Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 1 of 24 PageID #:16406
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES
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`INTERNATIONAL, INC.
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`Plaintiff,
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`BGC PARTNERS, INC.
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 10 C 715
`(Consolidated with:
`10 C 716, 10 C 718,
`10 C 720, 10 C 721,
`10 C 726, 10 C 882,
`10 C 883, 10 C 884,
`10 C 885, 10 C 929,
`10 C 931)
`
`Judge Virginia M. Kendall
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`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL INC.'S
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`(1) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`THAT THE ‘056 PATENT IS INVALID UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 FOR LACK OF
`WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`AND
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`(2) CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT THE ‘056 PATENT MEETS
`THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1
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`
`TDA 1029
`CBM of U.S. Pat. No. 7,533,056
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`

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`Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 2 of 24 PageID #:16407
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.(cid:3) INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1(cid:3)
`II.(cid:3) LEGAL STANDARDS ........................................................................................................... 2(cid:3)
`A.(cid:3) The Written Description Requirement ............................................................................ 2(cid:3)
`B.(cid:3) Burden of Proof ................................................................................................................. 3(cid:3)
`C.(cid:3) Summary Judgment .......................................................................................................... 4(cid:3)
`III.(cid:3)ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 4(cid:3)
`A.(cid:3) The Specification Discloses a Default Quantity .............................................................. 5(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Figures 3A-C Convey a Default Quantity ............................................................... 8(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`The Textual Description of Token Adjustment Conveys a Default Quantity .......... 9(cid:3)
`3.(cid:3)
`The Textual Description of Order Placement Conveys a Default Quantity ......... 10(cid:3)
`B.(cid:3) Defendants Misstate the Burden of Proof ..................................................................... 11(cid:3)
`C.(cid:3) Defendants Fail to Meet Their Burden of Proving Lack of Written Description ...... 12(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art ....................................................................... 12(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`Specification Is Irrelevant ..................................................................................... 13(cid:3)
`3.(cid:3)
`the Specification Is Incorrect ................................................................................ 13(cid:3)
`D.(cid:3) Defendants Cases Are Inapposite ................................................................................... 16(cid:3)
`IV.(cid:3)CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 18(cid:3)
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`Defendants Fail to Present any Evidence Regarding the Understanding of a
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`Defendants’ Assertion that the Exact Term “Default Quantity” Is Not Used in the
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`Defendants’ Assertion that the Concept of “Default Quantity” Is Not Disclosed in
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`Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 3 of 24 PageID #:16408
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`Cases(cid:3)
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............. 3
`Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., 601 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................ 16
`Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................... 2, 3, 12, 13
`Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) .................................................................................. 3, 12
`Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ................. 3, 4
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ............................................................................... 4
`Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 F.3d 1363
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................................................................................................................... 4
`Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........ 17
`Crown Pkg’g Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Bev.e Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .. 4
`Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................................................. 3, 13
`Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................. 4
`ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................... 16
`In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................... 2
`In re NTP, Inc., No. 2010-1277, 2011 WL 3250466 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2011) ................ 11, 16, 17
`Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................... 17
`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)...................................... 4
`Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 424 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2005).............................. 4
`PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ....................... 11, 12, 16
`Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 405 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....................... 17
`Tech.Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................... 4, 11, 12
`Trading Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ............... 13
`Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ......................... 2, 13, 17
`Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ..................................................... 2, 3
`Wang Labs. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ..................................................... 17
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`Statutes(cid:3)
`Rules(cid:3)
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ......................................................................................................................... 2, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 282 ............................................................................................................................... 3
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 56 ............................................................................................................................ 4
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`ii
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`Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 4 of 24 PageID #:16409
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`M.P.E.P § 2106 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 12
`M.P.E.P § 2106 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 12
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendants acknowledge that the written description issue is a “question of fact” that
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`focuses on whether the disclosure apprises one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor
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`actually was in possession of, and had invented, the claimed invention. Dkt. 373, Def. Br. 13-14.
