`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`______________
`
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owners.
`
`______________
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 to Severinsky et al.
`IPR Case No. IPR2015-00606
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 311 ET SEQ. AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ET SEQ.
`
`OF CLAIMS 56-65, 68-77, 242-251, 268-277, 292, 293 AND 298
`
`OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,237,634
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`
`EXHIBIT LIST ..................................................................................................................... iii
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ........................................ 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`
`Real Party-In-Interest - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) ............................................ 2
`Related Matters - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) ....................................................... 3
`Lead and Back-Up Counsel Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3) ......................... 3
`Service Information Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4) ...................................... 4
`
`III. GROUNDS FOR STANDING – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a) ..................................... 4
`
`IV. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGE - 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) .................................. 4
`
`V.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) ....................................... 5
`
`VI.
`
`PRIORITY DATE OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ................................... 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`
`C.
`
`
`The ‘634 Patent Family ................................................................................... 7
`The Electrical Limitations in the Challenged Claims Are
`Unsupported Before April 2, 2001 ................................................................ 8
`1.
`The “At Least 2.5” Ratio Is Unsupported Before April 2,
`
`2001 ....................................................................................................... 9
`The “Maximum Voltage” Limitation Is Unsupported
`Before April 2, 2001 .......................................................................... 10
`The “Maximum Current” Limitation Is Unsupported
`Before April 2, 2001 .......................................................................... 11
`An Insolubly Vague Incorporation by Reference Has No
`Impact ............................................................................................................. 13
`
`2.
`
`
`3.
`
`
`VII. THE PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE RELEVANT
`FIELD AND THE RELEVANT TIMEFRAME ............................................... 15
`
`VIII. STATE OF THE ART ............................................................................................ 16
`
`IX. OVERVIEW OF THE ‘634 PATENT ................................................................. 18
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`
`Background .................................................................................................... 18
`Purported Invention ..................................................................................... 19
`1.
`The Claimed Control Methodology, HEV Architecture
`
`and General Electrical Characteristics are Old .............................. 19
`The Claimed Voltage to Current Ratio of “At Least 2.5”
`Is Arbitrary and Old .......................................................................... 20
`
`2.
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`
`
`3.
`
`
`The Maximum DC Voltage and Maximum Current
`Limitations Are Old ........................................................................... 21
`
`X. GROUND OF UNPATENTABILITY ............................................................... 21
`
`A.
`
`
`B.
`
`
`2.
`
`
`Claims 56-65, 68-77, 268-277, 292, 293, 303 and 305 Are
`Obvious Over the ‘455 PCT Publication In View of Severinsky
`‘970 .................................................................................................................. 21
`1.
`Non-Challenged Independent Base Claims .................................... 22
`
`a.
`Independent Claim 33 ........................................................... 22
`b.
`Independent Claim 241 ......................................................... 27
`c.
`Independent Claim 267 ......................................................... 28
`d.
`Independent Claim 1 .............................................................. 30
`Challenged Dependent Claims ......................................................... 34
`a.
`Dependent Claims 68, 242 and 268 ..................................... 35
`b.
`Dependent Claims 69, 243 and 269 ..................................... 38
`c.
`Dependent Claims 70, 244 and 270 ..................................... 39
`d.
`Dependent Claims 71, 245 and 271 ..................................... 39
`e.
`Dependent Claims 72, 246 and 272 ..................................... 40
`f.
`Dependent Claims 73, 247 and 273 ..................................... 41
`g.
`Dependent Claims 74, 248 and 274 ..................................... 44
`h.
`Dependent Claims 75, 249 and 275 ..................................... 45
`i.
`Dependent Claims 76, 250 and 276 ..................................... 46
`j.
`Dependent Claims 77, 251 and 277 ..................................... 47
`k.
`Dependent Claims 56-65 ....................................................... 48
`Challenged Independent Claims 292 and 298 (and
`Dependent Claim 293) ...................................................................... 50
`a.
`Independent Claim 292 ......................................................... 51
`b.
`Dependent Claim 293 ............................................................ 54
`c.
`Independent Claim 298 ......................................................... 55
`Rationale to Combine ................................................................................... 57
`
`3.
`
`
`XI. OBJECTIVE INDICIA OF NONOBVIOUSNESS ......................................... 59
`
`XII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 60
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Description
`
`Identifier
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`
`No.
`
`1151
`1152
`1153
`
`1154
`1155
`1156
`
`1157
`
`1158
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`PCT Publication No. WO00/015455
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970
`Ford’s letter to Paice dated September 22, 2014
`Paice, LLC et al. v. Ford Motor Co. 1:14-cv-00492
`
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-00568,
`Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2014) (Decision Denying
`Institution of Inter Partes Review)
`U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/100,095
`
`‘634 Patent
`Stein Decl.
`‘455 PCT
`Publication
`Severinsky ‘970
`Ford Letter
`MD Ct.
`Decision
`IPR2014-00568
`Decision
`
`‘095 Provisional
`Application
`‘296 Provisional
`Application
`‘088 CIP Patent
`‘866 CIP
`Application
`‘817
`Application
`‘743
`Application
`‘634 File
`History
`‘762
`Application
`IPR2014-00570
`Decision
`
`Yamaguchi
`Paper
`
`GE Final
`Report
`
`1159
`
`U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/122,296
`
`1160
`1161
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,554,088
`U.S. Application No. 09/822,866
`
`1162
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/264,817
`
`1163
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/392,743
`
`1164
`
`File History for U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`
`1165
`
`U.S. Application No. 11/229,762
`
`1166
`
`1167
`
`1168
`
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-005708,
`Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2014) (Decision Denying
`Institution of Inter Partes Review)
`Kozo Yamaguchi et al., Development of a New
`Hybrid System – Dual System, SAE Technical Paper
`960231 (February 1996).
`http://papers.sae.org/960231/
`General Electric Company, Corp. Research & Dev.,
`Near-Term Hybrid Vehicle Program, Final Report -
`
`iii
`
`

