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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner
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`CBM2014-00190 (Patent 7,334,720)
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`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
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`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................... 3
`A. Exhibit 1003 Is Admissible ................................................................... 3
`B. Exhibits 1004, 1005, And 1006 Provide Prior Art References As
`Part of the Factual Underpinnings of a Legal Issue ............................... 11
`C. Exhibit 1028 Is Relevant For Showing Well-known Aspects of
`Credit Operations ....................................................................................... 12
`III. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 12
`
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`
`i
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
`EXHIBIT LIST
`SAMSUNG-1001 U.S. Patent No. 7,334,720 to Hulst et al. (“the ‘720 Patent”)
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`SAMSUNG-1002 Excerpts from the Prosecution History of the ‘720 Patent (“the
`Prosecution History”)
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`SAMSUNG-1003 Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey Bloom re the ‘720 Patent (“Bloom”)
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`SAMSUNG-1004 U.S. Patent No. 5,530,235 (“Stefik ‘235”)
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`SAMSUNG-1005 U.S. Patent No. 5,629,980 (“Stefik ‘980”)
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`SAMSUNG-1006 PCT Publication No. WO 00/08909 (“Gruse”)
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`SAMSUNG-1007 PCT Application PCT/GB00/04110 (“the ‘110 Appln.” or
`“‘110”)
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`SAMSUNG-1008 United Kingdom Patent Application GB9925227.2 (“the ‘227.2
`Appln.” or “‘227.2”)
`
`SAMSUNG-1009 Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Pa-tents—
`Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and
`Technological Invention, 77 Fed. Reg. 157 (Aug. 14, 2012)
`
`SAMSUNG-1010 A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act;
`Part II of II, 21 Fed. Cir. Bar J. No. 4
`
`SAMSUNG-1011 Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for
`Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos (Jul. 27, 2010)
`
`SAMSUNG-1012 Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Technologies, LLC, CBM2013-00019
`Paper No. 17 (entered Oct. 8, 2013) at 11-13
`
`SAMSUNG-1013 Volusion, Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc. and Versata Devel-
`opment Group, Inc., CBM2013-00017 Paper No. 8 (entered
`Oct. 24, 2013)
`
`ii
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
`SAMSUNG-1014 Salesforce.com, Inc. v. VirtualAgility, Inc., CBM2013-00024
`Paper No. 16 (entered Nov. 19, 2013)
`
`SAMSUNG-1015 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1016 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1017 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1018 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1019 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1020 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1021 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1022 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1023 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1024 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1025 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1026 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1027 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1028 Weinstein “MasterCard Plans Point-of-Sale Product for
`Merchants Leery of Bank Cards”
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`SAMSUNG-1029 Mayo Collaborative Serv v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
`1289 (2012)
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`SAMSUNG-1030 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
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`iii
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
`SAMSUNG-1031 Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
`(Fed. Cir. 2011)
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`SAMSUNG-1032 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
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`SAMSUNG-1033 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014)
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`SAMSUNG-1034 Bancorp Serv., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
`1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`SAMSUNG-1035 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`SAMSUNG-1036 SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed.
`Cir. 2010)
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`SAMSUNG-1037 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`
`SAMSUNG-1038 Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc.,
`728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
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`SAMSUNG-1039 RESERVED
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`SAMSUNG-1040 Affidavit in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Pro Hac Vice
`Admission of Ralph A. Phillips
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`
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`SAMSUNG-1041 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 14-1144, slip op.
`(Fed. Cir. June 12, 2015)
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`SAMSUNG-1042 Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc. et al.,
`14-1194, slip op. (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2015)
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`SAMSUNG-1043 Petitioner’s Response to Patent Owner’s Objections and Notice
`of Service of Supplemental Evidence Under 37 CFR §
`42.64(b)(2), Served on April 29, 2015
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`SAMSUNG-1044 LG Electronics v. Advanced Micro Devices, IPR2015-00324,
`Paper 17
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`iv
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
`SAMSUNG-1045 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1304–05 (Fed.
`Cir. 2013) (en banc)
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`SAMSUNG-1046 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.
