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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD IN THE UNITED
`STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`Trial N0.:
`
`IPR 2013—00596
`
`In re:
`
`US. Patent No. 7,802,310
`
`Patent Owners:
`
`PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC & Level 3 Communications
`
`Petitioner:
`
`Apple, Inc.
`
`Inventors:
`
`David A. Farber and Ronald D. Lachman
`
`For: CONTROLLING ACCESS TO DATA IN A DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
`
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`June 16, 2014
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.120
`
`2020057
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`

`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 2013-00596
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`SOLE INSTITUTED GROUND .................................................................... l
`
`II.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS .......................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`“data item” ............................................................................................ 2
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`“digital identifier” (claim 86); “content—based identifier”
`(claims 70, 81) ...................................................................................... 3
`
`“content—dependent name” (claims 24, 32) .......................................... 4
`
`“selectively permitting .
`
`. .” (claim 70) ................................................ 6
`
`“selectively allow. . .” (claims 81 and 86)............. ............................. 7
`
`Challenged Claims Require that the Data Item Corresponding
`to the Name/Identifier in the “Request” is Accessed ........................... 8
`
`G.
`
`The BRC Standard is Not Applicable to this Proceeding................... 10
`
`l—< l—i l—i
`
`LAW .................. l 1
`
`THE MODIFICATION TO WOODHILL BASED ON STEFIK
`
`ALLEGED BY PETITIONER’S EXPERT WOULD NOT HAVE
`
`BEEN OBVIOUS BECAUSE ONE OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE
`
`ART WOULD HAVE TRIED TO MINIMIZE (NOT MAXIMIZE)
`THE NUMBER OF COMPARISON PROCEDURES REQUIRED
`TO CHECK WHETHER ACCESS WAS AUTHORIZED ......................... 12
`
`ONE WOULD NOT HAVE MODIFIED WOODHILL TO CHECK
`
`WHETHER ACCESS TO A FILE BY A COMPUTER WAS
`
`AUTHORIZED WHEN THE COMPUTER ALREADY HAD THE
`
`CURRENT VERSION OF THAT FILE ........................... l9
`
`VI.
`
`STEFIK TEACHES AWAY FROM THE ALLEGED
`
`MODIFICATION BY IGNORING UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS AND
`NOT USING THEM TO DETERMINE WHETHER ACCESS IS
`
`AUTHORIZED ............................................................................................. 22
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`Patent Owner’s Response (U.S. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 2013—00596
`
`VII.
`
`KSR DEMONSTRATES NONOBVIOUSNESS BECAUSE PRIOR
`
`ART ELEMENTS ARE NOT USED FOR THEIR INTENDED
`
`PURPOSE AND DO NOT SERVE THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION
`
`IN THE ALLEGED COMBINATION ......................................................... 24
`
`VIII.
`
`THE ART TEACHES AWAY FROM THE ALLEGED
`
`MODIFICATION BECAUSE “FUNDAMENTAL”, “KEY” AND
`“MUST” FEATURES OF STEFIK ARE NOT REFLECTED IN THE
`
`ALLEGED COMBINATION ....................................................................... 26
`
`IX.
`
`GRANULES CORRESPONDING TO CONTENTS IDENTIFIERS IN
`
`THE ALLEGED REQUEST IN WOODHHILL AS ALLEGEDLY
`MODIFIED BY STEFIK ARE NEVER PROVIDED TO THE
`
`REQUESTING COMPUTER IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST .................. 30
`
`THE ALLEGED IDENTIFIER IN THE WOODHILL/STEFIK
`
`COMBINATION IS NOT A “NAME” AND IS NOT USED FOR
`
`ACCESSING ........................... 32
`
`XI.
`
`FURTHER FLAWS IN WOODHILL INCLUDING PETITIONER’S
`
`IMPROPER MIXING OF ALTERNATIVE ALLEGATIONS
`
`,,,,, 36
`
`XII.
`
`SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................... 41
`
`XIII.
