`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________
`
`CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`Patent of FRONTLINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`Patent Owner
`______________
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151
`_____________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.220
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I. 
`II. 
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
`Background ...................................................................................................... 4 
`A. 
`The 151 Patent ....................................................................................... 6 
`B. 
`Patent Claims ......................................................................................... 6 
`1.  Method Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 ................................................ 6 
`2. 
`System Claims 6 and 7 ................................................................ 9 
`III.  Claim Construction ........................................................................................ 12 
`A.  Ordinary Meaning Should Apply ........................................................ 13 
`1. 
`“Website” .................................................................................. 13 
`2. 
`“One or more computers” ......................................................... 14 
`3. 
`“Organization worksite” ........................................................... 15 
`4. 
`“Receiving” ............................................................................... 16 
`5. 
`“Generating” ............................................................................. 16 
`6. 
`“Posting” ................................................................................... 17 
`7. 
`“Information” ............................................................................ 18 
`8. 
`“Providing” ............................................................................... 18 
`IV.  Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 Recite Patentable-Eligible Subject
`Matter Because They Fall Within Permitted Statutory Categories and
`They Are Not Abstract Ideas ......................................................................... 19 
`The Claims Are Directed To Patent Eligible Processes and
`A. 
`Machines ............................................................................................. 21 
`The Claims Are Not An Abstract Idea ................................................ 22 
`
`B. 
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`1. 
`2. 
`
`Claims 6 and 7 Recite Machines, Not an Abstract Idea ........... 22 
`Computing Hardware Imposes a Meaningful Limit on the
`Recited Operations .................................................................... 23 
`Bancorp is Factually Different ............................................................ 29 
`C. 
`The Claim Language May Not Be Disregarded .................................. 31 
`D. 
`The Claims Do Not “Preempt” an Abstract Idea ................................ 36 
`E. 
`Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 42 
`
`
`V. 
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
`365 U.S. 336 (1961) ........................................................................................ 2, 31
`
`Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US),
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .............................................................. 24, 29, 30
`
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) .................................................................................. 19, 20
`
`Burr v. Duryee,
`68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1863) .......................................................................... 3, 22
`
`Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
`447 U.S. 303 (1980) ............................................................................................ 18
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ...................................................................... 1, 30, 31, 32, 35
`
`Fuzzysharp Technologies Inc. v. 3dLabs Inc.,
`447 Fed. Appx. 182 ....................................................................................... 34, 35
`
`Gottschalk v. Benson,
`409 U.S. 63 (1972) .............................................................................................. 36
`
`In re Alappat,
`33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) ...................................................... 22, 23
`
`In re Iwahashi,
`888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .................................................................... 22, 32
`
`In re Nuijten,
`500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...................................................................... 3, 22
`
`In re Warmerdam,
`33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................................................................ 22
`
`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................ 32
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) ............................................................................ 20, 21, 24
`
`Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith,
`959 F.2d 936,942 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ..................................................................... 31
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................... 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
`
`Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................ 19, 20, 21
`
`SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................... 3, 22, 23, 24
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ........................................... 1, 2, 3, 18, 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 34, 35, 42
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ................................................................................................... 3, 37
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 .................................................................................................... 3, 37
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 .......................................................................................................... 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282 ........................................................................................................ 31
`
`35 U.S.C. § 321 .................................................................................................... 1, 12
`
`OTHER AUTHORITY
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.220 ................................................................................................... 13
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 of U.S. patent 6,675,151 (“the 151 Patent”)
`
`(attached at Pet. Exs. 1001, 1002) (“Pet. Ex.” referring to Exhibits attached to
`
`CRS’s Petition For Transitional Post-Grant Review Under § 18 of the Leahy-Smith
`
`America Invents Act and 35 U.S.C. § 321) recite patent eligible subject matter.
`
`The claims are not directed to a mere “abstract idea.”
`
`A section 101 analysis involves two steps. First, the statutory category, if
`
`any, to which a claim is directed must be identified. Second, the three exceptions
`
`set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court must be examined to determine whether any
`
`applies. Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 each claim either a machine or a process –
`
`permitted statutory categories. Accordingly, Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 must be
`
`analyzed to determine if any is an abstract idea.