`Cir. 2013)
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`SAMSUNG-1047 Interthinx, Inc. v. Corelogic Solutions, LLC, CBM2012-00007,
`Paper 58
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`SAMSUNG-1048 Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC, CBM2014-00102, Paper 8
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`SAMSUNG-1049 Vibrant Media v. General Electric Company, IPR2013-00172,
`Paper 50
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`SAMSUNG-1050 SK Innovation Co. LTD. v. Celgard, LLC, IPR2014-00680,
`Paper 57
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`SAMSUNG-1051 Declaration of Ms. Patricia Hoskins
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`
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`v
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`At the onset of this proceeding (CBM2014-00190), Samsung Electronics
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`America, Inc. and Samsung Electronics., Ltd. (“Petitioner” or “Samsung”), filed
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`evidentiary exhibits, including, among others, an expert declaration from Dr.
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`Bloom (Exhibit 1003). Smartflash moves to exclude Exhibit 1003 in its entirety
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`for allegedly lacking foundation because Smartflash believes that a declaration
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`must include an express statement of an evidentiary standard, and because
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`Smartflash believes that such a statement is missing from the Exhibit. Paper 33 at
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`1-4. Smartflash’s contention is based on its flawed and unsupported interpretation
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`of 37 CFR § 42.65, which does not require a declarant to expressly state an
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`evidentiary basis on which expert opinions are based. Id. Despite Board’s
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`repeated dismissal of similar contentions in other matters1, Smartflash insists that
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`an expert declaration is required to expressly recite or apply the preponderance of
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`the evidence standard in order for the expert testimony to be accorded weight. Id.
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`Smartflash also urges the Board to exclude portions of Exhibit 1003 in a
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`piecemeal manner, for example, as inadmissible hearsay. Paper 33 at 7-10. Here,
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`Smartflash ignores the supplemental evidence that Samsung timely served pursuant
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`to 37 CFR § 42.64 to overcome hearsay objections. Exhibits 1043. Because
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`1 See Vibrant Media v. General Electric Company, IPR2013-00172, Paper 50 at
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`42; Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC, CBM2014-00102, Paper 8 at 4.
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`1
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`Smartflash continues to mount such objections despite having been served the
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`supplemental evidence, Samsung is now filing that evidence through Exhibit
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`10432.
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`Smartflash also generally asserts that Exhibits 1004-1006 and 1008 lack
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`relevance because the current proceeding has been instituted on § 101 grounds
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`while the disputed Exhibits are prior art references. Paper 33 at 10-12. Yet,
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`Smartflash’s underlying assumption—that subject matter eligibility determinations
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`are pure questions of law without underlying factual issues—is not supported by
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`the Federal Circuit3. Indeed, the prior art references submitted in Exhibits 1004-
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`2 LG Electronics v. Advanced Micro Devices, IPR2015-00324, Paper 17, at 5
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`(“Further supplemental evidence is not necessary to be filed at this time because
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`the admissibility objection may be overcome by the evidence. If Patent Owner
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`continues to object to the admissibility of [evidence] and subsequently files a
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`motion to exclude [evidence], Petitioner may file the previously-served
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`supplemental evidence as supporting evidence to its Opposition.”).
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`3 “[T]he analysis under [35 U.S.C.] § 101, while ultimately a legal determination,
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`is rife with underlying factual issues.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
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`1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d
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`1269, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
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`2
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`1006 and 1008 are helpful to the Board in demonstrating the well-known and
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`conventional aspects of the challenged claims.
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`Accordingly, Smartflash’s motion to exclude should be denied.
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`II. ARGUMENTS
`A. Exhibit 1003 Is Admissible
`1. Exhibit 1003 Has Sufficient Foundation and Is Reliable
`Smartflash seeks to exclude Exhibit 1003 in its entirety because Smartflash
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`observed no expressly stated evidentiary standard in Dr. Bloom’s Declaration. See
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`Paper 33 at 1-4 (citing 37 CFR § 42.65). Smartflash bases this contention on a
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`flawed and unsupported interpretation of 37 CFR § 42.65, which requires only that
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`a declarant “disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based”
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`and, notably, does not require a declarant to expressly state an evidentiary basis on
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`which the opinion is based. See Paper 33 at 1-4 (quoting 37 CFR § 42.65)
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`(emphasis added).
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`Indeed, a highly similar argument was earlier considered and rightly rejected
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`by the Board in Vibrant Media v. General Electric Company, IPR2013-00172.
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`Specifically, in the Vibrant Media case, a party, citing to 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) rather
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`than 37 CFR § 42.65, argued that 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) requires an expert declaration
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`to expressly recite or apply the preponderance of the evidence standard in order for
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`the expert testimony to be accorded weight. See Vibrant Media, Paper 50 at 42.