`

`
`
`Exhibit
`
`No.
`
`Description
`
`Identifier
`
`1169
`1170
`1171
`
`1172
`1173
`1174
`
`1175
`
`1176
`
`1177
`
`1178
`
`1179
`
`1180
`
`Phase 1 (October 1979).
`http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19800017707
`U.S. Patent No. 3,888,325
`U.S. Patent No. 4,335,429
`Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco. Inc., No. 2010-1348 (Fed.
`Cir. Opinion March 2, 2011)
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`U.S. Patent No. 913,846
`Michael Duoba, Ctr. for Transp. Research, Argonne
`Nat’l Lab., Challenges for the Vehicle Tester in
`Characterizing Hybrid Electric Vehicles, 7th CRC on
`Road Vehicle Emissions Workshop (April 1997).
`http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/516019
`Society of Automotive Engineers Special Publication,
`Technology for Electric and Hybrid Vehicles, SAE
`SP-1331 (February 1998)
`Catherine Anderson & Erin Pettit, The Effects of APU
`
`Characteristics on the Design of Hybrid Control
`
`Strategies for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE
`Technical Paper 950493 (1995).
`http://papers.sae.org/950493/
`L. E. Unnewehr et al., Hybrid Vehicle for Fuel
`Economy, SAE Technical Paper 760121 (1976).
`http://papers.sae.org/760121/
`Case No. IPR2014-00568, Paper 8, Patent Owner’s
`[Redacted] Preliminary Response to Petition for Inter
`Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 7,455,134 (July 11,
`2014)
`Performance Characterization Chevrolet S-10
`Electric, Panasonic Lead-Acid Battery, Southern
`California Edison Electrical Transportation Division
`(December 1999).
`http://avt.inel.gov/pdf/fsev/sce_rpt/s10pbareport.p
`df
`Tesla Motors Website,
`www.teslamotors.com/roadster/specs, retrieved
`October 31, 2014.
`
`Reinbeck
`Kawakatsu
`Cimline
`
`Dr. Stein CV
`Pieper
`Duoba
`
`SAE SP-1331
`
`Anderson
`
`Unnewehr
`
`IPR2014-00568
`Redacted PO
`Prelim.
`Response
`S10
`Performance
`Report
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Performance
`Specs
`
`iv
`
`

