Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`Paper 11
`Date: July 2, 2014
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`_____________
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`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., FORD MOTOR COMPANY, AMERICAN
`HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA
`LLC, SUBARU OF AMERICA INC., TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA,
`INC., and VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
`____________
`
`
`Before JOSIAH C. COCKS, HYUN J. JUNG, and GEORGE R. HOSKINS,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`COCKS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
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`

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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`
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`Petitioner, Nissan North America, Inc. et al. (“Petitioner”), filed an amended
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`petition (Paper 6, “Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1-5, 12-16, 18,
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`19, 21, 25-31, and 34-36 of U.S. Patent No. 6,324,463 (the “’463 patent”). Patent
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`Owner, Cruise Control Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”), filed a preliminary
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`response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
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`To institute an inter partes review, we must determine the information
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`presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable
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`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
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`challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below,
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`we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable
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`likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1-5,
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`12-16, 18, 19, 21, 25-31, and 34-36. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby
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`institute an inter partes review as to those claims.
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`A. Related Matters
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`
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`Petitioner has identified several related district court proceedings involving
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`the ’463 patent, all of which were filed by Patent Owner in the United States
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`District Court for the District of Delaware. See Pet. 3-4; Paper 5, at 2-4. The ’463
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`patent is also the subject of four other requests for inter partes review (IPR2014-
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`00279, IPR2014-00280, IPR2014-00281, and IPR2014-00289).
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`B. The ’463 Patent (Ex. 1001)
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`
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`The ’463 patent discloses cruise control systems for use in a human
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`operated vehicle. See Ex. 1001, Abst. Figures 1 and 2 of the ’463 patent are
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`shown below:
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`2
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`Figure 1 illustrates a digital speed display, while Figure 2 illustrates an analog
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`speedometer. See id. at 3:8-13. In Figure 1, main speed display 3 shows the
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`current speed at which the vehicle is operating. See id. at 3:49-53. When a cruise
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`control set button (not shown in Figure 1) is pressed, the vehicle speed is stored in
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`digital memory 12 as a preset speed. See id. at 3:53-60. Second speed display 16
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`shows that preset speed. See id.
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`Figure 2’s analog speedometer 40 incorporates several LED assemblies 45.
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`See id. at 4:19-26. Each LED assembly 45 has an LED and a detector. See id. at
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`4:29-30. When a cruise control set button (not shown in Figure 2) is pressed, all of
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`the detectors are activated, and all of the LEDs momentarily light up. See id. at
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`4:48-51. The back of needle 42 reflects the light of the lit LEDs behind the needle,
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`and that reflected light is detected by the detector of the LED assembly disposed at
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`the location of needle 42. See id. at 4:51-57. The LED of that assembly is then
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`activated and remains lit to indicate the speed at which cruise control was engaged.
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`See id. at 4:57-64.
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`
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`Claims 1, 2, 6, 12, 13, 18, 21, 25, 26, 29, and 34 are independent. Claims 1
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`and 12 are illustrative and is reproduced below:
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`1. A cruise control system for vehicle having a human
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`operator, comprising:
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`3
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`a speed controller that automatically maintains the vehicle
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`speed at a preset speed;
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` an enable switch associated with said controller for enabling
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`the system;
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` a set speed input in communication with said controller for
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`manually setting the speed of the vehicle at said preset speed, thereby
`engaging the system;
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` a memory which stores information indicative of said preset
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`speed; and
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`a feedback system for communicating said information in said
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`memory to the operator of the vehicle.
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`
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`determining the speed at which the vehicle is traveling;
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`activating the cruise control system at a desired cruising speed;
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`12. A method for visually communicating to the human
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`operator of a vehicle having a cruise control system a cruising speed
`at which the vehicle is set, comprising:
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`
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`displaying a symbol indicative of the speed at which the cruise
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`control system is activated;
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`maintaining the activated cruise control speed symbol upon
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`temporary acceleration or deceleration of the vehicle;
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`removing said symbol when the cruise control system is
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`deactivated or a new cruising speed is selected.
