Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 1 of 25 PageID #: 39501
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`
`
`INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS,
`INC., a Delaware corporation,
`INTERDIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
`CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,
`IPR LICENSING, INC., a Delaware
`corporation, and INTERDIGITAL
`HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
`Defendants,
`
`C.A. No.: 13-009-RGA
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`ZTE CORPORATION and ZTE (USA) INC.,
`
`
`
`Defendants and
`Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
`
`
`
`
`OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ZTE’S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS
`A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE ASSERTED PATENT CLAIMS ARE NOT
`INFRINGED AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL
`
`Kelly E. Farnan (#4395)
`Farnan@rlf.com
`Travis S. Hunter (#5350)
`Hunter@rlf.com
`Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.
`920 N. King Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`302-651-7700
`
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`ZTE Corporation and ZTE (USA) Inc.
`
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`Ralph J. Gabric
`Charles M. McMahon
`Mircea A. Tipescu
`Brian A. Jones
`Hersh H. Mehta
`Brinks Gilson & Lione
`455 North Cityfront Plaza Drive
`Chicago, IL 60611
`(312) 321-4200
`
`Jay H. Reiziss
`Brinks Gilson & Lione
`1775 Pennsylvania Ave NW #900
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 296-8700
`
`Dated: November 26, 2014
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
` 2018
`
` Ex. 2018-0001
`
`IPR Licensing, Inc.
`Exhibit .
`ZTE Corp v. IPR Licensing, Inc.
`IPR2014-00525 
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 2 of 25 PageID #: 39502
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARDS ............................................................................................................2
`
`III. JMOL OF NON-INFRINGEMENT IS WARRANTED UNDER RULE 50 .........................3
`
`A. The 966 and 847 “Same Code” Patents ........................................................................3
`
`1. The “same code” requirement ...........................................................................3
`
`2. The “synchronize to a/the pilot signal” requirement ........................................5
`
`B. The 244 “Logical Connection” Patent ..........................................................................7
`
`1. The “available for use” requirement .................................................................7
`
`2. The “logical connection” requirement ............................................................10
`
`IV. A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED UNDER RULE 59 .......................................................13
`
`A. Irreconcilable Verdicts on the 966 and 847 “Same Code” Patents ............................13
`
`B. Irreconcilable Verdicts on the 244 “Logical Connection” Patent ..............................15
`
`C. Absent Entry of JMOL of Non-Infringement, a New Trial Is Warranted After
`the Court Clarifies the Meaning of “Logical Connection” ....................................17
`
`D. InterDigital’s Improper and Prejudicial Use of Licensing Evidence .........................17
`
`E.
`
`InterDigital’s Improper, Misleading, and Prejudicial Closing Arguments .................19
`
`V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................20
`
`
`
`
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`i
`
` Ex. 2018-0002
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 3 of 25 PageID #: 39503
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Advanced Fiber Techs. (AFT) Trust v. J & L Fiber Servs., Inc.,
`674 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................. 12
`
`Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,
`449 U.S. 33 (1980) ...................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
`980 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1992) ..................................................................................................... 20
`
`In re Fulton,
`391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................. 15
`
`L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v. Sony Corp.,
`2014 WL 4674815 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014)................................................................................ 2
`
`LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 7, 9
`
`LG Elecs. USA, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
`798 F. Supp. 2d 541 (D. Del. 2011) ........................................................................................ 2, 3
`
`Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
`278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960) .......................................................................................................... 2
`
`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Extreme Networks, Inc.,
`231 F.R.D. 453 (D. Del. 2005) .................................................................................................. 20
`
`MobileMedia Ideas, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`966 F. Supp. 2d 439 (D. Del. 2013) .................................................................................. 6, 9, 18
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................. 17
`
`On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH,
`386 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................. 12
`
`Pannu v. Iolab Corp.,
`155 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................... 2
`
`Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. ComputerVision Corp.,
`732 F.3d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ..................................................................................................... 2
`
`Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co.,
`81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................................ 10
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`ii
`
` Ex. 2018-0003
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 4 of 25 PageID #: 39504
`
`
`
`Solomon Techs., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
`No. 5-cv-1702, 2010 WL 715243 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2010) .................................................... 10
`
`Star Scientific, Inc. v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................................... 6
`
`Trustees in Bankr. of N. Am. Rubber Thread Co. v. United States,
`593 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................. 10
`
`Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
`926 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1991) .................................................................................................. 2, 3
`
`STATUTES
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 50(A)(1) .................................................................................................................. 2
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 59(A)(1) .................................................................................................................. 2
`
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`iii
`
` Ex. 2018-0004
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 5 of 25 PageID #: 39505
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`InterDigital’s infringement case was riddled with inconsistencies and conflicting
`
`admissions that undermine the verdict as a matter of law. The record lacks substantial evidence
`
`of infringement, and no reasonable juror could have found in InterDigital’s favor.
