Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 1200
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
`MEDICAL SCHOOL and CARMEL
`LABORATORIES, LLC,
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 17-868-JFB-SRF
`
` Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`L’ORÉAL S.A. and L’ORÉAL USA, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants
`
`REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT L’ORÉAL S.A. IN SUPPORT OF
`MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
`
`Frederick L. Cottrell, III (#2555)
`Jeffrey L. Moyer (#3309)
`Katharine L. Mowery (#5629)
`Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.
`One Rodney Square
`920 N. King Street
`Wilmington, Delaware 19801
`(302) 651-7700
`cottrell@rlf.com
`moyer@rlf.com
`mowery@rlf.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
`L’Oréal S.A. and L’Oréal USA, Inc.
`
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`Dennis S. Ellis
`Katherine F. Murray
`Adam M. Reich
`Paul Hastings LLP
`515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA, 90071
`(213) 683-6000
`
`Naveen Modi
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C., 20005
`(202) 551-1990
`
`Blaine M. Hackman
`Paul Hastings LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`212-318-6000
`
`
`Dated: January 5, 2018
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: 1201
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`Table of Authorities ....................................................................................................................... ii
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
`
`The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction over L’Oréal S.A. ................................................ 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Agency Speculation Does Not Support Personal Jurisdiction .............. 2
`
`L’Oréal S.A. Is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(1) ............. 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute Does Not Reach L’Oréal S.A. .................. 4
`
`Due Process Does Not Support Jurisdiction Over L’Oréal S.A. ............... 5
`
`L’Oréal S.A. Is Also Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction Under
`Rule 4(k)(2) ............................................................................................................ 6
`
`D.
`
`The Court Should Deny Plaintiffs’ Request for Jurisdictional Discovery ............. 8
`
`The Court Should Dismiss the FAC Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ........................................ 9
`
`Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 10
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 3 of 16 PageID #: 1202
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd.,
`772 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1991) ......................................................................................2, 3, 4
`
`Asanov v. Gholson, Hicks & Nichols, P.A.,
`209 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................................7
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Bare Escentuals Beauty, Inc. v. L’Oréal USA, Inc.,
`No. C-07-1669 MMC (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2008) ........................................................................7
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................1
`
`Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale,
`542 F.3d 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................................7
`
`Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co.,
`792 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................2
`
`Chayegan v. L’Oréal S.A.,
`No. 02-21485-CIV (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2003) ............................................................................8
`
`Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow,
`890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989).......................................................................................................3
`
`Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) .............................................................................................................2, 4
`
`DermaFocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc.,
`201 F. Supp. 3d 465 (D. Del. 2016) ...........................................................................................9
`
`Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA,
`623 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2010).......................................................................................................1
`
`Fugate v. Boeing Co.,
`No. 13-152-SLR, 2013 WL 3155394 (D. Del. June 20, 2013) ..................................................8
`
`Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH,
`163 F.R.D. 471 (D. Del. 1995) ..................................................................................................8
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 4 of 16 PageID #: 1203
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
`326 U.S. 310 (1945) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
`564 U.S. 873 (2011) ...................................................................................................................7
`
`Jurimex Kommerz Transit G.M.B.H. v. Case Corp.,
`65 F. App’x 803 (3d Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................3
`
`Ketterson v. Wolf,
`No. 99-689-JJF, 2001 WL 940909 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2001) .....................................................8
`
`Kuhn Constr. Co. v. Ocean & Coastal Consultants, Inc.,
`844 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D. Del. 2012) ...........................................................................................3
`
`Liberty Media Holding, LLC v. Tabora,
`No. 11-cv-651-IEG (JMA), 2012 WL 28788 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) ......................................8
`
`Mayne Pharma Int’l PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co.,
`No. 15-438-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 7833206 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015) ............................................9
`
`Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. SA,
`263 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017) ................................................................................. passim
`
`O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd.,
`496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007).......................................................................................................6
`
`R. Bard Inc. v. Guidant Corp.,
`997 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1998) ................................................................................................2
`
`ReefEdge Networks, LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`29 F. Supp. 3d 455 (D. Del. 2014) ...........................................................................................10
`
`Round Rock Research LLC v. ASUSTeK Computer Inc.,
`967 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D. Del. 2013) ...........................................................................................3
`
`Rovi Corp. v. Haier Grp. Corp.,
`No. 11-1140 (KAJ), 2013 WL 4534641 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2013) .............................................4
`
`Rush v. Savchuk,
`444 U.S. 320 (1980) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico,
`
`563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................7
`
`iii
`
`

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`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 5 of 16 PageID #: 1204
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr,
`574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..............................................................................................5, 7
`
`Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,
`318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003).......................................................................................................8
`
`Zazu Designs v. L’Oréal S.A.,
`No. 86 C 7536, 1988 WL 1091941 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1988) ...................................................7
`
`Statutes
`
`10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1)-(4) ..............................................................................................................4
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P.