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`4
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`C. Prior Art Relied Upon
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`
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`Autonomous Intelligent Cruise
`Control (AICC), Prometheus
`(“Prometheus”)
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`JP S60-174329
`Narita
`(translation, Ex. 1006)1
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`Toyota Celsior Owner’s Manual
`(“Celsior”)
`(translation, Ex. 1009)
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`Apr. 1991
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`Ex. 1003
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`Sept. 1985
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`Ex. 1004
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`July 1997
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`Ex. 1007
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`D. The Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
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`
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`Petitioner contends that claims of the patent are unpatentable under 35
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`U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a) on the following grounds:
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`Reference[s]
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`Prometheus
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`Prometheus and Narita
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`Prometheus and Celsior
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`Basis Claim[s] challenged
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`§ 102
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`§ 103
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`1-3, 5, 12-14, 18, 19, 25-27,
`29-31, and 34-36
`3-5, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 28
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`§ 103
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`4
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`A. Preliminary Matters
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`
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response presents two arguments addressed to
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`the merits of the Petition’s proposed grounds for unpatentability. Patent Owner
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`first asserts we should deny inter partes review on a proposed ground of
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`unpatentability because the Petition provides only a partial translation of Celsior.
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`1 Our decision cites to the translations of the prior art relied upon, including the
`page numbering of the original documents as reflected in the translations.
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`See Prelim. Resp. 10-11. That publication is written in the Japanese language. See
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`Ex. 1007 (original Japanese-language document). Patent Owner contends that
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`Celsior, in its entirety, constitutes 261 pages, and Petitioner has provided a
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`translation of only 15 of those pages. See Prelim. Resp. 10.
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`
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`It is apparent that the Japanese version of Celsior (Ex. 1007) and the
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`corresponding English translation (Ex. 1009) are directed to only portions of a
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`larger document. Rule 42.63(b), which applies in this proceeding,2 states: “When
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`a party relies on a document or is required to produce a document in a language
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`other than English, a translation of the document into English and an affidavit
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`attesting to the accuracy of the translation must be filed with the document.” 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.63(b) (2013) (emphasis added). The Certificates of Translation
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`provided with the Petition attest only that “[t]he translations are accurate and
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`complete translations of relevant portions of the original document.” Exs. 1006
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`and 1009 (emphasis added). Thus, the Petition is not in strict compliance with
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`Rule 42.63(b), because it does not include translations “of the document[s].”
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`The translations also suffer from a second deficiency, not raised by Patent
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`Owner. Rule 42.63(b) requires an “affidavit,” defined as an “affidavit or
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`declaration under § 1.68 of this chapter.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2013). The
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`Certificates of Translation are not affidavits because they were not made under
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`oath. The Certificates can qualify as permitted declarations only if the declarant is
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`warned on the same document that willful false statements and the like are
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`punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, and they also state all statements
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`made of the declarant’s own knowledge are true, and all statements made on
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`information and belief are believed to be true. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2013). The
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`2 Patent Owner relies on MPEP § 706.02, but that is not binding authority in this
`proceeding. Even if we were to apply the MPEP, we would still institute review.
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`Certificates do not satisfy those requirements, and therefore are not declarations
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`
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`under Rule 1.68.
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`
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`Nonetheless, we may waive or suspend the requirements of Rule 42.63(b)
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`and also place conditions on the waiver or suspension. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b)
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`(2013). Pursuant to that authority, we have decided to grant inter partes review
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`based on the “relevant portions” of the original documents that have been
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`translated, and waive the requirement for a translation of the full document, subject
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`to the following condition. Petitioner must, within 30 days of the date of this
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`decision is entered, file substitute Certificates of Translation directed to the
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`translations originally filed with the Petition complying with the requirements of
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`Rule 42.63(b) to the extent that the substitute Certificates include a proper
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`indication that the declarant is subject to the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2013).