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`The Board considered and rejected that argument, concluding that 35 U.S.C. §
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`316(e) makes no such requirement: “[r]ather, it is within our discretion to assign
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`the appropriate weight to be accorded to evidence based on whether the expert
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`testimony discloses the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based.”
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`Id. (emphasis added)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a)); see also Apple Inc. v. Smartflash
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`LLC, CBM2014-000102, Paper 8 at 4 (considering and dismissing a similar
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`challenge by Smartflash to an expert’s declaration, the challenge being based on
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`the absence of the phrase “preponderance of the evidence” within that declaration,
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`and concluding that “Patent Owner identifies purported omissions from the
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`Declaration, but offers no evidence that [the expert] used incorrect criteria, failed
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`to consider evidence, or is not an expert in the appropriate field”).
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`Consistent with the requirements of 37 CFR §§ 42.64(a) and 42.65, Dr.
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`Bloom’s testimony discloses underlying facts and data on which his opinions were
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`based. For example, Dr. Bloom’s declaration extensively referenced prior art
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`disclosures, and it also noted Dr. Bloom’s relevant and timely industry experience
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`with digital right management. See Bloom at ¶¶ 5-22, ¶¶ 29-103.
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`Further reinforcing this inappropriate objection, Smartflash asserts that the
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`Board ignored FRE 702 under which the admissibility of expert testimony requires
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`not only that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data” (FRE 702(b)), but
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`also that “the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods” (FRE
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`702(c)) and that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
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`facts of the case” (FRE 702(d)). Paper 33 at 3. Smartflash had ample opportunity
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`to cross-examine Dr. Bloom during the two-day deposition on opinions expressed
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`in his Declaration. Yet, Smartflash failed to question Dr. Bloom as to any reliable
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`principles and methods that he used to render his opinion. Nor did Smartflash
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`question Dr. Bloom regarding his reliable application of the principles and
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`methods to the facts. Indeed, in the earlier served Notice of Objection, Smartflash
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`did not even rely on FRE 702 to object to Dr. Bloom’s Declaration in its entirety.
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`Exhibit 2098. In other words, Smartflash has waived its objection to Exhibit 1003
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`in its entirety for any alleged failure to meet all of 37 CFR §§ 42.64(a), 42.65 and
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`FRE 702.
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`To the extent that Smartflash conflates evidentiary weight with the
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`principles and methods of FRE 702, Samsung respectfully notes that, by attesting
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`to statements set forth in his declaration, Dr. Bloom has indicated that those
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`statements are correct, and, therefore, that those statements are more likely true
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`than not true based on evidence known to him. See Bloom at ¶ 138 (“I hereby
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`declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all
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`statements made on information and belief are believed to be true”). From this, Dr.
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`Bloom’s statements are self-revealing of his satisfaction of the preponderance of
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`evidence standard.
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`5
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`Accordingly, Samsung respectfully submits that Dr. Bloom’s declaration is
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`proper under FRE 702.
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`2. Exhibit 1003 Paragraphs 23-112 Are Relevant and
`Admissible Because They Speak To The Underlying Factual
`Issues of Subject Matter Eligibility Determination.
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`As an alternative to excluding Exhibit 1003 in its entirety, Smartflash argues
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`that paragraphs 23-112 are directed to “discussions of Gruse, Stefik ‘235 and
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`Stefik ‘980 references” and hence are irrelevant to the “purely legal issue of
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`whether the claims of the ‘720 Patent are directed to patent eligible subject matter
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`under § 101.” Paper 33 at 5-6. The underlying assumption—that subject matter
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`eligibility determinations are pure questions of law without underlying factual
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`issues—is not supported by the Federal Circuit. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
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`722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp.,
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`717 F.3d 1269, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)) (“[T]he analysis under [35
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`U.S.C.] § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife with underlying
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`factual issues.”); see also Interthinx, Inc. v. Corelogic Solutions, LLC, CBM2012-
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`00007, Paper 58 at 5. Here, several prior art reference speak to the well-known
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`and conventional aspects of “appl[ying] generic computer technology towards the
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`solution of a financial problem: enabling limited use of paid-for/licensed content.”
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`See Exhibit 1003 at 24. Thus, paragraphs 23-112 of Dr. Bloom’s Declaration are
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`6
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`relevant to the § 101 inquiry of patent eligibility. Accordingly, paragraphs 23-112
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`of Dr. Bloom’s declaration are admissible.