`R. 4(k)(1)............................................................................................................................2, 4, 6
`R. 4(k)(2)............................................................................................................................2, 6, 7
`R. 12(b)(2)..................................................................................................................................3
`R. 12(b)(6)..........................................................................................................................1, 3, 9
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 6 of 16 PageID #: 1205
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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiffs University of Massachusetts Medical School and Carmel Laboratories, LLC
`
`(collectively “Plaintiffs”) offer no evidence that negates the sworn testimony by L’Oréal USA,
`
`Inc. (“L’Oréal USA”), demonstrating that L’Oréal USA is and operates as a distinct entity from
`
`L’Oréal S.A.—a French entity that operates in France. (See D.I. 25.) Instead, Plaintiffs ignore
`
`this testimony, speculate that L’Oréal USA is an agent for L’Oréal S.A., and offer a mishmash of
`
`theories to support personal jurisdiction. But “[m]ere ownership of a subsidiary does not justify
`
`the imposition of liability on the parent” under a stream of commerce theory, agency theory, or
`
`any other theory posited by Plaintiffs. See Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. SA, 263 F.
`
`Supp. 3d 498, at 504 (D. Del. 2017) (quoting Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471,
`
`484 (3d Cir. 2001)). The FAC with respect to L’Oréal S.A. should be dismissed as a result.
`
`The Court should also dismiss the FAC because it does not state a patent infringement
`
`claim against L’Oréal S.A. The FAC does not “raise a right to relief above the speculative
`
`level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and the four paragraphs Plaintiffs
`
`devote in their Opposition to address their pleading deficiencies confirm this. Plaintiffs have not
`
`identified a single product made, used, or sold into the U.S. by L’Oréal S.A. that infringes their
`
`patent claims.1 The FAC does not even allege that L’Oréal S.A. knew about infringing uses of
`
`the “Accused Adenosine Products.” Rule 12(b)(6) thus provides a second basis for dismissal.
`
`II.
`
`THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER L’ORÉAL S.A.
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs have not established that L’Oréal S.A. is properly subject to this Court’s
`
`
`1 Plaintiffs also should not be allowed to “undertake a fishing expedition based only upon bare
`allegations, under the guise of jurisdictional discovery.” Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v.
`BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2010). In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that
`L’Oréal USA, not L’Oréal S.A., infringe their patent. Plaintiffs offer no facts from which they
`can impute L’Oréal USA’s alleged acts to L’Oréal S.A., and they have done nothing to
`controvert the sworn facts establishing otherwise. (See D.I. 25.)
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 7 of 16 PageID #: 1206
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`
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`jurisdiction. See Nespresso, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 502 (plaintiffs have prima facie burden to
`
`establish personal jurisdiction). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Court lacks general jurisdiction
`
`over L’Oréal S.A.,2 and only contest that the Court has specific jurisdiction under Rules 4(k)(1)
`
`and 4(k)(2) based on an implausible agency theory. (See D.I. 27 at 2; D.I. 25.)
`
`A.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Agency Speculation Does Not Support Personal Jurisdiction
`
`The linchpin of Plaintiffs’ personal jurisdiction argument, i.e., that L’Oréal USA is an
`
`agent for L’Oréal S.A., does not hold. “In order to establish jurisdiction under the agency
`
`theory, the plaintiff must show that the defendant exercises control over the activities of the
`
`third-party.” Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`Relevant factors “include the extent of overlap of officers and directors, methods of financing,
`
`the division of responsibility for day-to-day management, and the process by which each
`
`corporation obtains its business.” Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F. Supp.
`
`1458, 1463 (D. Del. 1991). “The court must avoid ‘the notion that a parent company can be held
`
`liable for the obligations of a subsidiary [under the agency theory] purely on the basis of
`
`domination and control.’” R. Bard Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 997 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Del. 1998).
