throbber
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`––––––––––
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`––––––––––
`
`MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`JOHN D’AGOSTINO
`Patent Owner
`
`––––––––––
`
`Case IPR2014-00544
`(Patent 7,840,486)
`
`Title: System and Method for Performing Secure Credit Card Purchases
`
`
`
`––––––––––
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`
`Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Claim Construction ...................................................................................... 1
`
`Cohen Discloses a Payment Category Including at Least “Limiting
`Purchases to a Single Merchant...Prior to any Particular Merchant Being
`Identified” ..................................................................................................... 5
`
`Cohen Discloses Designating a Payment Category Before Generating the
`Transaction code .......................................................................................... 9
`
`Conclusion ..................................................................................................13
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`
`
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`- i -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`PETITIONER’S UPDATED LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`Description
`
`Exhibit 1001 U.S. Patent No. 7,840,486
`
`Exhibit 1002 File History for U.S. Patent No. 7,840,486
`
`Exhibit 1003 File History for U.S. Reexamination No. 90/012,517
`
`Exhibit 1004 U.S. Patent No. 6,422,462 (“Cohen”)
`
`Exhibit 1005 U.S. Patent No. 6,636,833 (“Flitcroft”)
`
`Exhibit 1006 U.S. Patent No. 5,826,243 (“Musmanno”)
`
`Exhibit 1007 Complaint in D’Agostino v. MasterCard, Inc. et al. (13-cv-0738)
`
`Exhibit 1008 Declaration of Jack D. Grimes, Ph.D.
`
`Exhibit 1009 Excerpts from Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary,
`Second Edition
`
`Exhibit 1010 U.S. Patent No. 6,064,987 (“Walker”)
`
`Exhibit 1011 U.S. Patent No. 5,283,829 (“Anderson”)
`
`Exhibit 1012
`
`ISO 8583 Financial Transaction Card Originated Messages –
`Interchange Message Specifications (1992) (“ISO 8583”)
`
`Exhibit 1013 File History for U.S. Patent No. 8,036,988
`
`Exhibit 1014 Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB”) 3/7/14 CBM Decision
`for U.S. Patent No. 8,036,988
`
`Exhibit 1015 Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB”) 3/7/14 CBM Decision
`for U.S. Patent No. 7,840,486
`
`
`
`
`- ii -
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`Exhibit 1016 Patent Owner’s 12/24/13 Preliminary Response to Petitioner’s
`Request for CBM Patent Review of the ‘486 Patent
`
`Exhibit 1017 U.S. Provisional App. No. 60/079,884 (“’884 Provisional)
`
`Exhibit 1018 U.S. Provisional App. No. 60/099,614 (“’614 Provisional)
`
`Exhibit 1019 U.S. Provisional App. No. 60/098,175 (“’175 Provisional)
`
`Exhibit 1020 U.S. Provisional App. No. 60/092,500 (“’500 Provisional)
`
`- iii -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Patent Owner’s Response attempts to distinguish the claims of the ‘486
`
`patent from Cohen by presenting two principal arguments. Patent Owner contends
`
`that Cohen does not disclose: (1) a payment category that limits purchases to a
`
`single merchant prior
`
`to
`
`the merchant being
`
`identified;
`
`and
`
`(2)
`
`designating/selecting a payment category before generating the transaction code.
`
`Response at 1-2,18, 28. Patent Owner’s arguments, however, are premised on
`
`claim constructions already rejected by the Board in its Decision to Institute
`
`(“ID”). ID at 6-8. Because Cohen explicitly discloses each of the limitations at
`
`issue, as properly construed by the Board, all claims of the ’486 patent are
`
`unpatentable and should be canceled.
`
`II. Claim Construction
`
`Patent Owner and its declarant1 premise their arguments on flawed claim
`
`constructions that are divorced from the broadest reasonable interpretation standard
`
`applicable to this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
`
`
`1 Edward L. Gussin’s testimony should be given no weight because his opinions
`
`are based on flawed claim constructions previously rejected by the Board, and
`
`because he lacks the minimum qualifications that he concedes are required of a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2007 ¶ 30; Ex. 1008 ¶ 18.