`
`Under existing case law, for a claim to be invalid for claiming an abstract
`
`idea, the abstractness should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad
`
`statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs
`
`primary attention on the patentability. However, as cautioned by the Supreme
`
`Court, too broad an interpretation of what constitutes an abstract idea could
`
`eviscerate patent law. Here none of Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 are directed to a
`
`patent ineligible abstract idea because computing structure plays a significant part
`
`in performing the claimed operations.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`CRS’s analysis is deficient, wrong in its conclusion, and invites error. For
`
`purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Board must consider the invention as claimed,
`
`including all of the limitations of each claim, and may not set aside those
`
`limitations in support of a search of the invention's “idea” or “concept.” Diamond
`
`v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
`
`Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961) (“[T]here is no legally recognizable or
`
`protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination
`
`patent.”).1
`
`Under a misguided analysis, virtually any claim can be held to cover
`
`unpatentable subject matter, for virtually any claim can be reduced to a core idea
`
`that is in some sense “abstract.” Computer-related and computer-implemented
`
`inventions are especially vulnerable, where, as here, CRS incorrectly regards
`
`computer-related structure as particularly insignificant in the section 101 analysis.
`
`But Supreme Court precedent does not support this analysis. Claims to particular
`
`computers or particular uses of computers may be anticipated or obvious, or may
`
`
`1 In its Preliminary Response (Paper No. 16), Patent Owner argued that Section 101 does not fall
`
`within the available grounds for challenging patentability under Section 18 of the AIA. Patent
`
`Owner maintains that position for the very same reasons expressed. Patent Owner reserves the
`
`right to raise this issue should any appeal or other proceeding be filed in relation to this matter.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`lack definiteness or present other issues, but those are matters for analysis under
`
`sections 102, 103, and 112, not section 101.
`
`CRS’s analysis of system claims 6 and 7 fails to consider the actual elements
`
`of the claim. There can be no dispute that the systems recited in claims 6 and 7 are
`
`“machines” as provided for in section 101. The “machines” comprise “a database”
`
`and “one or more computers comprising a server connected to the database.” Such
`
`a “machine” is “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
`
`combination of devices.” In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
`
`(quotation marks omitted). “A machine is not a principle or idea.” Burr v. Duryee,
`
`68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863).
`
`CRS’s analysis of independent claim 3 and dependent claims 16, 24, and 33
`
`likewise fails to recognize the significance of the computer and communication
`
`elements recited in the claim language. Claim 3 does not simply recite that an
`
`otherwise mental process should be carried out using a computer, nor is the
`
`computer simply “an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
`
`more quickly.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2010). Rather, the computing structure itself performs a series of interactive
`
`operations that previously had never been performed and which result in a
`
`substitute worker being secured to fill a vacancy. The one or more computers play
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`a “significant part” in permitting the claimed invention to be practiced and place a
`
`meaningful limit on the claim scope. Id.
`
`Accordingly, claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 of the 151, when their actual
`
`language is given its due significance and consideration, are not directed to mere
`
`abstract ideas. Rather, the claims are directed to patent eligible subject matter.
`
`II. Background
`The 151 patent discloses systems and methods for performing substitute
`
`fulfillment whereby a replacement worker is secured to substitute for a worker
`
`during a temporary absence. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at Abstract).
`
`Before automation of the fulfillment process, location of a replacement to
`
`fill a temporary employee absence in an organization was an unreliable and labor-
`
`intensive process. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 1, ll. 29-32). The substitute fulfillment
`
`task is non-trivial, requiring managers to devote significant time, effort and other
`
`resources, with no guarantee of success. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 2, ll. 10-14).
`
`The substitute fulfillment task usually is triggered in a school when a teacher
`
`“calls in sick.” (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 2, ll. 66-67). Once a teacher has called in sick
`
`or otherwise signaled his absence, the responsible administrator must disrupt her
`
`schedule to focus on the substitute fulfillment task. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 4-8).