`
`L’Oréal USA operates as a separate and independent legal entity from L’Oréal S.A., and
`
`does not act as L’Oréal S.A.’s agent in any capacity. (See D.I. 25, ¶¶ 2-4.) Relatedly, L’Oréal
`
`S.A. does not control L’Oréal USA in any respect. Plaintiffs do not controvert these facts, but
`
`they contend that they do not have to establish a basis for their agency theory at this time, even in
`
`the face of contrary evidence. (See D.I. 27 at 3-4; D.I. 25.) Under Plaintiffs’ view, which none
`
`
`2 Indeed, Plaintiffs cannot establish that general jurisdiction would be appropriate, as L’Oréal
`S.A. is a French entity with its principal place of business in France (see D.I. 13, ¶ 5), and does
`not have the requisite “continuous and substantial contacts” with Delaware that would render it
`“at home” in Delaware. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 769 (2014).
`
`2
`
`

`

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`
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`of the cases they cite supports,3 merely labeling a parent company a “principal” is sufficient to
`
`survive a Rule 12(b)(2) challenge. Plaintiffs are mistaken. They cannot meet their burden by
`
`simply asserting that one company operates as the agent of another. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
`
`U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
`
`‘further factual enhancement.’”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
`
`Plaintiffs’ alternative argument, that buried in hundreds of pages of unauthenticated
`
`Internet documents is something to support an agency theory, also fails. At most, the documents
`
`show L’Oréal USA and L’Oréal S.A. are part of the L’Oréal Group. But, again, a mere
`
`corporate relationship does not establish an agency relationship for the purpose of establishing
`
`personal jurisdiction. See supra 3-4; see also Round Rock Research LLC v. ASUSTeK Computer
`
`Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 969, 978 (D. Del. 2013) (“While Plaintiff has shown . . . facts that reflect
`
`the parent-subsidiary relationship, these facts do not make [the subsidiary] the ‘agent’ of [the
`
`parent] for purposes of jurisdictional analysis.”). Further, none of these documents refutes the
`
`testimony that L’Oréal USA does not serve as L’Oréal S.A.’s agent. (See D.I. 25.)
`
`Moreover, even if Plaintiffs could establish an agency relationship, they cannot establish
`
`personal jurisdiction, because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not tie L’Oréal S.A. to the alleged
`
`infringement. See Applied Biosystems, 772 F. Supp. at 1464 (“[W]e reject the argument that an
`
`agency relationship with a Delaware corporation is alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction, so that
`
`
`3See Kuhn Constr. Co. v. Ocean & Coastal Consultants, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526, 531 (D.
`Del. 2012) (declining to consider the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) argument against intentional
`interference tort claim because there were insufficient facts to determine if the defendant was an
`agent that interfered with contracts of its principal); Jurimex Kommerz Transit G.M.B.H. v. Case
`Corp., 65 F. App’x 803, 804, 808 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing agency allegations to move past the
`pleading stage despite a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge because the plaintiff specifically alleged that it
`had past dealings with the parent and produced affidavits evincing the parent’s financial control
`of the transaction at issue); Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989)
`(recognizing need to be especially sensitive to concealed information in securities fraud cases).
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 9 of 16 PageID #: 1208
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`
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`it is unnecessary to meet the terms of the long-arm statute.”). “[U]nder the formulation approved
`
`by the Delaware Supreme Court . . . finding an agency relationship simply permits a court to
`
`attribute specific acts by the agent to the principal; the agent and principal are still separate
`
`corporations. . . . No statute exists, however, which permits Delaware courts to exercise personal
`
`jurisdiction over a nonresident principal based on the mere existence of a limited agency
`
`relationship with a Delaware corporate as agent.” Id. at 1464-65. Critically here, Plaintiffs have
`
`not plausibly alleged a single fact to indicate that L’Oréal S.A. makes, uses, or sells the Accused
`
`Adenosine Products in the U.S. See id. at 1466.
`
`B.
`
`L’Oréal S.A. Is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(1)
`
`
`
`This Court also cannot exercise specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1), because (1)
`
`Delaware’s long-arm statute does not reach L’Oréal S.A., and (2) exercising jurisdiction over
`
`L’Oréal S.A. would not comport with due process. See Rovi Corp. v. Haier Grp. Corp., No. 11-
`
`1140 (KAJ), 2013 WL 4534641, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2013).4
`
`1.
`
`Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute Does Not Reach L’Oréal S.A.