`
`For example, on U.S. Patent Nos. 7,190,966 and 7,286,847 (the “same code” patents),
`
`InterDigital’s experts took conflicting positions. To distinguish the prior art, Dr. Haas testified
`
`that two different portions of a theoretical sequence of chips can never be retrospectively
`
`combined to form the claimed “same code,” but Dr. Jackson did exactly that to show
`
`infringement. Even ignoring other flaws in Dr. Jackson’s testimony, this inconsistency alone
`
`requires judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) of non-infringement on the “same code” patents.
`
`As to U.S. Patent No. 8,380,244 (the “logical connection” patent), Dr. Cooklev
`
`repeatedly contradicted InterDigital’s infringement theory. The 244 patent claims require
`
`cellular physical channels to be available for a phone to select for use while the phone is using
`
`WiFi, but Dr. Cooklev admitted that ZTE’s phones release those channels. He also admitted that
`
`the PDP context in ZTE’s phones does not meet his own definition of the required “logical
`
`connection.” These admissions fundamentally undermine InterDigital’s infringement case, and
`
`the Court should grant JMOL of non-infringement on the “logical connection” patent.
`
`In the alternative, the Court should grant a new trial. ZTE’s phones operate like the prior
`
`art, so the jury’s verdicts of infringement and validity are irreconcilable. If ZTE’s phones use a
`
`“same code,” then so did the prior art. If ZTE’s phones maintain a “logical connection,” then so
`
`did the prior art. The inconsistent infringement and validity verdicts are against the weight of the
`
`evidence, and allowing them to stand would be erroneous. Indeed, to even reach infringement on
`
`the 244 patent, the jury was forced to resolve a legal dispute about the meaning of “logical
`
`connection,” which independently warrants a new trial on this patent.
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`1
`
` Ex. 2018-0005
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 6 of 25 PageID #: 39506
`
`
`
`Finally, InterDigital’s trial tactics also merit a new trial. InterDigital introduced
`
`irrelevant but highly prejudicial licensing evidence, and InterDigital presented an improper,
`
`misleading, and prejudicial impeachment scoreboard during closing arguments. Each of these
`
`tactics independently justifies a new trial on all patents.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`Rule 50 requires JMOL if “‘the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
`
`legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [a] party’ on an issue.” L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v.
`
`Sony Corp., 2014 WL 4674815, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(A)(1)).
`
`JMOL must be granted if “the jury’s findings, presumed or express, are not supported by
`
`substantial evidence” or if “the legal conclusion(s) implied [by] the jury’s verdict cannot in law
`
`be supported by those findings.” Id. (quoting Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted). “‘Substantial’ evidence is such relevant evidence from
`
`the record taken as a whole that might be acceptable by a reasonable mind as adequate to support
`
`the finding under review.” Id. (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. ComputerVision Corp., 732 F.3d
`
`888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view the
`
`record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Consol. Rail
`
`Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir. 1991)).
`
`A new trial may be granted “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
`
`granted in an action at law in federal court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(A)(1)(A). “The decision to grant
`
`or deny a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” LG Elecs. USA, Inc. v.
`
`Whirlpool Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 541, 558 (D. Del. 2011). “In making this determination, the
`
`trial judge should consider the overall setting of the trial, the character of the evidence, and the
`
`complexity or simplicity of the legal principles which the jury had to apply to the facts.” Id.
`
`(quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir. 1960)). A new trial should be
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`2
`
` Ex. 2018-0006
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 7 of 25 PageID #: 39507
`
`
`
`conducted where “the verdict was against the weight of the evidence . . . [and] a miscarriage of
`
`justice would result” if the verdict stands. Id. (quoting Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1352). “Unlike
`
`the standard for determining judgment as a matter of law, the court need not view the evidence in
`
`the light most favorable to the verdict winner.” Id. (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,
`
`449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980)).