`

`
`
`Description
`
`Identifier
`
`GM Press Release, Corvette Stingray: 3.8 seconds
`from 0 to 60 mph, GM News Website,
`http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.
`html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2013/Jun/0620-
`corvette-performance.html (June 20, 2013), retrieved
`November 1, 2014.
`Gene Berdichevsky et al., The Tesla Roadster Battery
`System, Tesla Motors, Inc. (August 16, 2006).
`http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/referenc
`es/docs/tesla.pdf
`Will Dron, Roadster 2.5 Sport – Road Test, The
`Charging Point Website,
`http://www.thechargingpoint.com/manufacturers/te
`sla/roadster-2.5-sport-roadtest.html#roadTest (July
`18, 2011), retrieved November 1, 2014.
`U.S. Patent Application No. 10/382,577
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,209,672
`U.S. Patent No. 6,338,391
`Comparison of ‘455 PCT Publication and ‘634 Patent
`Descriptions
`
`GM Press
`Release
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Battery
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Road Test
`
`‘577
`Application
`‘672 Patent
`‘391 Patent
`‘455/‘634
`Description
`Comparison
`
`Exhibit
`
`No.
`
`1181
`
`1182
`
`1183
`
`1184
`
`1185
`1186
`1187
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner FORD MOTOR COMPANY (“Ford”) requests inter partes review
`
`of claims 56-65, 68-77, 242-251, 268-277, 292, 293 and 298 (collectively the
`
`“Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 to Severinsky et al. (“the ‘634
`
`Patent,” Ex. 1151), which is owned by PAICE, LLC et al. (“Paice”).
`
`The ‘634 Patent has 306 claims and is one of five patents Paice has asserted
`
`against Ford in litigation. Ford has asked Paice several times to limit the asserted
`
`claims to a reasonable number. (Ford Letter, Ex. 1155.) Paice has refused. Due to
`
`Ford’s one-year statutory limit and page constraints on IPR petitions, Ford is filing
`
`several IPRs to address the ‘634 Patent claims and is trying to group the claims in a
`
`logical fashion. This IPR focuses on claims reciting at least one of the following
`
`limitations: (1) “a ratio of maximum DC voltage. . . to [maximum] current
`
`supplied. . . is at least 2.5”; (2) “a maximum DC voltage supplied from said battery
`
`is at least approximately 500 volts” or “energy originating at the battery is supplied
`
`to the solid state inverter at a DC voltage having a peak of at least 500 volts”; and
`
`(3) “a maximum current supplied from said battery is less than approximately 150
`
`amperes” or “energy originating at the battery is supplied to the solid state inverter
`
`at a maximum current of no more than 150 amperes” (collectively, the “electrical
`
`limitations”).
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`As explained below, and in the Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein (“Stein
`
`Decl.,” Ex. 1152), the Challenged Claims of the ‘634 Patent are unpatentable over two
`
`prior art references having the same inventor as the ‘634 Patent. Because there is no
`
`disclosure of the claimed electrical limitations in the ancestors of the ‘634 Patent prior
`
`to April 2, 2001, the effective filing date of the Challenged Claims is April 2, 2001 and
`
`does not extend back to the earliest claimed priority date of September 14, 1998. As
`
`such, a PCT application, which published in March 2000 as WO00/15455 (“the ‘455
`
`PCT Publication,” Ex. 1153) is intervening art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
`
`As described below, the ‘455 PCT Publication discloses all of the limitations of
`
`the Challenged Claims, except the electrical limitations quoted above, and those
`
`limitations are described in U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 issued to Severinsky
`
`(“Severinsky ‘970,” Ex. 1154). The ‘455 PCT Publication expressly references
`