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`And yet, Defendants fail to set forth who a person of ordinary skill in the art would be for this
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`patented technology. Likewise, they fail to present any facts—either in the form of a declaration
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`or otherwise—regarding whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the inventors
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`possessed the concept of a default quantity in conjunction with the other claim elements.
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`Instead, Defendants offer nothing more than litigation-induced attorney argument, without any
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`factual support.
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`Defendants advance two arguments in support of their motion, but neither has any merit.
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`First, Defendants argue that the exact term “default quantity” does not appear in the
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`specification. This is irrelevant, however, as it is black letter law that the disclosure need not
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`describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims. In fact, the
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`law is clear that the disclosure need not take any particular form, and could even be a figure
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`standing alone. The law is also clear that the disclosure does not have to explicitly describe
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`every claim element, so as long as every element is necessarily present in the disclosure such that
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`it can be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art.
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`Second, Defendants repeatedly assert, without any support, that the specification contains
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`“no disclosure” of the claimed default quantity. As demonstrated below, there are numerous
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`portions of the ‘056 patent specification conveying to those of skill in the art that the inventors
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`were in possession of the claimed default quantity. This is confirmed by the Declaration of
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`Richard Hartheimer (“Ex. 2, Hartheimer Decl.”), which is submitted herewith. In view of this
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`factual evidence presented by TT—and the complete lack of any factual evidence from the
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`1
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`Defendants—Defendants cannot possibly satisfy their burden of proving, by clear and
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`convincing evidence, that the ‘056 patent does not meet the written description requirement. As
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`such, their motion should be denied and summary judgment should instead be granted in favor of
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`TT.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A.
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`The Written Description Requirement
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`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, a “specification shall contain a written description of the
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`invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1(2006). To satisfy this written description requirement, the
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`disclosure of the relied-upon specification must “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art
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`that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad
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`Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Vas-
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`Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that the disclosure must
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`“allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor(s)] invented what is
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`claimed.”). As such, to determine whether a disclosure meets the written description
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`requirement, a court must undertake “an objective inquiry into the four corners of the
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`specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at
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`1351. Courts often consider expert declarations about how one skilled in the art would
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`understand the specification to assist with this inquiry. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v.
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`eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (relying on expert testimony about the
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`knowledge of one skilled in the art to find sufficient written description); In re Alton, 76 F.3d
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`1168, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (approving the use of an expert declaration in a written
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`description analysis as factual evidence explaining why one of ordinary skill in the art would
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`have understood the specification to describe the claimed subject matter).
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`2
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`The determination of whether a disclosure meets the written description requirement is a
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`“question of fact” that necessarily varies depending on “the nature and scope of the claims” as
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`well as “the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
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`However, there are a few guiding principles that apply in all cases. First, the disclosure “need
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`not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims.”
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`Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352
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`(noting that the specification need not “recite the claimed invention in haec verba”). Second, the
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`disclosure need not take any particular form. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. Indeed, drawings alone
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`can satisfy the written description requirement. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564-65. Third,
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`the disclosure need not explicitly describe every claim element, as long as every element is
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`necessarily present in the disclosure such that it can be recognized by one skilled in the art. See,
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`e.g., All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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`(“[T]he failure of the specification to specifically mention a limitation that later appears in the
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`claims is not a fatal one when one skilled in the art would recognize upon reading the
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`specification that the new language reflects what the specification shows has been invented.”).
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`B.
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`Burden of Proof
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`An issued patent is statutorily presumed to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. This
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`presumption is based on “the expertise of patent examiners presumed to have done their job.”
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`Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992). It is
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`the job of the Patent Office to make sure that applicants have complied with the written
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`description requirement. M.P.E.P § 2106(II); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 996-97 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008), aff'd but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (stating that “[t]he
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`MPEP also requires examiners to identify all grounds of rejection in the first official PTO action
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`to avoid unnecessary delays in examination” (emphasis added)). To overcome the presumption
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`3
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`of validity of patents, the challenger must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
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`Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In a case
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`where the challenger is alleging that a broadening amendment goes beyond the written
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`description, the fact that the patent office allowed amended claims “is entitled to an especially
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`weighty presumption of correctness.” Brooktree, 977 F.2d at 1574-75; Commonwealth Scientific
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`& Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
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`challenger’s burden never shifts. Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1329
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`(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`C.