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`For any content of the noted documents for which English translation has not been
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`provided, we remind Petitioner of its duty of candor and good faith to the Office
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`(37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2013)) as well as its routine discovery obligation to serve
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`relevant information that is inconsistent with a position advanced by Petitioner in
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`the Petition (37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2013)).
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`B. Claim Construction
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`As a step in our analysis, we determine the meaning of the claims for
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`purposes of this decision. In an inter partes review, a claim in an unexpired patent
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`shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of
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`the patent in which it appears. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2013). Under that
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`construction, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as
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`would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
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`patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007). We construe the terms below in accordance with that standard.
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`7
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`Patent 6,324,463
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`1. “engaging the system” (claim 1) and
`“engaging the cruise control system” (claim 21)
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`Petitioner contends we should construe “engaging the system” in claim 1 to
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`
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`mean “operating the cruise control system to automatically control the vehicle at
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`the preset speed.” Pet. 12-13 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 4, 1:46-48, 5:13-15). Patent
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`Owner contends we should construe “thereby engaging the system” in claim 1 to
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`mean “as a result, activating the speed controller of the cruise control system to
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`automatically maintain the vehicle speed at the preset speed.” Prelim. Resp. 4-5
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`(citing Ex. 1001, 3:54-57). Patent Owner describes “operating the cruise control
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`system” in Petitioner’s proposal as “an overly broad generalization of the claimed
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`invention,” and contends the construction instead should refer specifically to the
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`speed controller of the cruise control system, apart from the claimed feedback
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`system and the claimed set speed input. Id. We conclude Petitioner’s proposal
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`comports with the broadest reasonable construction of “engaging” in light of the
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`’463 patent specification.
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`The term “comprising” in claim 1 leaves open the possibility that other
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`unclaimed components of the cruise control system, in addition to the speed
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`controller, may play a part in controlling the vehicle’s speed. In addition, the term
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`“maintain” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unduly narrow, because it
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`forecloses temporary acceleration of the vehicle while the cruise control system is
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`engaged. See Ex. 1001, 1:32-36, 4:6-14 (indicating vehicle may be accelerated
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`temporarily while cruise control is engaged). We therefore adopt Petitioner’s
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`proposed construction.
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`Petitioner proposes the same construction for “engaging the cruise control
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`system” in claim 21. See Pet. 12-13. Patent Owner instead proposes “putting the
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`cruise control system into an operative state” for claim 21. Prelim. Resp. 5-6. In
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`8
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
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`particular, Patent Owner notes claim 21 separately recites “engaging the cruise
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`control system” and “setting the preset speed,” and contends claim 21 therefore
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`“requires that the cruise control system is engaged prior to setting the preset speed
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`(which can only be set, and is only utilized, during use of the cruise control
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`system).” Id. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. In particular,
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`under a broadest reasonable construction, the “engaging” and “setting” of claim 21
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`may occur simultaneously. See Ex. 1001, 3:56-57 (“when the set button is pressed,
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`that is, when the cruise control is engaged”). Thus, there is no requirement that the
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`engagement of the cruise control system must occur “prior to” the act of setting the
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`present speed. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.
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`For the foregoing reasons we construe “engaging the system” in claim 1 and
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`“engaging the cruise control system” in claim 21 to mean “operating the cruise
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`control system to automatically control the vehicle at the preset speed.”
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`2. “enabling” (claims 1 and 2) and “enabled” (claims 2 and 4)
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`Petitioner contends that we should construe “enabling the system” in claim 1
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`
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`and “enabling . . . the controller” in claim 2 to mean “a ‘system on’ state for the
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`cruise control system.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:39-46). Patent Owner instead
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`proposes “putting the speed controller of the cruise control system into an
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`operative condition . . . in that the speed controller will automatically maintain the
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`vehicle at a preset speed.” Prelim. Resp. 2-3. Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s
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`proposal as “too vague to provide any benefit when evaluating the validity of the
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`claims.” Prelim. Resp. 3.
