Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 7715
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`
`FINJAN, LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability
`Corporation,
`
`
`
`
`
`RAPID7, INC., a Delaware Corporation
`and RAPID7 LLC, a Delaware Limited
`Liability Company,
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
` C.A. No. 1:18-cv-01519-MN
`
` Jury Trial Demanded
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S PARTIAL DAUBERT
`MOTION TO PRECLUDE TRIAL TESTIMONY BY RAPID7’S EXPERTS
`KEVIN ALMEROTH, PH.D., PATRICK MCDANIEL, PH.D., AND SOMESH JHA,
`PH.D., CONCERNING SUFFICIENCY OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
`FOR THE PATENTS-IN-SUIT
`
`
`
`Richard L. Renck (No. 3893)
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`222 Delaware Avenue,
`Suite 1600
`Wilmington, DE 19801-1659
`Tel.: (302) 657-4900
`Fax: (302) 657-4901
`RLRenck@duanemorris.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`Rapid7, Inc. and Rapid7 LLC
`
`
`
`Dated: November 6, 2020
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`L. Norwood Jameson
`Matthew C. Gaudet
`Robin McGrath
`David C. Dotson
`John R. Gibson
`Jennifer H. Forte
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`1075 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2000
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`Tel.: (404) 253-6900
`Fax: (404) 253-6901
`wjameson@duanemorris.com
`mcgaudet@duanemorris.com 
`rlmcgrath@duanemorris.com
`dcdotson@duanemorris.com 
`jrgibson@duanemorris.com
`jhforte@duanemorris.com
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 7716
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`
`Jarrad M. Gunther
`Joseph A. Powers
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`30 South 17th St.
`Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196
`Tel.: (215) 979-1837
`Fax: (215) 689-4921
`jmgunther@duanemorris.com
`japowers@duanemorris.com
`
`Jordana Garellek
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`Duane Morris LLP
`1540 Broadway
`New York, NY 10036-4086
`Tel.: (212) 471-1829
`Fax: (212) 214-0889
`jgarellek@duanemorris.com
`
`*admitted pro hac vice
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 7717
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`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Rapid7’s Experts Focus on The Scope of Specific Claims Elements in
`
`Rapid7’s Experts Used Finjan’s Infringement Allegations To
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 1
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 1
`Legal Standard ........................................................................................................ 1
`1.
`Daubert Motions ......................................................................................... 2
`2.
`Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ................................................ 2
`3.
`Written Description ..................................................................................... 2
`View of Finjan’s Infringement Allegations ............................................................ 3
`1.
`Determine the Necessary Scope of Specific Claim Elements .................... 3
`2.
`The Methodology Used by Rapid7’s Experts Is Correct ............................ 4
`Defendants’ Experts ................................................................................................ 5
`Defendants’ Experts’ Opinions are Admissible Under Rule 403 ........................... 9
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 9
`
`Finjan Has No Support For Its Attack On The Methodology of
`
`
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`
`
`i
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 7718
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousse, 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................5
`
`Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................... 2-3, 9
`
`Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................ 6-7
`
`Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .........................6
`
`Daubert v. Merrell Dow. Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ........................................................ 2, 8-9
`
`Hines v. CONRAIL, 926 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1991) ............................................................................2
`
`i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..................................................2
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..........................................5
`
`LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ......................4
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) .................................................6
`
`Rivera v. ITC, 857 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................5, 7
`
`Simon v. Weissmann, 301 F. App’x 107 (3d Cir. 2008) ..................................................................8
`
`SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
`(en banc) .....................................................................................................................................6
`
`Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2002) .............................................9
`
`Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., C.A. No. C 12-05501 SI, 2014
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57519 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) ..............................................................4, 9
`
`Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. 10-cv-10578, 2016 U.S.
`Dist. LEXIS 145316 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2016) ..................................................................5, 8
`
`Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. 2:10-cv-10578-PDB-
`DRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145816 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2016) ..........................................8
`
`Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, LLC, C.A. No. 10-cv-10578, 2015 U.S.