`
`III.
`
`JMOL OF NON-INFRINGEMENT IS WARRANTED UNDER RULE 50
`
`A.
`
`The 966 and 847 “Same Code” Patents
`
`1.
`
`The “same code” requirement
`
`InterDigital failed to introduce substantial evidence that ZTE’s phones meet the “same
`
`code” limitations in claim 1 of the 966 patent and claim 5 of the 847 patent. Dr. Jackson’s
`
`contradictory testimony is insufficient to prove that ZTE’s phones generate both successively
`
`transmitted signals and a message from any “same code.” His alleged “sequence of [42,496]
`
`chips” is nowhere defined or generated as a code or sequence. Instead, Dr. Jackson
`
`retrospectively combined chips selected from two different scrambling codes, the preamble
`
`scrambling code and the real values of the message part scrambling code. (Tr. at 473:15-
`
`480:17.) Dr. Jackson admitted that the preamble scrambling code is 4,096 chips and the message
`
`scrambling code is 38,400 chips. (Id. at 488:23-489:13.) He also admitted that neither the
`
`WCDMA standard nor ZTE’s phones use the collective 42,496 chips as a code, explaining that
`
`“[t]he standard gives you the 4,096 and the 38,400, but I'm not aware of any device that adds
`
`them together to the 42,000.” (Id. at 472:22-24.)
`
`Critically, Dr. Jackson’s argument that the retrospective combination of chips from two
`
`different scrambling codes may form the “same code” was directly contradicted by InterDigital’s
`
`invalidity expert. Dr. Haas testified that two different codes generated from a theoretical long
`
`sequence cannot be “retrospectively” combined to be the required “same code”:
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`3
`
` Ex. 2018-0007
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 8 of 25 PageID #: 39508
`
`
`
`Q. Number two, it cannot be some random sequence of chips that you take a portion
`from here and a portion from there and retrospectively say, here it is, a sequence of
`chips. Can't do that; right?
`A. Absolutely, and this is exactly what I said in my deposition on the subject, sir.
`Q.
`It has to be something, that same code has to be something which is somehow
`defined to be a sequence, to be a code; is that right?
`A. Correct. It cannot be some random thing that you put together retrospectively and
`say, this is the same code.
`Q. Because each time you generate something, retrospectively you can't say, I'm taking
`a portion, stuck it together with another portion and created a code. You can't do
`that, can you?
`A. You cannot. Otherwise it would be completely meaningless.
`Q. That same code cannot be random pieces somehow selected retrospectively to
`create this code; is that correct?
`Indeed, sir.
`
`A.
`
`(Id. at 1483:20-1484:18.) Dr. Jackson’s selection of chips from two different scrambling codes
`
`is exactly the type of retrospective combination that Dr. Haas testified is improper.
`
`Dr. Jackson tried to gloss over this fatal flaw by suggesting that the “same code” is a
`
`42,496-chip sequence called Clong,1,n. (See, e.g., id. at 400:14-401:14, 456:18-457:4.) But that
`
`artificial label results only from his improper retrospective combination. In truth, Clong,1,n is an
`
`algorithm or theoretical sequence defined in the WCDMA standard to include more than 33
`
`million chips, as Dr. Jackson reluctantly admitted during cross examination. (Id. at 481:13-
`
`482:15.) ZTE’s phones do not generate Clong,1,n, so Dr. Jackson was forced to rely on his
`
`improper retrospective combination of chips from two different scrambling codes to create his so
`
`called “same code.” No reasonable juror could credit Dr. Jackson’s testimony on the so-called
`
`Clong,1,n “same code” as it conflicts with Dr. Haas’ testimony and is inconsistent with
`
`Dr. Jackson’s own admission that none of the accused devices define or add together the chips
`
`from the preamble scrambling code and the message part scrambling code to form the alleged
`
`42,000-chip Clong,1,n. (Id. [Jackson] at 472:22-24.)
