Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`Paper No. 49
`Date: July 20, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`BROSE NORTH AMERICA, INC. AND BROSE FAHRZEUGTEILE
`GMBH & CO. KG, HALLSTADT,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UUSI, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_________
`
`
`Case IPR2014‐00417
`
`Patent 7,579,802 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before GLENN J. PERRY, HYUN J. JUNG, and JASON J. CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 318(a) AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
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`571-272-7822
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`Paper No. 49
`Date: July 20, 2015
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`BROSE NORTH AMERICA, INC. AND BROSE FAHRZEUGTEILE
`GMBH & CO. KG, HALLSTADT,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UUSI, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_________
`
`
`Case IPR2014‐00417
`
`Patent 7,579,802 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before GLENN J. PERRY, HYUN J. JUNG, and JASON J. CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 318(a) AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014‐00417
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`I.
`
`A. Procedural Background
`
`
`
`Brose North America, Inc. and Brose Fahrzeugteile GmbH & Co. KG,
`Hallstadt (collectively “Petitioner”), filed a Corrected Petition (Paper 6,
`“Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 6–9, and 14 of U.S.
`Patent No. 7,579,802 (Ex. 1005, “the ’802 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 311–319.
`UUSI, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper
`10. On August 1, 2014, we instituted review as to claims 1, 6–9, and 14 of
`the ’802 patent and instituted trial on seven grounds of unpatentability as set
`forth below. Paper 11, “Dec. on Inst.”
`Claims
`Grounds
`1, 7–9, and 14
`§ 102(b)
`1, 6–9, and 14
`§ 103(a)
`7, 9, and 14
`§ 102(b)
`7, 9, and 14
`§ 103(a)
`1, 6–9, and 14
`§ 103(a)
`7–9 and 14
`§ 103(a)
`7–9 and 14
`§ 103(a)
`
`Reference
`Itoh1
`Itoh
`Kinzl2
`Kinzl
`Itoh and Kinzl
`Itoh and Zuckerman3
`Itoh, Kinzl, and Zuckerman
`
`
`Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 31, “PO
`Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 34, “Reply”).
`In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude (Paper 41,
`“Motion”), seeking to exclude certain of Petitioner’s evidence in Exhibits
`1054, 1055, 1057, 1058, 1063, 1065, 1066, and 2004.
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 4,870,333 issued Sept. 26, 1989 (Ex. 1007, “Itoh”).
`2 U.S. Patent No. 4,468,596 issued Aug. 28, 1984 (Ex. 1008, “Kinzl”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 5,069,000 issued Dec. 3, 1991 (Ex. 1009, “Zuckerman”).
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`Petitioner opposed (Paper 44, “Opp.”) Patent Owner’s Motion to
`Exclude. We heard Oral Argument on April 30, 2015. Paper 48, (“Tr.”).
`
`
`
`B. Related Matters
`
`Petitioner indicates that the ’802 patent is being asserted in: UUSI,
`LLC v. Robert Bosch LLC, No. 2:13-cv-10444, filed in the United States
`District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, on February 4, 2013; and
`UUSI, LLC v. Webasto Roof Sys., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-11704, filed in the
`United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, on April
`15, 2013.
`The ’802 patent belongs to a family of patents involved in multiple
`inter partes reviews including IPR2014-00416, IPR2014-00417, IPR2014-
`00648, IPR2014-00649, and IPR2014-00650.
`
`
`C. Summary of Conclusions
`
`In this Final Written Decision, issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude and we
`determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the
`evidence that all claims for which trial was instituted, claims 1, 6–9, and 14,
`are unpatentable.
`
`II. THE ’802 PATENT (Ex. 1005)
`The ’802 patent describes a system and method for sensing an
`obstruction in the travel path of a moveable panel, such as a window or
`sunroof of a vehicle. See Ex. 1005, Abstract and Background. Figure 1 is
`reproduced below:
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`Figure 1 is a schematic of an exemplary actuator safety feedback control
`system 1. Id. at 2:26–27; 2:65–66. Controller 2 monitors and controls
`movement of a motor driven panel. Id. at 2:65–3:5. Motor drive outputs 7a
`and 7b control whether the motor (not shown in Figure 1) drives the panel in
`a forward or a reverse direction. Id. at 3:38–39. Controller 2 can sense
`obstacles in the panel’s path in various ways, including a paired infrared
`emitter and detector disposed along the panel’s path (id. at 3:63–4:53), a
`motor current monitor (id. at 5:53–57; 7:26–8:3), and other motor monitors
`(id. at 11:9–32).