`
`THE EXAMINER CONSIDERED AND ALLOWED THE
`
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS OVER ALL ART RELIED UPON BY
`
`PETITIONER DURING PROSECUTION OF THE ‘3 IO PATENT ........... 42
`
`XIV.
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 44
`
`PATENT OWNER’S EXHIBIT LIST
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC (“patent owner” or “PO”) submits this
`
`response to the petition. Petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Petitioner has not met its
`
`burden for the reasons explained below. See also Dewar Decl. at 1m 18~62 [EX.
`
`20201)
`
`US. Patent No. 7,802,310 (“the ‘3 10 patent”) has an effective filing date of
`
`April 11, 1995 given its continuity.
`
`(EX. 1001.) While patent owner (PO) reserves
`
`the right to establish an earlier date of invention, an effective filing date of April
`
`11, 1995 is assumed for purposes of this Response (i.e., the “critical date” is no
`
`later than April 11, 1995 for purposes of this submission). Petitioner does NOT
`
`allege a later effective filing date in connection with the instituted ground, and the
`
`Board rejected petitioner’s Section 112 arguments in connection with a non—
`
`instituted ground in Paper 9. Thus, the April 11, 1995 effective filing date is
`
`applicable in this proceeding.
`
`PO notes that another IPR is also pending regarding the ‘3 10 patent. (See
`
`IPR 2014—00062.)
`
`1. SOLE INSTITUTED GROUND
`
`The Board, on March 26, 2014, construed certain claim terms and instituted
`
`a trial in this proceeding regarding the ‘3 10 patent for only the following:
`
`1.
`
`Whether claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82 and 86 are unpatentable as
`
`obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over Woodhill (EX. 1014 — US.
`
`1
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`,
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`Patent Owner’s Response (U.S. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`lPR 2013-00596
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`Patent No. 5,649,196) and Stefik (EX. 1013 —— U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,359,881).
`
`The Board ordered that no other grounds of alleged unpatentability were
`
`authorized regarding the ‘3 10 patent. (Paper 9.) Thus, petitioner is not permitted
`
`to argue unpatentability in this proceeding regarding any other ground(s) even if
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`such other ground(s) may have been in the petition.
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`Claim terms are presumed to be given their ordinary and customary meaning
`
`as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`
`invention. Phillips 12. AWH Corp, 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`
`However, the inventor may rebut that presumption by providing a definition of the
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`term in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.
`
`A. “data item ”.
`
`The specification of the ‘3 10 patent provides a definitionfor at least the
`
`following term in the chart below with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`
`precision (i.e., the inventors were their own lexicographer):
`
`
`Claim Term
`
`Correct Construction
`
`“data item”
`
`Sequence Osz'ts.
`
`(‘3 10 patent, col. 2:16—17.) As the
`
`
`
`
`
`(This term appears
`expressly in claims 24,
`32 and 70. This term is
`
`also contained in the
`below—constructions of
`
`“digital identifier”,
`“content—based
`
`Board explained in its June 5, 2013 Decision in [PR
`
`2013—00082, the “sequence of bits” may include any of
`
`the following which represent examples in a non-
`
`exhaustive list: (1) the contents of a file; (2) a portion of
`
`a file; (3) a page in memory; (4) an object in an object-
`
`2
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013-00596
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`
`
`identifier” and
`“content-dependent
`name” and is thus also
`
`relevant thereto.
`
`
`
`oriented program; (5) a digital message; (6) a digital
`
`scanned image; (7) a part of a Video or audio signal; (8) a
`
`directory; (9) a record in a database; (10) a location in
`
`memory or on a physical device; (1 1) any other entity
`
`which can be represented by a sequence of bits.