`
`The administrator must determine which classes the absent teacher teaches and
`
`what skills are required of a replacement. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 17-29). The
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`administrator then typically identifies acceptable substitutes from the substitutes
`
`registered with the school district. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 26-28). The
`
`administrator telephones potential substitutes to check their availability and
`
`willingness to take on the assignment. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 28-30).
`
`Sometimes the administrator may have to telephone an individual substitute
`
`several times. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 30-32). If the administrator locates and
`
`confirms a substitute, the administrator may then have to inform the relevant
`
`department head or other teachers and complete paperwork to process the
`
`assignment. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 32-35).
`
`Systems for supporting substitute fulfillment were known, although those
`
`systems utilized telephones and interactive voice prompt technology to interface
`
`with teachers and substitutes. Petitioner, CRS, sold such systems. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at
`
`col. 3, ll. 48-50). One of the practical limitations associated with such earlier
`
`systems is the requirement for a customer to purchase hardware specifically
`
`designed to receive telephone calls from teachers reporting absences and to initiate
`
`telephone calls to substitute teachers to find replacements. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3,
`
`ll. 39-48). Such hardware systems were costly. (Pet. Ex. 1001 at col. 3, ll. 39-48).
`
`As a result, only relatively large school systems had the financial resources to
`
`purchase and maintain such systems. For school districts without sufficient
`
`resources, the old manual, labor intensive method was used.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`A. The 151 Patent
`The 151 patent discloses an inventive telephone and Internet-based system
`
`for securing substitute workers to replace absent workers. The disclosed system
`
`receives via the Internet information of an absent position, posts that information
`
`on an Internet website, receives a response via the Internet from a substitute
`
`viewing the information, and secures the position via the Internet for the substitute,
`
`including, in part, halting fulfillment processing of the position for other
`
`substitutes. (Pet. Ex. 1002 at claim 3).
`
`As a result of the invention disclosed in the 151 patent, substitute fulfillment
`
`could now be accomplished with only an Internet connection. Since only an
`
`Internet connection was now necessary, a computer constructed to carry out
`
`substitute fulfillment could be made available via the Internet to employers such as
`
`school districts. School districts no longer had to purchase their own computer for
`
`automated fulfillment. Automated fulfillment would no longer be limited to large
`
`school districts.
`
`Patent Claims
`
`B.
`There are fifty-five claims comprised in the reexamined 151 patent.
`
`Petitioner CRS has requested review of only claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33.
`
`1. Method Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33
`Claim 3 is directed to “[a] method for performing substitute fulfillment”— a
`
`process, that is performed by “one or more computers.” The claimed method
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`recites that the “one or more computers” perform various operations including
`
`receiving information via “at least one communication link,” generating and
`
`posting information “on a website,” and halting further processing “at the one or
`
`more computers” in response to receiving an acceptance to fulfill the position
`
`with any other substitute worker. Claim 3 recites in total as follows:
`
`3.
`
`A method for performing substitute
`
`fulfillment for a plurality of different organizations
`
`comprising:
`
`receiving absentee information representing an
`
`absent worker that will be or is physically absent from an
`
`organization worksite via at least one communication
`
`link;
`
`generating and posting by one or more computers a
`
`list of one or more positions of one or more absent
`
`workers that need to be filled by one or more substitute
`
`workers on a website and providing, for one or more of
`
`the positions, information indicating directly or indirectly
`
`an organization worksite location for the respective
`
`position;
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`receiving a response comprising an acceptance, by
`
`the one or more computers, from a substitute worker
`
`selecting a posted position on the website via an Internet
`
`communication link; and
`
`securing in response to receiving the acceptance
`
`for the substitute worker, via the Internet communication
`
`link and the one or more computers, the posted position
`
`for the substitute worker who selected the posted position
`
`to fill in for the absent worker, the securing comprising
`
`halting, at the one or more computers, further processing
`
`to fulfill the posted position with any other substitute
`
`worker.