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`We conclude Petitioner’s proposal comports with the broadest reasonable
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`construction of “enabling” and “enabled” in light of the ’463 patent specification.
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`That is, the ’463 patent specification consistently describes “enabling” as turning
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`9
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`on the cruise control system (see Ex. 1001, 1:18-20, 1:64-65, 4:39-44) and
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`“engaging” as setting the cruise control at a desired speed (see id. at 1:21-25, 1:45-
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`48, 3:56-57). We therefore adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction that “enabling
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`the system” in claim 1 and “enabling . . . the controller” in claim 2 mean “a
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`‘system on’ state for the cruise control system.” Pet. 13. This construction also
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`applies to the descriptor “enabled” in claims 2 and 4. See id.; Prelim. Resp. 3.
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`3. “indicating to the operator the unset status of the preset speed” (claim 15) and
`“displaying a symbol indicative of an unset state of the preset speed”
`(claim 21)
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`Petitioner contends that we should construe “unset status” and “unset state”
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`in these two claim limitations to mean “a state or status in which there is no preset
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`speed for the cruise control system.” Pet. 13-14. Patent Owner contends
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`Petitioner’s proposal is improper because “it adds ‘for the cruise control system.’”
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`Prelim. Resp. 7. We note, however, that claim 15’s parent claim 13, and claim 21,
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`both recite “a preset speed for which the cruise control system is set” (emphasis
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`added). That the claims, themselves, associate setting of the preset speed with the
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`cruise control system undermines Patent Owner’s contention that there is
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`impropriety in the Petitioner’s proposed construction. We therefore adopt
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction.
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`Patent Owner further contends we should construe these two claim
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`limitations to mean “displaying a visual indication that the preset speed has not
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`been set.” Prelim. Resp. 6-8. We are not persuaded as to claim 15, which broadly
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`recites “indicating” without requiring the indication to be visual. As to claim 21,
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`“displaying . . . a symbol” self-evidently requires a visual indication. We therefore
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`decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction as being either too narrow
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`(claim 15) or inconsistent with the plain language of the claim (claim 21).
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`Patent 6,324,463
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`4. “activating the cruise control system” (claims 12 and 15) and
`“deactivated” (claims 12, 13, and 21)
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`Petitioner contends we should construe “activating” in these claims to mean
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`“turning on,” and “deactivated” as “turned off.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner agrees as
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`to all claims except for claim 12. See Prelim. Resp. 9-10. We agree with the
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`parties in this regard, and therefore construe “activating the cruise control system”
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`in claim 15 to mean turning on the cruise system, and “deactivated” in claims 13
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`and 21 to mean that the cruise control system is turned off.
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`Patent Owner contends we should construe “activating” in claim 12 to mean
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`something different, namely, “causing the cruise control system to maintain the
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`speed at which the vehicle is traveling at the desired cruising speed.” Prelim.
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`Resp. 8. It is true that claim 12, unlike the other claims, recites “activating the
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`cruise control system at a desired cruising speed,” “displaying a symbol indicative
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`of the speed at which the cruise control system is activated,” and “maintaining the
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`activated cruise control speed symbol” (emphases added). These limitations seem
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`to equate activation with setting the cruise control system at a desired cruising
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`speed.
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`“[C]laim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.”
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[A] claim term
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`should be construed consistently with its appearance in other places in the same
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`claim or in other claims of the same patent.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274
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`F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, construing the same term to have
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`different meanings in different claims is the exception rather than the rule.
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`Moreover, claim 12 recites “removing said symbol when the cruise control system
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`is deactivated” (emphasis added). If we were to adopt Patent Owner’s construction
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`of claim 12, that limitation would require the symbol indicative of the cruising
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`speed to be removed when the cruise control system stops maintaining the cruising
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`speed — for example, upon temporary acceleration of the vehicle, or temporary
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`deceleration of the vehicle when the brakes are applied. We conclude that one of
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`ordinary skill in the art, upon reading the ’463 patent specification, would not
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`construe claim 12 in such a manner. See Ex. 1001, 2:5-35 (discussing “potential
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`safety hazards” of prior cruise control systems which did not display preset cruise
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`control speed upon temporary acceleration or deceleration), 2:37-45 (discussing
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`solution). We, therefore, construe activating / activated in claim 12 the same as in
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`the other claims of the ’463 patent.