`
`(See
`
`June 5, 2013 Dec. in IPR 2013—00082 at 2-3 [EX. 2008];
`
`and May 17, 2013 Dec. in IPR 2013—00082 at 14-15 [Ex
`
`2009])
`
`During prosecution of family member US. Patent
`
`No. 7,949,662, applicant and the USPTO Examiner made
`
`clear that the “data item” may be “any sequence of bits”
`
`and that “the data item may represent any type/kind of
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`data.” See, in EX. 2004, the § 112 rejection in the Office
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`Action dated Sept. 14, 2007, the response thereto, and
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`then the Examiner’s withdrawal of the § 112 rejection on
`
`page 21 of the Office Action dated July 3, 2008. (EX.
`
`
`
`
`
`2004)
`
`
`B. “digital identifier” {claim 86); “content—based identifier ” (claims 70Z 812.
`
`The Board construed these two terms as “an identifierfor a data item being
`
`based at least in part on a given function ofat least some 0ftlzebz'ts in the
`
`particular sequence ofbits 0ftlze particular data item.” (Paper 9, pgs. 8—10.)
`
`PO has assumed this construction for these two terms in this proceeding
`
`regarding claims 70, 81 and 86, without prejudice to argue for another construction
`
`for these terms in other proceeding(s). PO notes that the Board’s construction of
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`Patent Owner’s Response (U.S. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013-00596
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`“digital identifier” conflicts with the district court’s construction of that same term
`
`in related litigations. (Ex. 2013, pg. 47; and Ex. 2014.)
`
`C.
`
`‘bontent—dependent nameflclaims 24432).
`
`The Board also construed “content—dependent name” as “an identifier for a
`
`data item being based at least in part on a given function of at least some of the bits
`
`in the particular sequence of bits of the particular data item.” (Paper 9, pgs. 8-10.)
`
`This construction is wrong for several reasons. First, the Board’s
`
`construction conflicts with the express language of claim 32. Claim 32 expressly
`
`requires that the content-dependent name of the data item is based on “all of the
`
`contents of the particular data item” (emphasis added). Thus, at least with respect
`
`to claim 32, the construction of “content—dependent name” should be “a namefor
`
`a data item being based at least in part on a given function ofgll 0ftlze bits in the
`
`particular sequence of bits 0ftlie particular data item.” (emphasis added.)
`
`Claim 11 also states “all.”
`
`
`Second, the Board’s construction for “content—dependent name” in claims
`
`24 and 32 improperly ignores the word “name” in the claim language. It cannot
`
`reasonably be said that all identifiers are names. For example, while afingerprint
`
`is an identifierfor a person, it is ngt a ‘name ”for that person. Contrary to the
`
`Board’s suggestion, something is not a “name” simply because it is an “identifier.”
`
`Any attempt to replace “name” with “identifier” in a construction of “content—
`
`dependent name” would be wrong, unreasonable and illogical. Even Woodhill
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013—00596
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`contrasts the difference between a file “name” and a binary object “identifier” (see
`
`e. g, file name 40 and file name 80 in Figs. 3—4 of Woodhill, compared to binary
`
`object identifier 74 in Fig. 3 of Woodhill), evidencing that they are not the same
`
`thing in this art. One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would
`
`have understood that there is a significant difference between a “name” and a mere
`
`“identifier.” “Name” should not be removed from the construction, and should
`
`not be replaced with “identifier.” One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`
`invention would have recognized that a “name” for a data item is used not only to
`
`identify that data item, but is also used to refer to that data item, to access that data
`
`item, search for that data item, and address that data item, both in this art in general
`
`and according to the instant specification. (E.g., ‘3 10 patent, col. 15:34—3 7; col.
`
`16:32-62; col. 18:12—35; col. 22:61-67; col. 23:51-64; col. 32:55-67; and Dewar
`
`Decl., 1] 23 [Ex 2020].)
`
`Accordingly, in the Board’s construction of “content—dependent name” for
`
`claim 24, “an identifier” should be replaced with “a name.” And at least with
`
`respect to claim, 32, the construction of “content—dependent name” should be “a
`
`
`namefor a data item being based at least in part on a given function ofgfl 0ftbe
`
`bits in the particular sequence of bits 0ftbe particular data item.” (emphasis
`
`added.) This is relevant at least because the alleged identifier in the
`
`Woodhill/Stefik combination is not a “name.”