`Severinsky ‘970, which provides one of multiple reasons to combine the references,
`
`rendering the Challenged Claims obvious. Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in
`
`showing that at least one of the Challenged Claims is not patentable. Inter partes
`
`review of the ‘634 Patent should be instituted.
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.8
`
` Real Party-In-Interest - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1)
`A.
`
`Petitioner certifies that Ford Motor Company is the real party-in-interest.
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`
` Related Matters - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2)
`B.
`
`Petitioner identifies the following related judicial matters:
`
`1) Paice, LLC and The Abell Foundation, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, Case
`
`Number 1-14-cv-00492, filed February 19, 2014 in the District of Maryland, Baltimore
`
`Division. The ‘634 Patent and four other patents are asserted in this proceeding. The
`
`Maryland District Court issued an order 1) denying the Patent Owner’s motion for a
`
`preliminary injunction to enjoin Ford from filing Petitions concerning the patents-in-
`
`suit, and 2) staying the litigation pending IPRs of those patents. (MD Ct. Decision,
`
`Ex. 1156 at 1, 10-17, 30.)
`
`2) Paice LLC and The Abell Foundation, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, et
`
`al., Case Number 1:2012cv00499, filed on February 16, 2012 in the District of
`
`Maryland, Baltimore Division. The ‘634 Patent is being asserted in this proceeding.
`
`Petitioner has filed the following IPR petitions on the ‘634 Patent: IPR2014-
`
`00904 and IPR2014-01416. Petitioner has also filed IPRs directed to the related
`
`patents included in the above litigation proceedings – specifically, IPR2014-00568,
`
`IPR2014-00570, IPR2014-00571, IPR2014-00579, IPR2014-00852, IPR2014-00875,
`
`IPR2014-0884, and IPR2014-01415.
`
`
`C.
`
`Lead and Back-Up Counsel Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3)
`
`Ford appoints Frank A. Angileri (Reg. No. 36,733) of Brooks Kushman P.C. as
`
`lead counsel, and Sangeeta G. Shah (Reg. No. 38,614), Michael D. Cushion (Reg. No.
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`
`55,094), and Michael N. MacCallum (Reg. No. 63,018) of Brooks Kushman P.C., as
`
`well as Lissi Mojica (Reg. No. 63,421) and Kevin Greenleaf (Reg. No. 64,062) of
`
`Dentons US LLP, as back-up counsel. A Power of Attorney is filed concurrently
`
`herewith.
`
`
`D.
`
`Service Information Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4)
`
`Service of any documents to lead and back-up counsel can be made via hand-
`
`delivery to Brooks Kushman P.C., 1000 Town Center, Twenty-Second Floor,
`
`Southfield, Michigan 48075 and Dentons US LLP, 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite
`
`7800, Chicago, Illinois 60606-6306. Petitioner consents to service by email at
`
`FPGP0104IPR2@brookskushman.com and iptdocketchi@dentons.com.
`
`III. GROUNDS FOR STANDING – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a)
`
`Petitioner certifies that the ‘634 Patent is available for inter partes review and
`
`that the Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting inter partes review
`
`challenging the claims of the ‘634 Patent on the grounds in this Petition.
`
`IV. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGE - 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`
`Inter partes review of the ‘634 Patent’s Challenged Claims is requested on the
`
`ground listed below, based on the following prior art:
`
`1.
`
`The ‘455 PCT Publication (‘455 PCT Publ., Ex. 1153), which published
`
`on March 23, 2000, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). (See page 2; see also IPR
`
`2014-00568 Decision, Ex. 1157 at 10.) The ‘455 PCT Publication published more
`
`4
`
`