`Dist. LEXIS 33306 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2015) ...................................................................5, 7
`
`Ware v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., C.A. No. 4:07-CV-00122 RLV, 2011
`WL 13322747 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) ...............................................................................5, 7
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 7719
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`Ware v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., C.A. No. 4:07-CV-00122 RLV, 2012
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206575, 2012 WL 13134065 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2012) ................................5
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................................ 4, 6-8
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 403 .........................................................................................................................2, 9
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 702 .........................................................................................................................2, 8
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 7720
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendants Rapid7, Inc. and Rapid7 LLC (collectively, “Rapid7”) oppose Plaintiff Finjan
`
`LLC’s (“Finjan”) Partial Daubert Motion to Preclude Trial Testimony by Rapid7’s Experts
`
`Kevin Almeroth, Ph.D., Patrick McDaniel, Ph.D., and Somesh Jha, Ph.D., Concerning
`
`Sufficiency of Written Description for the Patents-In-Suit (the “Motion”). D.I. 203, 204.
`
`Finjan’s Motion is premised on Finjan’s mischaracterization of the analysis undertaken by
`
`Rapid7’s experts as being an untimely claim construction dispute. D.I. 204, Finjan Br. at 3.
`
`The Federal Circuit and other district courts have confirmed that the methodology
`
`actually used by Rapid7’s experts in analyzing written description is proper. Specifically, these
`
`courts have confirmed that it is proper to analyze a plaintiff’s infringement allegations – exactly
`
`as Rapid7’s experts have done here – to (i) determine the scope that a given claim element must
`
`necessarily have under the plaintiff’s own allegations, and then (ii) analyze that claim scope for
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`written description support. This is a question of fact for the jury to determine, not a claim
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`construction dispute for the Court. Despite Finjan’s allegations to the contrary, Rapid7 is not
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`“attempt[ing] to make claim construction a jury issue.” D.I. 204, Finjan Br. at 13.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Rapid7 served its opening expert reports in June 2020. D.I. 139. Rapid7’s experts
`
`included an analysis of whether certain claim elements meet the requirements for written
`
`description in their reports. D.I. 205, Exs. A - C. Rapid7’s experts’ analysis on written
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`description is tied to specific claim elements and used Finjan’s infringement allegations “insofar
`
`as those allegations demonstrate the asserted scope of the claims.” D.I. 197-4, Reply Expert
`
`Report of Kevin Almeroth at ¶ 128.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 7721
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`1.
`
`Daubert Motions
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`Expert testimony is admissible “if [1] the testimony is based upon sufficient facts and
`
`data, [2] the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and [3] the expert has
`
`reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert
`
`v. Merrell Dow. Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). “When the methodology is sound, and
`
`the evidence relied upon sufficiently related to the case at hand, disputes about the degree of
`
`relevance or accuracy (above this minimum threshold) may go to the testimony’s weight, but not
`
`its admissibility.” i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 852 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`2.
`
`Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
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`“Excluding evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 at the pretrial stage is an extreme measure.”
`
`Hines v. CONRAIL, 926 F.2d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 1991). Evidence may only be excluded if “its
`
`probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
`
`prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
`
`presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
`
`3. Written Description
`
`Compliance with the requirement of written description is a question of fact. Ariad
`
`Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “[T]he purpose of the
`
`written description requirement is to ‘ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in
`
`the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as
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`described in the patent specification.’” Id. at 1353-54 (internal citations omitted). In determining
`
`whether the written description requirement is met, courts analyze “whether the disclosure of the
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`application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
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`possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. at 1351.
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`2
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 7722
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`B.
`
`Rapid7’s Experts Focus on The Scope of Specific Claims Elements in View of
`Finjan’s Infringement Allegations
`
`The gist of Finjan’s flawed argument is that the opinions of Rapid7’s experts on written
`
`description are “based on alternative claim constructions crafted by Rapid7.” D.I. 204, Finjan
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`Br. at 6-7. This is incorrect both on the facts and the law.
`
`1.
`
`Rapid7’s Experts Used Finjan’s Infringement Allegations To
`Determine the Necessary Scope of Specific Claim Elements
`
`Finjan does not identify any purported “alternative claim constructions” proposed by
`
`Rapid7’s experts, and there are none.
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`Instead, Rapid7’s experts follow the case law in identifying the claim scope necessarily
`
`asserted by Finjan based on its infringement analysis. To do so, Rapid7’s experts identify
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`specific claim elements in the asserted claims that are, respectively, the focus of each written
`
`description inquiry. See, e.g., D.I. 205, Ex. A at XII(A)(1)(a), Ex. B at XIII(B)(1), Ex. C at
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`XII(A)(1). Rapid7’s experts thus focused on Finjan’s infringement allegations to understand the
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`necessary scope given to a specified claim term under Finjan’s own allegations, before analyzing
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`that claim scope for written description support.