`
`Claim 16 depends from claim 3 and further recites operations including
`
`“receiving electronically the acceptance . . . from the website,” “generating by the
`
`one or more computers information,” and “posting this information via the
`
`Internet communication link.”
`
`16. The method of claim 3,
`
`wherein the receiving an acceptance by a substitute
`
`worker comprises receiving electronically the acceptance
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`by the substitute worker from the website on which the
`
`list of one or more positions was posted; and
`
`wherein the securing step comprises generating by
`
`the one or more computers information that the position
`
`was secured to the substitute worker and sending or
`
`posting this information via the Internet communication
`
`link to the substitute worker.
`
`
`
`
`
`Claim 24 depends from claim 3 and further recites as follows:
`
`
`
`24. The method of claim 3, wherein the
`
`information provided comprises information on a start
`
`time for an absence of the absent worker.
`
`Claim 33 depends from claim 3 and further explains that the operations
`
`comprise “receiving an acceptance . . . by a web communication link.”
`
`33. The method of claim 3, wherein the
`
`receiving step by computer, comprises receiving an
`
`acceptance from one of the substitute workers by a web
`
`communication link.
`
`System Claims 6 and 7
`
`2.
`Claim 6 is directed to “[a] substitute fulfillment system”—a machine, that
`
`employs “one or more computers” to perform various operations that are recited
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`in the claim. More particularly, claim 6 is directed to a machine comprising “a
`
`database” comprising particular worker records, and “one or more computers
`
`comprising a server” connected to the database and configured to perform
`
`operations for securing one or more substitute workers. The “one or more
`
`computers” are configured to perform various operations including receiving
`
`information via “at least one communication link,” generating and posting
`
`information “on a website,” and halting further processing “at the one or more
`
`computers” in response to receiving an acceptance. Claim 6 recites as follows:
`
`6. A substitute fulfillment system that secures one
`
`or more substitute workers for a plurality of
`
`organizations comprising:
`
`a database comprising worker records, said worker
`
`records having information associated with workers for
`
`each of the organizations, and substitute records, said
`
`substitute records having information associated with 60
`
`at least one substitute worker; and
`
`one or more computers comprising a server
`
`connected to the database, the server configured for:
`
`receiving absentee information representing
`
`an absent worker that will be or is physically
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`absent from an organization worksite via at least
`
`one communication link;
`
`generating and posting a list of one or more
`
`positions of one or more absent workers that need
`
`to be filled by one or more substitute workers on a
`
`website and providing, for one or more of the
`
`positions, information indicating directly or
`
`indirectly an organization worksite location for the
`
`respective position;
`
`receiving a response comprising an
`
`acceptance from a substitute worker selecting a
`
`posted position on the website via an Internet
`
`communication link; and
`
`securing, in response to receiving the
`
`acceptance from the substitute worker, via the
`
`Internet communication link and the one or more
`
`computers, the posted position for the substitute
`
`worker who selected the posted position to fill in
`
`for the absent worker, the securing comprising
`
`halting, at the one or more computers, further
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`processing to fulfill the posted position with any
`
`other substitute worker.
`
`Claim 7 depends from claim 6 and recites further operations that are
`
`performed by the “server” comprised in the “one or more computers” including
`
`“generat[ing] a list” and “transmit[ting] the generated list . . . via the at least one
`
`communication link.” Claim 7 recites as follows:
`
`7. The substitute fulfillment system of claim 6
`
`wherein the server is further configured to generate a list
`
`of substitute workers and absent workers who the
`
`substitute workers will be filling in for a given
`
`organization and to transmit the generated list of
`
`substitute workers and names of the absent workers who
`
`the substitute workers will be filling in for to the given
`
`organization via the at least one communication link.
`
`III. Claim Construction
`CRS proposes constructions for several claim terms and phrases. (CRS’s
`
`Petition For Transitional Post-Grant Review Under § 18 of the Leahy-Smith
`
`America Invents Act and 35 U.S.C. § 321, hereinafter “Pet.”, at 18-19). CRS
`
`provides no explanation as to why the identified terms and phrases allegedly
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`require construction. Moreover, CRS provides absolutely no support for its
`
`proposed construction.