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`3. Exhibit 1003 Paragraphs 23-26 and 113-128 Are Admissible
`Because Dr. Bloom Has Been Qualified to Testify Regarding
`the Underlying Factual Issues
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` As another alternative to a whole-sale exclusion of Exhibit 1003, Smarflash
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`attempts to exclude Paragraphs 23-26 and 113-128 of the Bloom Declaration
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`because Smartflash perceives these paragraphs as being directed to the strict legal
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`issue of patent eligibility and Dr. Bloom is not established as a legal expert. Paper
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`33 at 6. Such proposition again ignores the guidance from the Federal Circuit that
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`“the analysis under [35 U.S.C.] § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is
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`rife with underlying factual issues.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
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`1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d
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`1269, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)). Here, the Declaration notes Dr.
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`Bloom’s relevant, timely, and substantial industry experience with digital rights
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`management. See Exhibit 1003 at ¶¶ 5-224. As a qualified expert in the field of
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`4 In fact, during the two-day deposition when Smartflash had ample opportunity to
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`cross-examine Dr. Bloom regarding his qualification as an expert in the filed of
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`digital rights management, Smartflash did not question the strength and depth of
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`Dr. Bloom’s industry experience with digital right management. See Exhibits
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`2055, 2056, and 2057.
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`7
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`digital rights management, Dr. Bloom explains that “the ‘720 Patent applies
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`generic computer technology toward the solution of a financial problem: enabling
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`limited use of paid-for/licensed content.” Exhibit 1003 at ¶ 24. After walking
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`through all elements in ¶¶114-125, Dr. Bloom also opines that “[t]he claims of the
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`‘720 Patent . . . cover nothing more than the basic financial idea of enabling
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`limited use of paid for and/or licensed content using ‘conventional’ computer
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`systems and components.” Exhibit 1003 at ¶ 126. Therefore, paragraphs 23-26
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`and 113-128 speak to the well-known and conventional aspects of “enabling
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`limited use of paid-for and/or licensed content using conventional computer
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`systems and components” for which Dr. Bloom is well-qualified to testify. Id.
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`According, paragraphs 23-26 and 113-128 are admissible.
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`4. Exhibit 1003 Paragraphs 129-137 Are Admissible Because
`They Provide Dr. Bloom’s Understanding of Legal
`Concepts and of Their Application to This CBM Review.
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`Attempting to conjure another alternative to excluding Exhibit 1003 in its
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`entirety, Smarflash mischaracterizes Paragraphs 129-137 of the Bloom Declaration
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`as testimony on United States patent law or patent examination practice. See Paper
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`33 at 7. Such mischaracterization blatantly ignores Dr. Bloom’s statement in the
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`leading paragraph of this section:
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`I am not a lawyer. However, counsel has advised me of legal concepts that
`are relevant to CBM review proceedings and to the opinions that I offer in
`this declaration. My understanding of these concepts and of their
`applications to this CBM review is indicated below:
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`8
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`Exhibit 1003 at ¶ 129.
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`Thus, as noted above, Dr. Bloom is simply producing the factual foundations
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`for this proceeding.
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`5. Exhibit 1003 Paragraphs 102-107, 122, 123, 124, 125, and
`128 Are Admissible Because Petitioner Timely Served
`Patent Owner with Supplemental Evidence Pursuant To 37
`C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1).
`
`Smartflash alleges that paragraphs 102-107, 122, 123, 124, 125 of the Bloom
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`Declaration contain hearsay evidence, despite being timely served supplemental
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`evidence that include voluminous pages of the underlying publications. See Paper
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`33 at 7-10. The applicable rule, 37 CFR § 42.64, however, does not require
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`Samsung to file such voluminous pages in response to an evidentiary objection that
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`Smartflash earlier served Samsung. Exhibit 2098. Indeed, as noted by the Board
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`in LG Electronics v. Advanced Micro Devices, “supplemental evidence is not
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`necessary to be filed at this time because the admissibility objection may be
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`overcome by the evidence.” IPR2015-00324, Paper 17, at 5. In this case, the
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`Board went on to state that “[i]f Patent Owner continues to object to the
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`admissibility of [the evidence] and subsequently files a motion to exclude [the
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`evidence], Petitioner may file the previously-served supplemental evidence as
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`supporting evidence to its Opposition.” Id. In accordance with the Board’s
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`guidance, Samsung files, with this reply, the voluminous pages of the underlying
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`9
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`publications that were timely served. Exhibit 1043. Here, Samsung is merely
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`addressing the admissibility of the declaration paragraphs in dispute, not the
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`admissibility of the newspaper pages of the supplemental evidence to support the
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`sufficiency of the declaration paragraphs to prove any fact. See LG Electronics v.