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`For example, Finjan cites to paragraphs 319 and 320 of Dr. Almeroth’s report in support
`
`of its argument (D.I. 204, Finjan Br. at 4-5), but an examination of those paragraphs reveals that
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`what Finjan characterizes as “hypothetical constructions” is simply Dr. Almeroth’s discussion of
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`what Finjan has alleged satisfies the claim element, which is by definition indicative of the scope
`
`of the claim element (if Finjan’s infringement allegations are correct). D.I. 205, Ex. A at ¶ 319
`
`(“I understand from Plaintiff’s infringement contentions for InsightVM, Nexpose, InsightAppSec
`
`that Plaintiff contends asset information and other data collected from a customer network is
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`“content with a first function” that is received over a network.”); id. ¶ 320 (“further understand
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`from Plaintiff’s infringement contentions that Plaintiff contends a “first function” can include,
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`3
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 7723
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`for example, standard JavaScript functions within a file received over the Internet.”). These
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`paragraphs make no mention of any new claim constructions. Id. Rapid7’s other experts take
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`the same approach.
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`2.
`
`The Methodology Used by Rapid7’s Experts Is Correct
`
`The written description analysis requires both “an inquiry into the specification,” and “an
`
`inquiry into the scope of the invention.” Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., C.A.
`
`No. C 12-05501 SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57519, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014); see also
`
`LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(“Although the specification would meet the requirements of section 112 with respect to a claim
`
`directed to that particular engine, it would not necessarily support a broad claim to every possible
`
`type of fuel-efficient engine, no matter how different in structure or operation from the
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`inventor’s engine.”). Accordingly, the written description requirement is dependent on the scope
`
`of the claims as a threshold issue. Verinata Health, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57519, at *7.
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`In view of this, it is permissible to consider the plaintiff’s infringement allegations
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`regarding a given claim element to determine the scope of the claim necessarily encompassed by
`
`such allegations. Infringement contentions describe “the scope of what [a plaintiff] asserts is
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`claimed by the patents” and therefore impact a defendant’s written description defenses. Id.
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`(allowing a defendant to amend its written description defenses in its invalidity contentions
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`because plaintiff amended its infringement contentions to expand the asserted scope of its
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`claims). Rapid7’s experts thus determine and then apply what is necessarily Finjan’s view of the
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`scope of the claim elements at issue, or how Finjan is applying the Court’s claim construction (in
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`the event a term has been construed by the Court). As described in more detail below, this
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`approach is permissible. See, e.g., Rivera v. ITC, 857 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Ware v.
`
`Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., C.A. No. 4:07-CV-00122 RLV, 2011 WL 13322747, at *20
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`4
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 7724
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`(N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, C.A. No. 4:07-CV-00122-RLV,
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`2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206575, 2012 WL 13134065 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2012); Visteon Glob.
`
`Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int'l, LLC, C.A. No. 10-cv-10578, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33306, at *31
`
`(E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2015) (“Visteon 1”); Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., C.A.
`
`No. 10-cv-10578, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145316, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2016) (“Visteon
`
`2”).
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`Likewise, it is well established that if a patentee seeks a broad claim scope for
`
`infringement, there must be adequate disclosure in the specification for that claim scope to be
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`valid. Cf. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The
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`irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have its claims include a jacketless
`
`system, but, having won that battle, it then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a
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`challenge it could not meet. The motto, ‘beware of what one asks for,’ might be applicable
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`here.”). Rapid7’s experts explicitly state that they do not agree with Finjan’s interpretation of
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`the scope of the claim elements at issue in the written description analysis, but if Finjan’s
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`interpretation is correct for purposes of infringement, it must also be correct for purposes of
`
`invalidity. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousse, 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
`
`(“[C]laims are construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.”). Finjan may want
`
`to avoid this dilemma before the jury, but Finjan cannot have it both ways.
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`C.
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`Finjan Has No Support For Its Attack On The Methodology of Defendants’
`Experts
`
`Finjan essentially argues that any discussion of the scope of claim elements by Rapid7’s
`
`experts constitutes a new (and impermissible) claim construction argument. If that were true,
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`experts could not opine on the written description requirement in front of a jury – a fact issue –
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`5
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 7725
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`or, would at least have to ignore the plaintiff’s own allegations about the scope of the specific
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`claim terms at issue. As set forth herein, that is not the law.