`
`
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`- 1 -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`Regarding “generating a transaction code,” Patent Owner argues that this
`
`term must be read to require that the “transaction code” be “indicative” of not just
`
`“a specific credit card account” but also “a payment category.” Response at 4-8.
`
`As the Board found, however, this may be a preferred embodiment, but it is
`
`certainly not required. ID at 6. Patent Owner’s argument that the Board’s
`
`construction
`
`is
`
`incorrect because
`
`it purportedly “excludes” a preferred
`
`embodiment” (pp. 4,8) is meritless. The Board’s construction properly includes
`
`within the scope of the claim the embodiment where the “transaction code” is
`
`indicative of a payment category. Thus, this embodiment is not “exclud[ed]” at all.
`
`Claim differentiation also counsels against Patent Owner’s construction requiring
`
`indication of a payment category. Claim 8, for example, would be superfluous if
`
`Patent Owner’s construction were adopted.
`
`Patent Owner’s additional argument that this term should be broadened to
`
`cover either a “credit card account or a debit card account” (pp. 5-6) is both
`
`irrelevant and meritless. First, Patent Owner does not explain how this revised
`
`construction would alter the outcome in this proceeding. Second, the argument is
`
`belied by the claims themselves, all of which are expressly limited to methods for
`
`“secure credit card purchases.” Ex. 1001 (emphasis supplied).
`
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “defining at least one payment
`
`category” is also flawed as it improperly avoids giving any meaning to the term
`
`
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`- 2 -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`“payment category,” instead merely repeating that disputed term in its proposed
`
`construction. Response at 9-11. Moreover, Patent Owner’s construction, which
`
`requires “specifying the limit of a payment category,” fails to apply the broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation standard. Nothing in the claim or specification requires
`
`that a payment category necessarily include “the limit” applicable to that category.
`
`Similarly, the Patent Owner’s argument regarding “particular merchant” is
`
`unfounded. Response at 11-13. The Board correctly found this term to mean “the
`
`merchant to whom the customer discloses the transaction code” and/or “the
`
`merchant with whom the customer is transacting.” ID at 8. The argument the
`
`Patent Owner now makes in support of its construction (i.e., that the “particular
`
`merchant” is merely one with whom a customer is able to engage in “a” purchase
`
`transaction and not necessarily “the” merchant with whom the customer is
`
`transacting, Response at 11-12) is unreasonable, at least because the Patent Owner
`
`argued the exact opposite to obtain allowance during the ex parte prosecution of
`
`the parent ‘486 Patent. See Ex. 1013 p. 187 (where the Patent Owner distinguished
`
`the prior art for failing to tie the transaction to the code, contending that the prior
`
`art is “not directed towards generating a temporary account number on a
`
`transactional basis,” but rather uses merchant type category codes and approved
`
`vendor lists having pre-identified merchants); Ex. 1008 p.14, n.3; Petition at 10.
`
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`- 3 -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`Additionally, the Patent Owner falsely states that “Petitioner’s expert
`
`agrees” with Patent Owner’s construction. Response at 11-12. To the contrary,
`
`Petitioner’s expert’s construction calls for “a specific merchant with whom a
`
`customer can engage in the purchase transaction” -- not “a” purchase transaction,
`
`as proposed by the Patent Owner. Ex. 1008 ¶ 23. Although only a word, the
`
`difference is immense. Under Patent Owner’s construction, the “particular
`
`merchant” could be any merchant potentially involved in any transaction --
`
`untethered to the “transactions” explicitly mentioned in the clause just preceding
`
`“particular merchant.” In context, the phrase “particular merchant” must reference
`
`“the” merchant with whom the customer is transacting -- not any merchant with
`
`whom the customer could transact.2 See Ex. 1008 ¶ 26.
