2111-
`
`Pagolof'l
`
`
`
`parent's TRADEMAR1<§ 1P ansiiouc'f Pnooucrsaeeevas invsnron'é newssnorice's' Fields? ABOUT us
`
`2111 Claim Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation [ht-11.2013]
`
`CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE lNTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF THE
`SPECIFICATION
`
`During patent examination, the pending claims must be “given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
`specification.“ The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303. 1316. 75 USPQ2d 1321. 1320
`(Fed. Cir, 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the ‘broadesl reasonable interpretation" standard:
`
`The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the
`claim language. but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction "in light of the specification as it would be
`Interpreted byone of ordinary skill in the art." in reAm Aced. ofScl. Tech. Ctr. 357 F.3d1350,1364[.?0 USP02d182?.
`1030] (Fed. Cir. 2004) Indeed. the rules of the PTO require that application claims must “conform to the invention as set forth
`in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis
`in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description.‘ 33
`QFR 1 3.5mm Lmtlt-‘J?-9Q29;§P.E£r;.llltflllid§_e§ 29.32%
`
`See also in re Hyatt. 211 F.3d136‘i". 13?2, 54 USPOZd 1664. 166? (Fed. Cir. 2000). Because applicant has the opportunity to
`amend the claims during prosecution. giving a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim.
`once issued. will be Interpreted more broadly than is justified, lri re Yamamoto. T40 F.2d 1569. 15?1 (Fed Cir. 198-1}; to re Zlelz.
`893 F 2d 319. 321. 13 USPQ2d 1320. 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted
`as broadly as their terms reasonably allow"): in re Prater. 415 F.2d 1393. 1404-05. 162 U-SPQ 541. 55061 (CCPA 1969} (Claim 9
`was directed to a process of analyzing data generated by mass spectrographic analysis of a gas. The process comprised selecting
`the data to be analyzed by subjecting the data to a mathematical manipulation. The examiner made rejections under 35 use
`2i.QJ_Lr.rI_P§.P_-§lll.5;fl.Phkihtiiiiiitl GPAQZATfiLand &U4.3LGJQZtIllaluflfiiftamLIJEtmilliliflri$29631- in the filil-Lfifijflflm use -9_01_5_-
`apgx-I.litmlodgeggzggigyejectlon. the examiner explained that the claim was anticipated by a mental process augmented by panel
`and paper markings. The court agreed that the claim was not limited to using a machine to carry out the process since the claim
`did not explicitly set fonh the machine. The court explained that "reading a claim in light of the specd’icalion. to thereby interpret
`limitations explicitly recited [n the claim. is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim.‘ to
`thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis 'in the claim.” The
`court found that applicant was advocating the latter. i.e.. the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into
`the claim 1. See also in re Mom's. 12?r F.3d1048.1054-55.44 USPQZd 1023. 103-28 (Fed. Cir. 199?) (The court held that the
`PTO Is not required. in the course of prosecution. to interpret claims in applications in the some manner as a court would interpret
`claims in an infringement suit. Rather. the ”PTO applies to verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of
`the words in their ordinary usage as they would he undErstood by one ol'ordinary skill in the art. taking intoaccount whatever
`enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in applicant‘s
`5p ac ification .").
`
`The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims must also be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art
`would reach. in re Cortn'ghi‘. 165 F.3d 1353. 1359, 49 USPQ2d 1464. 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1900) {The Board’s construction of the claim
`limitation ‘restere hair growth" as requiring the hair to be returned to its original state was held to be an incorrect interpretation of
`the limitation. The court held that. consistent with applicant's disclosure and the disclosure of three patents from analogous arts
`using the same phrase to require only some increase in hair growth. one of ordinary skill would construe “restore hair growth" to
`mean that the claimed method increases the amount of hair grown on the scalp. but does not necessarily produce a full head of
`hair). Thus the focus of the inquiry regarding the meaning of a claim should be what would be reasonable from the perspective of
`one of ordinary skill in the art. in re Suirco Surface. the, 603 F.3d 1255, 1260. 94 USPde 1640. 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2010): in re
`Buszarp'. 504 F.3d 1364. 04 USF'de 1749 (Fed. Cir 2001’). in Buszaro‘. the claim was directed to a flame retardant composition
`comprising a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture. 504 F.3d at 1365. 04 USPQ2d at was. The Federal Circuit found that
`the Board's interpretation that equaled a “flexible” team with a crushed "rigid” foam was not reasonebleld. at 135?. 84 USPQZd at
`1151. Persuasive argument was presented that persons experienced in the field of polyurethane foams know that a flexible
`mixture is different than a rigid foam mixture. id. at 1366. 04 USPQEd at 1751.