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`Summary Judgment
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`Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists such that
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`the moving party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex
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`Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In determining whether there is a genuine issue
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`of material fact, the court must draw all inferences and view all evidence in the light most
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`favorable to the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
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`Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment that a patent satisfies the
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`written description requirement is appropriate when the court determines that no reasonable jury
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`could find invalidity, taking into account the clear and convincing evidence. Crown Pkg’g Tech.,
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`Inc. v. Ball Metal Bev. Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Pandrol USA, LP
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`v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`Defendants concede that the specification of the ‘056 patent discloses receiving a user input
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`indicating a quantity to be used for at least one order to be placed by the user at a price level.
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`Dkt. 373, Def. Br. 4. Thus, Defendants’ entire motion boils down to whether the specification
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`conveys that this quantity can be a “default quantity to be used . . . for each of a plurality of
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`4
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`orders.”
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`y skill in the e of ordinaryh below, one For the reassons set forth
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`art would reecognize thaat the
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`ntity. default quanthis claimed ssession of tinventorss were in pos
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`A.
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`The SSpecificationn Discloses aa Default QQuantity
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`The specificaation disclosees an emboddiment referrred to as a “PPriority Vieww,” which iss
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`A T
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`illustrated in Figures 3A-C showwn below:
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`5
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`Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 10 of 24 PageID #:16415
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`H MicroCor- 42'
`File Vtews Actions Teslin-
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`324
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`316
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`300(161300(15)300(14) 300(13}300(12)
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`00m) FIG. 3B
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`.r
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`30005} 300(13) monumental
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`300(16)
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`300(12}
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`FIG. 3C
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`TT SOF, ¶ 5.
`TT SOF,‘|[5.
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`As shown in these figures, the Priority View includes a bid token 320 (circled in red on
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`the bottom left in each figure) associated with a bid order type and an offer token 324 (circled in
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`red on the top left in each figure) associated with an offer order type, which a trader can use to
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`place orders with an electronic trading exchange. TT SOF, ¶ 6; Ex. 1, ‘056 Patent, Col. 8:28-30;
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`Ex. 2, ¶ 11. The bid token 320 has a size that reflects a quantity to be used for a new bid (or
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`buy) order (400 in Figure 3a). TT SOF, ¶ 7; Ex. 1, Col. 8:31-33; Ex. 2, ¶ 11. Similarly, the offer
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`token 324 has a size that reflects a quantity to be used for a new offer (or sell) order. TT SOF, ¶
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`8; Ex. 1, Col. 8:31-33; Ex. 2, ¶ 11. A trader can optionally adjust the sizes of these tokens—and
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`thus their reflected quantities—before placing a trade. TT SOF, ¶ 9; Ex. 1, Col. 8:30-33; Ex. 2, ¶
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`12.
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`To place an order using the tokens 320, 324, a trader can select a token with a pointing
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`device, drag a copy of the token to a location corresponding to a desired value (e.g., price) on the
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`value axis 332 (while the token itself remains in its original position on the left-hand side of the
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`screen), and release the pointing device. TT SOF, ¶ 10; Ex. 1, Col. 8:36-38; Ex. 2, ¶ 13. This in
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`turn triggers the display of an order pop-up window showing the order information, which is
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`autopopulated with the quantity reflected by the current size of the selected token and the value
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`corresponding to the location at which the selected token is released. TT SOF, ¶ 11; Ex. 1, Col.
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`8:45-48; Ex. 2, ¶¶ 12-13. Using the order pop-up window, the trader can (but is not required to)
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`modify the autopopulated order information and then submit the order. TT SOF, ¶ 12; Ex. 1,
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`Col. 8:48-51; Ex. 2, ¶¶ 12-13.