`
`The Patent Owner further spends time attacking the Board’s construction of
`
`the “single merchant limitation.” Response at 13-16. These arguments lack
`
`substance. The Board interpreted this phrase as “any group, category, or type of
`
`
`2 Patent Owner’s reliance on claim differentiation is misplaced (Response at 13).
`
`None of the independent claims require the merchant ever be identified. Instead,
`
`they merely require a limitation to be included in a payment category “prior to any
`
`particular merchant being identified.” Moreover, the dependent claims include
`
`particular timing limitations related to when during transaction processing the
`
`merchant is identified. Thus, those claims are not superfluous.
`
`
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`- 4 -
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`merchant is included in the payment category prior to the customer selecting a
`
`particular merchant for a transaction.” ID at 8. The Board, however, qualified this
`
`construction in its IPR2014-00543 Institution Decision (“Companion Institution”)
`
`regarding the ‘988 patent, p. 10, noting that the “single merchant” allows “for only
`
`one merchant.” Id. at 10. The Patent Owner ignores this clarifying construction,
`
`and interprets the Board’s construction of “said single merchant limitation” to be
`
`“any one group, type, or category of merchant.” Response at 13. But this is
`
`neither reasonable nor correct, as the Board has already explained in its
`
`Companion Institution, correctly construing this phrase as “for only one
`
`merchant.”
`
`In view of the foregoing, Patent Owner’s arguments regarding patentability
`
`also fail, as explained below.
`
`III. Cohen Discloses a Payment Category Including at Least “Limiting
`Purchases to a Single Merchant...Prior to any Particular Merchant
`Being Identified”
`
`In connection with claims 1-15 and 22-30, and limiting “purchases” or a
`
`“purchase” to a single merchant “prior to any particular merchant being
`
`identified,” Patent Owner argues (1) that Petitioner relies on Cohen’s disclosure of
`
`single-use cards (at 19); (2) that Cohen’s disclosure of single-use cards does “not
`
`meet the disputed claim limitation because a single-use card cannot be used to
`
`make multiple purchases as required by the claims” (at 19); and (3) that this claim
`
`limitation “includes making more than one purchase” (at 19). Patent Owner also
`
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`- 5 -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`generally argues that the “single merchant limitation” is not disclosed in Cohen.
`
`Response at 20-27.
`
`Patent Owner is wrong on all counts. First, Patent Owner assumes
`
`incorrectly that this limitation requires “multiple purchases” with a single
`
`merchant. But, the surrounding claim text is not restricted to multiple purchases or
`
`transactions. Instead, each of the independent claims at issue (1, 24, 25 and 29)
`
`specifies as follows, respectively: “limiting purchases to a single merchant for at
`
`least one transaction;” “limiting purchases to a single merchant;” “limits a nature,
`
`of a series of subsequent purchases to a single merchant;” and “limits a nature of a
`
`subsequent purchase to a single merchant.” Thus, under the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation standard, the claims encompass conducting at least one purchase
`
`with a single merchant. They could also encompass multiple purchases at a single
`
`merchant, but that is not required. Had the Patent Owner desired to restrict its
`
`claims to only multiple purchases, it should have sought to do so by amendment.
`
`Second, even if, as Patent Owner contends, the claim requires multiple
`
`purchases with a single merchant, Cohen discloses this feature. Ex. 1004 at 2:35-
`
`43; 8:25-39 (“The card could be valid only for purchases on that particular day, to
`
`a certain designated purchase limit, and even, if desired only in a certain store, or
`
`group of stores or types of stores (e.g. clothing stores...); “any of [these] features...
`
`can also be combined.”) Id. 8:35-36 (emphasis supplied).
`
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`- 6 -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`The fact that Cohen also discloses a single-use card that can be used for a
`
`single purchase does not alter this conclusion. Cf. Response at 19. As disclosed in
`
`Cohen: “a card [could be used] in any computer store which is good for a total
`
`purchase of up to, for example, $2000 in value.” Id. at 8:38-40 (emphasis added).
