17:11-15, emphasis added).
`
`B. As the Board has previously found, Severinsky ’970
`discloses a “setpoint”
`
`Paice argues that “Severinsky’s aspirational operating range of ‘60-90% of
`
`its maximum torque’ does not disclose a ‘60% of MTO’ setpoint.” (POR at 30.)
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`Paice similarly argues that “Ford’s identified ‘60% of MTO’ is merely the lower
`
`bound of the desired operating range or ‘sweet spot’ of the engine—not a
`
`setpoint.” (POR at 32-33.) Paice is incorrect; Severinsky ’970 teaches a “setpoint.”
`
`Indeed, the Board has finally determined that “Severinsky teaches that the
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`point at which the engine operates efficiently is based on a ‘torque’ value, stating
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`that the microprocessor runs the engine ‘only in the near vicinity of its most
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`efficient operational point, that is, such that it produces 60–90% of its maximum
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`torque whenever operated.’” (’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 20, emphasis in
`
`original.) Further, in IPR2014-00904 regarding the ’634 Patent, the Board finally
`
`determined that “Severinsky’s disclosure of an ‘operational point’ for the engine is
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`no different than the claimed ‘setpoint.’” (’904 Final Decision, Ex. 1242 at 15.)
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`The record continues to support the Board’s findings. For example,
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`Severinsky ’970 discloses that: (1) the microprocessor controls the engine to “run
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`only in the near vicinity of its most efficient operational point, that is, such that it
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`produces 60-90% of its maximum torque whenever operated;” and (2) operating
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`the motor “under other circumstances.” (Pet. at 23, emphasis added, citing
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`Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205, 7:8-16; 20:63-67; Stein Decl., Ex. 1202, ¶¶175-176.)
`
`The Board also found: “That Severinsky describes the ‘engine’s efficient
`
`operational point’ in terms similar to, if not the same as, the ‘setpoint’ in the ’097
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`patent, i.e., a percentage of maximum torque, runs counter to Paice’s argument that
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`Severinsky employs the engine based on speed alone.” (’1415 Final Decision, Ex.
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`1238 at 22, emphasis in original.)
`
`Paice also argues that Severinsky ’970’s disclosure of “potential output
`
`torques of the engine” is “unrelated to input torque requirements taught by the
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`’097 patent, including, for example, the instantaneous torque required to propel the
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`vehicle (i.e., road load).” (POR at 38, emphasis added.) Paice made this same
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`argument in IPR2014-01415, and the Board rejected it, finding that:
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`This argument fails for the simple reason that, like Severinsky, the
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`’097 patent itself expresses “road load” as a torque output, not an
`
`input. Notably, according to the ’097 patent, “[t]he road load is
`
`expressed as a function of the engine’s maximum torque output.” Ex.
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`1101, 37:57–58 (emphasis added); see also id. at 36:25–27 (“[t]he
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`road load is shown . . . as varying from 0 at the origin to 200% of the
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`engine’s maximum torque output”). Thus, we disagree with Paice’s
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`attempt to characterize the claimed “road load” as a torque “input”
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`when the ’097 patent itself expressly states otherwise.
`
`(’1415 Final Decision, Ex. 1238 at 25, emphasis in original.)
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`Accordingly, the Board should reject Paice’s argument again in this IPR for
`
`the same reasons, because it has not changed.
`
`C.
`
`Severinsky ’970 discloses the additional “abnormal and
`transient conditions” limitations of claims 7, 17, 27 and 37
`
`Paice argues that Severinsky ’970 cannot meet the “abnormal and transient
`
`conditions” limitations of claims 7, 17, 27, (“operating the engine at torque output
`
`levels less than SP under abnormal and transient conditions”) and claim 37
`
`(“wherein the controller is operable to start and operate the engine at torque
`
`output levels less than SP under abnormal and transient conditions”) because its
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`disclosure relates to “traffic operation” and Paice allegedly “explicitly disavowed
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`‘city traffic’ as not within the scope of ‘abnormal and transient conditions.’” (POR
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`Case No: IPR2015-00792
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`at 41-42.) The “abnormal and transient conditions” limitations were not addressed
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`in prior IPR decisions.