`
`
`
`As a French corporation that does not regularly do business in Delaware (D.I. 25),
`
`L’Oréal S.A. is not within the ambit of Delaware’s long-arm statute. See 10 Del. C. §
`
`3104(c)(1)-(4). Plaintiffs have neither established that L’Oréal USA is L’Oréal S.A.’s agent nor
`
`that L’Oréal USA committed infringing acts under the control of L’Oréal S.A. See supra II.A.
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs’ alternative stream of commerce theory (see D.I. 27 at 15) is also not supported.
`
`In the recent Nespresso holding by this District, the plaintiff argued, just like Plaintiffs do here,
`
`that personal jurisdiction existed because the defendants helped develop, manufacture, import,
`
`distribute, market, and sell the accused products into the U.S., intended to serve the U.S., and
`
`
`4 When evaluating jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1), courts must consider the law of the forum
`state. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753.
`
`4
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`

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`
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`made money from U.S. sales. See Nespresso, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 504. As in Nespresso, this
`
`Court should reject Plaintiffs’ stream of commerce argument because the record does not show
`
`that L’Oréal S.A. (the foreign entity): (1) introduced the product into the U.S. or Delaware
`
`stream of commerce; (2) had any role in the design, manufacture, distribution, marketing, or sale
`
`of the product; (3) engaged in manufacturing or sales relating to the product in the U.S. or
`
`Delaware; and (4) influenced L’Oréal USA’s (the subsidiary) pricing, product design,
`
`manufacturing, or sales decisions in the U.S. or Delaware. See id. Plaintiffs’ allegations and the
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`uncontroverted evidence show that the accused products are made and sold by L’Oréal USA in
`
`the U.S., and L’Oréal S.A. plays no role in this stream of commerce. (FAC, ¶ 33; D.I. 25.)
`
`2.
`
`Due Process Does Not Support Jurisdiction Over L’Oréal S.A.
`
`
`
`Exercising personal jurisdiction over L’Oréal S.A. also would not comport with due
`
`process. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Plaintiffs cannot establish
`
`that L’Oréal S.A. “purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum” and that their
`
`“claim[s] arise[] out of or relate[] to [L’Oréal S.A.’s] activities with the forum[,]” and “assertion
`
`of jurisdiction [would not be] reasonable and fair.” See Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574
`
`F.3d 1403, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`
`
`First, Plaintiffs have not shown that L’Oréal S.A. purposefully directed activities at
`
`Delaware. The FAC contains no allegations tying L’Oréal S.A. to Delaware. Plaintiffs’ singular
`
`allegation of conduct in or directed toward Delaware only concerns acts of L’Oréal USA. (See
`
`D.I. 13, ¶ 33.) It would be “plainly unconstitutional” and inconsistent with International Shoe to
`
`reflexively attribute the alleged in-state contacts of L’Oréal USA to L’Oréal S.A. simply because
`
`they are part of the same “L’Oréal Group.” See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1980).
`
`
`
`Second, because the FAC contains no allegations about Delaware-related activities by
`
`L’Oréal S.A., Plaintiffs cannot show patent infringement arising out of, or related to, any
`
`5
`
`

`

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`
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`L’Oréal S.A. Delaware-related activities.
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`
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`Finally, as Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that L’Oréal S.A. infringed the
`
`patent-in-suit, it would be unreasonable and unfair for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over
`
`L’Oréal S.A. (See D.I. 13, ¶ 33.) And as a foreign entity with operations in France, L’Oréal
`
`S.A. has “unique burdens,” such as extensive travel and legal prohibitions for French entities in
`
`foreign litigation, that weigh against the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction. See O’Connor
`
`v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs’ identification of
`
`two instances over the last nineteen (19) years where L’Oréal S.A. filed suit in this District to
`
`enforce patent rights unrelated to this case (see D.I. 28 Exs. 17, 19) does not change the analysis.
`
`Those limited contacts with this District would not make it reasonable or fair for the Court to
`
`exercise personal jurisdiction over L’Oréal S.A. when Plaintiffs have not connected L’Oréal S.A.
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`to their infringement claims. See Nespresso, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 504 (finding personal
`
`jurisdiction inappropriate despite foreign entity owning patents covering the accused products).
`
`C.
`
`L’Oréal S.A. Is Also Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(2)
`
`
`
`This Court also cannot exercise specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). As L’Oréal S.A.