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`Based on this disclosure, a person of ordinary skill in the art would clearly recognize that
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`each token’s size and quantity remain unchanged between orders (which is a default quantity),
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`rather than resetting to zero after each order (which would not be a default quantity). Ex. 2, ¶ 14.
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`ere does the ¶ 14. Nowhehis. Ex. 2, ¶on confirm the specificatioortions of theIndeed, nnumerous po
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`specificaation state thaat the order ttokens disapppear or reseet to zero afteer an order i
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`s entered. Idd.
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`1.
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`Figures 3AA-C Conveyy a Default QQuantity
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`Figures 3A-CC convey thaat the tokens 320, 324 ea
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`ch reflect thhe claimed deefault quantiity:
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`Fig. 3A
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`Fig. 3B
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`Fiig. 3C
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`TT SOF,
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` ¶ 13; Ex. 1,, Figs. 3A-C; Ex. 2, ¶ 155. As shownn in each of tthese figuress, the buy tokken
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`cts a quantitty. Id. Likewwise, the
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`320 and tthe offer tokken 324 alwaays have a size that refle
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`specificaation never ddepicts or desscribes a tokken 320, 3244 that has no
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`size (and thuus no quantiity).
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`this reason
`TT SOF, ¶ 14; Ex. 2,, ¶ 15. Accoordingly, for
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`alone, a persson of ordinaary skill in tthe
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`art wouldd recognize tthat the tokeens retain theeir quantitiess between orrders rather tthan resettin
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`g to
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`zero. Id.
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`Figures 3A-CC’s illustratioons of tokenss with sizes
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`(and thus quuantities), evven when thoose
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`tokens arre not being used, also coonvey a defaault quantityy. Ex. 2, ¶ 166. For exammple, in Figuure
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`Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 13 of 24 PageID #:16418
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`3A, only the bid token 320 is being used to place an order, but the offer token 324 still has a size
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`reflecting a quantity. TT SOF, ¶ 15; Ex. 1, Fig. 3A; Ex. 2, ¶ 16. Similarly, in Figures 3B-C,
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`neither of the tokens 320, 324 are being used to place an order, and yet the bid token 320 and the
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`offer token 324 both have sizes reflecting a quantity. TT SOF, ¶ 16; Ex. 1, Figs. 3B-C; Ex. 2, ¶
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`16. Of course, if there were no default quantity, those tokens would have no size (and thus
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`reflect no quantity) when not in use. Ex. 2, ¶ 16. Accordingly, for this additional reason, a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the tokens retain their default quantities
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`between orders rather than resetting to zero. Id.
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`Moreover, Figure 3A’s illustration of a copy of the bid token 320 being dragged into the
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`window (which is shown in the green circle in the depiction of Figure 3A on page 5 above) also
`
`conveys the claimed default quantity. TT SOF, ¶ 17; Ex. 2, ¶ 17. That is because even after the
`
`copy of the token is dragged into the window, the original bid token 320 from which the copy is
`
`made (on the left-hand side of the screen) retains its size and quantity, as shown. Id.
`
`Finally, the fact that the tokens in Figures 3A-C all have different sizes (and thus reflect
`
`different quantities) conveys the claimed default quantity. TT SOF, ¶ 18; Ex. 2, ¶ 18. For
`
`example, looking at Figures 3A and 3B, each of the four tokens has a different size (and thus
`
`reflect different quantities). Id. These different quantities convey to a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art that the token’s size (and quantity) is not being reset after each order. Id.
`
`2.
`
`The Textual Description of Token Adjustment Conveys a Default
`Quantity
`
`The textual description of the manner in which a trader inputs a quantity using the tokens
`
`320, 324 further conveys the concept of a default quantity:
`
`After being selected, the trader adjusts the size of the offer or bid token 324, 320
`until the size of the token matches the desired quantity of the order. Preferably, a
`pop-up window or other screen indicator is displayed to show in numerical terms
`
`
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`Case: 1:10-cv-00715 Document #: 396 Filed: 09/14/11 Page 14 of 24 PageID #:16419
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`the quantity of the current size of the token, to ease the process of creating a
`properly sized order token.