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`5. Remaining claim terms
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`All other terms of the claims are given their plain and ordinary meaning that
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`is consistent with the Specification. For purposes of this decision, we need not
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`construe expressly those terms.
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`C. Discussion
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`
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`Petitioner proposes three grounds of unpatentability with respect to the
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`claims of the ’463 patent. All of the grounds involve Prometheus. Prometheus
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`describes the operation of an “Autonomous Intelligent Cruise Control (AICC)”
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`feature in connection with a motor vehicle. The reference summarizes the
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`functioning of an AICC system as follows:
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`The Autonomous Intelligent Cruise Control (AICC) is an assisting
`system being able of controlling relative speed and distance between
`two adjacent vehicles in the same lane.
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`Ex. 1003, 5 (emphasis removed).3
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`3 In this Decision, the noted pagination of Prometheus is that supplied by Petitioner
`which appears in the lower right-hand corner of the pages of the document.
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`12
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`Patent 6,324,463
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`Based on the disclosure of Prometheus, Petitioner contends that claims 1-3,
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`5, 12-14, 18, 19, 25-27, 29-31, and 34-36 are anticipated, and claims 3-5, 12, 15,
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`16, 21, and 28 would have been obvious.
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`1. Anticipation
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`In urging that the above-noted claims are anticipated, Petitioner points
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`primarily to four Figures appearing in Prometheus at pages 108-111 and labeled as
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`Figures 1-4, as well as content described in Prometheus at pages 105-107.
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`Petitioner also relies on the declaration testimony of David A. McNamara (Ex.
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`1010) in support of its anticipation position.
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`As a part of the Petition, Petitioner reproduces Prometheus’s Figure 3. See
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`Pet. 9. That Figure 3, as it appears in the Petition, is reproduced below:
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`Figure 3 above depicts an image of a vehicle’s dashboard that incorporates
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`an AICC system. See Ex. 1003, 107. As is apparent from Figure 3, the left side of
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`the figure presents a speedometer that indicates the speed of the vehicle. The
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`figure also describes that there are “Consign Speed LEDs” as a part of the
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`speedometer. Prometheus explains that “consign speed is the speed selected by the
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`driver to maintain the vehicle.” Id. at 105. That “consign speed” is displayed to
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`the vehicle’s operator via the consign speed LEDs, see id. at 108, which, in Figure
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`3, are expressed as being “green.” See also Figure 4 (“All LEDs under consign
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`speed corresponding LED are ON.”) Prometheus also explains that its AICC
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`system includes two modes of “regulation”: “speed” regulation, and “distance”
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`regulation. Id. at 105. In that regard, Prometheus describes the following:
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`To activate the regulation, the driver has to press on the
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`ACTIVATE button, and immediately the system starts the regulation,
`as well in speed if there is not a detected target, as in distance if there
`is at least one. To deactivate the regulation and take control of the
`vehicle, the driver has two possibilities: the DEACTIVATE button or
`the BRAKE PEDAL. In both cases the driver stops the regulation and
`the consign speed is memorized by the system. If the driver wants to
`take up the regulation, he can act in two ways: press on the
`ACTIVATE button so the system starts again the regulation with the
`vehicle speed as consign speed, or press on the RESUME button and
`the system starts again the regulation with the memorized speed as
`consign speed.
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`Id. Thus, Prometheus discloses that a “consign speed” is memorized by the system
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`and may be resumed by the vehicle after certain actions are taken by the vehicle’s
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`operator. Further, as discussed above, that memorized consign speed is displayed
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`to the vehicle’s operator by virtue of the consign speed LEDs associated with the
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`speedometer. See, e.g., Figure 4, State 2.