`
`This portion of Cohen alone meets the Patent Owner’s narrow construction
`
`(Response at 20, 22-23) as it recites the use of a payment category comprising an
`
`unidentified “computer store” (singular, not plural) or, in other words, a “single
`
`merchant” allowing for one or multiple purchases or transactions, over any time
`
`period, up to a certain value. This is exactly what Patent Owner says is required by
`
`this limitation, and is exactly what is disclosed in Cohen -- as the Board previously
`
`found. ID at 12.
`
`Patent Owner further argues that Cohen’s disclosure does not satisfy the
`
`claims’ limits to a “single merchant” or designation of a payment category “prior
`
`to any particular merchant being identified.” Response at 21-26. Patent Owner
`
`also cites the Central Reexamination Unit’s (“CRU’s”) statement that “Cohen does
`
`not disclose a single merchant being included in a payment category prior to any
`
`particular merchant being identified.” Response at 27. Both the Patent Owner and
`
`the CRU misapply the teachings of Cohen.
`
`Applying this Board’s proper construction of the “single merchant
`
`limitation” (i.e., “only one merchant is included in the payment category prior to
`
`
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`the customer selecting that particular merchant for a transaction”), or even using
`
`the Patent Owner’s construction (“including the limit in the payment category that
`
`limits transactions to a single merchant before any specific merchant is identified
`
`as the single merchant,” Response at 17), Cohen anticipates.
`
`More specifically, Cohen explicitly discloses a payment card system having
`
`“customized or limited use” credit cards. Ex. 1004, 2:55-57. These cards, in one
`
`example, “could be valid only for purchase...only in a certain store, or group of
`
`stores or type of stores (e.g., clothing stores)...” Id. 8:44-46. Or, the card could be
`
`used “in any computer store” (singular, not plural, and not an “identified” store).
`
`Id. 8:37-39. These instances alone demonstrate a payment category limited to one
`
`(i.e. a single) merchant (e.g., a certain store, type of store, clothing store or “any”
`
`unnamed computer store), in each case the name of the store being unidentified
`
`until the card is later used at the store itself. Accordingly, Cohen discloses the
`
`“single merchant limitation.”
`
`To support its flawed argument, Patent Owner resorts to selectively quoting
`
`Dr. Grimes in an effort to convince the Board that Dr. Grimes “concedes that a
`
`merchant type limit…does not satisfy the disputed claim limitation.” Response at
`
`22. In particular, Patent Owner quotes the following from Dr. Grimes: “pre-
`
`identifying a merchant by an MCC code is insufficient to satisfy the element ‘prior
`
`to any particular merchant being identified.’” Id. But, as the remainder of the
`
`
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`- 8 -
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`sentence (left out by Patent Owner) makes clear, Dr. Grimes is not relying on “pre-
`
`identifying” a merchant to satisfy the claim element. Instead, as Dr. Grimes
`
`correctly states in the rest of that sentence: “the claimed identification must be
`
`related to the transactions in the payment category.” Ex. 1008, p. 14, n.3. Like Dr.
`
`Grimes, Petitioner relies on Cohen’s disclosure of identifying the merchant at the
`
`time of the transaction as satisfying the claim element, not any “pre-identification,”
`
`as the Board has recognized. (Companion Institution at 15) (“the user
`
`subsequently identifies a particular merchant”) (emphasis added).
`
`Accordingly, Patent Owner’s arguments that in Cohen, merchants must be
`
`pre-identified “in order to limit a credit card’s use to a group of stores, that group
`
`must already exist” (e.g. Response at 22-26) are irrelevant. These arguments
`
`confuse any pre-identification (which, as Dr. Grimes has noted, was disclaimed
`
`during ex parte prosecution) with the claimed identification that takes place in the
`
`course of carrying out the transaction that is subject to the limit. Whether
`
`merchants have been pre-identified as being within a particular class of merchants,
`
`such as clothing stores, is simply irrelevant to the claims. Accordingly, Cohen
`
`anticipates.