`Independent claim 7, reproduced below, is illustrative.
`7. Apparatus for controlling activation of a motor for
`moving an object along a travel path and de-activating
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`the motor if an obstacle is encountered by the object
`comprising:
`a) a movement sensor for monitoring movement of
`the object as the motor moves said object along a
`travel path;
`b) a switch for controlling energization of the
`motor with an energization signal; and
`c) a controller including an interface coupled to the
`switch for controllably energizing the motor and
`said interface additionally coupling the controller
`to the movement sensor for monitoring signals
`from said movement sensor; said controller
`comprising a stored program that:
`i) determines motor speed of movement from an
`output signal from the movement sensor;
`ii) calculates an obstacle detect threshold based on
`motor speed of movement detected during a
`present run of said motor driven element;
`iii) compares a value based on currently sensed
`motor speed of movement with the obstacle detect
`threshold; and
`iv) outputs a signal from the interface to said
`switch for stopping the motor if the comparison
`based on currently sensed motor movement
`indicates the object has contacted an obstacle.
`
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`As a step in our analysis, we determine the meaning of the claims for
`purposes of this decision. In an inter partes review, the proper claim
`construction standard in an expired4 patent is set forth in Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See In re Rambus, 694
`F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Board’s review of the claims of an
`
`
`4 The ’802 patent expired in November 2014.
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`expired patent is similar to that of a district court’s review.”). We construe
`the terms below in accordance with that standard.
`
`
`
`A. “a sensor for measuring a parameter of a motor. . . that
`varies in response to a resistance to motion” (claim 1)
`
`Patent Owner would have us limit the term “a sensor for measuring a
`parameter of a motor that varies in response to a resistance to motion”
`(claim 1) to “a sensor that measures a magnitude of motor current.” PO
`Resp. 15–16. Petitioner argues the term should be construed, according to
`its plain meaning, to cover “any sensor that measures any motor parameter
`that varies as a result of resistance to motion.” Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1063 ¶
`26).
`
`Patent Owner argues a limiting prosecution history in which Patent
`Owner argued that the sensor includes an “operational amplifier that
`amplifies a voltage across a current-measuring resistor.” PO Resp. 13–14.
`We do not find any clear disavowal in the prosecution history that would
`limit the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed term.
`Patent Owner argues support for its narrow construction in the
`Specification, which states “motor current is the primary measured
`parameter of immediate importance for both hard and soft obstacle
`detection” (emphasis added) and “motor current” denotes magnitude. Id. at
`14 (citing Ex. 1005, 15:66–16:3, 18:35–37). The Specification of the
`’802 patent states: “obstacle detection via motor current sensing or current
`sensing and speed sensing means becomes the remaining reliable backup
`method of detecting an obstacle” (emphasis added). Ex. 1005, 4:12–14. We
`are not persuaded to import this narrowing limitation from the specification
`based on the examples argued.
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`Patent Owner further argues that the doctrine of claim differentiation
`dictates that the sensor of claim 1 corresponds to a “current amplitude
`sensor,” whereas “a movement sensor” recited in claim 7 would embrace a
`“Hall effect sensor that senses movement of the motor shaft.” PO Resp. 15.
`Although the doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption
`that the limitations in claims 1 and 7 are different in scope, this presumption
`can be overcome by written description or prosecution history. See
`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-Cor Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`As discussed supra, the ’802 patent Specification describes “obstacle
`detection via motor current sensing or current sensing and speed sensing
`means becomes the remaining reliable backup method of detecting an
`obstacle” (emphasis added). Moreover, the Specification does not include a
`special definition, nor a disavowal. Reply 2.
`Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s
`construction and construe the claim term “sensor for measuring a parameter
`of a motor . . . that varies in response to a resistance to motion” in
`accordance with its plain meaning. Our construction embraces any sensor
`that measures any motor parameter that varies as a result of resistance to
`motion.