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`Advanced Micro Devices, IPR2015-00324, Paper 17, at 4 (noting that the Board
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`distinguishes “two different challenges: (1) the admissibility of evidence (e.g.,
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`authenticity or hearsay)… and (2) the sufficiency of evidence to prove a particular
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`fact….”).”5 Here, Dr. Bloom simply made reference to, for example, newspaper
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`5 Under FRE 703, as long as the facts (such as the newspaper pages) used are the
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`sort that reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field for forming an
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`opinion, the information need not be admitted (nor need it even be admissible). In
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`other words, under this rule, an expert may rely on hearsay statements as long as
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`the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect. See SK
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`Innovation Co. LTD. v. Celgard, LLC, IPR2014-00680, Paper 57 at 28 (discussing
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`“FRE 703 allows the proponent of the expert opinion to disclose the evidence
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`underlying an expert to the jury if the ‘probative value in helping the jury evaluate
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`the opinion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect” and “because the Board
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`is not a lay jury, and has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony, the
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`danger of prejudice in this proceeding is considerably lower than in a conventional
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`district court trial.”).
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`articles that document the problem of media piracy. Accordingly, paragraphs 102-
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`107, 122, 123, 124, 125, and 128 are admissible.
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`B.
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`Exhibits 1004, 1005, And 1006 Are Admissible Because They
`Speak To The Underlying Factual Issues of Subject Matter
`Eligibility Determination
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`Exhibits 1004-1006 are copies of prior art references relied upon by
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`Samsung in the petition. Smartflash seeks to exclude these prior art references
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`because the proceeding is instituted on 101 grounds only. Paper 33 at 10-11. As
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`discussed above in Section IIA2, the underlying assumption—subject matter
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`eligibility determinations are pure questions of law without underlying factual
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`issues—is not supported by the Federal Circuit. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
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`722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp.,
`
`717 F.3d 1269, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)) (“[T]he analysis under [35
`
`U.S.C.] § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife with underlying
`
`factual issues”); see also Interthinx, Inc. v. Corelogic Solutions, LLC, CBM2012-
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`00007, Paper 58 at 5. Here, Exhibits 1004 to 1006 are copies of prior art
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`references that speak to the well-known and conventional aspects of “appl[ying]
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`generic computer technology towards the solution of a financial problem: enabling
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`limited use of paid-for/licensed content.” See Exhibit 1003 at 24. Accordingly,
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`Exhibits 1004 to 1006 are relevant to the § 101 inquiry of patent eligibility and
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`admissible. Indeed, Smartflash made such conventional implementation relevant
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`11
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`through the disclosure of the ‘720 Patent itself. See generally Exhibit 1001 at 4:4-
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`5, 16:46-49, 18:24-30.
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`C. Exhibit 1028 Is Admissible For Its Relevancy in Showing the
`Well-known Aspects of Credit Operations For Making Payments
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`Last, Smartflash moves to exclude Exhibit 1028 (copy of an article entitled
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`“Mastercard Plans Point-of-Sale Product For Merchants Leery of Bank Cards”) on
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`relevancy and authenticity grounds. Consistent with Sections IIA2 and IIB,
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`Exhibit 1028 is directed to well-known historic credit operations in support of Dr.
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`Bloom’s observation that the ‘720 Patent mimics such payment operations in
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`purporting to enable limited use of paid-for/licensed content. Exhibit 1003 at ¶
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`128. Further, Samsung respectfully submits a librarian declaration attesting to the
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`authenticity of the downloaded copy.
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`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that the evidence discussed
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`above are admissible.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Thomas A. Rozylowicz/
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`Thomas A. Rozylowicz
`Reg. No. 50,620
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` 10/5/2015
`Date:
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`Case CBM2014-00190
`Attorney Docket No: 39843-0003CP1
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 CFR §§ 42.6(e)(4) and 42.205(b), the undersigned certifies
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`that on October 5, 2015, a complete and entire copy of this Petitioner’s Reply to
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`Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence and exhibits were provided via email
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`to the Patent Owner by serving the correspondence email addresses of record as
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`follows:
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`Michael R. Casey
`J. Scott Davidson
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Dr., Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
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`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
`jsd@dbjg.com
` docket@dbjg.com
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`/Christine Rogers/
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`Christine Rogers
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`60 South Sixth Street, Suite 3200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`(650) 839-5092
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`13