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`Finjan attempts to dispatch of cases cited by Rapid7 in its opposition to Finjan’s October
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`2, 2020 letter brief (and similarly relied upon here), by arguing that those cases are “cases where
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`accused infringers argued that, if the claims were construed so broadly as to encompass accused
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`products, the claims would be invalid for one reason or another.” D.I. 203 at 10-11. Finjan tries
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`to dovetail this argument with its citation to SRI, Brookhill-Wilk 1, and Phillips for the
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`proposition that “Finjan’s infringement contentions are not a cognizable source of evidence for
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`claim construction.” Id. at 10. This argument fails for at least three reasons.
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`First, Rapid7’s experts do not propose any claim constructions, nor use Finjan’s
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`infringement contentions as a “source of evidence for claim construction,” which is a recurring
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`foundational flaw in Finjan’s motion.
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`Second, this is not a claim construction proceeding, but a necessary and permissible
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`inquiry into the sufficiency of written description, per the case law described herein.
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`Third, Finjan’s attempt to group the cases cited by Rapid7 with SRI, Brookhill-Wilk 1 and
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`Philips is incorrect. The cases cited by Rapid7 address invalidity under the written description
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`requirement (as explained in more detail below), not standards for claim construction (as in SRI,
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`Brookhill-Wilk 1 and Philips). See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107,
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`1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294,
`
`1299 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`
`banc). Of course, even a claim term that has been construed by the Court can result in the claim
`
`being rendered invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112. See, e.g., Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N.
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`Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“ATI sought to have the scope of the claims of
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`
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`6
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`

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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 7726
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`the ‘253 patent [during claim construction] include both mechanical and electronic side impact
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`sensors. It succeeded, but then was unable to demonstrate that the claim was fully enabled.”).
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`Under the scope of the claim elements that would be necessary to support Finjan’s
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`allegations regarding how the clam elements are met by the accused products, those claim
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`elements are not supported by written description. The Federal Circuit has recognized the
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`propriety and permissibility of this type of analysis. For example, in Rivera, the Federal Circuit
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`noted that “[b]oth parties analyze[d] the written description issue under the assumption that the
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`asserted claims read on Solofill's K2 and K3 cup-shaped containers.” Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319.
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`It found that “written description support for broad claims covering a receptacle with integrated
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`filter such as Solofill's accused products and Rivera's Eco-Fill products is lacking.” Id. at 1321.
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`See also Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d 1274 at 1285.
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`Similarly, as stated in Ware, “[t]he issue here is whether or not the '592 specification
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`supports claim 1 as now asserted by plaintiffs in order to sustain their charge of infringement. It
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`is these assertions by plaintiffs that give rise to Section 112(1) issues.” Ware, 2011 WL
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`13322747, at *20. “If claim 1 is read broadly to capture defendants' systems, the '592 patent is
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`invalid under Section 112(1). If claim 1 is construed to cover that which is disclosed in the '592
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`specification, defendants have not infringed.” Id. at *28. Further, in Visteon 1, the court denied
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`Visteon's motion for summary judgment regarding Garmin's § 112 defenses and stated that
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`Garmin’s expert “ties his opinions both to the full scope of the claims, as interpreted by him
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`based upon Visteon's infringement contentions, and to the time of filing.” Visteon 1, 2015 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 33306, at *31.
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`Similar to Finjan’s tactic here, following Visteon’s unsuccessful summary judgment
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`pleading, Visteon then brought a motion in limine to exclude Garmin’s § 112 defenses that were
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`7
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 7727
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`allegedly directed to the accused products and the court agreed with the Special Master’s Report
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`and Recommendations in denying that motion as well. Visteon 2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`145316, at *12. The Special Master stated “only at trial will the theoretical construction
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`suggested by Dr. Michalson (based on Visteon's infringement contentions) become real or
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`vanish. At trial Visteon will have to take a stand, but it has not done so in the motion in limine,
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`and thus its effort to block Garmin's §112 defense is still premature.” Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc.