`
`B. “a movement sensor for monitoring movement of the
`object” (claim 7)
`Patent Owner contends that “a movement sensor for monitoring
`movement of the object” (claim 7) should construed so as to be limited to
`only a separate discrete, physical hardware-based sensor (such as a position
`encoder or Hall effect sensor) and exclude sensors that measure motor
`current or voltage (such as a current pulse counter as used in “sensorless”
`motor control).” PO Resp. 37. In support, Patent Owner notes that the ’802
`
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`patent Specification states “[s]ensorless electronic sensing of motor current
`commutation pulses is the preferred low cost method . . . [i]n certain
`circumstances, it may be preferable to use . . . at least one hardware sensor
`means” that includes specialized sensors such as:
`Hall effect, magnetoresistive, magnetodiode, magnetotransistor,
`Wiegand effect, and variable reluctance; capacitive; optical:
`Reflective and blocking; generated inductive magnetic fields:
`ECKO (eddy current killed oscillator), variable inductor, and
`variable transformer; and film resistor.
`
`
`Ex. 1005, 23:49–67; 11:26–32. PO Resp. 31–32.
`Patent Owner points to prosecution argument that the “movement
`sensor” of claim 7 corresponded to a “[m]ovement sensor, position encoder,
`col. 4, line 16.” PO Resp. 33–34 (citing Ex. 1019, page 20, element 12C).
`Moreover, Patent Owner contends the doctrine of claim differentiation
`dictates that the sensor of claims 1 and 14 be interpreted as “current
`measurement,” whereas claim 7 recites a “movement sensor.” PO Resp. 34–
`35.
`
`Additionally, Patent Owner notes that claim 13, which depends from
`claim 7, recites “the sensor” and later in the claim recites “the current
`sensor.” PO Resp. 35–36. Patent Owner argues that “current sensor” is
`newly introduced and that “current sensor,” recited in claim 13 does not
`contradict claim 7’s recitation of a “movement sensor” as recited in claim 7.
`Thus, claim 13 should be treated as requiring both a “movement sensor” and
`a “current sensor.” Id.
`Petitioner argues that “a movement sensor for monitoring movement
`of the object” (claim 7) should be construed as “any sensor that (directly or
`indirectly) monitors movement of the object.” Reply 6–7.
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`We agree with Patent Owner that claim 13’s recitation of a “current
`sensor” is consistent with the claim 7 recitation of a “movement sensor.”
`We disagree, however, with Patent Owner that claim 13 should be treated as
`having both a “movement sensor” and a “current sensor” because claim 13
`recites “the sensor” (emphasis added), which looks to claim 7’s “movement
`sensor” for antecedent basis. It would make no sense for claim 13 to specify
`that “the sensor” (emphasis added) of claim 7 is a “current sensor” unless the
`sensor of claim 7 is sufficiently broad to include a current sensor and other
`sensors. Moreover, the Specification of the ’802 patent suggests that
`“movement sensor” is sufficiently broad to include a current sensor, among
`a broader range of sensors. For example, the Specification of the ’802 patent
`recites “obstacle detection via motor current sensing or current sensing and
`speed sensing means becomes the remaining reliable backup method of
`detecting an obstacle” (emphasis added). Ex. 1005, 4:12–14.
`Patent Owner’s claim differentiation argument is not persuasive for
`similar reasons. Claim 13 is narrower in scope than claim 7. It further limits
`the sensor set forth in claim 7 to be a current sensor, thus differentiating it
`from claim 7. We do not read the prosecution history as limiting the
`“movement sensor” so as to exclude a “current sensor.” Id.
`Accordingly, we construe “a movement sensor for monitoring
`movement of the object” as “any sensor that directly or indirectly monitors
`movement of the object.” Our construction embraces a speed sensor and a
`current sensor that indirectly monitors movement.
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`C. “travel path” (claim 7)
`
`
`
`Claim 7 refers to a “travel path.” Patent Owner contends that this
`term refers to the “entire travel path” of the object and not to a portion of the
`entire travel path. PO Resp. 37–38. Patent Owner argues that although the
`doctrine of claim differentiation normally applies to a claim depending on
`another claim, the doctrine also requires that “all or part of a range of
`motion” in independent claim 1 be differentiated from independent claim 7,
`which recites “a travel path.” Id. Moreover, Patent Owner argues the
`controlling activation of a motor described in claim 7 along the entire travel
`path is critical to the protection of a body part that the window encounters.