`
`compliance With 3.5.03.9...1.121hl..iiiinni-Sihi5ariaii.-.I...h.iniiii.alcii.1magmas:Eilor
`Lhmitiyosqztizst. second paragraph-
`
`re~AlA 35
`
`-S-0 “Wasps
`
`2111 .0“! Plain Meaning ER‘11.2013]
`
`{Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable to applications subject to the firstlnventor to llle (FlTF) provisions of the Alli except
`that the relevant data is the “effective filing date" of the claimed invention instead of the ”time of the invention." which is only
`applicable to applications subject-to gig-Alag5£35m:1m9_%391§;w.
`Mgaorsgai. See gs U.S.C. too (total {mgog-
`9O.i.5:«weminimisaodtdLrilntLalu and M858fi....1.50.tszlliit.li.itrisonata _ _ W...“ ,_._1.§el.er secrl
`
`l. THE WORDS OF A CLAIM MUST BE GIVEN THElR “PLAIN MEANING" UNLESS SUCH MEANING
`ES INCDNSESTENT WITH THE SPECIHCATION
`
`Under a broadest reasonable Interpretation. words of the claim must be given their plain meaning. unless such meaning is
`inconsistent with the specification. The plain meaning of a term means the ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by
`those of ordinary skill in the art at the time of'the invention. The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a
`variety of sources. including the words of the claims themselves. the specification. drawings. and prior art. However. the best
`source for determining the meaning of a claim term is the specification - the greatest clarity is obtained when the specification
`
`httpu’l’nwwmspto.govlwcblofficcslpaclmpcpr’s?1 11.html
`
`5f20l2014
`
`DMC Exhibit 2084_OO1
`
`Target v. DMC
`
`|PR2013-OO530, 531, 532, 533
`
`

`

`2111~
`
`Page 2 of 7
`
`serves as a glossary for the claim terms. The presumption that a term is given its ordinary and customary meaning may be
`reported by the applicant by clearly setting forth a different definition of the term in the specification. in re Moms. 12? F.3d 1048.
`1054. 44 USPQZd 1023. 1028 (Fed. Cir. 199?) (the USPTO looks to the ordinary use of the claim terms taking into account
`definitions-or other 'enlightenment' contained in the written description); But ch in re Am. flood of Sci. Tech. Ctr.. 136? F.3d 1359.
`1369. 70 USPQZd 182?. 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004} (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred
`embodiment described in the specification. even if it is the only embodiment described. absent clear disclaimer in the
`specification“). When the specification sets a clear path to the claim language. the scope of the claims is more easily determined
`and the public notice tuncbon of the claims is best served.
`
`Although claims of issued patents are interpreted in light of the specification, prosecution history. prior art and other claims. this is
`not the mode of claim interpretation to be applied during examination During examination. the claims must be interpreted as
`broadly as their terms reasonably allow. in is American Academy of Science Tech Center. 367 F.3d 1359. 1369, 70 USPOEd
`182?. 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The USPTO uses a different standard for construing claims than that used by district courts; during
`examination the USPTD must give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification). This means that
`the words of the claim must be given their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistentwith the specification in re Zlelz.
`393 F.2d 319. 321. 13 USPQ2d 1320. 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989} (discussed below); Chains-hence. inc. v. Lamb—Weston. lilo. 358
`F.3d 1371. 13?2. 69 USPQEd 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Ordinary. simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable.
`absent any indication that their use in a particular context changes their meaning. are construed to mean exactly what they say.
`Thus. “heating the resulting batter-coated dough to a temperature in the range of about400°F to 350*? required heating the
`dough. rather than the air inside an oven. to the specified temperature).
`
`ll.