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`In light of the teachings of Prometheus, Petitioner contends that all the
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`features required by claims 1-3, 5, 12-14, 18, 19, 25-27, 29-31, and 34-36 are
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`disclosed in that reference. See Pet. 18-41. Patent Owner does not dispute that
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`contention. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is established when each and
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`every element in a claim is found in a prior art reference and arranged as recited in
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`the claim. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed.
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`IPR2014-00291
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`Cir. 2001). In reviewing the Petition, we are satisfied, at this time, that Petitioner
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`has shown where all the features of the above-noted claims are found in
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`Prometheus in the same manner as they are arranged in the claims. Accordingly,
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`we are persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will
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`prevail in showing that claims 1-3, 5, 12-14, 18, 19, 25-27, 29-31, and 34-36 are
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`unpatentable based on Prometheus.
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`2. Obviousness
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`Petitioner contends that claims 3-5, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 28 are unpatentable
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`over Prometheus and Narita. Petitioner also contends that claim 4 is unpatentable
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`over Prometheus and Celsior.
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`a. Prometheus and Narita
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`With respect to claims 3, 5, and 12, as discussed above, we have determined
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`already that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail
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`in showing that those claims are unpatentable as anticipated by Prometheus. In
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`reviewing the Petition (see Pet. 42-48), we are also persuaded that Petitioner has
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`established a reasonable likelihood that claims 3, 5, and 12 are unpatentable based
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`on Prometheus taken with Narita.
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`Claim 21 is independent and claims 4, 15, 16, and 28 ultimately depend
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`from one of independent claims 1, 12, or 26. Claim 21 and those dependent claims
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`include features directed to displaying signals or indicators to an operator that
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`convey “when the controller is initially enabled to indicate the state of the
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`controller” (claim 4), or “the unset status of the preset speed” (claims 15 and 21) in
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`the form of a “visual symbol” (claim 16) or “symbol” (claim 21). Claim 28
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`similarly adds that the visual information indicative of the preset speed is in the
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`form of a “digital numerical indicator.”
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`15
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`Petitioner contends that the features added by claims 4, 15, 16, 21, and 28,
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`even if absent from Prometheus, are disclosed in Narita. Narita is titled “Vehicle
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`Speed Automatic Control Device.” Ex. 1006, Title. An excerpted portion of
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`Narita’s Figure 5 is reproduced in the Petition and is also reproduced below:
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`Pet. 45. The excerpted Figure above depicts actual vehicle speed display unit 36
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`and stored vehicle speed display unit 37. Petitioner contends the following with
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`respect to that excerpted Figure:
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`Figure 5 of Narita (excerpted [above]) teaches a digital stored
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`vehicle speed display unit that changes display after the stored speed
`is set. Narita discloses that the digital stored vehicle speed display
`unit displays a series of dashes (“--”) after power to the control device
`is turned on but before the set switch is turned on; as illustrated, the
`digital stored vehicle speed display unit displays the stored speed
`(“70”) after the set switch is turned on. ([Ex. 1006,] 5 & Fig. 5.)
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`Pet. 42. In support of that above-noted assessment of Narita’s disclosure,
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`Petitioner also points to the declaration testimony of Mr. McNamara. Pet. 46-54
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`(citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 65 and 68-72). Petitioner also reasons, with recourse to Mr.
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`McNamara’s testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had
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`reason to combine the teachings of Prometheus and Narita. Id. at 53-54.
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`With respect to claims 15, 16, 21, and 28, we are persuaded by the Petition
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`that Narita discloses the content of those claims. More specifically, we are
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`persuaded that the reference discloses a system or process for displaying “the unset
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`status of the preset speed” (claims 15 and 21), constituting a “visual symbol”
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`(claim 16), “symbol” (claim 21), or “digital numerical indicator” (claim 28).