`Id. at 38–40.
`Petitioner contends the specification and prosecution history do not
`include a special definition of the “travel path” limitation, nor a clear
`disavowal of the plain meaning of “travel path,” and Patent Owner does not
`argue otherwise. Reply 8. We agree with Petitioner.
`Although the doctrine of claim differentiation suggests claim 7 does
`not require “all or part of a range of motion” because claim 1 recites “all or
`part of a range of motion” and claim 7 merely recites “a travel path,” this
`suggestion is not a hard and fast rule and will be overcome by a contrary
`construction dictated by the written description or prosecution history.
`Seachange Int’l, 413 F.3d at 1369.
`The ’802 patent specification does not provide a special definition nor
`provide a clear disavowal of the plain meaning of the “travel path”
`limitation, and Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. Reply 8. Instead,
`the Specification of the ’802 patent indicates during and immediately after
`the startup phase, obstacle detection will not occur. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1063
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`¶ 96). The Specification of the ’802 patent refers to I as motor current and
`PP as pulse period in discussing obstacle detection along a travel path. Ex.
`1005, 15:57–67. In particular, the Specification of the ’802 patent states
`“after allowing some small initial amount of time for the motor rotor to
`begin rotation, I is immediately measured and compared against a fixed
`maximum threshold value and PP is immediately measured and compared
`against some maximum threshold number of clock cycles” (emphasis added).
`Id. at 16:31–36. Thus, in this embodiment, obstacle detection is not
`performed along the entire travel path.
`Because the Specification of the ’802 patent indicates obstacle
`detection is not performed along the entire travel path and the prosecution
`history does not include a special definition nor a clear disavowal of the
`plain meaning (Ex 1005, 16:31–36), we conclude from the totality of the
`evidence that the “travel path” recited in claim 7 is not limited to the “entire
`travel path.” Rather, it can refer to a portion of the entire travel path.
`
`D. Means Plus Function – “decision making logic for . . .
`monitoring . . . calculating . . . comparing . . . stopping” (claim
`14)
`
`Patent Owner contends that the term “decision making logic for . . .
`monitoring . . . calculating . . . comparing . . . stopping” as used in claim 14
`invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph5, means plus function analysis
`because decision making logic is not and was not a known structure to those
`
`5 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) re-
`designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). Because the ’802 patent has a filing date before
`September 16, 2012 (effective date of § 4(c)), we will refer to the pre-AIA
`version of § 112.
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`skilled in the art prior to the priority date of the ’802 patent. PO Resp. 49.
`Further, Patent Owner contends because the Specification of the ’802 patent
`does not explicitly recite a “decision making logic,” the term “decision
`making logic” is a nonce word combined with the preposition “for” and
`functional language. Id. at 49–50. We disagree.
`The Federal Circuit held that “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device
`for,” “unit for,” “component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus
`for,” “machine for,” or “system for,” are non-structural generic placeholders
`that may invoke pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Welker Bearing
`Co., v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Mass. Inst. of Tech.
`v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Personalized
`Media Commc’ns, LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mas-
`Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`Although this list is not exhaustive, and other generic placeholders may
`invoke pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, “decision making logic
`for” is not on the list of generic placeholders. As such, a rebuttable
`presumption applies that the term is not within the purview of 35 U.S.C. §
`112, sixth paragraph. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310.
`Furthermore, pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph does not
`apply if persons of ordinary skill in the art reading the specification
`understand the term to be the name for the structure that performs the
`function, even when the term covers a broad class of structures or identifies
`the structures by their function. Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325
`F.3d 1364, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Watts v. XL Sys. Inc., 232 F.3d 877,
`880–81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704; Greenberg v.