`
`For the same reason, ZTE is entitled to JMOL that no ZTE product directly infringes
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`4
`
` Ex. 2018-0008
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 9 of 25 PageID #: 39509
`
`
`
`claim 3 of the 847 patent. InterDigital failed to introduce evidence that ZTE’s phones send
`
`“successively transmitted signals generated using a portion of a code” and “a signal generated
`
`using a remainder of the code.” Dr. Jackson failed to identify a single, defined, generated code
`
`from which a portion is used to generate the PRACH preamble and a remainder is used to
`
`generate the PRACH message part. (Id. [Jackson] at 470-484.)
`
`Alternatively, a new trial on the 966 and 847 patents is warranted at least for the
`
`foregoing reasons and because the infringement verdict was against the weight of the evidence,
`
`which, viewed in a neutral light, compels a conclusion of non-infringement. See LG, 798 F.
`
`Supp. 2d at 558 (“Unlike the standard for determining judgment as a matter of law, the court
`
`need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.”).
`
`2.
`
`The “synchronize to a/the pilot signal” requirement
`
`The jury’s inherent finding that ZTE’s phones satisfy the “synchronize to a/the pilot
`
`signal” limitations of claims 3 and 5 of the 847 patent is not supported by substantial evidence.
`
`Claim 3 requires “a circuit configured to synchronize to a pilot signal transmitted by a base
`
`station associated with a CDMA network wherein, if the circuit becomes unsynchronized to the
`
`pilot signal during an idle period of the subscriber unit, the circuit is further configured to re-
`
`synchronize to the pilot signal.”1 The entirety of InterDigital’s expert Dr. Jackson’s testimony
`
`regarding this limitation consists of the following generic assertions:
`
`Q. Well, what’s a pilot signal?
`A. Well, a pilot signal – pilot signals are used commonly in communications. And
`they’re basically signals that guide or steer the operation of other parts of a receiver,
`sort of the way a pilot steers an airplane or a boat. The way to think about it is, in
`this case, a good way to think about it is it’s like a conductor providing a timing
`beat that keeps all the players in time of music. And WCDMAs have a timing
`
`1
`In the context of claims 3 and 5 of the 847 patent, the Court construed the term “circuit”
`to mean “arrangement of electrical components” and the phrase “[re-]synchronize to the/a pilot
`signal” to mean “establish a timing reference with a pilot signal.”
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`5
`
` Ex. 2018-0009
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 10 of 25 PageID #: 39510
`
`
`
`signal. And it’s essential that a device is synchronized to it.
`Q. Do the ZTE devices synchronize to a pilot signal as required in Claim 36 [sic, claim
`3] of the ’847 patent?
`A. Yes.
`Q. Okay, let’s check that box.
`
`(Tr. at 424:13-425:13.) Dr. Jackson provided similarly conclusory testimony about the related
`
`“synchronize to the pilot signal” limitation in claim 5 of the 847 patent. (Id. at 428:8-430:9.) He
`
`provided no evidence or particularized explanation showing how the accused devices allegedly
`
`synchronize or re-synchronize to any WCDMA timing signal or other pilot signal. Such
`
`conclusory expert testimony does not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support the
`
`jury’s determination of infringement for claims 3 and 5 of the 847 patent. See MobileMedia
`
`Ideas, LLC v. Apple Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 439, 459 n.8 (D. Del. 2013) (“When an expert opinion
`
`is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable
`
`record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s
`
`verdict.”) (quotations omitted); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d
`
`1558, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (setting aside jury’s infringement verdict because experts failed
`
`to provide “particularized” explanation of infringement).
`
`There is simply no evidence that ZTE’s accused products practice the “synchronize to
`
`a/the pilot signal” limitations of claims 3 and 5 of the 847 patent. InterDigital tried
`
`unsuccessfully to bridge this fatal gap in proof with testimony from ZTE’s expert, Dr. Kakaes,
`
`regarding use of a pilot signal in WCDMA. (Tr. at 1414:11-1416:17.) InterDigital, however,
`
`bears the burden of proving the presence of each and every claim limitation in the accused
`
`devices. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2011). InterDigital cannot shift that burden to ZTE’s expert to provide testimony showing the
`
`lack of the “synchronize to a pilot signal” limitations. There is no legally sufficient basis for a
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`6
`
` Ex. 2018-0010
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 11 of 25 PageID #: 39511
`
`
`
`verdict that ZTE infringes claim 3 or 5 of the 847 patent, and the Court should grant judgment of
`
`non-infringement as a matter of law on those claims. Alternatively, the Court should grant a new
`
`trial for the 847 patent at least for the foregoing reasons and because the evidence was
`
`insufficient to justify the verdict of infringement. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer,
`
`Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A new trial is required because the jury's verdict was
`
`based on an expert opinion that finds no support in the facts in the record.”).