`
`is a French entity, the Rule 4(k)(2) analysis turns on whether jurisdiction would comport with
`
`due process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). As discussed above, it would not. See Nespresso, 263
`
`F. Supp. 3d at 505-06 (minimum contacts standard governs Rule 4(k)(2) due process analysis).
`
`
`
`As they do for their Rule 4(k)(1) argument, Plaintiffs rely on the same flawed agency
`
`theory to support due process under Rule 4(k)(2). (See D.I. 27 at 9-11.) While Plaintiffs have
`
`established a parent-subsidiary relationship, they have not established an agency relationship.
`
`(See D.I. 25.) Plaintiffs also contend that Rule 4(k)(2) applies because L’Oréal S.A. owns U.S.
`
`patents and has filed lawsuits to protect its ownership rights. But this District has noted that
`
`“‘ownership of a United States patent, without more cannot support the assertion of personal
`
`6
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`

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`Case 1:17-cv-00868-JFB-SRF Document 29 Filed 01/05/18 Page 12 of 16 PageID #: 1211
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`
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`jurisdiction over a foreign patentee in any state.’” Nespresso, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 504.5
`
`
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`It also would not comport with due process for this Court to assert personal jurisdiction
`
`under Rule 4(k)(2) based on an alleged three-day trip by members of the Board of the L’Oréal
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`Group to New York in June 2016 (see D.I. 27 at 5, n.3, 10), as it does not establish that L’Oréal
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`S.A. purposefully availed itself of the laws and protections of the U.S.6
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments for Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction are also unavailing. First,
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`L’Oréal S.A. is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction because it responded to Plaintiffs’
`
`correspondence. See Asanov v. Gholson, Hicks & Nichols, P.A., 209 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir.
`
`2006) (“‘normal incidents’ of legal representation, such as making phone calls and sending
`
`letters, do not, by themselves, establish purposeful availment to support the assertion of personal
`
`jurisdiction”); Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[S]ending letters
`
`to another state . . . is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in that state.”). Second, the
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`three orders denying L’Oréal S.A. motions to dismiss in unrelated non-patent infringement cases
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`in other districts identified by Plaintiffs do not support personal jurisdiction.7 Cf. J. McIntyre
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`5 To counter, Plaintiffs misstate Touchcom. (See D.I. 27 at 10.) Touchcom is inapposite; there,
`the court found personal jurisdiction appropriate under Rule 4(k)(2) for a legal malpractice claim
`arising directly from a lawyer’s filing a deficient patent application. See Touchcom, 574 F.3d at
`1409, 1416. Moreover, Touchcom does not stand for the overbroad proposition, advanced by
`Plaintiffs, that filing unrelated patent lawsuits years prior renders a foreign entity, like L’Oréal
`S.A., subject to personal jurisdiction as a defendant in an unrelated patent infringement lawsuit.
`6 Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir.
`2009), which Plaintiffs cite as the basis for contending that a singular trip to the U.S. by foreign
`entity representatives confers Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction, is completely inapposite. In Synthes, the
`foreign entity’s representatives were shown to have continuously traveled to the U.S. for at least
`the preceding five years specifically to market and sell the allegedly infringing products. See id.
`at 1299. That is vastly different from one possible trip to another state in a previous year, which
`has no connection to this case.
`7 None of the orders cited by Plaintiffs is apposite. In Zazu Designs v. L’Oréal S.A., No. 86 C
`7536, 1988 WL 1091941 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1988), the court found jurisdiction in a trademark
`infringement case arising from a trademark which L’Oréal S.A. had spent millions to market in
`Illinois. See id. at *2, 7. Bare Escentuals Beauty, Inc. v. L’Oréal USA, Inc., No. C-07-1669
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`7
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`Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-
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`forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”); see also Liberty Media Holding, LLC v. Tabora,
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`No. 11-cv-651-IEG (JMA), 2012 WL 28788, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (personal
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`jurisdiction determinations based on other states’ long-arm statutes are “not relevant”).
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`D.
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`The Court Should Deny Plaintiffs’ Request for Jurisdictional Discovery
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`The Court should also deny Plaintiffs’ late request for jurisdictional discovery. “[A]
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`court cannot permit discovery as a matter of course simply because a plaintiff has named a
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`particular party as a defendant. The court must be satisfied that there is some indication that this
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`particular defendant is amenable to suit in this forum.” Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163
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`F.R.D. 471, 475 (D. Del. 1995). Plaintiffs must “present[] factual allegations that suggest ‘with
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`reasonable particularity’ the possible existence of the requisite ‘contacts between [L’Oréal S.A.]