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`Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Many
`devices take their names from the functions they perform.”). The term is not
`required to denote a specific structure or a precise physical structure to avoid
`the application of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. See Watts, 232
`F.3d at 880. In this case, the Specification of the ’802 patent states “[t]he
`circuitry of FIGS. 2A–2D includes a number of operational amplifiers which
`require higher voltage than the five volt VCC logic circuitry power signal”
`(emphasis added). Ex. 1005, 6:30–32. As a result, one of ordinary skill in
`the art reading the Specification of the ’802 would understand the term
`“logic” to be the name of a type of circuitry (e.g., structure) that performs
`the function.
`Moreover, “circuit” has been found to be a structural term that does
`not invoke pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Linear Tech. Corp. v.
`Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1321, (Fed. Cir. 2004); Apex, 325 F.3d
`at 1373; Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583–84; Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at
`704–05; CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1369–70; Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
`102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Watts, 232 F.3d at 881; Al-Site Corp. v.
`VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`Because one of ordinary skill in the art reading the Specification of
`the ’802 patent would understand the term “logic” to be the name of a type
`of circuitry and “circuit” has been found not to invoke pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112, sixth paragraph , we conclude from the totality of the evidence that
`claim 14 does not invoke pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.
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`IV. THE PRIOR ART
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`A. Challenges Based on Itoh
`For reasons stated below, we conclude, based on a preponderance of
`the evidence, that claims 1, 7–9, and 14 are anticipated by Itoh.
`
`1. Independent Claim 1
`The parties’ arguments focus on “a sensor for measuring a parameter
`of a motor . . . that varies in response to a resistance to motion” (claim 1).
`We begin with Petitioner’s contentions regarding this limitation.
`Petitioner’s arguments focus on Itoh’s “Embodiment 3” as being the “most
`relevant” to the patentability of the ’802 patent. Pet. 14. Embodiment 3 is
`illustrated in Figures 5–7 of Itoh. Ex. 1007, 7:46–52. Figure 7 is shown
`below:
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`Figure 7 shows a diagram of an opening and closing device for window 26.
`Id. at 7:50–52. The Itoh device monitors whether obstacle 48 is present as
`window 26 is closed and, in such an event, may reverse window 26 to move
`in a downward direction. Id. at 8:49–52, 11:16–20.
`According to Petitioner, the claim 1 limitation “a sensor for measuring
`a parameter of a motor coupled to the motor driven element” embraces
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`Itoh’s pulse-detecting circuit 30 that detects a ripple current corresponding
`to the rotational frequency of motor 20, and outputs a motor pulse signal to
`CPU 34 and counter 36 of controller 32 to calculate the rotational speed of
`the motor. Pet. 15, 30; Ex. 1001, ¶ 94; Ex. 1007, 7:60–64; 8:33–61; 9:37–
`62; Fig. 7.
`Patent Owner argues the correct construction for “a sensor for
`measuring a parameter of a motor that varies in response to a resistance to
`motion” (claim 1) is “a sensor that measures a magnitude of motor current.”
`See supra Part III.A. As a result, Patent Owner argues Itoh does not
`disclose, teach, or suggest “a sensor for measuring a parameter of a motor
`that varies in response to a resistance to motion” (claim 1) because “‘Itoh
`simply measures the timing of binary motor commutation current pulses,
`which is inversely proportional to speed.’” PO Resp. 16–19 (quoting Ex.
`2001 ¶ 57).
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Itoh fails to
`disclose, teach, or suggest “a sensor for measuring a parameter of a motor
`that varies in response to a resistance to motion.” At the outset, we
`construed the claim 1 limitation “sensor for measuring a parameter of a
`motor . . . that varies in response to a resistance to motion” as “any sensor
`that measures any motor parameter that varies as a result of resistance to
`motion” rather than as “a sensor that measures a magnitude of motor
`current.” See supra Part III.A.
`The cited portions of Itoh relied upon by Petitioner disclose circuit 30
`detects a ripple current corresponding to the rotational frequency of motor
`20, and outputs a motor pulse signal to CPU 34 and counter 36 of controller
`32, which discloses “a sensor for measuring a parameter of a motor” as
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`recited in claim 1. Pet. 15, 30; Ex. 1007, 8:33–40. Moreover, the cited
`portions of Itoh relied upon by Petitioner disclose CPU 34 detects if an
`obstacle is stuck between the window frame and window and determines
`whether to descend or interrupt the motion of the window, which discloses
`“varies in response to a resistance to motion” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 15,
`30; Ex. 1007, 8:49–9:62; Figs. 6–7.