`
`TT SOF, ¶ 20, Ex. 1, Col. 8:30-36 (emphasis added); Ex. 2, ¶ 19. The use of the term “adjusts”
`
`(which is commonly understood as altering) conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that
`
`the trader is changing the token’s predetermined size. TT SOF, ¶¶ 21-22; Ex. 1, Col. 8:31; Ex. 2,
`
`¶ 19. Indeed, if the token had no size (and thus no quantity) after each order such that the trader had
`
`to specify a new quantity for each individual order, the specification would have used a term other
`
`than “adjusts.” Ex. 1, Col. 8:31; Ex. 2, ¶ 19. Accordingly, the specification’s discussion of
`
`“adjust[ing] the size of the offer or bid token 324, 320” reasonably conveys to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art that the trader is altering a predetermined quantity (i.e., a default
`
`quantity), rather than entering a quantity for the first time. Ex. 2, ¶ 19. This is reinforced by the
`
`specification’s discussion of displaying “the quantity of the current size of the token,” which
`
`further conveys that the token has a size (and thus reflects a predetermined quantity) prior to an
`
`adjustment. Ex. 1, Col. 8:34-35; Ex. 2, ¶ 19.
`
`3.
`
`The Textual Description of Order Placement Conveys a Default
`Quantity
`
`The textual description of how tokens 320, 324 are used to place orders also conveys the
`
`claimed default quantity. Ex. 2, ¶ 20. In particular, as described in the specification, the quantity
`
`reflected by a selected token 320, 324 is auto-populated into a pop-up window, and a trader can
`
`then modify the quantity before order submission. TT SOF, ¶ 23; Ex. 1, Col. 8:45-51; Ex. 2, ¶
`
`20. Of course, this ability to further modify the token’s quantity only makes sense if it is a
`
`default quantity that may need to be further modified for certain orders. Ex. 2, ¶ 20. Indeed, if
`
`the token’s quantity was not a default quantity and the trader instead had to specify a quantity for
`
`each individual order, there would be no need to further modify the quantity via the pop-up
`
`window. Id. Accordingly, the specification’s disclosure of the ability to modify the token’s
`
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`quantity conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that this quantity is a default quantity for
`
`multiple orders, rather than a one-time quantity for a particular order. Id.
`
`For at least these reasons, the specification reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art that the inventors were in possession of a user interface in which the quantity
`
`reflected by an order token 320, 324 is a default quantity to be used for multiple orders. Id. at ¶
`
`25. Accordingly, the Defendants cannot meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing
`
`evidence that the specification fails to adequately disclose this claimed subject matter. In fact,
`
`the Court should grant summary judgment in TT’s favor, because no reasonable juror could find
`
`that the ‘056 patent fails to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
`
`B.
`
`Defendants Misstate the Burden of Proof
`
`Defendants advance a totally unsupported “theory” that the burden is on TT to prove that
`
`the written description is sufficient if a patent examiner does not affirmatively address (i.e., make
`
`a “considered judgment” on) the issue of written description during prosecution. This is false.
`
`The burden always remains on the Defendants, regardless of whether the examiner considers the
`
`issue. None of the three cases cited by the Defendants support their position. See Dkt. 373, Def.
`
`Br. 14 (citing In re NTP, Inc., No. 2010-1277, 2011 WL 3250466 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2011)1;
`
`Tech. Licensing, 545 F.3d 1316; PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2008)).
`
`The NTP case is completely irrelevant. NTP involved the PTO’s ability to address issues
`
`during reexamination, which is a special proceeding during which the PTO reexamines certain
`
`issues of patentability (e.g., novelty). In particular, the NTP court found that if the PTO
`
`affirmatively addresses (i.e., makes a “considered judgment” on) an issue during prosecution,
`
`then that issue could not be raised again during a reexamination proceeding. NTP, 2011 WL
`
`1 Unreported cases are included as Exhibit 4.