`
`IT is lMPRUPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFlCATION
`
`"Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description. it is important not to
`import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example. a particular embodiment appearing in the written
`description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.“ Superguide Corp. v. lIJirec'l'vl
`Enterprises. inc. 358 F.3d am. 375. 69 USPQQd 1865. 1888 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Liebei—Flarsheim Co. v. Manfred inc. 358
`F.3d 898. 905. 59 USF'O2d 1301. 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing recent cases wherein the court expressly rejected the
`contention that it a patent describes only a single embodiment. the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that
`embodiment).- E-Pass Techs. the v. 3Com Corp. 343 F.3d 1364. 1359. 57 USPQZd 194?. 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Interpretation
`of descriptive statements In a potent's written description is a difficult task. as an inherent tension exists as to whether a statement
`is a clear lexicographic definition or a description of a preferred embodiment. The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of the
`specification’ wrthout unnecessarily importing timitations from the specification into the claims“); Allins inc. v. Symanteo Corp. 31 c
`F.3d1363. 13?1. ES USPQZE} 1855, 1369~TD (Fed. Cir. 2003) {Although the specification discussed only a single embodiment. the
`court held that it was improper to read a specii'tc order of steps into method claims where. as a matter of logic or grammar. the
`language or the method claims did not impose a appoiiic order on the performance of the method steps. and the specification did
`not directly or implicitly require a particular order). See also subsection i‘l'.. below When an element is claimed using language
`falling under the scope of 35 U.S.C. 112(a} (mmp301s-npgirvihtminsipidjiggmgqpmgaLor pypfltfim3L0.$_.§_._1_121111;}? 1-901 ‘-
`flkamm}Egfl§_3_ugfigfil 5th paragraph (often broadly referred to as means— (or step—i plus- function language). the specification
`must be consulted to determine the structure. material, or acts corresponding to the function recited in the claim. in re Donaldson.
`
`{5.21.3.6 ..13!01T.#_d_fl_|12_29§3il_i
`
`in in re Zlel2.supra. the examiner and the Beard had interpreted claims reading “normally-solid polypropylene" and "normally solid
`polypropylene having a crystalline polypropylene content" as being limited to “normally solid linear high homopolymers of
`propylene which have a crystalline polypropylene content.” The court ruled that limitations. not present'in the claims. were
`impropeny imported from the. specification. See also in re Marcel. ?10 F.2d ‘399. 802. 210 USPQ 289. 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983}
`(“claims are not to be read in a vacuum. and limitations therein are to be interpreted in light of the specification in giving them their
`'broadest reasonable interpretation."' (quoting in re Olruzawa. 53? F.2d 545. 548. 190 USPQ 46-1, 466 (CCPA 19?6}). The court
`looked to the specification to construe "essentially free of alkali metal" as including unavoidable levels of impurities but no more.)
`Compare in re Weiss. 989 F.2d 1202. 26 USFOZd 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1993) {unpublished decision - cannot be cited as precedent)
`(The claim related to an athletic shoe with cleats that “break away at a preselected level of force" and thus prevent injury to the
`wearer. The examiner rejected the claims over prior art teaching athletic shoes with cleats not Intended to break off and
`rationalized that the cleats would break away given a high enough force. The court reversed the rejection stating that when
`interpreting a claim term which is ambiguous. such as "‘a preselected level of force.‘ we must look to the specification for the
`meaning ascribed to that term by the inventor." The specification had defined "preselected level of force" as that level oi force at
`which the breaking away will prevent injury to the wearer during athletic exertion.)
`
`“PLAIN MEANING" REFERS TO THE ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY MEANING GIVEN TO THE
`Ill.
`TERM BY THOSE OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`"mite ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the
`art in question at the time of the Invention. l.e.. as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips v. AWH Corp..415
`F.3d1303.1313.?5 USPO-zd 1321. 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) {an bane); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp..33b F.3d129a.
`1302. 5? USPQEd 1435. 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Brooklriil-Wiilr 1. LLC v. intuitive Surgical. inc, 334 F.3d 1294. 1298 57 USPQ2d
`1132. 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim terms. the words are
`presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art”). It is the use of
`the words in the context of the wntten deecnption and customarily by those skilled in the relevant art that accurately reflects both
`the ‘ordinary' and the "customary" meaning of the terms In the claims. Ferguson Beauregardiogic Controls v. Mega Systems.
`350 F.3d 132?. 1338. 69 USPQ2d 1001. 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dictionary definitions were used to deten‘nihe the ordinary and
`customary meaning or the words “normal' and "predetennine" to those skilled in the art. In construing claim terms. the general
`meanings gleaned from reference sources. such as dictionaries, must always be compared against the use of the ten'ns in context.
`and the intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings is most consistent
`with the use of the words by the inventor); ACTV. the. v. The Walt Disney Company. 346 F.3d 1052. 1092. 68 USPOZd 1516-.