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`Patent Owner’s Response (U.S. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013—00596
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`D. ‘fielectivemmittlig. . .” (cl_aim 70 .
`
`Petitioner also proposes overly broad constructions for “selectively
`
`permitting” in claim 70 and to “selectively allow” in claims 81 and 86.
`
`PO disagrees with petitioner’s proposed construction for “selectively
`
`permitting”, at least because petitioner’s construction again ignores the plain
`
`language of claim 70. Petitioner contends that “selectively permitting” in claim 70
`
`of the ‘3 10 patent should be construed as “permitting based on whether a condition
`
`is met” (emphasis added). Petitioner’s construction incorrectly ties the
`
`“selectively permitting” to be whether any condition is met, and ignores the
`
`context of “selectively.” However, claim 70 reads as follows:
`
`I
`
`“(A) .
`
`.
`
`. determining whether the content—based identifier for the
`
`particular data item corresponds to an entry in a database comprising
`
`a plurality of content—based identifiers; and (B) based at least in part
`
`on said determining inJig; (A2, selectively permitting the particular
`
`data item to be accessed at or by one or more computers in the .
`
`network. . .” (emphasis added)
`
`Petitioner’s construction improperly attempts to read the above—underlined
`
`language of claim 70 out of the claim. Petitioner would have the Board construe
`
`claim 70 so that the “permitting” is performed based on whether any condition is
`
`met. Contrary to petitioner’s construction, the plain language of claim 70 requires
`
`that the “selectively permitting .
`
`. .” is performed based at leaston whether a very
`
`particular condition is met - namely, whether in step (A) it was determined that the
`
`content-based identifier for the data item (i) did correspond to an entry in a
`
`6
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013—00596
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`database comprising a plurality of content~based identifiers, or (ii) did not
`
`correspond to an entry in the database. In other words, the plain language of the
`
`claim requires permitting the data item to be accessed when one of conditions (i)
`
`and (ii) is determined in step (A), and not permitting the data item to be accessed
`
`when the other of conditions (i) and (ii) is determined in step (A). “Selectively
`
`permitting .
`
`. .” in claim 70 is not based on some unspecified “condition.”
`
`Petitioner’s construction is incorrect because it conflicts with the plain language of
`
`the claim.
`
`E. “selectively allow. . .”(claims 8] and 862.
`
`PO also disagrees with petitioner’s proposed construction for “selectively
`
`allow”, at least because petitioner’s construction again ignores the plain language
`
`of the claims. Petitioner contends that to “selectively allow” in claims 81 and 86
`
`should be construed as “permitting based on whether a condition is met”
`
`(emphasis added). Contrary to petitioner’s construction, to “allow” in claims 81
`
`and 86 is not based on whether any condition is met. And petitioner ignores the
`
`context of “selectively” in the claims. For example, claim 81 reads as follows:
`
`to .
`
`.
`
`. (b) compare the content—based identifier of the particular
`
`sequence of bits to a plurality of values; and to (c) selectively allow
`
`said particular sequence of bits to be provided or accessed by other
`
`devices degending on whether or not said content-degendent
`
`identifier corresponds to one of the Qluralig or values.” (emphasis
`
`added)
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`lPR 2013—00596
`
`Petitioner’s construction improperly attempts to read the above—underlined
`
`language of claim 81 out of the claim. Petitioner would have the Board construe
`
`claim 81 so that to “allow” is performed based on whether any condition is met.
`
`Contrary to petitioner’s construction, the plain language of claim 81 requires the
`
`device to selectively allow the sequence of bits to be provided or accessed by other
`
`devices depending on whether in step (b) the content-based identifier of the
`
`particular sequence of bits (i) did correspond to one of the plurality of values, or
`
`(ii) did not correspond to one of the plurality of values. In other words, the plain
`
`language of claim 81 requires the device to allow the sequence ofbits to be
`
`provided/accessed when one ofconditions (z) and (it) occurs, and not allow the
`
`sequence ofbits to be provided/accessed when the other ofconditions (I) and (it)
`
`occurs. Petitioner’s construction of to “selectively allow” in claim 86 is similarly
`
`flawed. “Selectively allow .