`
`
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`3250466, at *9. This finding related to a reexamination proceeding, however, has nothing to do
`
`with the burden of proof for a written description challenge during a patent infringement suit.
`
`Indeed, unlike a patent infringement suit, a patent is not even presumed valid during a
`
`reexamination proceeding. Id. at *5. Thus, the NTP case is inapplicable.
`
`Moreover, Technology Licensing and PowerOasis are inapplicable because they dealt
`
`with whether there was written description support in a priority document. In some situations,
`
`namely where the patent examiner did not have occasion to consider the priority issue during
`
`prosecution, the burden of coming forward with some evidence to support priority is on the
`
`patentee. Tech Licensing Corp., 545 F.3d at 1327-28. Even in that case, the ultimate burden
`
`remains with the challenger. Id. This rule exists because a patent examiner does not necessarily
`
`need to consider priority unless the examiner is faced with prior art requiring the patentee to
`
`claim priority. This is not the situation here. In every patent application, the examiner does
`
`consider whether claims are supported by the application itself. M.P.E.P § 2106(II); Bilski, 545
`
`F.3d at 996-97. Here, the Examiner was required to make sure that the ‘056 claims are supported
`
`by its specification (which is identical to the earlier the ‘999 specification). Therefore, TT does
`
`not have to come forward with any evidence to support priority.
`
`C.
`
`Defendants Fail to Meet Their Burden of Proving Lack of Written
`Description
`
`1.
`
`Defendants Fail to Present any Evidence Regarding the Understanding
`of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`As noted above, the written description issue is a “question of fact” regarding whether the
`
`specification “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of
`
`the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. The Defendants
`
`acknowledge this standard in their motion. See Dkt. 373, Def. Br. 13-14. Yet, Defendants fail to
`
`provide any information regarding who a person of ordinary skill in the art would be for this
`
`
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`patented technology. Likewise, they fail to present any facts—either in the form of a declaration
`
`or otherwise—regarding whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the
`
`inventors possessed the claimed default quantity. Instead, Defendants offer nothing more than
`
`argument regarding whether their lawyers believe the specification discloses the claimed default
`
`quantity, without any factual support. For this reason alone, Defendants fail to meet their
`
`burden of proving lack of written description by clear and convincing evidence.
`
`2.
`
`Defendants’ Assertion that the Exact Term “Default Quantity” Is Not
`Used in the Specification Is Irrelevant
`
`Defendants rely heavily on the fact that the exact term “default quantity” does not appear
`
`in the specification. Dkt. 373, Def. Br. 5-8, 10, 15. This fact is irrelevant, however. It is black
`
`letter law that the specification “need not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same
`
`terms as used in the claims.” Eiselstein, 52 F.3d at 1038; see also Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352
`
`(finding that the specification need not “recite the claimed invention in haec verba”); Trading
`
`Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2007) aff’d, 595 F.3d
`
`1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]e need not find that the application describes exactly the subject
`
`matter claimed . . . .”). Accordingly, the absence of the exact term “default quantity” from the
`
`specification has no bearing on whether the inventors were in possession of the claimed default
`
`quantity.
`
`3.
`
`Defendants’ Assertion that the Concept of “Default Quantity” Is Not
`Disclosed in the Specification Is Incorrect
`
`As discussed above, numerous portions of the specification convey to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art that the inventors were in possession of the claimed default quantity.
`
`This is confirmed by the Declaration of Richard Hartheimer, a person of ordinary skill in the art.
`
`Ex. 2, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5.
`
`
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`Nevertheless, Defendants conclude that the specification contains “no disclosure” of the
`
`claimed default quantity. This conclusion is based solely on Defendants’ assertion that the
`
`specification requires a user to specify a new quantity for each individual order. Dkt. 373, Def.
`
`Br. 8, 14 (stating the specification discloses “only methods of order entry in which a user
`
`specifies a quantity . . . for each individual order”). But this assertion is simply not true. Ex. 2