`
`As explained above in Section II.C, Paice’s alleged “disavowal” should be
`
`rejected because it is not “clear and unmistakable.” See Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at
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`1325–26. In its Institution Decision, the Board stated that Severinsky ’970’s
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`disclosure of operating “the engine to prevent the battery from discharging
`
`excessively during the time the engine is off because its output would be below the
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`setpoint of 60% MTO requires starting the engine.” (Decision at 15, emphasis
`
`added.) That is correct and meets the Board’s construction of “‘abnormal and
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`transient conditions’ as covering starting the engine.” (Decision at 15; see also
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`Stein Decl., Ex. 1202, ¶¶424-435.)
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`More specifically, Severinsky ’970 discloses operating the engine outside its
`
`most fuel efficient operating range (i.e., at torque output levels less than the SP
`
`(60% MTO)) on occasion: “it is preferable to use the engine somewhat
`
`inefficiently rather than to discharge the batteries excessively, which would
`
`substantially reduce the battery lifetime.” (Pet. at 49; Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205,
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`18:23-33; Stein Decl., Ex. 1202, ¶¶427-436.) A POSA would have understood that
`
`maintaining battery life in an HEV is both a drivability consideration and a safety
`
`consideration. (Pet. at 50, Stein Decl., Ex. 1202, ¶434.) Thus, Severinsky ’970’s
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`disclosure of operating the engine “outside its most fuel efficient operating range”,
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`i.e., when RL < SP, meets the Board’s construction that examples of “abnormal
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`and transient conditions” “encompass starting and stopping the engine, in
`
`comparison to other disclosed conditions of operating the engine.” (Pet. at 49-50;
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`Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1205, 18:23-33; Decision at 9.)
`
`D.
`
`Paice cannot avoid its admissions in the specification of the
`’097 Patent
`
`Paice states that “nowhere does the ’097 patent state that Severinsky uses
`
`road load or torque requirements to make decisions about when to employ the
`
`engine.” (POR at 43.) In fact, the ’097 Patent admits that “an important aspect of
`
`the invention of the [Severinsky] ’970 patent” is operating the engine “at relatively
`
`high torque output levels” and operating the motor “when less torque is required.”
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`(Pet. at 26-27; ’097 Patent, Ex. 1201, 24:47-59.) The ’097 Patent also admits that
`
`“[w]here the road load exceeds the engine's maximum torque . . . the traction
`
`motor (and possibly also the starting motor) are used to provide additional torque,
`
`as in the [Severinsky] ’970 patent and above.” (Pet. at 31; ’097 Patent, Ex. 1201,
`
`44:2-5, emphasis added.) These admissions are binding on Paice
`
`for
`
`determinations of both anticipation and obviousness. See, e.g., PharmaStem
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`Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Constant
`
`v. Advanced Micro–Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`
`Paice relies on Clearwater Systems Corp. v. Evapco, Inc., 394 Fed. Appx.
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`699 (Fed. Cir. 2010) for the proposition that “it is legally impermissible for Ford to
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`Case No: IPR2015-00792
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`rely on portions of the ’097 Patent as evidence of what is actually disclosed in
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`Severinsky [’970].” (POR at 45.) Paice’s characterization of Clearwater is
`
`incorrect. In Clearwater, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court that found
`
`inherency by anticipation at summary judgment. (Id.) The district court found that
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`the claimed method (in a ’739 Patent-in-suit) was anticipated by a prior art device
`
`(’267 Patent) based solely on disclosure in the ’739 Patent-in-suit stating that the
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`prior art device could be used to practice the claimed method. Clearwater Systems
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`Corp. v. Evapco, Inc., 596 F.Supp.2d 291, 313 (D. Conn. 2009). The District
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`Court’s decision was based on a claim chart that relied only on excerpts from the
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`patent-in-suit. Clearwater, 596 F.Supp.2d at 311-312. Here, inhe