`
`. .” in claims 81 and 86 is not based on some
`
`unspecified “condition.” Petitioner’s construction is again incorrect because it
`
`conflicts with the plain language of these claims.
`
`
`F. Challenged Claims Require that the Data Item Corresgonafi/zg to the
`
`
`Name/Identifier in the “Request ” is Accessed.
`
`Claims 24 and 70 require a “request” that includes a content—dependent
`
`name (claim 24) or identifier (claim 70) for a corresponding data item. These
`
`claims then require that the data item corresponding to the name (claim 24) or
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`lPR 2013-00596
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`identifier (claim 70) is accessed by other computer(s) based on the claimed
`
`comparison. For example, claim 70 states:
`
`“in response to a request at a first computer, from another computer,
`
`said reguest comprising at least a content—based identifier for a
`
`particular data item .
`
`.
`
`. (A) .
`
`.
`
`. determining Whether the content—
`
`based identifier for the particular data item corresponds to an entry in
`
`a database comprising a plurality of content-based identifiers; and
`
`
`(B) based at least in part on said determining in step (A), selectively
`
`permitting the particular data item to be accessed at or by one or
`
`more computers in the network .
`
`. .” (emphasis added)
`
`Thus, independent claim 70 requires that the particular data item corresponding to
`
`the content—based identifier in the request is accessed, or permitted to be accessed,
`
`by other computer(s) in the network based on the comparison in step (A).
`
`Similarly, independent claim 24 requires that the particular data item
`
`corresponding to the content—dependent name in the request is provided to or
`
`accessed by the second computer when it is determined that access to that data
`
`item is authorized based on the comparison. And independent claims 81 and 86
`
`also require that the particular sequence of bits corresponding to the identifier
`
`received from the another device is provided to or accessed by other devices
`
`depending on the comparison.
`
`This is important because both parties agree that in the alleged
`
`Woodhill/Stefik combination granules corresponding to contents identifiers in the
`
`alleged request (“update request”) are NEVER provided to the requesting
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013-00596
`
`conunuerinresponsetotherequest (Ckfldbergl)ep.65-67,80:82 U3x.2015];and
`
`l)eumrl)ecl,1fll26,48—Sl[Ex.2020})’Thus,eventheaflegedconfifinafionthfls
`
`to meet the challenged claims in this respect.
`
`G.WmBRC$mmmdmAbquMmHemfl$fhwgfimg
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.lOO(b) states that a claim in an “unexpired patent” shall be
`
`given its broadest reasonable construction (“BRC” or “BRl”) in light of the
`
`spajficafion.Iioweventhe‘3101xfientexpnesonnApnl11,2015.iAcconhngbg
`
`POlmsnoabflfiytoamenddm‘310pMemflnflnspnxmemngandnoappaflvflfl
`
`takerflaceiunilafierthe‘3101xuentexphes.Indeed,thelJSPTKvafllhave
`
`jurisdiction over this proceeding after the ‘3 10 patent expires. No certificate under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 318(b) can issue before the ‘3 l0 patent expires. At least any document
`
`(e.g., final written decision, decision on rehearing, certificate, etc.) authored or
`
`generated by the USPTO after the ‘3 10 patent expires cannot use BRC, and instead
`
`should use and must rely upon the same claim construction standard as the district
`
`counlakiouthifVfiUQMVu14W71Cbna,415li3d1303(Fed.Cn12005)(m1banc)
`
`Moreover, the USPTO has no authority to change the claim construction standard
`
`required by Phillips for IPR proceedings because an IPR is not an examination
`
`proceeding and the applicable claim construction standard is a substantive issue
`
`(notarnerermoceduralmsue) Chaperlbchs Cb.v.lhukm,536l?3dl330,1335
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus, the BRC standard should not be used in this proceeding for
`
`construing claims.