`152-1 (Fed. Cir 2003} {Since there was no express definition given for the term "URL‘ in the specification. the term should be given
`its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the intrinsic record and take on the ordinary and customary meaning
`attributed to it by those of ordinary skill in the art; thus. the term ”URL" was held to encompass both relative and absolute URLs);
`and E-Pass Technologies. inc. v. 30cm Corporation. 343 F.3d 1364. 1363. 67 USPQQd 1947. 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Where no
`explicit definition for the icon ‘eiectronlc multi-lunction card” was given in the specification, this term should be given its ordinary
`meaning and broadest reasonable interpretation: the term should not be limited to the industry standard definition of credit card
`where there is no suggestion that this definition applies to the electronic rnuiti-iunction card as claimed. and should not be limited
`to preferred embodiments in the specification}.
`
`httpzllwwuspto.govlwebiofficesipacimpepl’sQ1 1 i.html
`
`5l20f20 14
`
`DMC Exhibit 2084_002
`
`Target v. DMC
`
`|PR2013-OO530,
`
`531, 532, 533
`
`

`

`2111-
`
`Page 3 of 7
`
`The ordinary and customary meaning or a term may be evidenced by a variety of sources, including "the words of the claims
`themselves. the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history. and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific
`principles, the meaning of technical terms. and the state of the art.“ Philips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 USPCtzd at 1327.
`If extrinsic reference sources. such as dictionaries. evidence more than one definition for the term. the intrinsic record must be
`consulted to Identify which of the different possible definitions is most consistent with applicant's use of the terms. Brookhili—titiiiii 1.
`334 F.3d at 1300, 6? USFQ2d et113?: see also Renishaw PLO v. Mamass Sodeta‘perfizioni, 158 F.3d 1243. 1250. 48 USPde
`111?, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Where there are several common meanings for a claim term. the patent disclosure serves to point
`away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meanings?) and Vitronics Corp. v. Cones-phonic inc. 90 F.3d 1579,
`1583. 39 USPOZd 15?:3, 15?? (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term "solder retlow temperature” to mean "peak reflow
`temperature" of solder rather than the ‘liquidus temperature” of solder In order to remain consistent with the specification). If more
`than one extrinsic definition is consistent with the use of the. words in the intrinsic record. the claim terms may be construed to
`encompass all consistent meanings. See e.g.. Rexnord Corp. v. Laiii'em Corp. 2?4 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851. 1354
`(Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the court's analytical process for determining the meaning of disputed claim terms),- Tom Co. v White
`Consul. (notes. lnc.. 199 F.3d 1295. 1299. 53 USPQZd 1065, 196? (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[W']ords in patent claims are given their
`ordinary meaning in the usage of the field of the invention. unless the text of the patent makes clear that a word was used With a
`special meaning"). Compare MSM investments Co. v. Carolwood Corp, 259 F.3d 1335, 1339-40. 59 0613de 1656. 1659-60
`(Fed. Cir. 2091) (Claims directed to a method of feeding an animal a beneficial amount of methylsulfonytmethane (1.18M) to
`enhance the animal's diet were held anticipated by prior oral administration of MSM to human patients to relieve pain. Although
`the ordinary meaning of ”feeding“ is limited to provision of food or nourishment. the broad definition of "food" in the written
`description warranted finding that the claimed method encompasses the use of MSM for both nutritional and pharmacological
`purposes); and Rapopon v. Element. 254 F.3d 1053. 1059-60, 59 USPOEd 1215, 1219-20 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Both intrinsic
`evidence and the plain meaning of the term “method for treatment of sleep apnees' supported construction of the term as being
`limited to treatment of the underlying sleep apnea disorder itself. and not encompassing treatment of anxiety and other secondary
`symptoms related to steep apnea ).
`
`1V. APPLICANT MAY BE OWN LEXICOGRAPHER
`
`An applicant is entitled to be his or her own lexicographer and may rebut the presumption that claim terms are to be given their
`ordinary and customary meaning by clearly setting forth a definition of the term that is different from its ordinary and customary
`meaning(s). See in re Pacifism. 30 F.3d 14‘i’5. 1480. 31 USPOZd 16?1. 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (inventor may define specific terms
`used to describe invention, butmusldo so "with reasonable clarity. deliberateness, arid precision" and. if done. must "’set out his
`uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the
`change" in meaning) (quoting iniettrceii. inc. v. Phonomeiircs. too. 952 F.2d 1384. 13931-139, 21 USPQZd 1383. 1386 (Fed Cir.
`1992)). Where an explicit definition is provided by the applicant for a term, that definition Will control interpretation of the term as it
`is used in the claim. Toro Co. v. While Consolidated inductees inst. 199 F.3d 12951301, 53 USPQZd 1065. 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
`(meaning of words used in a claim is not construed in a “lexicographic vacuum. but in the context of the specification and
`drawings”). Any special meaning asaigned to a term "must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from
`common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention." Mutti'ionn Desiccants inc. v.