`
`B.
`
`The 244 “Logical Connection” Patent
`
`1.
`
`The “available for use” requirement
`
`a.
`
`InterDigital’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, admitted that the accused
`devices do not meet the “available for use” limitation
`
`Claim 1 (and dependent claim 8), as construed, requires “a processor configured to
`
`maintain a logical connection with the cellular wireless network when none of the plurality of
`
`physical channels available for the subscriber unit to select for use are in use by the subscriber
`
`unit while the IEEE 802.11 transceiver communicates packet data with the IEEE 802.11 wireless
`
`local area network.” (PX-0004 at 11:12-16; D.I. 413 at 2 (emphases added).) InterDigital’s
`
`expert, Dr. Cooklev, acknowledged that this “available for use” limitation requires cellular
`
`physical channels “to be available to a subscriber unit while the unit is on the WiFi.” (Tr. at
`
`805:1-21; 810:16-22.) Dr. Cooklev then admitted that the accused CDMA2000 devices do not
`
`meet that limitation.2 Specifically, he testified that the relevant physical channels (Walsh
`
`channels) “get disabled and brought down” when the accused ZTE phones switch from cellular
`
`to WiFi, making those channels “no longer available for the subscriber unit to select and use”:
`
`Q. All right. And so when the ZTE phones that use the CDMA 2000 cellular protocol,
`when they switch from the cell, 3G to WiFi, the same thing happens with their
`physical channels; too. Right? They get disabled and brought down? That’s how
`
`
`2
`The accused devices follow either the CMDA2000 or the WCDMA cellular protocol.
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`7
`
` Ex. 2018-0011
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 12 of 25 PageID #: 39512
`
`
`
`the software works; is that right?
`A. Yes.
`[Q.] And so that makes the physical channels, the Walsh channels that you point to, no
`longer available for the subscriber unit to select and use; isn’t that correct?
`A. Yes. That is correct.
`
`(Id. at 815:13-816:3.)
`
`Dr. Cooklev also admitted that the accused WCDMA devices do not meet the “available
`
`for use” limitation. Specifically, after being shown his expert report, Dr. Cooklev acknowledged
`
`that, “during the 3G-to-WiFi switching process, the Qualcomm software disables and brings
`
`down the physical channels.” (Id. at 812:6-20 (emphasis added).) Dr. Cooklev also admitted
`
`that when the “software disables and brings down the physical channels,” it makes those
`
`channels “no longer available for the subscriber unit to select for use”:
`
`[Q.] So then you go on to say in the last sentence, this makes the E-DPDCH, the
`physical channels that you point to in the cellular network, no longer available for
`the subscriber unit to select for use; is that correct? That’s what you said?
`A. Well, that’s what the highlighted text says.
`Q.
`I’ve highlighted what you said.
`A. Okay.
`Q. You said that; right?
`A. Well, although the highlighted text says that –
`THE COURT: Wait, Dr. Cooklev. Did you say that?
`THE WITNESS: If it’s from my expert report, yes, I did.
`
`(Id. at 813:1-18.) Dr. Cooklev’s testimony conclusively established that no accused device
`
`meets the “available for use” limitation.
`
`b.
`
`Dr. Cooklev’s trial-inspired “ubiquitously available” theory
`does not support the infringement verdict
`
`After acknowledging the fatal hole in InterDigital’s infringement case, Dr. Cooklev tried
`
`to backtrack by volunteering a new opinion that “the cellular connection is ubiquitously
`
`available” (Tr. at 813:24-814:13), and thus “the E-DPDCH and the Walsh channels are available
`
`everywhere at any time to the subscriber unit” (id. at 816:12-24). But Dr. Cooklev
`
`acknowledged that his new “ubiquitously available” theory was subject to a critical exception.