`
`IV. Cohen Discloses Designating a Payment Category Before Generating
`the Transaction code
`
`Patent Owner argues that the claims require “designating/selecting a
`
`payment category that places limitations on a transaction code before the
`
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`- 9 -
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`transaction code is generated.”3 Response at 28-32 (emphasis added). Petitioner
`
`disagrees and respectfully submits that designating/selecting a payment category
`
`need not take place before the transaction code is generated. Indeed, nothing in the
`
`patent’s specification requires such a narrow reading, and the doctrine of claim
`
`differentiation supports a broader reading, not requiring the limitations at issue to
`
`proceed in sequence.
`
`For instance, claim 1 calls for “defining a payment category,” and separately
`
`“designating said payment category thereby designating at least that a transaction
`
`code … can be used by only one merchant,” and then separately “generating a
`
`transaction code” -- and claim 2 requires that “the step of designating said single
`
`merchant” take place “subsequent to generating the transaction code.” (Emphasis
`
`added). Claim 2’s “subsequent” requirement would not make sense if claim 1
`
`required just the opposite, as seemingly urged by the Patent Owner. Consequently,
`
`claim 1 does not require the designating/selecting step before the transaction code
`
`is generated. If the inventor had wanted to claim a particular sequence in Claim 1
`
`he would have explicitly done so, as he did in Claim 2.
`
`
`3 The Board construed “generating a transaction code” to mean “creating or
`
`producing a code that is usable as a substitute for a credit card number in a
`
`purchase transaction, the transaction code is pre-coded to be indicative of a specific
`
`credit card account.” ID at 6.
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`- 10 -
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`Nonetheless, Patent Owner then argues that Cohen does not disclose these
`
`two steps in the order it says the claims require. Patent Owner’s argument is
`
`without merit, even if the claims were to be read to require that the limitations be
`
`placed on a transaction code before the code were generated.
`
`Patent Owner cites to one embodiment in Cohen where the payment
`
`category is defined after the transaction code is generated. (Response at 43; Ex.
`
`1004 (Cohen) at 9:13-23) This is the same embodiment cited by the CRU in
`
`issuing the Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certification for the
`
`‘988 patent (‘988 NIIRC at 2-3). Both the Patent Owner and the CRU, however,
`
`misinterpret and/or misunderstand (or ignore) the explicit additional disclosures in
`
`Cohen defining a payment category before generating the transaction code. See,
`
`e.g., Cohen at 3:40-55, 56-67.
`
`More specifically, Patent Owner argues that Cohen’s single or multiple use
`
`cards do not satisfy the “defining/selecting a payment category that places a
`
`limitation on a transaction code” before “generating the transaction code.”
`
`Response at 28-32. Cohen, however, discloses that a single use card (i.e. a
`
`“disposable card”) is generated for the purpose of allowing a single transaction,
`
`after which it can be thrown away. Cohen at 2:14-15. Cohen also discloses that
`
`customized or limited use cards are generated for the purposes of allowing one or
`
`multiple transactions for only particular uses or groups of uses. Id. at 7:65-8:57.
`
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`- 11 -
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`In all cases, a user can call a credit card company to request a single or
`
`customized use card. Cohen at 3:41-47 (“a user dials into her credit card company
`
`before making a transaction, and after providing the ordinary credit card number
`
`and verification data, is provided with a disposable or customized number and/or
`
`mailed, provided with, or allowed to activate a disposable or customized card for a
`
`single or limited range use.”) (ID at 13, emphasis added). The fact that the user
`
`requests the single or customized use card and then receives such a card in
`
`response - all before any transaction takes place - indicates that the payment
`
`category (i.e. restricting a card to a single or customized use, which effectively
`
`limits the card to a single merchant or multiple merchants, as the case may be) is
`
`defined before the transaction code is generated. The user receives a card that has
`
`already been designated for a single or customized use, so the single or customized
`
`use category must have been designated before the transaction code was generated.
`
`Cohen does not suggest otherwise.