`Based on our claim construction discussed supra in part III.A, Itoh’s
`disclosure discussed supra, and the record before us, we conclude that
`Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that claim 1 is
`anticipated by Itoh.
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`2. Claims 7–9
`The parties’ arguments focus on “a movement sensor for monitoring
`movement of the object” (claim 7) and the “travel path” (claim 7). We begin
`with Petitioner’s contentions regarding the limitation “a movement sensor
`for monitoring movement of the object.”
`Petitioner’s arguments concerning claims 7–9 focus on Embodiment 3
`of Itoh, already discussed above. Pet. 18–21, 32–36. According to
`Petitioner, claim 7’s “a movement sensor for monitoring movement of the
`object” embraces Itoh’s pulse detecting circuit 30 indirectly monitoring
`movement of window 26 by sensing pulses generated by motor 20 as it
`drives movement of window 26. Pet. 33; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 118–121; Ex. 1007,
`7:60–8:11; 8:33–61; 9:16–62; Fig. 7.
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Itoh fails to
`disclose, teach, or suggest “a movement sensor for monitoring movement of
`the object” because we construed the claim 7 limitation “a movement sensor
`for monitoring movement of the object” as “any sensor that directly or
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`indirectly monitors movement of the object” rather than as “a separate
`discrete, physical hardware-based sensor (such as a position encoder or Hall
`effect sensor)” that is mounted. See supra Part III.B.
`The cited portions of Itoh relied upon by Petitioner disclose a pulse
`detecting circuit 30 indirectly monitoring movement of window 26 by
`sensing pulses generated by motor 20 as it drives movement of window 26,
`which discloses “a movement sensor for monitoring movement of the
`object” as recited in claim 7. Pet. 33; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 118–121; Ex. 1007, 7:60–
`8:11; 9:16–62; Fig. 7.
`Regarding the “travel path” limitation, Petitioner argues claim 7’s
`“travel path” embraces Itoh’s pulse detecting circuit 30 indirectly monitoring
`movement of window 26 along a travel path in a window frame 24. Pet. 33;
`Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 118–121; Ex. 1007, 7:47–8:11; 8:33–48; 9:16–62; Fig. 7.
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Itoh fails to
`disclose, teach, or suggest “travel path” because we construed that the claim
`7 limitation “travel path” can refer to a portion of the travel path. See supra
`Part III.C.
`The cited portions of Itoh relied upon by Petitioner disclose a pulse
`detecting circuit 30 indirectly monitoring movement of window 26 along a
`travel path in window frame 24, which discloses “monitoring movement of
`the object . . . along a travel path” as recited in claim 7. Pet. 33–34; Ex.
`1001 ¶¶ 118–121; Ex. 1007, 7:47–8:11; 8:33–48; 9:16–62; Fig. 7.
`Based on our claim construction discussed supra in part III.B and
`III.C, Itoh’s disclosure discussed supra, and the record before us, we
`conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that
`claims 7–9 are anticipated by Itoh.
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`3. Independent Claim 14
`Claim 14 has many limitations which are substantially similar to
`limitations discussed in connection with claim 7. The parties’ arguments
`focus on “decision making logic for . . . monitoring . . . calculating . . .
`comparing . . . stopping” (claim 14). We begin with Petitioner’s contentions
`regarding this limitation.
`According to Petitioner, the claim 14 limitation “decision making
`logic for . . . monitoring . . . calculating . . . comparing . . . stopping”
`embraces Itoh’s controller 32 that executes an algorithm for monitoring,
`calculating, comparing, and stopping. Pet. 21–23, 38–39; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 161–
`177; Ex. 1007, 7:47–64; 8:33–61; 9:16–62; 10:33–11:20; Fig. 7.
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Itoh fails to
`disclose, teach, or suggest the limitation “decision making logic for . . .
`monitoring . . . calculating . . . comparing . . . stopping” because we
`construed the claim 14 limitation “decision making logic for . . . monitoring
`. . . calculating . . . comparing . . . stopping” as not invoking 112 sixth
`paragraph. See supra Part III.D.