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`8
`
` Ex. 2018-0012
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 13 of 25 PageID #: 39513
`
`
`
`While transmitting on WiFi, the accused devices simply cannot select to use either the E-
`
`DPDCHs or Walsh channels. (See id. [Cooklev] at 818:5-10 (“It is switching to WiFi and it’s
`
`the phone—the phone is not going to be able to select the physical channels.”) That makes those
`
`channels not “available for the subscriber unit to select for use” while on WiFi and, thus, the
`
`accused devices do not meet the “available for use” limitation. (See Section III.B.1.a, supra; see
`
`also Tr. [Cooklev] at 810:17-22, 1573:6-1574:5, 1575:5-1576:2.) Nor could Dr. Cooklev’s new
`
`opinions support the verdict because they are conclusory—devoid of reasoning or other support.
`
`See MobileMedia, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 459 n.8; LaserDynamics, 694 F. 3d at 81.
`
`c.
`
`Judicial estoppel requires a finding of non-infringement
`
`Judicial estoppel also compels a finding of non-infringement because the argument
`
`InterDigital presented to the jury is factually contrary to the infringement theory InterDigital
`
`advanced and prevailed upon in International Trade Commission Investigation No. 337-TA-800
`
`(“the 800 investigation”). In the 800 investigation, InterDigital asserted the parent of the 244
`
`patent, arguing that the same accused functionality infringed there because, according to
`
`InterDigital, the E-DPDCH physical channels and Walsh channels are released when data is not
`
`being transmitted over the cellular network. (See Ex. 1 (IDC Post-Hearing Brief) at 264; Ex. 2
`
`(ITC Initial Determination) at 322.)3 Here, InterDigital took the exact opposite factual position
`
`before the jury by arguing that these very same channels are always available.
`
`Judicial estoppel precludes InterDigital from prevailing on an infringement theory here
`
`that is inconsistent with the infringement theory upon which InterDigital prevailed at the ITC.
`
`See Trustees in Bankr. of N. Am. Rubber Thread Co. v. United States, 593 F.3d 1346, 1353-54
`
`
`3
`In the 244 parent, U.S. Patent No. 7,616,970, the relevant claim limitation is “a
`communication session above the physical layer is maintained when all assigned physical layer
`channels have been released.”
`
`
`RLF1 11200135v.1
`
`
`9
`
` Ex. 2018-0013
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00009-RGA Document 466 Filed 11/26/14 Page 14 of 25 PageID #: 39514
`
`
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds
`
`in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,
`
`assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in
`
`the position formerly taken by him.”) (quotations omitted); see also Solomon Techs., Inc. v.
`
`Toyota Motor Corp., No. 5-cv-1702, 2010 WL 715243, at **1-4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2010)
`
`(applying judicial estoppel with regard to a claim construction argument that differed from the
`
`construction advanced before the International Trade Commission).4
`
`2.
`
`The “logical connection” requirement
`
`The evidence indisputably established that the PDP context in ZTE’s phones does not
`
`satisfy the required “logical connection.”5 Both parties’ experts agreed that “logical connection,”
`
`as used in the Court’s construction, refers to a connection between two layers of the protocol
`
`stack above the physical layer. (Tr. [Cooklev] at 788:9-12, 791:12-18; id. [McLaughlin] at
`
`1127:18-1128:11.) Both experts also agreed that the PDP context is stored at the session layer,
`
`which is a single layer, of the protocol stack. (Id. [Cooklev] at 781:16-21, 782:2-10; id.
`
`[McLaughlin] at 1130:9-16.) Because the PDP context resides within a single layer, and is not a
`
`connection between two layers, no reasonable juror could conclude that the PDP context meets
`
`the agreed-upon definition of “logical connection.” For this additional reason, the jury’s
`
`infringement verdict is not supported by substantial evidence.
`
`
`4
`To the extent that the application of judicial estoppel also requires a showing of bad faith,
`see, e.g., Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir.
`1996), the only reasonable inference here is that InterDigital advanced its new “ubiquitously”
`available theory in bad faith. InterDigital’s counsel—who also represented InterDigital in the
`800 investigation—knew or should have known that InterDigital’s infringement theory in this
`Court is inconsistent with InterDigital’s infringement theory in the 800 investigation.
`
` 5
`
`It is undisput