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`and the forum state.’” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003).
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`Plaintiffs have not met their burden for discovery, as “[e]ven taking a broad view of all of
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`Plaintiffs’ allegations, Plaintiffs fail to assert, with reasonable particularity, facts showing that
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`[L’Oréal S.A.] might be subject to personal jurisdiction . . . .” See Fugate v. Boeing Co., No. 13-
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`152-SLR, 2013 WL 3155394, at *6 (D. Del. June 20, 2013); supra II. Plaintiffs only allege
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`conduct in the U.S. by L’Oréal USA. (See D.I. 13, ¶ 33.) Because “Plaintiffs’ Amended
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`Complaint is facially deficient” in terms of its claims against L’Oréal S.A. and uncorrectable
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`given the evidence offered by L’Oréal USA (see D.I. 25), jurisdictional discovery would be
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`inappropriate. See Ketterson v. Wolf, No. 99-689-JJF, 2001 WL 940909, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 14,
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`2001) (denying jurisdictional discovery where plaintiffs did not affirmatively plead requisite
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`MMC (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2008) likewise involved trademark claims. In Chayegan v. L’Oréal
`S.A., No. 02-21485-CIV (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2003), the court declined to dismiss an employment
`suit for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiff was a Florida employee of a U.S. corporation not
`shown to be amenable to process in France, and the employment contract was entered into in
`Florida. (See D.I. 28-26 at pp. 4, 15-18.)
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`8
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`

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`facts to establish a basis for the court’s jurisdiction).
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`III. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE FAC PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)
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`Plaintiffs premise their opposition to L’Oréal S.A.’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion on their beliefs
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`that the FAC adequately pleads agency and that L’Oréal S.A. proposes an improperly elevated
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`pleading standard. (D.I. 27 at 17-20.) Plaintiffs, however, misapply the law.
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`Agency. Agency allegations are not exempt from the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards.
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`Plaintiffs incorrectly suggest that the FAC cannot be dismissed for failing to adequately plead
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`agency (D.I. 27 at 17), but the facts and issues in the cases that Plaintiff cites are inapposite to
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`those here.8 Indeed, while Plaintiffs acknowledge that the FAC must “identify which particular
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`defendant or defendants are responsible for which allegedly infringing products, process or
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`method,” they can only cite paragraphs in the FAC that either indiscriminately lump Defendants’
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`activities together (D.I. 13 ¶¶ 7, 32), or solely allege L’Oréal USA’s infringing acts. (D.I. 13 ¶
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`33.) Plaintiffs’ basis for suing L’Oréal S.A. is an unfounded claim that “Defendants both create
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`and design the Accused Adenosine Products.” (D.I. 13 ¶ 32; D.I. 27 at 18.) In contrast, the
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`complaint in Mayne Pharma International PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co. alleged specific infringing
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`acts by each defendant. No. 15-438-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 7833206, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015).
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`Direct Infringement. The Iqbal/Twombly standard requires some explanation of
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`infringement beyond parroting claim language (see D.I. 22 at 2-3). The decision in DermaFocus
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`LLC v. Ulthera, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 465, 470 (D. Del. 2016) arose when information needed to
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`prove infringement was not readily available in the public domain. Plaintiffs acknowledge the
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`public availability of Accused Adenosine Products (D.I. 13, ¶¶ 25, 31, 34; D.I. 13-5 at 3), but
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`they never indicate that they conducted testing. (D.I. 22 at 6-7.) Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to
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`rebut L’Oréal S.A’s arguments regarding the “without dermal cell proliferation” feature claimed
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`8 See supra n.3.
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`9
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`in the ’327 and ’513 patents. (D.I. 24 at 15.) Moreover, the FAC never suggests a difference
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`between the adenosine concentration that is “applied to the dermal cells” and the concentration in
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`a product itself (D.I. 24 at 4-5; D.I. 15 at 5, 10), which alone supports dismissing the FAC. (D.I.
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`22 at 3-5.) The FAC also never alleges how an Accused Adenosine Product could be applied to
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`the skin so that the adenosine concentration reaching the dermal cells would plausibly fall within
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`the claimed range. (D.I. 22 at 5.)
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`Induced Infringement.9 Although the Accused Adenosine Products include marketing
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`materials and instructions (D.I. 27 at 19-20), Plaintiffs never connect these