`

`
`
`than one year before the April 2, 2001 effective filing date of the Challenged Claims.
`
`(Id.; See also Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶156-165.)
`
`2. U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (Severinsky ‘970, Ex. 1154), which issued on
`
`September 6, 1994, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Although Severinsky ‘970
`
`and the ‘634 Patent share a common inventor, Severinsky ‘970 is not part of the ‘634
`
`Patent Family. (See also Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶166-167.)
`
`Ground of Unpatentability for U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`
`Ground
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Basis
`
`Challenged Claims
`
`1
`
`‘455 PCT Publication and
`
`§ 103
`
`56-65, 68-77, 242-251, 268-277,
`
`Severinsky ‘970
`
`292, 293 and 298
`
`
`
`V. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)
`
`Per the claim construction standard for an inter partes review, Petitioner bases
`
`this petition on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language. Solely
`
`for purposes of this proceeding, the following discussion proposes construing one
`
`claim term. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, Petitioner
`
`proposes that all claim terms should be entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning,
`
`with the exception of the “maximum DC voltage” limitation in claims 61, 73, 247
`
`and 273, which requires clarification based on the context of the claim. Other than
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`
`the claims, the term “maximum DC voltage” does not appear in the specification of
`
`the ‘634 Patent. 1
`
`Claims 61, 73, 247 and 273 each recite “a ratio of maximum DC voltage on
`
`the DC side of at least said first AC-DC converter coupled to said second electric
`
`motor to current supplied from said battery to at least said first AC-DC converter,
`
`when maximum current is so supplied, is at least 2.5.”
`
`Because the claim addresses “a ratio of maximum DC voltage . . . to current
`
`supplied . . . when maximum current is so supplied,” the claimed “maximum DC
`
`voltage” is a voltage under load value as opposed to a nominal, open-circuit voltage.
`
`This construction is also consistent with the ‘634 specification, which distinguishes a
`
`nominal voltage from a voltage under load, and then uses the voltage under load
`
`values for the ratio calculations. (‘634 Patent, Ex. 1151, 50:51-65 and 51:13-26; Stein
`
`Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶95-99.) Accordingly, under the broadest reasonable construction
`
`standard, “maximum DC voltage” should be construed to mean “maximum DC
`
`voltage under load.” This is also consistent with the Board’s determination in IPR
`
`2014-00568. (IPR2014-00568 Decision, Ex. 1157 at 7.)
`
`
`
` 1
`
` In this Petition, quoted claim language is italicized for ease of reference. Petitioner
`
`will occasionally add boldface or underlining to certain language for emphasis.
`
`6
`
`

`

`
`
`VI. PRIORITY DATE OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`
` The ‘634 Patent Family
`A.
`
`The ‘634 Patent is a divisional in an extensive chain of filings that claims
`
`priority to two separate provisional applications–Provisional Appl. No. 60/100,095
`
`(“the ‘095 Provisional Application,” Ex. 1158), filed September 14, 1998, and
`
`Provisional Appl. No. 60/122,296 (“the ‘296 Provisional Application,” Ex. 1159),
`
`filed March 1, 1999. The diagram below shows the ‘634 Patent (highlighted in green),
`
`its ancestors, and other relevant family members.
`
`
`
`Significant to this Petition, the ‘634 Patent’s priority claim extends through,
`
`among other applications, continuation-in-part (“CIP”) U.S. Patent No. 6,554,088
`
`(“the ‘088 CIP Patent,” Ex. 1160 (highlighted in yellow)), which issued from CIP
`
`Application No. 09/822,866 (“the ‘866 CIP Application,” Ex. 1161). The ‘866 CIP
`
`Application is a CIP of two applications, U.S. Application No. 09/264,817 (“the ‘817
`
`Application,” Ex. 1162) and U.S. Application No. 09/392,743
`
`(“the
`
`‘743
`
`Application,” Ex. 1163). (See Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶101-108.)
`
`7
`
`