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`In connection with claim 4, we observe that the claim 4 requires that a
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`digital display must display a predetermined signal indicating the state of the
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`controller when it is “initially enabled.” According to Petitioner, “[o]ne of
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`ordinary skill would understand that Figure 5 in Narita discloses that the digital
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`stored vehicle speed display unit displays a series of dashes (“--“)_after power to
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`the control device is turned on but before the set switch is turned on . . . .” Pet. 46
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`(citing Ex. 1010 (McNamara Decl.) ¶ 65). We, however, are not persuaded that the
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`dashed line indicates the enabled state of the controller, because Narita does not
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`suggest that portion of stored vehicle display unit 37 changes when the controller is
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`enabled. That is, display unit 37 may very well show a dashed line before the
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`controller is enabled. In other words, the dashed line does not indicate necessarily
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`the state of the controller as “initially enabled.”4
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`We have considered the Petition and are persuaded that Petitioner has shown
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`that it has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claims 15, 16,
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`21, and 28 are unpatentable based on the Prometheus and Narita. We are not
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`persuaded that the Petition has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 4 is
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`unpatentable over Prometheus and Narita.
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`4 In this regard we note a critical distinction between claim 4 (for which we do not
`institute review based on Prometheus and Narita) and claim 15 (for which we do
`institute such review). Claim 4 requires the digital display to indicate the enabled
`state of the controller, whereas claim 15 requires indicating the unset status of the
`preset speed. Claim 15 does not require indicating the activated or enabled status
`of the cruise control system.
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`b. Prometheus and Celsior
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`Petitioner contends that claim 4 is unpatentable based on the teachings of
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`Prometheus and Celsior. As discussed above, claim 4 ultimately depends from
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`claim 1 and adds a feature directed to a display for conveying a signal to an
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`operator. In particular, claim 4 requires that a “digital display” operate to display a
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`“predetermined signal when the controller is initially enabled to indicate the state
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`of the controller.”
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`Petitioner characterizes Celsior’s disclosure as follows:
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`that
`for vehicles
`Celsior discloses a cruise control system
`automatically maintains the vehicle speed at a set cruise control speed
`and a combination of different indicators and visual symbols that
`informs the vehicle operator of the operating status of the cruise
`control system. (Celsior (Ex. 1009), at 130-134.)
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`Pet. 54. In reviewing Celsior, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s assessment of
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`Celsior’s disclosure is accurate. In connection with claim 4 of the’463 patent,
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`Petitioner directs our attention to a figure found on page 133 of the reference,
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`which is reproduced below:
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`The figure above depicts instructions in setting Celsior’s radar cruise
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`control. On this record, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Celsior
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`discloses the claim limitation of claim 4. When the main switch is pressed to turn
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`the radar control system on, the phrase “CRUISE READY” appears in the multi-
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`information display. See Ex. 1009, 133. In that regard, we are persuaded that the
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`displayed indication of “CRUISE READY” constitutes a “digital display of a
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`predetermined signal,” which signifies the state of the controller when it is initially
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`enabled. For purposes of this decision, we also are persuaded by Petitioner’s
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`contention that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by the Celsior
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`disclosure to modify the Prometheus cruise control system to include this feature.
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`See Pet. 56-57 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 80).
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`We, therefore, determine Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that
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`claim 4 is anticipated by Celsior.
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`D. Alleged Redundancies
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`Patent Owner asserts that the Petition’s grounds contain “redundancy of the
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`alleged grounds of unpatentability.” See Prelim. Resp. 11. In that regard, Patent
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`Owner references the content of other Petitions (IPR2014-00280 and IPR2014-
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`00281) asserting additional grounds of unpatentability with respect to claims of
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`the’463 patent, and involving some of the prior art discussed above in connection
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`with this proceeding (IPR2014-00291). Patent Owner requests that we deny those
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`allegedly “redundant” grounds as now presented in this IPR2014-00291
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`proceeding. We decline to do so. The referenced Petitions (IPR2014-00280 and
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`IPR2014-00281) are separate proceedings, and as noted in an order issued
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`concurrently to this De