`Meo‘zam Ltd. 133 F.3d 1413, 147?. 45 USPDzd 1429. 1432 (Fed Cir 1998). See also Process Control Corp. v. HydReciairn
`Corp. 190 F.3d 1350,1357. 52 USPQZd1029. 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and mini? § 3173.051g) [52173.hlinlilld0e21mfifl. The
`specification should also be relied on for more than just explicit lexicography or clear disavowai of claim scope to determine the
`meaning of a claim term when applicant acts as his or her own textcographei: the meaning of a particular claim term may be
`defined by Implication, that is. according to the usage of the term in the context in the specification. See Phillips V. AWH Corp, 415
`F lid 1:303, 75 USPQZd 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en pane). and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic inc. 90 F.3d 1579. 1563.
`39 USPDZd 15i’3. 15?? (Fed. Cir. 1996). Compare Merck 8. Co. inc. v. Tove Pharms. USA. inc. 395 F.3d1364.1370.}_’3
`USPQEd 1641, 1646 (Fed Cir. 2005) (the court held that palantee failed to redefine the ordinary meaning of ‘about" to mean
`"exactly" in clear enough terms to justify the counterintuitive definition of 'about" stating that “Wt-ten a patentee acts as his own
`Iexicographar in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from their ordinary meaning. no must-clearly express that
`intent in the written description").
`
`2111.02 Effect of Preamble [R-08.2012}
`
`The determination of whether a preamble limits a claim is made on a case-by-case basis in light or the facts in each case: there is
`no litmus test defining when a preamble limits the scope of a claim. Catalina Ming. inr'i v. Coolsavirigscom, (no. 299 F.3d 901.
`809. 62 USF'OZd 1?31. 1785 (Fad. Cir. 2002). See id. at 808-10. 62 USPQZd at1?94-86 for a discussion of guideposts that have
`emerged from various decisions exploring the preamble‘s effect on claim scope. as well as a hypothetical example illustrating
`these principles.
`
`“[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it.“ Sell Communications Research. inc. v. yiraii'nk
`Communications Corp. 55 F.3d 615. 620, 34 USPQ2d 1919. 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 'if the claim preamble. when read in the
`context of the entire claim. recites limitations of the claim. or. if the claim preamble is ‘necessary to give life. meaning. and vitality'
`to the claim. then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the haianca of the claim.” Pill-ray Bowes. inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
`Co, 192 F M1299. 1305, 51 USPOZd 1161. 1165—96 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Jansen v. RaxaiiSundown. inc. 342 F.3d 1329.
`1333. 66 USPQQd 1154. 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(ln considering the effect of the preamble in a claim directed to a method ottreating
`or preventing pemiCious anemia in humans by administering a certain vitamin preparation to "a human in need thereof.’ the court
`held that the ciaime‘ recitation of a patient or a human ‘in need“ gives lite and meaning to the preamble's statement of purpose.)
`Krona v. Rollie, 137 F.2d 150. 152, BB USPQ 4?8. 491 (CCPA1951) (A preamble reciting “An abrasive anicte" was deemed
`essential to point out the invention defined by claims to an articte comprising abrasive grains and a hardened binder and the
`process of making it. The court stated “it is only by that phrase mat it can be known that the subject matter defined by the claims is
`comprised as an abrasive article. Every union of substances capable inter aira oi use as abrasive grains and a binder is not an
`'abrasive article.” Therefore, the preamble served to further define the structure of the article produced.)
`
`I.
`
`PREAMBLE STATEMENTS LIMITING STRUCTURE
`
`Any terminology in the preamble that limits the structure of the claimed invention must be treated as a claim limitation. Sec. (3.9..
`Coming Glass Wodrs v. Sumiiomo Eiec. USA. inc. 668 F.2d 1251. 1257. 9 USPQZd 1952. 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (The
`determination of whether preamble recitationa are structural limitations can be retrolved only on review of the entirety of the
`application 'to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim '); Pad-Tec-
`inc. v. Amer-ace Corp. 903 F.2d 7.96. 901. 14 USF'Qad 13h, rare (Fed. Cir. 1990) (determining that preamble language that
`
`httpu’i’wnwuspto.gov/webiofficesipacimpepisZ1 11.html
`
`5i20i’20 14
`
`DMC Exhibit 2084_OO3
`
`Target v. DMC
`
`|PR2013-OO530,
`
`531, 532, 533
`
`