`
`10
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`Patent Owner’s Response (U.S. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`IPR 2013—00596
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`While PO’s claim constructions set forth above are submitted to be correct
`
`under either the BRC standard or the Phillips standard, the Board should use the
`
`Phillips standard to construe claims in this proceeding.
`
`III. LAW
`
`“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
`
`claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
`
`reference.” Verdegaal Bros. 12. Union Oil Co. ofCalz'fOrnia, 814 F.2d 628, 631
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1987). A feature is “inherent” in a reference only if that feature is
`“necessarily present” in the reference, “not merely probably or possibly present.”
`
`Trintec Indus, Inc, v. Top—USA. Corp, 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`Furthermore, in order to anticipate, a prior art reference must not only disclose all
`
`elements of the claim, but must also disclose those elements “arranged as in the
`
`claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc, 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`Moreover, a patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the
`
`subject matter would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
`
`person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR
`
`Ini’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc, 550 US. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is
`
`resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope
`
`and content of the prior art; (2) differences between the claimed subject matter and
`
`the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations such
`
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`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
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`as commercial success, long felt need, copying by others, etc. Graham v. John
`
`Deere Co. ofKansas City, 383 US. 1, 17—18 (1966). A court can take account of
`
`the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`
`employ. KSR, 550 US. at 418. “A prior art reference may be considered to teach
`
`away [from the clamed invention] when ‘a person of ordinary skill, upon reading
`
`the reference, .
`
`.
`
`. would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was
`
`taken by the applicant’.” Monarch Knitting Mach. V. Sulzer Marat, 139 F.3d 877,
`
`885 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The “general rule” is that references that
`
`teach away “cannot serve to create a prima facie case of obviousness.” McGinZey
`
`12. Franklin Sports, Inc, 262 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`IV. THE MODIFICATION TO WOODHILL BASED ON STEFIK
`ALLEGED BY PETITIONER’S EXPERT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
`OBVIOUS BECAUSE ONE OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART WOULD
`HAVE WANTED TO MINIMIZE (NOT MAXIMIZE) THE NUMBER OF
`COMPARISON PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO CHECK WHETHER
`ACCESS WAS AUTHORIZED
`
`Woodhill relates to a backup system. (Woodhill, col. 9:1 to col. 10:12, and
`
`col. 14:52 to col. 16:15.) Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure for large
`
`database files, described from column 17:18 to col. 18:9 and in Figs. 5H—51, is the
`
`ONLY portion of Woodhill that petitioner alleges would have been obvious to
`
`modify in order to meet the challenged claims. (Goldberg Dep. 54—55, 57—67, 71,
`
`74 [Ex. 2015].) In Woodhill as allegedly modified by Stefik, petitioner contends
`
`that the “request” of claims 24 and 70 is the “update request” described in
`
`Woodhill at column 17:42—46. (Goldberg Dep. 54—55, 84 [Ex. 2015].) Petitioner
`
`12
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`’
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`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 2013—00596
`
`contends that the claimed “data items” are either binary objects or granules.
`
`(Goldberg Dep. 57-59, 85 [Ex 2015].) Petitioner’s expert refers to these as “two
`
`reads” on the challenged claims, one read being where the data items are binary
`objects and the other read being where the data items are granules. (Goldberg Dep.
`
`71, 85 [Ex 2015].) When the “data items” are binary objects, petitioner contends
`
`that the “content—dependent name” of claim 24, “content-based identifier” of
`
`claims 70 and 81, and “digital identifier” of claim 86 in the claimed “request” are
`
`binary object identifiers 74 allegedly in the “update request”, in Woodhill as
`
`allegedly modified by Stefik. (Goldberg Dep. 64—67, 71, 84—85 [Ex 2015].) But
`
`when the “data items” are granules, petitioner contends that the, “content-
`
`dependent name” of claim 24, “content—based identifier” of claims 70 and 81, and
`
`“digital identifier” of claim 86 in the claimed “request” are “contents identifiers”
`
`calculated in step 444 which are in the “update request.” (Goldberg Dep. 6467,
`
`71, 84—85 [Ex 2015].)