`

`
`
`
`B.
`
`The Electrical Limitations in the Challenged Claims
`
`Are Unsupported Before April 2, 2001
`
`The electrical limitations are disclosed for the first time in the ‘866 CIP
`
`Application under a section entitled “Further Improvements According to the
`
`Continuation-in-Part” -- a section that includes new matter not disclosed in either
`
`of the ‘866 CIP Application’s parents, the ‘817 and ‘743 Applications. (‘866 CIP
`
`Application, Ex. 1161 at 89:18; Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶100.)
`
`Per Patentee’s own admission, these electrical limitations are new matter.
`
`During prosecution of the ‘634 Patent, Patentee asserted that new claims 76-85 “have
`
`been added reciting specifics of the preferred ranges of voltage and current, and their
`
`ratio.” (‘634 File History, Ex. 1164 at 256-257 and 311.) The Patentee further stated
`
`that support for these claims is found in “pages 89-91 of the application text,” i.e., the
`
`CIP “Further Improvements” section. (‘634 File History, Ex. 1164 at 94-96, 311; ‘762
`
`Application, Ex. 1165 at 88-90; see also Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶109-113.)
`
`The determination of a priority date for claims in a CIP application depends on
`
`when the claimed subject matter first appeared in the chain of patent disclosures.
`
`Augustine v. Gaymar, 181 F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The test for whether a
`
`priority application supports later claimed limitations is whether the disclosure of the
`
`priority application reasonably conveys that the inventor had possession of the later
`
`claimed subject matter at the time that the priority application was filed. Augustine,
`
`181 F.3d at 1302 (emphasis added). A description that merely renders the invention
`
`8
`
`

`

`
`
`obvious does not satisfy the requirement of adequate support for the claimed
`
`invention of the later filed claims. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
`
`1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, the priority application itself must describe the
`
`invention. PowerOasis v. T-Mobile, 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`
`
` The “At Least 2.5” Ratio Is Unsupported Before 1.
`April 2, 2001
`
`Claims 56-68, 61-65, 68-70, 73-77, 242-244, 247-251, 268-270 and 273-277 of
`
`the ‘634 Patent include a “ratio of maximum DC voltage. . . to [maximum] current
`
`supplied” (the “maximum voltage-to-current ratio”) of “at least 2.5.” This limitation
`
`is not supported by the pre-‘866 CIP Application filings. The “at least 2.5” maximum
`
`voltage-to-current ratio is disclosed for the first time in the “Further Improvements
`
`According to the Continuation-in-Part” section of the ‘866 CIP Application. (Stein
`
`Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶114-121.) Prior to the ‘866 CIP Application, there is no suggestion
`
`that the ratio of maximum voltage-to-current supplied is a relevant parameter, let
`
`alone that the ratio should be “at least 2.5.” (Id. at ¶¶122-129.) The ‘817 Application’s
`
`vague preference for “relatively high voltage and relatively low current” is insufficient
`
`to lead a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) to the “at least 2.5” ratio. (See
`
`‘817 Application, Ex. 1162 at 20:1-4; Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶122 and 129.) Such
`
`imprecise language cannot constitute a defined genus. MPEP §2163; In re Lukach,
`
`442 F.2d 967, 969 (CCPA 1971).
`
`9
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`
`
`As the filings prior to the ‘866 CIP Application fail to reasonably convey to a
`
`POSA that the inventor had possession of the “at least 2.5” maximum voltage-to-
`
`current ratio, the above-identified claims are entitled to an April 2, 2001 priority date
`
`– the filing date of the ‘866 CIP Application. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`
`598 F.3d 1336, 135 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). This is consistent with the Board’s
`
`determination in IPR2014-00568. (IPR2014-00568 Decision, Ex. 1157 at 10.)
`
`
`
` The “Maximum Voltage” Limitation Is 2.
`Unsupported Before April 2, 2001
`
`Claims 59, 71, 245 and 271 of the ‘634 Patent recite “a maximum DC voltage
`
`is at least approximately 500 volts.” Claim 292 similarly recites “wherein energy
`
`originating at the battery is supplied to the solid state inverter at a DC voltage
`
`having a peak of at least 500 volts.” For ease of reference, both limitations will be
`
`referenced as the “maximum voltage” limitation. This limitation is not supported by
`
`the pre-‘866 CIP Application filings.
`
`Like the “at least 2.5” maximum voltage-to-current ratio limitation, the
`
`maximum voltage limitation is disclosed for the first time in the ‘866 CIP Application.
`
`(Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶139-142.) In each of the ‘817 and ‘743 Applications, a single
`
`open-circuit voltage is provided, 768 volts and 800 volts respectively, with no hint of a
`
`maximum voltage threshold or a broader range. (‘817 Application, Ex. 1162 at 50:34-
`
`35; ‘743 Application, Ex. 1163 at 34:25-28). Thus, nothing in the earliest priority
`
`10
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`