`
`v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., C.A. No. 2:10-cv-10578-PDB-DRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145816, at *27
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`(E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2016) (“Visteon 2 Special Master Report”). The Special Master also
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`noted:
`
`To be sure, were Visteon to present an understanding of the '060 Patent claims that
`actually align with the patent disclosure, Garmin would have no need for its § 112
`defenses. But if Visteon proceeds at trial with its overbroad interpretation that far
`exceeds any reasonable "plain and ordinary" meaning of the claim language,
`Garmin must be able to present its § 112 defenses—the critical fetters that keep
`patent owner's honest to the invention they actually disclosed.
`
`Id. at *24-25. Like Rapid7’s experts’ written description analysis, Garmin’s expert’s “opinions
`
`flow from what he perceives to be Visteon’s interpretation of the claims.” Id. at *29. In view of
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`the above case law and despite Finjan’s contrary allegations, there is legal support for Rapid7’s
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`experts’ analysis, which is based on reliable principles and methods and is proper under Daubert
`
`and Rule 702. D.I. 204, Finjan Br. at 9.
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`Additionally, to the extent Finjan is arguing that Rapid7’s experts have misinterpreted
`
`Finjan’s infringement allegations and purported claim scope, it is certainly free to cross examine
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`Rapid7’s experts about such alleged errors at trial. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
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`509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
`
`careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
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`shaky but admissible evidence.”); Simon v. Weissmann, 301 F. App’x 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2008)
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 7728
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`(“‘[a] party confronted with an adverse expert witness who has sufficient, though perhaps not
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`overwhelming, facts and assumptions as the basis for his opinion can highlight those weaknesses
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`through effective cross-examination.’” (quoting Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d
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`408, 414 (3d Cir. 2002))).
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`D.
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`Defendants’ Experts’ Opinions are Admissible Under Rule 403
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`Finjan also argues that “[e]ven if [] Rapid7 experts’ methodology . . . were permissible
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`under Daubert,” Rapid7’s legally proper methodology “would still be inadmissible due to the
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`plain lack of probative value and clear risk of jury confusion.” D.I. 204, Finjan Br. at 12.
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`Whether patent claims meet the written description requirement is undoubtedly a question of fact
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`that a jury can determine. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355. This determination “require[s] an inquiry
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`into the scope of the invention.” Verinata Health, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57519, at *7. Thus, a
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`jury’s inquiry into the scope of a claim and review of a legally-recognized and proper analysis to
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`determine written description compliance cannot possibly be “non-probative under Rule 403”
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`and could not cause a “clear risk of jury confusion.” D.I. 204, Finjan Br. at 12-13. In any event,
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`as discussed above, Rapid7 is not asserting alternative claim constructions and is not
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`“attempt[ing] to make claim construction a jury issue.” Id. at 13.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Finjan’s Motion incorrectly describes Rapid7’s experts’
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`methodology, which is legally proper. Therefore, Rapid7 respectfully requests that the Court
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`deny Finjan’s Motion.
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`[Signature Block on Following Page.]
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`Case 1:18-cv-01519-MN Document 220 Filed 11/06/20 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 7729
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`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`
`
`
`/s/ Richard L. Renck -
`Richard L. Renck (I.D. No. 3893)
`222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1600
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel.: (302) 657-4900
`Fax: (302) 657-4901
`rlrenck@duanemorris.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`Rapid7, Inc. and Rapid7 LLC
`
`
`Dated: November 6, 2020
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`L. Norwood Jameson
`Matthew C. Gaudet
`David C. Dotson
`John R. Gibson
`Robin McGrath
`Jennifer H. Forte
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`1075 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2000
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`Tel.: (404) 253-6900
`Fax: (404) 253-6901
`wjameson@duanemorris.com
`mcgaudet@duanemorris.com
`dcdotson@duanemorris.com
`jrgibson@duanemorris.com
`rlmcgrath@duanemorris.com
`jhforte@duanemorris.com
`Jarrad M. Gunther
`Joseph A. Powers
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`30 South 17th St.
`Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196
`Tel.: (215) 979-1837
`Fax: (215) 689-4921
`jmgunther@duanemorris.com
`japowers@duanemorris.com
`
`Jordana Garellek
`DUANE MORRIS LLP
`1540 Broadway
`New York, NY 10036-4086
`Tel.: (212) 471-1829
`Fax: (212) 214-0889
`jgarellek@duanemorris.com
`*admitted pro hac vice
`
`
`
`
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