`
`I
`
`Petitioner’s expert alleges that it would have been obvious to have modified
`
`Woodhill’s column 17 granularization restore procedure for large database files to
`
`have compared binary object identifiers 74 or “contents identifiers” allegedly in
`
`Woodhill’s “update request” with a plurality of values in order to check whether
`
`access by the requesting local computer is authorized. (Goldberg Dep. 31-34, 54—
`
`55, 71, 74—75 [Ex. 2015].) This is the ONLY modification to Woodhill which
`
`petitioner’s expert alleges to meet the challenged claims. 1d. Petitioner does not
`
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`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 2013—00596
`
`rely on any other procedure in Woodhill as allegedly modified by Stefik to meet
`
`the challenged claims. Id.
`
`Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure which petitioner seeks to
`
`modify is used for processing large database files each of which includes many
`
`binary objects and many granules.
`
`(‘3 10 patent at col. 14:52—65, col. 17:18—35;
`
`Goldberg Dep. 106—108 [EX. 2015]; and Dewar Decl., 1] 30 [Ex. 2020].) As
`
`petitioner’s expert testified:
`
`Q. Would you agree that Woodhill’s granularization procedure is
`
`used for large database files?
`
`A. Yes.
`
`(Goldberg Dep. 106 [EX. 2015].)
`
`Q. Large data, a large database file would include a plurality of
`
`granules, right?
`
`MR. CORNWELL: Objection. Form.
`
`THE WITNESS:
`
`I would expect so. Yes.
`
`Q. Probably a whole lot of granules, right?
`
`MR. CORNWELL: Objection. Form.
`
`THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
`
`Q. And a whole lot of binary objects?
`
`MR. CORNWELL: Objection. Form.
`
`THE WITNESS: Yes.
`
`(Goldberg Dep. 108 [EX. 2015].) Thus, the parties agree that Woodhill’s
`
`granularization restore procedure which petitioner seeks to modify under Section
`
`103 is for processing large database files, and that each such file includes “a whole
`
`14
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`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 2013-00596
`
`lot of granules” and “a whole lot of binary objects.” Id. See also Dewar Decl., 11
`
`30 [Ex. 2020]. The parties also agree that a binary object is made up of many
`
`granules. (Goldberg Dep. 119 [Ex. 2015]; and Dewar Decl, fit 30 [Ex. 2020].)
`
`Simply stated, these are very large files having many binary object and many
`
`granules. Id.
`
`In 1995, one of ordinary skill in the art would have expected a “large
`
`database file” of the type handled by Woodhill’s granularization procedure to be at
`
`least 1 to 2 gigabytes in size. (Dewar Decl., 11 31 [Ex. 2020].) Woodhill explains
`
`that a binary object is 1 megabyte in size, and that a granule can be 1 kilobyte.
`
`(Woodhill, col. 7:54—55, col. 14:58—67.) Given such sizes, a single 1 gigabyte large
`
`database file to be processed by Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure
`
`would include at least 1,024 binary objects and 1,048,576 granules. (Dewar Decl.,
`
`$1 31 [Ex. 2020].) Thus, 1,024 binary object identifiers and 1,048,576 contents
`
`identifiers would correspond to the binary objects and granules of the file,
`
`respectively. Id.
`
`The alleged modification would not have been obvious to one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art at the time of the invention because one of ordinary skill would have
`
`sought to minimize the numbers of comparisons needed (not maximize them).