`

`
`
`filings conveys that the inventor had possession of the maximum voltage limitation.
`
`(Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶130-138 and 143.)
`
`The maximum voltage limitation is new matter introduced in the ‘866 CIP
`
`Application under the “Further Improvements According to the Continuation-in-
`
`Part” section. In that CIP section, Patentee introduces the idea that high voltages of
`
`500v for a 3000lb vehicle and 800v for a larger vehicle are required. (‘866 CIP
`
`Application, Ex. 1161 at 89:23-90:28, emphasis added.)
`
`From the lack of description of the “at least 500 volts” range and Patentee’s
`
`own admission that the maximum voltage limitation is new matter it is clear that the
`
`above-identified claims of the ‘634 Patent are entitled to a priority date no earlier than
`
`the filing date of the ‘866 CIP Application - April 2, 2001. This is consistent with the
`
`Board’s determination in IPR2014-00570. (IPR 2014-00570 Decision, Ex. 1166 at 7.)
`
`
`
` The “Maximum Current” Limitation Is 3.
`Unsupported Before April 2, 2001
`
`Claims 60, 72, 246 and 272 of the ‘634 Patent recite “maximum current. . . is
`
`less than approximately 150 amperes.” Claim 298 similarly recites “wherein energy
`
`originating at the battery is supplied to the solid state inverter at a maximum current
`
`of no more than 150 amperes.” For ease of reference, both limitations will be
`
`referred to as the “maximum current” limitation. This limitation is not supported by
`
`the pre-‘866 CIP Application filings.
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`11
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`

`
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`Of the pre-‘866 CIP Application filings, only the ‘817 Application includes any
`
`description of current conditions. The ‘817 Application states that current through
`
`the required components “should be limited to 30-50 amperes.” (‘817 Application,
`
`Ex. 1162 at 50:22-28.) Nothing in the earliest priority filings conveys that the
`
`inventor had possession of a maximum current limit of “less than approximately 150
`
`amperes.” (Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶144-149.)
`
` Like the other electrical limitations, by Patentee’s own admission, the
`
`maximum current limitation is new matter disclosed for the first time in the “Further
`
`Improvements” section of the ‘866 CIP Application. (Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶150-
`
`152.) In that CIP section, Patentee introduces the idea that, for a relatively heavy
`
`vehicle, a maximum current of 153 amperes should be produced. (‘866 CIP
`
`Application, Ex. 1161 at 90:15-28.) Patentee then relies on this CIP section as
`
`support for its “less than approximately 150 amperes” claim amendment. (‘634 File
`
`History, Ex.1164 at 94-96, 256, 311; Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶151.) The lack of
`
`disclosure of the maximum current limitation together with Patentee’s own “new
`
`matter” admission make it clear that the above-identified claims are entitled to a
`
`priority date no earlier than the filing date of the ‘866 CIP Application -- April 2,
`
`2001.
`
`12
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`