`The cited portions of Itoh relied upon by Petitioner disclose controller
`32 executing an algorithm for monitoring, calculating, comparing, and
`stopping, which discloses “decision making logic for . . . monitoring . . .
`calculating . . . comparing . . . stopping” as recited in claim 14. Pet. 21–23,
`38–39; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 161–177; Ex. 1007, 7:47–64; 8:33–61; 9:16–62; 10:33–
`11:20; Fig. 7.
`Based on our claim construction discussed supra in part III.D, Itoh’s
`disclosure discussed supra, and the record before us, we conclude that
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`Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that claim 14 is
`anticipated by Itoh.
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`B. Other Asserted Grounds – Itoh as the primary reference
`For reasons stated below, we conclude, based on a preponderance of
`the evidence, that claims 1, 6–9, and 14 are unpatentable over Itoh and one
`or more of the following: knowledge of one ordinary skill in the art, Kinzl,
`and Zuckerman.
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`1. Claims 1, 7–9, and 14
`Petitioner and Patent Owner present various alternate arguments
`reliant on claim interpretations we have not adopted.
`Based on our claim construction discussed supra in part III, Itoh’s
`disclosure described supra in part IV.A, and the record before us, we
`conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that
`claims 1, 7–9, and 14 are unpatentable over Itoh and one or more of the
`following: knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, Kinzl, and
`Zuckerman.
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`2. Claim 6
`The parties’ arguments focus on “immediate past measurements are
`sensed within a forty millisecond interval” (claim 6). We begin with
`Petitioner’s contentions regarding this limitation.
`Petitioner contends claim 6 is obvious over Itoh (see Pet. 28–39), or
`over Itoh and Kinzl (see id. at 49–56). Petitioner contends the 40
`millisecond timeframe would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
`art as a discovering of the optimum or workable range of a general
`condition. Pet. 17, 28, 32; Ex. 1001 ¶ 109.
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`Petitioner contends a 1.2 millisecond pulse period is an example
`within the scope of Itoh for more than 33 cycles of the motor pulse signal
`(“Tp”) samples to elapse in 40 milliseconds. Reply 4. Moreover, Petitioner
`contends 40 milliseconds would have been an obvious design choice to a
`person having ordinary skill in the art because 40 milliseconds are not
`“uniquely successful” and Itoh implicitly teaches the time period for
`sampled data is a parameter to be selected. Id.
`Patent Owner contends design choice rationale does not apply because
`Petitioner fails to present: 1) evidence for why one of skill in the art would
`choose a fixed time window instead or a number of samples; and 2) how 40
`milliseconds might be derived. PO Resp. 23–28.
`Because a 1.2 millisecond pulse period is an example within the scope
`of Itoh for more than 33 Tp samples to elapse in 40 milliseconds and one of
`ordinary skill in the art reading the Specification of the ’802 patent would
`understand there is no unique success of 40 milliseconds, we conclude from
`the totality of the evidence that claim 6 is an obvious design choice.
`
`C. Challenges based on Kinzl
`For reasons stated below, we conclude, based on a preponderance of
`the evidence, that claims 7, 9, and 14 are anticipated by Kinzl and obvious
`over Kinzl.
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`1. Claims 7 and 9
`The parties’ arguments focus on “a movement sensor for monitoring
`movement of the object” (claim 7) and the “travel path” (claim 7). We begin
`with Petitioner’s contentions regarding the limitation “a movement sensor
`for monitoring movement of the object.”
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`Petitioner relies on Figures 1 and 2 of Kinzl, which are shown below:
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`Pet. 41. Figure 1 shows a diagram of a system for operating an electric
`window of an automotive vehicle, and Figure 2 shows three zones
`established for operation of the system. Ex. 1008, 1:7–13, 2:37–41.
`Microcomputer 24 uses sensor 26 to monitor the opening and closing of
`electric window 10, via drive motor 12. Id. at 2:44–57. Microcomputer 24
`determines from sensor 26 whether window 10 has been blocked and, if a
`block is detected, responds in different manners (including stopping and/or
`reversing) dependent upon whether window 10 is in zone 1, 2, or 3. Id. at
`3:6–26.
`Petitioner a
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