`
`(Dewar Decl., {l 32 [Ex 2020].) Under petitioner’s first read where the data items
`
`are binary objects and binary object identifiers 74 are compared to determine
`
`whether access is authorized, the allegedly modified granularization restore system
`
`15
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`

`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 20113—00596
`
`of Woodhill would require that each of the 1,024 binary object identifiers be
`
`compared with a plurality of binary object identifiers for a total of 1,024 different
`
`comparison processes in order to determine whether access to the single large
`
`database file being restored is authorized. (Goldberg Dep. 38-39 [EX. 2015]; and
`Dewar Decl., H 32 [Ex 2020].) And under petitioner’s second read where the data
`
`items are granules and “contents identifiers” are compared to determine whether
`
`access is authorized, the allegedly modified granularizaticn restore system of
`
`Woodhill would require that each of the 1,048,576 “contents identifiers” be
`
`compared with a plurality of contents identifiers for a total of 1,048,576 different
`
`comparison processes in order to determine whether access to the single large
`
`database file being restored is authorized. Id. Accordingly, the number of
`
`different comparison processes needed to be performed by the allegedly modified
`
`restore system would therefore be at least 1,024 (with each of these involving
`
`many different comparisons), just to check if access to the single large database
`
`file was authorized. Id. This would be non—sensical and illogical, as one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would never have modified a system so that it required at
`
`least 1,024 comparisons to determine if access to a file was authorized. (Dewar
`
`Decl., 1] 32 [Ex 2020].) As testified by petitioner’s expert:
`
`Q.
`
`If you could make a determination regarding whether access to a
`
`given file was authorized, using one comparison on the one hand, or a
`
`thousand comparisons on the other hand, which would you pick?
`
`MR. CORNWELL: Objection. Form.
`
`16
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`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,3 lO)
`
`lPR 2013—00596
`
`THE WITNESS: If that was the only criterion for evaluating the
`
`efficacy of the system, then certainly one check is better than a thousand.
`
`(Goldberg Dep. 53 [Ex 2015].)
`
`One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have
`
`sought to minimize the number of comparisons needed to determine whether access
`
`to a given file (large database file in Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure)
`
`was authorized. (Goldberg Dep. 53 [EX. 20l5]; and Dewar Decl., 1] 32 [EX.
`
`2020].) This is a matter of common sense. (Dewar Decl., 1] 32‘[EX. 2020].) One
`
`would never have modified Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure in the
`
`manner alleged by petitioner’s expert (i,e., comparing binary object identifiers or
`
`contents identifiers) at least because (a) it would have been known that each large
`
`database file would likely include thousands of binary objects and granules, (b) this
`
`would have exponentially maximized the number of comparisons needed to
`
`determine whether access to the large database file was authorized — this would
`
`have been highly undesirable as wasteful, unnecessary, inefficient and costly, and
`
`(c) the binary object identifiers and contents identifiers in Woodhill do not even
`
`identify the large database file being processed in Woodhill’s restore procedure in
`
`any respect and could not logically be used to check whether access thereto was
`
`authorized. (Dewar Decl., fi] 32 [EX. 2020].) The alleged modification would not
`
`have been made and would not have been obvious, as it would have been none
`
`sensical and illogical. Id. Moreover, petitioner does not contend that it would
`
`have been obvious to have modified Woodhill to have checked Whether access to
`
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`

`Patent Owner’s Response (US. Pat. No. 7,802,310)
`
`IPR 2013—00596
`
`each individual granule or binary object was authorized on a granule—by—granule
`
`basis or on an object—by—object basis, and there would have been no logical reason
`
`to have done this because this nothing in the cited art discloses or suggests this and
`
`this too would also have resulted in thousands of wasteful, unnecessary and
`
`inefficient comparisons as explained above. Id. at 1] 33.
`
`Stefik teaches a perfectly good system for controlling distribution of files,
`
`that utilizes “usage rights” and intentionally does NOT utilize unique identifiers
`
`701. (Dewar Decl., 1] 34 [EX. 2020].) Petitioner’s expert testified that Stefik’s
`
`unique identifiers 701 are equivalent to Woodhill’s binary object identifiers 74,
`
`and admitted that Stefik does NOT use these unique identifiers 701 in determining
`
`whether access to anythi

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