`
`Indeed, Cohen is even more explicit, disclosing that “in advance of the
`
`purchase” a user can call the credit card company to “indicate” the exact use of the
`
`card, namely “what the single use or customized credit card number is to be used
`
`for.” Cohen 3:49-54. Cohen thus discloses that a user may first designate or select
`
`a payment category that places limitations on a transaction code (e.g., single use,
`
`customized use), saying what the card is to be used for (e.g., for purchases in
`
`
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`- 12 -
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`computer stores). Then, “before making the transaction” and “in advance of
`
`purchase” -- and after saying what the card is to be used for (i.e., after
`
`defining/selecting a payment category) -- the user is “provided with a disposable or
`
`customized number” (i.e., transaction code) for making a purchase or purchases
`
`within the payment category. Id. This is the very sequence that Patent Owner says
`
`is missing from Cohen.
`
`But there is more. Cohen also discloses an additional embodiment, where “a
`
`user could be provided … with a set of disposable, one time only, or customized,
`
`limited use, numbers….” Ex. 1004, 3:56-60. Cohen further explains: “With
`
`respect to the customized card, the cards can either be preset for certain uses, or
`
`the cards can be ready and waiting in the user's office or home for setting to the
`
`desired use when the user is ready.” Id. 3:63-67 (emphasis added). Accordingly,
`
`Cohen discloses both designating a particular payment category before the number
`
`(or authorization code) is generated (i.e. the card is “preset” for a particular use)
`
`and designating a payment category after the code is generated (i.e. the card is
`
`“ready …for setting to the desired use when the user is ready”). As a result, Cohen
`
`anticipates, even if payment category designation is required before the code is
`
`generated.
`
`V. Conclusion
`
`The absence of comments in reply to a specific assertion made by the Patent
`
`Owner does not signify agreement with or concession of that assertion, but that the
`
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`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`
`assertion has already been addressed by MasterCard or is without any merit. For
`
`the foregoing reasons and based on the Petition, the expert declaration of Dr.
`
`Grimes, and all the supporting evidence of record, MasterCard respectfully
`
`requests that the Board issue a final decision cancelling each and every claim of
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`BAKER BOTTS LLP
`/Robert C. Scheinfeld/
`Robert C. Scheinfeld
`Reg. No. 31,300
`30 Rockefeller Plaza, 44th Floor
`New York, New York 10112-4498
`Phone: (212) 408-2512
`Facsimile: (212) 408-2501
`robert.scheinfeld@bakerbotts.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
`MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL
`INCORPORATED
`
`the ’486 patent.
`
`
`
`February 27, 2015
`
`
`
`Eliot D. Williams
`Reg. No. 50,822
`1001 Page Mill Road
`Building One, Suite 200
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Phone: (650) 739-7511
`Facsimile: (650) 739-7611
`eliot.williams@bakerbotts.com
`
`
`
`
`- 14 -
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`

`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that on the 27th day of February, 2015, a complete
`
`and entire copy of PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`was served via electronic mail and Federal Express to the Patent Owner’s attorneys
`
`of record at the following address:
`
`Stephen J. Lewellyn
`Brittany J. Maxey
`Maxey Law Offices, PLLC
`100 Second Avenue South
`Suite 401 North Tower
`St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
`s.lewellyn@maxeyiplaw.com
`b.maxey@maxeyiplaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Eliot D. Williams
`Reg. No. 50,822
`1001 Page Mill Road
`Building One, Suite 200
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Phone: (650) 739-7511
`Facsimile: (650) 739-7611
`eliot.williams@bakerbotts.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`BAKER BOTTS LLP
`
`/Robert C. Scheinfeld/
`Robert C. Scheinfeld
`Reg. No. 31,300
`30 Rockefeller Plaza, 44th Floor
`New York, New York 10112-4498
`Phone: (212) 408-2512
`Facsimile: (212) 408-2501
`robert.scheinfeld@bakerbotts.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
`MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL
`INCORPORATED

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