`

`
`
` An Insolubly Vague Incorporation by Reference Has
`C.
`No Impact
`
`Despite the lack of support for the electrical limitations, and Patentee’s
`
`admissions to that effect, Patentee may argue that an incorporation by reference
`
`clause allows it to reach back selectively into Severinsky ‘970 to fill the void. However,
`
`the incorporation by reference clause is fatally ambiguous and regardless does not fill
`
`the void.
`
`First, to incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify
`
`with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates, “using the one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art standard.” Zenon Environmental, Inc. v. United States Filter
`
`Corp., 506 F.3rd 1370, 1378-9 (Fed. Cir. 2007, emphasis added).
`
`The relevant language in the ‘634 Patent, which is included in each ancestor
`
`application, states:
`
`[1] This application discloses a number of improvements over and
`
`enhancements to the hybrid vehicles disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,343,970
`
`(‘the ‘970 Patent’), to one of the present inventors, which is incorporated
`
`herein by this reference. [2] Where differences are not mentioned, it
`
`is to be understood that the specifics of the vehicle design shown in the
`
`‘970 Patent are, applicable to the vehicles shown herein as well.
`
`(‘634 Patent, Ex. 1151, 10:40-47, reference numerals and emphasis added.)
`
`This seemingly inconsistent, negative provision fails to describe with detailed
`
`particularity the scope of the incorporation. To give meaning to the second, more
`
`13
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`

`

`
`
`specific clause, the incorporation must be limited to exclude any “differences”
`
`between Severinsky ‘970 and the ‘634 Patent. Because the term “differences” is not
`
`explained, it is impossible for one skilled in the art to ascertain the scope of the
`
`incorporation. (Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶¶153-154.) An insolubly ambiguous
`
`incorporation clause is afforded no weight. Hollmer v. Harari, 681 F.3d 1351, 1358
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Second, even if the entire Severinsky ‘970 patent were incorporated into the
`
`ancestor applications of the ‘634 Patent, written description support for the electrical
`
`current ratio is still lacking. Nothing in Severinsky ‘970 teaches the claimed ratio
`
`boundary of “at least 2.5.” (Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶155.) On the contrary, if a ratio is
`
`calculated from the single set of maximum voltage and maximum current values
`
`supplied in Severinsky ‘970, 1400 volts and 50 amperes respectively, that ratio would
`
`be 28:1, which is an order of magnitude from 2.5:1. (Id.) Severinsky ‘970 simply lacks
`
`the disclosure required to support the claimed ratio’s lower limit of 2.5, not to
`
`mention a sufficient number of embodiments to support an unbounded range. Ariad
`
`Pharm. 598 F. 3d at 1351; In re Wertheim 541 F. 2d 257, 263–264 (CCPA 1976).
`
`Likewise, the Severinsky ‘970 disclosure that “current should be less than 75 amperes
`
`and is preferably in the 30-50 ampere range” (Severinsky ‘970, Ex. 1154, 19:39-49)
`
`fails to support the claimed maximum current upper limit of “150 amperes.” Finally,
`
`while Severinsky ‘970 teaches that typical maximum voltages are “between 500 and
`
`14
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`

`

`
`
`1500 volts” (Id.), these voltages values do not support an unbounded range, as
`
`required by the claimed “at least approximately 500 volts” limitation. Further,
`
`Severinsky ‘970 does not state that these voltages values are under load.
`
`Finally, by Patentee’s own admission, the electrical limitations were deemed
`
`“Further Improvements” in the ‘866 CIP Application, filed more than eight years
`
`after the Severinsky ‘970 filing date. (Stein Decl., Ex. 1152, ¶113.)
`
`In sum, under any set of arguments, the Challenged Claims are entitled to a
`
`priority date no earlier than April 2, 2001, i.e., the filing date of the ‘866 CIP
`
`Application.
`
`VII. THE PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE RELEVANT
`FIELD AND THE RELEVANT TIMEFRAME
`
`The relevant field for purposes of the ‘634 Patent is systems, methods and
`
`apparatuses for controlling and operating a hybrid electric vehicle (“HEV”), and
`
`methods for improving fuel economy and reducing emissions. (‘634 Patent, Ex. 1151,
`
`col. 1:21-29 (“Field of the Invention”).) Within a given field, the level of ordinary skill
`
`in the art is evidenced by the prior art references of record. See In re GPAC Inc., 57
`
`F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (determining that the Board did not err in adopting
`
`the approach that the level of skill in the art was best determi