`
`CRS’s proposed constructions should be rejected and the ordinary meaning
`
`of the claim terms should apply. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). With few exceptions,2 CRS’s proposed constructions go beyond the
`
`ordinary meaning and incorporate extraneous language.
`
`A. Ordinary Meaning Should Apply
`1.
`“Website”
`The ordinary meaning of the word “website” is “a file or related group of
`
`files available on the World Wide Web.” (Pat. Own. Ex. 2001, selected excerpts
`
`from Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms, p. 527 (Seventh Edition) (2000))
`
`(“Pat. Own. Ex.” hereinafter referring to Exhibits submitted by Patent Owner and
`
`attached to the present Patent Owner’s Response Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.220).
`
`There is no indication in the patent specification or the prosecution history that the
`
`applicant intended the term to have anything other than its ordinary meaning. See
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-17.
`
`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the word “website.” In particular, CRS’s proposed
`
`
`2 Patent Owner Frontline does not oppose CRS’s proposed interpretations of “communication
`
`link,” “Internet communication link,” and “database.”
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`construction refers to “related HTML-coded webpages.” (Pet. at 18-19). CRS
`
`provides no support for including this language in its proposed claim construction.
`
`The extraneous language should be disregarded and the ordinary meaning should
`
`apply.
`
`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term
`
`“website” is its ordinary meaning – “a file or related group of files available on the
`
`World Wide Web.”
`
`“One or more computers”
`
`2.
`The ordinary meaning of the word “computer” is “a machine capable of
`
`executing instructions on data.” (Pat. Own. Ex. 2001 at p. 100). There is no
`
`indication in the patent specification or the prosecution history that the applicant
`
`intended the term to have anything other than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips,
`
`415 F.3d at 1313-17.
`
`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the word “computer.” In particular, CRS’s proposed
`
`construction refers to “general-purpose computations devices.” (Pet. at 18-19).
`
`CRS provides no support for including this language in its proposed claim
`
`construction. The extraneous language should be disregarded and the ordinary
`
`meaning should apply.
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim language
`
`“one or more computers” is its ordinary meaning – “one or more” “machine[s]
`
`capable of executing instructions on data.”
`
`“Organization worksite”
`
`3.
`The ordinary meaning of the word “site” is “the scene of . . . specified
`
`activity.” (Pat. Own. Ex. 2002, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p.
`
`2128 (1981)). Accordingly, the term “worksite” may be understood to mean “the
`
`scene of” “work.” Further, an “organization” “worksite” should be understood to
`
`be a “scene of” “work” associated with an “organization.” There is no indication
`
`in the patent specification or the prosecution history that the Applicant intended the
`
`term to have anything other than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1313-17.
`
`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the phrase “organization worksite.” For example,
`
`CRS’s proposed construction refers to “any work environment amenable to
`
`substitute fulfillment, information compilation or notification.” (Pet. at 18-19).
`
`CRS provides no support for including this language in its proposed claim
`
`construction. This extraneous language should be disregarded and the ordinary
`
`meaning should apply.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim phrase
`
`“organization worksite” is its ordinary meaning – “scene of” “work” associated
`
`with an “organization.”
`
`“Receiving”
`
`4.
`The ordinary meaning of the word “receiving” is “to take possession or
`
`delivery of.” (Pat. Own. Ex. 2002 at p. 1894). There is no indication in the patent
`
`specification or the prosecution history that the Applicant intended the term to
`
`have anything other than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-17.
`
`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the word “receiv[e].” For example, CRS’s definition
`
`refers to “being given information.” (Pet. at 18-19). CRS provides no support for
`
`including this language in its proposed claim construction. The extraneous
`
`language should be disregarded and the ordinary meaning should apply.
`
`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term
`
`“receiving” is its ordinary meaning – “tak[ing] possession or delivery of.”
`
`“Generating”
`
`5.
`The ordinary meaning of the word “generating” is “to bring into existence.”
`
`(Pat. Own. Ex. 2002 at p. 945). There is no indication in the patent specification or
`
`the prosecution history that the Applicant intended the term to have anything other
`
`than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-17.
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the word “generating.” For example, CRS’s proposed
`
`construction refers to “creating a visual representation of information, including in
`
`the form of a list or report.” (Pet. at 18-19). CRS provides no support for including
`
`this language in its proposed claim construction. The extraneous language should
`
`be disregarded and the ordinary meaning should apply.
`
`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term
`
`“generating” is its ordinary meaning – “to bring into existence.”
`
`“Posting”
`
`6.
`The ordinary meaning of the word “posting” is “to publish, announce, or
`
`advertise . . . .” (Pat. Own. Ex. 2002 at p. 1771). There is no indication in the
`
`patent specification or the prosecution history that the Applicant intended the term
`
`to have anything other than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-
`
`17.
`
`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the word “posting.” For example, CRS’s proposed
`
`construction refers to “the act of visually displaying information, including in the
`
`form of a list.” (Pet. at 18-19). CRS provides no support for including this
`
`language in its proposed claim construction. The extraneous language should be
`
`disregarded and the ordinary meaning should apply.
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term
`
`“posting” is its ordinary meaning – “to publish, announce, or advertise . . . .”
`
`“Information”
`
`7.
`An ordinary meaning of the word “information” is “data.” (Pat. Own. Ex.
`
`2002 at p. 1160). There is no indication in the patent specification or the
`
`prosecution history that the Applicant intended the term to have anything other
`
`than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-17.
`
`CRS’s proposed construction, on the other hand, includes additional
`
`limitations that are not part of the ordinary meaning of the word “information.”
`
`For example, CRS’s proposed construction refers to data “that may be stored or
`
`recorded.” (Pet. at 18-19). CRS provides no support for including this language in
`
`its proposed claim construction. The extraneous language should be disregarded
`
`and the ordinary meaning should apply.
`
`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term
`
`“information” is its ordinary meaning – “data.”
`
`“Providing”
`
`8.
`The ordinary meaning of the word “providing” is “supply[ing] for use.” (Pat.
`
`Own. Ex. 2002 at p. 1827). Furthermore, there is no indication in the patent
`
`specification or the prosecution history that the Applicant intended the term to
`
`have anything other than its ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-17.
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`CRS’s proposed construction includes additional limitations that are not part
`
`of the ordinary meaning of the word “providing.” For example, CRS’s proposed
`
`construction refers to “conveying or making information available.” (Pet. at 18-
`
`19). CRS provides no support for including this language in its proposed claim
`
`construction. The extraneous language should be disregarded and the ordinary
`
`meaning should apply. CITE.
`
`Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term
`
`“providing” is its ordinary meaning – “supply[ing] for use.”
`
`
`
`IV. Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 Recite Patentable-Eligible Subject
`Matter Because They Fall Within Permitted Statutory Categories
`and They Are Not Abstract Ideas
`
`Section 101 establishes four categories of subject matter that are eligible for
`
`[patent] protection: “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
`
`composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. “Section 101 emphasizes that ‘any’
`
`subject matter in the four independent categories qualif[ies] for [patent]
`
`protection.” Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 867
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2010). The “expansive terms . . . modified by the comprehensive ‘any’”
`
`in section 101 reflect the “wide scope” of patent eligibility. Bilski v. Kappos, 130
`
`S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308
`
`(1980)). The Supreme Court has identified only “three specific exceptions to
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`§ 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: laws of nature, physical phenomena,
`
`and abstract ideas.” Id. (citation omitted).
`
`Accordingly, a section 101 analysis involves two steps. First, the statutory
`
`category, if any, to which a claim is directed must be identified. Second, the
`
`Supreme Court’s three exceptions must be examined to determine whether any
`
`applies. Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868. Here, the claims are clearly
`
`directed to machines and processes as defined in section 101. CRS argues,
`
`incorrectly, that the claims are directed to a patent ineligible “abstra